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# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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### PART 13

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APRIL 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, MAY 15, 16, AND 29, 1952

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



Executive Business Branch  
DEC 24 1952







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UNITED STATES

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WASHINGTON : 1952



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# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4 p. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. James O. Eastland, presiding.

President: Senators Eastland, O'Connor, and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you give the reporter your name, please?

Mr. MOY. Eugene Moy, M-o-y.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you stand? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MOY. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, we have had testimony before this committee concerning the New China Daily News. We have introduced into the record a letter from Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. Joseph Barnes, in which he makes recommendations of personnel for the Office of War Information, with which both Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes were employed at the time; and Mr. Lattimore's recommendation in connection with the New China Daily News says here:

One of the outstanding rallying points of the unaffiliated Chinese in America is the New China Daily News in New York.

Then he goes on to give some comment on the nature of the New China Daily News.

Now, today we subpoenaed two of the editors of the New China Daily News. At least, they have been editors of the New China Daily News. Mr. Chew Hong was mentioned in this letter at the bottom of page 2:

Mr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong, both of our New York office, conform excellently to these requirements.

Mr. Chew Hong, we are informed by the marshal's office, is now in Red China, and therefore is not here today. We have here, however, Mr. Eugene Moy, and we would like to determine whether he is one of the editors of the New China Daily News.

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Moy, are you an editor of the New China Daily News?



**TESTIMONY OF EUGENE MOY, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL,  
BENEDICT WOLF**

Mr. MOY. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean you won't even tell this committee whether or not you are now one of the editors of the New China Daily News?

Mr. MOY. I have stated as I did this morning when you asked me questions.

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session?

Mr. MOY. That the Federal grand jury is conducting an investigation of the New China Daily News.

Senator EASTLAND. Are you a citizen of the United States?

Mr. MOY. Should I finish?

Senator EASTLAND. No, I asked you a question, and I want you to answer it.

Mr. MOY. Yes, I am.

Senator EASTLAND. How did you become a citizen?

Mr. MOY. Because my father was born here.

Senator EASTLAND. Where were you born?

Mr. MOY. I was born in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You were saying you refused to answer on the grounds that the Federal grand jury in New York is conducting an investigation of the New China Daily News.

Mr. MOY. Of the New China Daily News. And I have been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury several times, to be exact, four times, in connection with that investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. So therefore you will not even tell us whether you are an editor of that paper. Your name appears upon the masthead, does it not?

Mr. MOY. That would tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, tell me this, sir. Does your name appear on the masthead of the New China Daily News?

Mr. MOY. I decline to answer on the ground that it would tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a question right there?

Is it not required that there be published reports as to who are the editors or publishers of newspapers in New York State?

Mr. MOY. Yes, it is.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, have such reports been made, and are they being made currently?

Mr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you have those reports? Are they available?

Mr. MOY. You mean in the newspaper?

Senator O'CONOR. Either in the newspaper or copies of reports that you make to the State authorities in accordance with law.

Mr. MOY. I decline to answer that, because it would tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, now, I am not asking you as to what you did. I am asking you whether this particular publication has made reports; which may not include you; may or may not include you. But I am asking you whether such reports have been made.

Mr. MOY. I noticed that papers do make reports.



Senator O'CONOR. Papers do make reports. Well, do you know whether this particular publication has made a report, in accordance with the law of the State?

Mr. MOY. In accordance with the law of the State, all papers do.

Senator O'CONOR. All papers do. And this paper did?

Mr. MOY. I think it does.

Senator O'CONOR. You think it did. When, to your knowledge, did the paper make the last report as to its ownership and publishers?

Mr. MOY. Oh, the paper usually does it on October 1.

Senator O'CONOR. And to your knowledge did this paper do it on last October 1?

Mr. MOY. All papers do.

Senator O'CONOR. All papers do. Well, that is a matter of public record, is it not?

Mr. MOY. I think it is.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, if it is a matter of public record, why can you not answer the question?

Mr. MOY. I have stated the facts, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last communicate with anyone on the continent of Asia?

Mr. MOY. I decline to answer because of possible self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, that question has nothing to do with the New China Daily News. Will you answer the question now?

Mr. MOY. My answer stands.

Mr. MORRIS. It is still the same?

Mr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Even though the question was the first of a series of questions that had no relation whatsoever to the New China Daily News?

Mr. MOY. My answer stands.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when did you last communicate with Mr. Chew Hong?

Mr. MOY. I decline to answer on the same ground.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the ground?

Mr. MOY. Of possible self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think we can get any information from this witness. I would like the record to show we made an effort to find out the nature of the New China Daily News.

Senator EASTLAND. And that is even though he claims to be an American citizen. He insists, by his silence, in aiding and abetting a country that is now murdering American boys. I think if he is an American citizen, he is a disgrace to the United States, and the quicker we get rid of such cattle the better off this country will be.

You may stand aside.

EUGENE MOY

410 OCEAN AVENUE

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, April 9, 1952.

INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE,  
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

(Att.: Robert Morris, Counsel.)

GENTLEMEN: With reference to the hearing in executive session at which I appeared in Senator Ferguson's office on April 3rd, 1952, you asked me whether I had ever endorsed a check whose face bore the signature of Frederick V. Field.

I had no recollection of such endorsement at the time and I therefore answered "no". Since then my recollection has been refreshed, and I now wish to inform you that in December 1948, I endorsed a check which had been signed by Frederick V. Field, made out to cash, for \$450.00. I therefore want to correct the record, and ask you to make this part of the record of the hearing in executive session.

Very truly yours,

EUGENE MOY.

Call your next witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you get the next witnesses?

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). Will you kindly stand?

In the presence of Almighty God, do you swear that the testimony you give the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JONES. I do.

Mrs. JONES. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, what is your present occupation?

**TESTIMONY OF MR. AND MRS. CATESBY T. JONES, BALTIMORE, MD.,  
ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR COUNSEL, JOSEPH FANELLI**

Mr. JONES. I am a graduate student of the Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. MORRIS. And what is your residence?

Mr. JONES. My residence is 5413 Falls Road Terrace, Baltimore 10, Md.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, have you ever held a fellowship at the Walter Hines Page School?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you hold that fellowship?

Mr. JONES. From October 1949 to June 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Who obtained that fellowship for you?

Mr. JONES. Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he do that?

Mr. JONES. I have no idea.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, did you ask him to?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. He voluntarily obtained the fellowship for you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, testimony has come up in our public record to the effect that you and Mr. Owen Lattimore, Mrs. Lattimore, and Edward C. Carter met in a restaurant, the Aldo Cafe, here in Washington, after a public session of this committee. Did you, in fact, have a meeting in the Aldo Cafe with the persons that I just mentioned?

Mr. JONES. We had dinner in the Aldo Cafe.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date?

Mr. JONES. To the best of my recollection, the date was August 22, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. August—what was the date?

Mr. JONES. The 22d.

Mr. MORRIS. And who was the witness before the committee on that day?

Mr. JONES. Mr. Louis Budenz.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you attend the meeting that day?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I did.



Mr. MORRIS. Of this committee? You sat in this room while Mr. Budenz testified, did you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did Owen Lattimore ask you to attend the hearing that day?

Mr. JONES. No, sir, he did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you voluntarily attend the hearing?

Mr. JONES. I attended the hearing at the request of Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Of Mrs. Lattimore. And what did you do after you attended the hearing?

Mr. JONES. I went to the law offices of Arnold, Fortas & Porter.

Mr. MORRIS. And what did you do there?

Mr. JONES. I presented the notes that I had taken to Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you meet Mr. Carter in Mr. Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing there?

Mr. JONES. I don't know, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But you did meet him?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I met him.

Mr. MORRIS. So, in Mr. Fortas' office that evening there were yourself, Mr. Owen Lattimore, Mrs. Lattimore, and Mr. Fortas?

Mr. JONES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Fortas present?

Mr. JONES. Oh, oh; excuse me, sir. Mr. Fortas was not present.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any member of the firm present?

Mr. JONES. No senior member of the firm was present.

Senator EASTLAND. No senior member? What does he mean?

Mr. JONES. Well, there were employees. That is the only thing I was trying to cover, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else was present?

Mr. JONES. Oh, typists.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what did you do at the request of Mrs. Lattimore that afternoon? Will you tell the committee in great detail precisely what you did?

Mr. JONES. That afternoon, I came to this committee room and took notes on the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Mrs. Lattimore here in the room?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; she was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether she attended any of the preceding hearings?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I don't know that for a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Carter in the room?

Mr. JONES. I believe he was; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Carter, did you not?

Mr. JONES. No, at that time I didn't know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that.

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I was not a member of the Communist Party at that time.

Senator O'CONOR. Had you been before that?

Mr. JONES. And I will add that for the past 10 years I have not been a member of the Communist Party, nor connected in any way with communism, Communists, or Communist activities.

Senator O'CONOR. Had you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FANELLI. You may claim privilege.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments and any other constitutional rights that may be available to me.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, previously you said that you had received a fellowship to the Johns Hopkins University through the efforts of Owen Lattimore. That is correct?

Mr. JONES. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. How long have you known him?

Mr. JONES. I met him in the spring of 1949.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you discuss with him any of your connections prior to 10 years ago?

Mr. JONES. No political connections, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, to what extent.

Mr. JONES. Employment and academic record. That was all that was discussed.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you mean to say that Owen Lattimore recommended you for a fellowship with no greater knowledge than that of your past background and affiliations?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the fact that you had been a Communist prior to 10 years did not make any difference?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I will respectfully have to decline to answer that question.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, let us put it this way. Did Owen Lattimore ever inquire as to what possible connections you had with the Communist Party?

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer.

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you ever volunteer or discuss with him anything as to any of your connections prior to 10 years ago?

Mr. FANELLI. You may claim privilege on that.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I decline to answer that. I respectfully decline to answer that on the same grounds.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, let us see. Will you repeat the question? I did not understand.

Senator O'CONOR. My question is whether or not, even though Owen Lattimore had not asked you as to your possible connections with the Communist Party, you had volunteered to him any information.

Senator EASTLAND. In other words, whether he gave Owen Lattimore information as to whether or not he was a Communist 10 years ago?

Senator O'CONOR. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. And he declines to answer on the grounds that it might incriminate him?

Senator O'CONOR. Is that right?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. And of course that means that he did, and then Lattimore recommended him.



Mr. FANELLI. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, wait. The witness refused to answer that question, as to whether or not he did tell him.

Mr. FANELLI. If you will ask him about the time of the fellowship, I will instruct him to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. I am asking him whether, at or before the time that Lattimore recommended him for the fellowship, he, the witness, had discussed with Lattimore his prior connections if any with the Communist Party.

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that question.

Mr. JONES. The answer to that, sir, is "No."

Senator O'CONOR. Did you ever volunteer any information to him as to your past possible connections with the Communist Party?

Mr. FANELLI. Senator, at any time?

Senator O'CONOR. At any time.

Mr. FANELLI. On that you will claim privilege.

Senator EASTLAND. We are right back where we were at first.

Mr. FANELLI. But the difference was between at or before, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. Therefore, I broke it down into two parts.

Mr. FANELLI. He will claim privilege on the second question.

Senator O'CONOR. So that you now decline to answer whether or not you discussed with Lattimore your possible connections with the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. When Owen Lattimore recommended you for the fellowship, did he have information that you at any time had been a Communist or connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. He had no such information?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To your knowledge?

Mr. JONES. To my knowledge.

Senator EASTLAND. And you had never given him such information?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, when you met with him subsequent to the hearing in this room, did Owen Lattimore have any information of your possible past connections with the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

(Short recess.)

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, this morning in executive session, were you asked the question: "Were you a member of the Communist Party at the time that you, at the request of Eleanor Lattimore, attended the hearings before this committee on August 22, 1951?" Were you asked that question this morning in executive session?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, I believe I was asked that.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your answer at that time?

Mr. JONES. My answer was "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait. Did you say that you refused to answer on the ground that it might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. I probably did, sir. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in good faith, this morning, when you answered that question, that on August 22, 1951, you were at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. This morning no date was mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. The date was when she talked to you about coming down here.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the date of the hearing that you attended. Were you in good faith when at that time you said you refused to answer on the grounds that an answer would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, I was in good faith.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when that same question was asked you today, this afternoon, why did you give a different answer?

Mr. JONES. I consulted with counsel today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know, Mr. Jones, that when you claimed your privilege under the fifth amendment by declining to answer on the grounds that it might incriminate you, you were saying to the committee that, in your opinion, if you answered that question it might incriminate you? That is, in your opinion if you answered it truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you meant this morning when you declined to answer that question?

Mr. JONES. I would like to consult with counsel, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. By all means do so.

Mr. FANELLI. May we have a minute, Senator?

(Mr. Jones leaves the room to consult with his counsel, returning shortly thereafter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Now what is your answer?

Mr. FANELLI. What was the question, Senator? I have forgotten.

Senator O'CONOR. The question is whether or not at the executive hearing this morning your answer to the question as to whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party as of the date when you attended the hearing here last August—whether your answer was not that you declined to answer on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, that was my answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then the question was, Mr. Jones, if the Chair will permit me, as to whether, in answering in that manner, you intended to tell the committee that, in your opinion, if you answered that question truthfully, it might incriminate you?

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you reconcile that answer? This afternoon, it does not tend to incriminate you. This morning it did.

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that.

Mr. JONES. I would like to make that perfectly clear. This morning I answered questions in the way I did in good faith on the advice of counsel. This afternoon, counsel has conferred with me further. The only thing involved this morning was a question of waiver. My counsel has checked up on this question of waiver, and now, on advice of counsel, I am answering more fully.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, your counsel came to the conclusion and told you so, that you were not waiving, that you could claim it on any question?

Mr. FANELLI. You don't have to answer as to what your counsel told you.



Senator O'CONOR. Just a minute, Counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot ask you what you told him, but there is no reason why he cannot tell me.

Mr. FANELLI. I don't think he has any objection.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead and tell me, then.

Mr. JONES. What was that again, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel advised you that you could claim privilege on any particular question; is that right?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not waive it, if you did answer one question. It would not waive as to another question.

Mr. JONES. In the 10-year period; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1942? That is 10 years and 1 day from today.

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that.

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you leave the Communist Party, Mr. Jones?

Mr. FANELLI. You will decline to answer that.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I decline to answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we have a situation here in which counsel is telling the witness in advance of each answer as to whether to answer or not to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. Counsel, that is manifestly improper. You are not to make responses to the questions of counsel. The witness, of course, has a right to consult you for your advice, but you are not testifying.

Mr. FANELLI. Mr. Senator, I didn't mean to testify. I am merely indicating advice that is helpful. It is helpful to the committee if I can advise him.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you enlighten us on some testimony that is in this record to the effect that you gave an envelope to Owen Lattimore containing the record in an immigration case? Would you clear that up? Or gave it to Fortas?

Mr. FANELLI. No; not to Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. To Fortas?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you clear it up and tell us where the record came from, so that we would know whether it was the official record?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you do that now?

Mr. FANELLI. Certainly. I have no objection, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you desire to be sworn?

Mr. FANELLI. If the committee is going to ask me just about this, I am perfectly willing to tell it under oath or otherwise, Senator, as you desire. I am glad to accommodate the Senator. There is no secret about this.

Senator FERGUSON. I would be glad to know.

Mr. FANELLI. At the time of the Tydings hearings—it is no longer in my memory as to when those were; it may be a year ago, so I would have to check the date—but at the time of the Tydings hearings, I called Mr. Fortas. I had read in the paper that Mr. Budenz had testified in connection with Mr. Lattimore. There was an accusation of some sort. He might have testified that he was a member of the party. I don't remember that exactly. I wasn't following these

hearings closely. I had the copy of the transcript of a deportation proceeding against a Mr. John Santos.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was your client?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, he was. I was cocounsel in that case, as an immigration expert. It happens to be my primary field.

In that proceeding, one of the charges, I think the main charge, against Santos, was that he had been a member of the Communist Party, a charge that he had denied. I was cocounsel in that proceeding, and was given an extra copy of the transcript. I may say that the chief counsel in that proceeding, who had theretofore been counsel for the union, the Transport Workers Union, of which Santos was an officer at the time, was Mr. Harry Sacher, who has achieved some notoriety since.

Senator FERGUSON. He was sentenced for contempt in the 11 Communists trial?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he also receive a copy of the transcript?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes. It must have been, because I was in Washington, and he was in New York, and we were both on the case.

I would like it noted also for the record, Senator, that after the hearings in that case I withdrew from that proceeding. The reason I withdrew is that I was unable to get along with Mr. Sacher. I want to be fair to Mr. Sacher. It had nothing to do with any political difference, although I am sure there must be political differences between him and I. But I just couldn't stand him as cocounsel. Now, that is how I had this copy of the transcript.

Now, when I read in the paper that Mr. Budenz had just testified or was about to testify, I knew I had this transcript, which included a cross-examination of Mr. Budenz. He had been cross-examined in that proceeding.

Mr. MORRIS. By whom?

Mr. FANELLI. By Sacher. Sacher had done all the cross-examining. My function in that case was primarily to advise on questions of law, on immigration law.

In the course of that, he had claimed privilege a number of times. And I called Fortas, whom I know by reason of the fact that I was once at the Interior Department. We are not close friends, but I knew him in that connection. I knew he was Lattimore's counsel. And I asked him whether this material would be of interest to him and to the Tydings committee, and said if so he could have it.

He said he at least would like to look at it. I didn't give it to him in an envelope, that I can recall. He may have sent over for it. Maybe it was in an envelope addressed to him.

Thereafter, it has never come back, and I don't know what has happened to it, except that there have been some little items in the newspaper about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you had an extra copy of the transcript.

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir; two copies were made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the Immigration Service had stated that only one copy was given, and that that was given to counsel for purposes of appeal?

Mr. FANELLI. May I say I heard something to that effect here, at one of these hearings within the past week. Or maybe I read it in



the paper. I have seen it or heard it stated, that the Immigration Service has said that; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In fact, you are stating that there were two copies.

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that one was given to Mr. Sacher and one to you?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that the copy which you gave to Mr. Lattimore's attorney for his use before the Tydings committee was not the same copy as that which was given Mr. Sacher?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you know that the copy which was given Mr. Sacher for use on appeal was under the restriction that it would not be otherwise used?

Mr. FANELLI. That may be. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the copy that was given you under any such restriction?

Mr. FANELLI. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who gave you that copy?

Mr. FANELLI. The reporter was requested to give me another copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who requested the reporter to give it to you?

Mr. FANELLI. I suppose the presiding official at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it was done without any restrictions?

Mr. FANELLI. No, sir. I may say that was a public hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; and you understand that you got that transcript without any restrictions?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that any restrictions which the record shows applied to Mr. Sacher would apply also to you?

Mr. FANELLI. I doubt that there would be any restrictions applicable to him. I don't know, in fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there were, in fact, restrictions on him, would they apply equally to you?

Mr. FANELLI. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you felt you had the transcript without any restrictions?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

I would like to say this, Mr. Sourwine: I am sure that if the immigration office in New York, that is, the head of that office or one of its officials, informed the committee that the record shows that Sacher only had—or that there was only one copy of this that went to Sacher, that must be the occasion in the record, and they were telling what they believed to be the fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the rules in immigration cases?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any rule with regard to the handling of the transcripts of such cases?

Mr. FANELLI. There is a—it is not a regulation. Usually, almost invariably, let's put it that way, a deportation proceeding is not a public hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Do you know of any rule applicable to the transcripts of such hearings?

Mr. FANELLI. Not a rule, but I am going on to answer your question. In deportation proceedings, which generally are not public proceedings—I mean usually they aren't—a transcript is given to counsel for the respondent in a deportation proceeding, and he usually is asked to sign a receipt for that, which states, as I recall it, that he will not make a copy of it, and he will return it. It is a loan.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is for the lawyer alone?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir; in a deportation proceeding, which is a private proceeding, and that is for the protection, as I understand it—it is a receipt. It is for protection.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave this out without the consent of your client?

Mr. FANELLI. Sir, it was a public hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but you gave it out, though, without the consent of your client?

Mr. FANELLI. There was no consent required. But the answer to your question is "Yes." I gave it out without my client.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are saying that the Santos hearing was a public hearing?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And all of the testimony in this transcript was testimony that had been given in public?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that you signed no receipt at the time you got the transcript?

Mr. FANELLI. That is my best recollection, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it certified as a true transcript?

Mr. FANELLI. Gee, I would have to see it. I doubt it, since mine was a copy, but I am just not sure, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I think I had asked Mr. Jones if he had been a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1942.

And you had stated that you were not.

Mr. JONES. I answered "No."

Mr. MORRIS. Now, had you been a member of the Communist Party in April 1941?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I decline to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement that the witness has volunteered in his preceding answers in connection with the questions about his association with the Communist Party, I ask that he be directed to answer that question.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. The Chair directs that you answer that question.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I still have to decline, respectfully decline, under the first and fifth amendments and any other constitutional rights that are available.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you telling the committee by that declination that in your opinion, if you answer that question truthfully, it might incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, were you a member of the Communist Party on the first of October 1942?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I was not.



Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party on the first of October 1941?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party on January 1, 1942?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party on December 1, 1941?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you resign from the Communist Party or otherwise sever your connections with it?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you resign from the Communist Party? Could you tell us the procedure?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you have never resigned from the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I am not a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you have ever resigned from the Communist Party.

Mr. JONES. I would like to consult with counsel.

(Mr. Jones confers with his counsel.)

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. On the grounds that the answer, if given truthfully, might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, Mr. Jones, in the light of your previous response that you do not know how a resignation is effected, how, then, do you feel that your answer as to whether you did resign as of a certain date would incriminate you, if you are not aware of the manner or method of resigning?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I am going to have to consult with counsel again. I am sorry.

(Mr. Jones confers with his counsel.)

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that. I am not competent to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. What do you mean by "not competent"?

Mr. JONES. I respectfully decline to answer that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On what ground?

Mr. JONES. On the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones, did you answer truthfully when you answered Senator Ferguson's question as to whether you knew how a resignation from the Communist Party was effected, when you said "I don't know"? Was that a truthful statement?

Mr. JONES. I will have to consult with counsel.

Mr. FANELLI. Answer it.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had ever resigned from the Communist Party you would know how it was done; wouldn't you?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; not necessarily.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you could have resigned from the Communist Party without knowing how it was done?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. How? Explain your answer on that, Mr. Jones. How could you have taken an action without knowing how that action was to be pursued? How could that possibly be?

Mr. JONES. Memory could fail with all little technical formal things.

Senator O'CONOR. Explain.

Mr. JONES. Failure of memory. I don't remember all the details of bookkeeping throughout my life.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you forgotten how you resigned from the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. I would like to consult with counsel.

(Mr. Jones confers with his counsel.)

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1917?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1910?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1900?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you alive on April 1, 1900?

Senator O'CONOR. How old are you, Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. I am 39 years old.

I would like to consult with counsel, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. As to how old you are?

Mr. JONES. I will tell you that. Thirty-nine years old.

Senator O'CONOR. If you will listen to the questions, you were asked a minute ago whether you were a member of the party on April 1, 1910. That was 42 years ago. I just want to give you an opportunity—

Senator FERGUSON. How could you decline to answer that in good faith and say it might incriminate you, when you were not born yet?

Mr. JONES. I can explain myself, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Explain. We do not want to make these proceedings foolish with these answers.

Mr. JONES. No, sir; and I am certainly not trying to. I am not a trained lawyer. It is merely a question of a law of privilege, and I have to fall back on the advice of counsel. That is all.

Mr. FANELLI. May we consult a little bit? If we go outside, maybe we can save some time.

Senator FERGUSON. We will probably end up with the fact that after he was born he will decline to answer, and before that he will answer.

Mr. FANELLI. Senator, that I don't know.

(Mr. Jones and his counsel leave the room briefly.)

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was he a Communist before he was born?

Mr. FANELLI. Might I say I have advised him to answer the question to this committee as to any period prior to January 1, 1936, and claim privilege as to any time thereafter.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right—January 1, 1936?

Mr. JONES. January 1 is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that, you answer "No"?



Mr. JONES. "No." And as to January 1, 1942, I answered "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. And prior to January 1, 1936, your answer is you were not a Communist?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. At any time prior to that date, you were not a Communist?

Mr. JONES. January 1, 1936; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is there any date between January 1, 1936, and November 1, 1941, on which you were not a Communist?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the witness be directed to answer that question?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes; you are directed to answer that, Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. I am very sorry, sir, but I respectfully have to decline to answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to go and get these instructions that you had to attend this meeting, when Budenz was testifying.

Mr. JONES. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is the 22d of August.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you give us the instructions that Owen Lattimore gave you?

Mr. JONES. The instructions given to me by Mrs. Lattimore?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to Owen Lattimore at all?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; not when I received the instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it on the telephone that she talked with you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did she instruct you?

Mr. JONES. "Would you come down to Washington and help us?"

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked to Owen Lattimore about the case before?

Mr. JONES. In a vague social way. In no organized way; in a vague social way.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had you not done some investigation or looked up some matters for them in the case?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. My recollection is not precisely accurate. I didn't discuss his whole testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. You discussed some things of it?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had agreed in effect to help him?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I had.

Senator FERGUSON. And then his wife called you on the phone and said what?—"I want you"? or "We want you"?

Mr. JONES. I honestly can't recall the difference between "I" and "We" there.

Senator FERGUSON. But they wanted you to come down here and listen?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what were the instructions?

Mr. JONES. The instructions were to come to room 424 and to take as full notes as I possibly could on the testimony to be given that day.

Senator FERGUSON. By Louis Budenz?

Mr. JONES. I believe that was the man testifying.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the man. And then where were you to go?

Mr. JONES. Then I was to deliver my notes.

Senator FERGUSON. To——

Mr. JONES. To the law office of——

Senator FERGUSON. Abe Fortas?

Mr. JONES. Abe Fortas; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did she say that she and Owen Lattimore would be there?

Mr. JONES. I don't know whether she made it explicit, but it certainly was implicit.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you go from here to the Abe Fortas law office?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And took your notes?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you met whom?

Mr. JONES. I met Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. E. C. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. E. C. Carter. Did you see Carter in this room when you were here?

Mr. JONES. I recall I did; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you went directly from here to the Abe Fortas office?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long would you say it took you? You left when they closed the testimony?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long would you say, then, it took you to go to Abe Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Of course, the answer would have to be approximate, but certainly not over a half hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Not over a half hour. Then there was Owen Lattimore and his wife in Abe Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you saw them. Was Carter there before you?

Mr. JONES. I believe he was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He got there before you did. And you went into Abe Fortas' office, and Abe, as I understand it, was not there?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you had a conference with Owen Lattimore and his wife?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you told them what you had heard up here at the hearing, read it to them or gave it to them?

Mr. JONES. I read it to them and gave it to them, both.

Senator FERGUSON. You read it to them and gave it to them, both. Now, did you stay with Owen Lattimore until you went to the Arbor Cafe?

Mr. SOURWINE. The Aldo Cafe.

Mr. JONES. The Aldo, Senator. I stayed in Abe Fortas' office.



Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and Owen Lattimore was there in the immediate vicinity?

Mr. JONES. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you and Owen Lattimore and his wife and Carter were there together?

Mr. JONES. Well, there were times when I left the room, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You left the room. But they did not leave the office, the whole office?

Mr. JONES. No, the whole suite; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, they stayed in the suite with you during the time until you went to this restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Oh, just a moment, sir. Just as a point of detail, E. C. Carter left for his hotel before we went to the restaurant.

Senator FERGUSON. He left for his hotel, and he went to the hotel?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, as I understand it, you suggested the restaurant you would like to go to?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, you then, and Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore, went directly from Abe Fortas' suite of offices to the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; we went and picked up E. C. Carter at his hotel.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went by his room?

Mr. JONES. We went via the hotel.

Senator FERGUSON. Via the hotel. Did you go to his room?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; we met him in the lobby, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. And what hotel was that?

Mr. JONES. My recollection is inexact. It is one of two hotels, either the Lafayette or the Carlton.

Senator FERGUSON. Either one. And you met him there, not in his room, but he was downstairs?

Mr. JONES. Downstairs.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you went directly to this restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were over at Abe Fortas' office, one of the things which was done by Mr. Lattimore was to prepare an answer to Budenz for the press?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you talked about that answer? You saw it?

Mr. JONES. Yes; I saw the answer. I did see the answer, sure.

Senator FERGUSON. And was that not one of the purposes of getting the testimony, so that they could answer immediately and have it appear in the same story?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And one of the reasons that you took the notes was so that he could prepare his answer?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And be rather accurate?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You at one time had been a newspaperman?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that this was to be in order to get the news out to the press?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Before Senator Ferguson pursues that: Was there any reason assigned as to why the statement would be prepared so promptly and issued for publication?

Mr. JONES. Well, it was just a matter of—that is a matter of opinion, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. No; I am not asking for a matter of opinion. I am asking you for a matter of fact, as to whether there was any reason given or assigned by anyone at the conference as to why the statement should be issued so promptly.

Mr. JONES. No, sir; there was no such explanation made.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, was there any statement made as to when it was going to be issued? Right away, or given out to the press that evening, or later, or when?

Mr. JONES. That evening; yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. And who made that statement?

Mr. JONES. I have no recollection, sir. It is just a matter of mechanics of delivering the thing to the press. That is all.

Senator O'CONOR. But it was discussed, as to giving it out that evening?

Mr. JONES. Actually, I cannot recall. I don't know. I assume it was discussed. I mean, it is just reasonable that it should be. But I have no exact recollection of that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether it was released to the press?

Mr. JONES. As to the hour; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there anything said by Mr. Carter that he had taken notes here of the Budenz testimony? Because he was at the Fortas office when you got there?

Mr. JONES. I don't recall any explicit mention by E. C. Carter of taking notes here.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he have any notes?

Mr. JONES. I honestly don't recall. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know how you got from this office here that you are in now, the Senate Office Building, to Abe Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Certainly, sir. I took a taxi.

Senator FERGUSON. And you went reasonably fast?

Mr. JONES. Through traffic; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have thought that Mr. Carter would have had time to leave here at the end of the hearings and go down to his suite and come back to the office?

Mr. JONES. Oh, no. That is a misunderstanding. He didn't go to his suite first.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not?

Mr. JONES. No, sir. He left the hearing room. When, I don't know, because I wasn't paying—I hadn't met the man at that time, wasn't paying attention to him. He may have left half an hour earlier for all I know. But when I arrived at Fortas' office, he was there.

Senator FERGUSON. He was there. There wasn't any doubt about that?



Mr. JONES. There wasn't any doubt about that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he left some time that evening before you went to the restaurant, and went to the hotel. You met him in the lobby with Owen Lattimore and his wife, and then you went to this restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember seeing Mr. Sourwine at the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. No recollection whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that your party left so fast that Carter forgot his hat? When you say that the counsel for the committee just happened to be eating at that restaurant? Do you remember that incident?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I don't. As a matter of fact, I do remember that Mr. Carter left his hat.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. JONES. Yes, I do. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. How do you come to remember that?

Mr. JONES. I think because the next day when I was down here, he said—I am under oath, you know.

Senator FERGUSON. Sure you are under oath.

Mr. JONES. I am interested in being explicit.

Senator FERGUSON. You are being truthful.

Mr. JONES. I am being truthful.

Senator O'CONOR. There is no reason for you to falsify as to that.

Mr. JONES. No reason whatsoever. I do remember it, and the reason I remember it I think is because sometime the next day, Mr. Carter said he was put to the inconvenience of going back to Aldo's for his hat. It was a little oddity, something that might stick in your mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have your dinner at the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, we did, in a leisurely fashion, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you finish it?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, we finished it.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you get to the restaurant, would you say?

Mr. JONES. Oh, my goodness. Now, here again——

Senator FERGUSON. Well, about. I understand that.

Mr. JONES. 7:30, let's say.

Senator FERGUSON. 7:30?

Mr. JONES. Approximately.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, about when did you leave?

Mr. JONES. About 8:30, maybe not quite that long.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to put in the two newspapers where I found this press release by Owen Lattimore. The one is on August 23, 1951, being the New York Herald Tribune of Thursday, August 23, 1951, on page 3. It is under "Budenz asserts Pacific Institute was Red tool," and the Lattimore statement is in black type.

In reply to Budenz' testimony, Mr. Lattimore issued the following statement. \* \* \*

and then it is quoted. I will ask that be made part of the record.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be made part of the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 742" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 742

[New York Herald Tribune, Thursday, August 23, 1951, p. 3]

BUDENZ ASSERTS PACIFIC INSTITUTE WAS RED TOOL—TESTIFIES PARTY LABELED IT "LITTLE RED SCHOOLHOUSE"; IDENTIFIES THREE AS REDS

(By Don Irwin)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22.— \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

LATTIMORE'S STATEMENT

In reply to Mr. Budenz's testimony, Mr. Lattimore issued the following statement:

"Budenz has repeated his last year's discredited testimony. He now says that he heard my name mentioned in 1937 as a member of a Communist cell in New York. The fantastic nature of this lie is underscored by the fact that I was not even in the United States in 1937, except between Christmas and New Year's.

"I have already testified under oath that I am not and never have been a Communist, and I am prepared to do so again.

"Budenz is now also suggesting that because in 1945, like a great majority of Americans, I was hostile to the great industrial monopolists who built the Japanese Navy and equipped the Japanese Army, I must have been a Communist. This suggestion will not be much comfort to the thousands of Americans whose sons died to defeat Japanese militarism."

\* \* \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. And the New York Times, as of the same day—and these are library papers—on page 7 had also a line or two of his statement.

Senator O'CONOR. They will both be admitted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator desires, there is also here the article which was printed in the final edition of the Washington Star on the evening of the 22d. Would the Senator desire that introduced also?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That may give us the time that this was issued.

Mr. SOURWINE. It does not fix it, but it indicates that it did get into the Washington final Star of the 22d, whatever time their deadline may be.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 743" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 743

[The New York Times, Thursday, August 23, 1951, p. 7]

SORGE'S SPY RING HELD COPIED IN U. S.—GEN. WILLOUGHBY TELLS SENATORS OF RED ESPIONAGE IN ORIENT—BUDENZ ACCUSES LATTIMORE

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UP)—\* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

As General Willoughby testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Louis F. Budenz, former editor of The Daily Worker, told the Senate Internal Security subcommittee that Owen Lattimore and Frederick Vanderbilt Field were described in Communist party councils as key members of a Communist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations, a private organization that promotes knowledge about the Far East.



Mr. Lattimore, a professor at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, promptly labelled the testimony a "fantastic lie."

Mr. Budenz, who broke with the party in 1945 to rejoin the Roman Catholic Church and is now Assistant Professor of Economics at Fordham University, said that in meetings of the party's American "politburo" or top governing body, Mr. Lattimore was "specifically mentioned as a member of the institute's Communist cell under instructions."

Mr. Lattimore said in a statement that this was "a new lie" that Mr. Budenz had added to "his discredited last year's testimony."

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[Washington Star, August 22, 1951]

#### LATTIMORE DISCOVERS "ONE NEW LIE" IN BUDENZ' TESTIMONY

Owen Lattimore this afternoon issued the following statement on Louis Budenz' testimony before a Senate subcommittee identifying him as a Communist:

"Budenz seems to have told one new lie about me in addition to his discredited last year's testimony. He now says that he heard my name mentioned in 1937 as a member of a Communist cell. The fantastic nature of this lie is underscored by the fact that I was not even in the United States in 1937, except between Christmas and New Year.

"Budenz had an opportunity to tell this same lie last year under immunity, and did not. His telling it now is merely proof that his memory is inventive as well as elastic.

"I have already testified under oath that I am not and never have been a Communist, and I am prepared to do so again."

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to inquire a little more, if I might.

Did you have any discussions with Owen Lattimore after you were at that meeting, about you going there, and what you had done here, after you got the press release and had dinner and went home?

Mr. JONES. My impression is not. The conversation at the meal was trivial, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you certain that that is the only time you ever had dinner with Mr. Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, and his wife, in that restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are positive of that?

Mr. JONES. Positive of that.

Senator FERGUSON. So we could not be mistaken in the record here about some other meeting.

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the day that Budenz testified. You remember that?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; August 22.

Senator FERGUSON. August 22, 1951.

Mr. JONES. That was the only time I have ever eaten with the Lattimores in that café.

Senator FERGUSON. So that places the date and the only time.

Now, did you take notes the next day when Budenz testified?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And where did you take those notes to?

Mr. JONES. I also took those to Abe Fortas' office.

Senator FERGUSON. And he met you there?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Carter there?

Mr. JONES. I simply cannot recall.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You don't recall Carter. But you recall them there?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give them the notes?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you go to any restaurant to eat that day, with them?

Mr. JONES. I think not.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think so?

Mr. JONES. I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. At least, you did not go to where these—

Mr. JONES. Certainly we didn't go to the Aldo.

Senator FERGUSON. You only went the one time there?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Any other time did you take notes and give them the notes?

Mr. JONES. At one of these hearings? No.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only 2 days when Budenz testified?

Mr. JONES. That is quite correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the second day, did Lattimore know that you were going to take the notes before you took them?

Mr. JONES. I don't understand the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Lattimore know that you were coming back the second day to take the notes?

Mr. JONES. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was Lattimore surprised when you came into Abe Fortas' office and had the notes on the Budenz hearing the day you went to eat at the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. He was not surprised, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No. You had no doubt that he knew you were up here taking the notes?

Mr. JONES. Well, I am being asked to answer—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was he surprised?

Mr. JONES. There is a little detail here.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Give us the detail.

Mr. JONES. The detail is that the notes were delivered to his wife. Owen Lattimore was at that time very much preoccupied. He was sitting at a desk, a big lawyer's desk. I came into the room. I gave the notes to Mrs. Lattimore, sitting in a chair, sat down next to her, and talked to her about them. He was writing at a desk. So that is why I can't speak to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not discuss the notes with him? Because he had to make his press release on your notes, did he not?

Mr. JONES. I don't know whether I did discuss them with him or not. I went over the notes in great detail with Mrs. Lattimore; I mean, so that she could understand my handwriting, any amplifications I could make. Now, whether I, as well as Mrs. Lattimore, explained those to Mr. Lattimore, I just don't know.



Senator FERGUSON. Did he not prepare his statement from your notes?

Mr. JONES. Partially; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So he knew you had made those notes here?

Mr. JONES. Surely. The only detail that I add here is that the man was receiving the assistance of a reportorial secretarial nature, and he might not focus his attention on the person who was doing it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were there and talked to him. He knew you. You were a graduate student, and he had given you a fellowship. Is that not right?

Mr. JONES. Sure. He knew me.

Senator FERGUSON. Sure. Now, the next day, did he come personally and tell you to take the notes and bring them back to him?

Mr. JONES. I can't recall whether it was he or his wife who told me that.

Senator O'CONOR. Was it discussed that you were coming back the next day?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. So he knew you were going to come back for that purpose?

Mr. JONES. Surely.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had no doubts that he knew that you were going to come back for that purpose?

Mr. JONES. I had no doubts, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The second night did he prepare any release?

Mr. JONES. I prepared no release.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he?

Mr. JONES. He may have, but I don't remember that he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go home with the Lattimores that night?

Mr. JONES. No; I took the train home.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see Abe Fortas that night?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I didn't. I left early. I think if you look at your committee records, you will find the second day of the Budenz testimony did end early. And my little girl was having a birthday party, and she wanted me there, and so I just beat it right up. I didn't hang around. I left them in Washington. So I don't know who they saw.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the last secretarial service you rendered to Lattimore in this case?

Mr. JONES. The last reportorial service; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did help him, you and your wife, to set up these copies that were delivered of what he was going to say to the committee?

Mr. JONES. The mechanical work.

Senator FERGUSON. The mechanical work.

Mr. JONES. Sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "mechanical," do you mean mimeographing?

Mr. JONES. Actually—No, sir. Actually, I mean stapling, to be very precise there.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Senator asked a question about secretarial work. Did you, subsequent to this date of August 22, 1951, perform any secretarial work for Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; not secretarial.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you do any other kind of work?

Mr. JONES. Research; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You have done that since?

Mr. JONES. Research; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In connection with these hearings?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Research into what?

Mr. JONES. Oh, I looked up some things in the New York Times, I believe, in the library.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you examined or studied the committee hearings in connection with any work you have done for Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you pick the Aldo Cafe on that evening? Had you been there before?

Mr. JONES. Oh, years ago I had been there before.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not a customary eating place of yours?

Mr. JONES. When I lived in Washington, it was not customary. Occasional, sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been back there since that evening?

Mr. JONES. No; never.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you see Mrs. Lattimore here at these hearings on the 22d of August?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see her here at the meeting of this committee on the 23d of August?

Mr. JONES. I can't recall, sir. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see her here at these hearings on any other occasion?

Mr. JONES. No, sir. I haven't been here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see Mr. Carter here on any occasion other than the 22d? You did see him here on the 22d, I think you said.

Mr. JONES. The 22d and the 23d.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw him here on both the 22d and the 23d?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in answer to a previous question of Senator Ferguson's, I understood you to say that on the evening of the 22d, you had not "met the man," referring to Mr. Carter. Is that what you said?

Mr. JONES. That is not precisely what I said. There should be some clarification here, and I am very glad to make it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a moment. Was the evening of the 22d the first occasion on which you met Mr. Carter?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; it was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet him?

Mr. JONES. The noon of the 22d was the first occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that at this hearing?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; it was not at this hearing. It was at Mr. Fortas' office. You see, during the noon recess I went over to Mr. Fortas' office.

Mr. SOURWINE. And met Mr. Carter there?

Mr. JONES. I met Mr. Carter there.

Mr. SOURWINE. And who introduced you to him?

Mr. JONES. I cannot recall whether it was Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore, one of them.



Mr. SOURWINE. Either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore. That was noon on the 22d?

Mr. JONES. That was noon on the 22d.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then you and Mr. Carter both came back to this hearing in the afternoon, did you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; but not together.

Mr. SOURWINE. But not together. Then you both went back to Mr. Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Yes; but not together.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then you both came down here on the 23d. And did you see him at Mr. Fortas' office before the hearing at all?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I believe not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at Mr. Fortas' office before the hearing on the 23d?

Mr. JONES. I don't think I went into the office; no sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, after the hearing on the 23d, you and Mr. Carter both went back to Mr. Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. For myself, I can give you a simple "yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. But not together?

Mr. JONES. My memory is not clear enough. If Mr. Carter did, it was unimportant, so I don't—

Mr. SOURWINE. And you don't know whether he did or not?

Mr. JONES. Under oath I wouldn't want to say precisely that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know whether he was there?

Mr. JONES. He might have been. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he was there, he had to go back there?

Mr. JONES. Oh, sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. But at any rate, you didn't go there together?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you didn't leave together?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you leave before he did or did he leave before you did?

Mr. JONES. I can't answer that. My memory is not good enough.

Senator O'CONOR. If I can just clear one thing up, you stated that you were together with Mr. Carter at the noon recess on the 22d, and then the two of you came back again to the meeting, although you came back separately, and then you went back again to the office after the hearing that day.

Mr. JONES. That is quite correct, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. And that Owen Lattimore was there both at noon and in the evening?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Where was he in the meantime? Where did he go in the meantime?

Mr. JONES. I have no idea.

Senator O'CONOR. Was there any discussion of that? Because he did not come down to the meeting here, did he?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; he didn't.

Senator O'CONOR. Was not any comment made as to where he would go or what he would do in the meantime?

Mr. JONES. I think not.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you expect to see him when he returned subsequent to the afternoon session?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, sure.

Senator O'CONNOR. How did you know you were going to meet him there? Did he say?

Mr. JONES. Not being a lawyer—Of course, I expected to meet one of the Lattimores there, somebody competent to take my notes. So the natural assumption would be that he would be there. I mean, there wouldn't be a thing that you would speculate on.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Jones, I was trying to get the facts here. Why did you not tell me about going back at noon to Lattimore's office and meeting Carter? Because you indicated here in your testimony that in the afternoon, when you went down there and saw him, that evening, you had not seen Carter before.

Mr. JONES. That was a mistake in recollection on my part, a failure of memory.

Senator FERGUSON. You understand, "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth"?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you go back there at noon?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I went back.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who asked you to come there at noon?

Mr. JONES. Either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore—oh, it was Mrs. Lattimore who asked me to come there at noon. I can answer that definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. And you and Carter and the two Lattimores talked in Abe Fortas' office at noon?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There was not any doubt about that?

Mr. JONES. No doubt about that whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the first day, the evening of which you went to the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Noon of the 22d.

Senator FERGUSON. Noon recess.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt about that.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You left your notes there with Lattimore and his wife?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Came back and took more notes?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And went back?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is the story that you told us of going back in the evening a correct story? Or do you want to change it?

Mr. JONES. I would not like to change it, except that the first time I met E. C. Carter was at noon.

Senator FERGUSON. Instead of at night?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only thing you want to change?

Mr. JONES. The only thing I want to change.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not want to change it about going to the hotel and picking up Carter?

Mr. JONES. That hotel testimony is to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. That is an accurate description of it?



Mr. JONES. Certainly, sir. I regret I can't specify which of those two——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read what Owen Lattimore swore to under oath about these meetings?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I haven't read it in full.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that between the time you were on the stand in executive session and the time you came here for this public session, you did not go back over that testimony or have your attention called to it?

Mr. JONES. No, sir. No; I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not mean that? Or you do mean that? I am not trying to confuse you. I mean, did you have that testimony called to your attention?

Mr. JONES. Mr. Sourwine, I can make this very clear. I have never reviewed the formal transcript. The formal transcripts are not available for a long, long time afterward.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been told what Mr. Lattimore testified to?

Mr. JONES. Yes. I have been told a small section of it.

Senator O'CONOR. By whom?

Mr. JONES. By Mr. Lattimore.

Senator O'CONOR. In other words, he, after the hearings, repeated to you what his testimony had been?

Mr. JONES. No; he didn't. He just read to me a small section where he had mentioned my name before this committee. That is all.

Senator O'CONOR. What was the purpose of his reading to you his formal testimony in this hearing?

Mr. JONES. Just simply he wanted to get my recollection of it.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, was he trying to coach you or to induce you to say things that were in accordance with his testimony?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. What was his reason for reading you his testimony, then?

Mr. JONES. My name had been mentioned, and he knew that I had received a subpoena.

Senator O'CONOR. Oh. It was after you got the subpoena that he came to you with his testimony?

Mr. JONES. He didn't come to me. I went to him.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, regardless of the circumstances, when you two met, he then had a copy of his testimony?

Mr. JONES. Yes; he had the copy of the testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. And he read to you the exact version that he had given?

Mr. JONES. Not the full testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. But the part that affected you?

Mr. JONES. Where my name was mentioned there, and, oh, a half dozen questions or answers in that section of the testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. And what explanation did he make for taking that unusual course to read to you from his sworn testimony?

Mr. JONES. He wanted me to know that my name had been mentioned in this testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. Could he not have done that without reading the verbatim testimony?

Mr. JONES. As a matter of fact, I don't think he did read it aloud to me. I think he handed it to me.

Senator O'CONOR. He handed it to you. So that he did make it available to you?

Mr. JONES. Indicating where in the testimony it was. And I don't even know whether it was he. I think it was, again, the missis that handed it to me.

Senator O'CONOR. Was Owen Lattimore present?

Mr. JONES. I think so. I think he was in the house.

Senator O'CONOR. So that Owen Lattimore did know that you were actually refreshing your recollection from his testimony, his sworn testimony in the hearing?

Mr. JONES. In a limited sense; yes. The only reason I say a "limited sense" is that I haven't read the whole testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. Is it not a fact that you rehearsed it so that your two stories would coincide?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. That is what it seems to us, or seems to me. Because I cannot understand why it would be necessary, if you are only anxious to tell the truth and to give your best recollection, for Lattimore to take the unusual step of virtually coaching you by reading or allowing you to read from his testimony.

Mr. JONES. Oh, Senator, I can straighten you out on that.

Senator O'CONOR. Suppose you do, because it is a very important thing, and it is a very unusual thing.

Mr. JONES. I can straighten you out on that very easily. I had no idea why I was called before this committee. That is the simple truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when were you called?

Mr. JONES. Oh, Thursday or Friday.

Senator FERGUSON. Of last week?

Mr. JONES. Last week. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead, now. You said you can straighten me out. You have not done so yet.

Mr. JONES. Well, the subpoena read that I was to come down here and tell what I knew about the IPR. All right. I knew it was a Lattimore hearing. The natural thing to do would be to go to Mr. Lattimore. He was available. He was in the same city. And ask him, "What does this mean?"

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that the first Lattimore had ever told you that your name was mentioned?

Mr. JONES. Oh, yes, sir. That was the first occasion I had heard that my name was mentioned in that testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore, neither one, ever checked up with you to find out if you were the person who was with them in the Aldo Cafe on the night of August 22? Is that what you are testifying here?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. They never did come and check with you to see if you were with them?

Mr. JONES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Until after you had been subpoenaed here? Are you sure about that now?

Mr. JONES. I am not a hundred percent sure, but I think so; yes. I think so.



Senator O'CONOR. Counsel, I do not want to be discourteous. You indicated you wanted to say something.

Mr. FANELLI. I just wanted to indicate that there was a question Mr. Sourwine asked before which remains unanswered, which I think got lost in the discussion, and I would like to put it again. He asked, if I understood him correctly, whether Lattimore's testimony on this point was rehearsed or gone over in any way.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, my question was whether it had been called to his attention, or whether he had seen it or had it called to his attention, between the time he was in executive session and when he came back. I had not forgotten the question.

Mr. FANELLI. I thought you might have, and I want him to answer it.

Mr. JONES. What was it?

Mr. FANELLI. He still doesn't get it.

Mr. SOURWINE. After we were through with the executive session this morning, did you thereafter refer to Mr. Lattimore's testimony, or did anyone talk to you about it, or tell you what Mr. Lattimore had testified, either actually word for word, or in substance?

Mr. JONES. Between 11 o'clock this morning and 4 o'clock this afternoon? No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the question.

Senator FERGUSON. How many pages of testimony did you see after you got the subpoena?

Mr. JONES. At most three, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Three or four?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, do you think Owen Lattimore told the truth about your meeting down here and going to the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. It is a very inadequate description.

Senator FERGUSON. Inadequate? I will say you do not exaggerate on that. You know that he did not tell the truth, do you not?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I don't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you look at it, and you tell us whether or not in your opinion Owen Lattimore told the truth about that meeting. [Handing.]

Mr. Chairman, I think here is a case that indicates clearly that witnesses before this committee have not told the truth.

Mr. FANELLI. Senator, you are not speaking to Mr. Jones.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking him now. I want him to look at this.

Mr. JONES. Here is something in testimony that just makes no sense to me. It says:

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't remember at all.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not the truth, is it?

Mr. JONES. That is just plain meaningless, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was not the truth. Because you had a meeting. You had gone down there at noon and delivered your notes to him. You had gone at night. He got out a press release. You had gone to lunch, or dinner. The next day you took notes for him.

And he comes in here and tells us he does not remember a thing and does not know anything about it.

MR. JONES. Well, sir, I don't know how much this "I don't remember at all" covers.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it. You must have read that last Friday or Saturday. Why, he did not even remember your name. It took him another day to get him back here to remember your name.

MR. JONES. Well, sir, I will say this is neither truth nor a lie.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it?

MR. JONES. It is just inadequate, meaningless testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you, if a man is sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, whether or not that is true.

MR. JONES. This just indicates a confusion and a failure of memory. That is what it indicates to me.

Senator O'CONOR. On what did you base your answer to Senator Ferguson that, in your opinion, Owen Lattimore's description of this particular episode was inadequate?

MR. JONES. Because of the confusion here.

Senator FERGUSON. Confusion? It is not confusion. Let me read something, here. The question: "I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr. Lattimore." They were talking then about:

"He is a graduate student at Johns Hopkins." That is you?

MR. JONES. That is me.

Senator FERGUSON. "And I am one of the supervisors of his thesis work." That is referring to you?

MR. JONES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. "Did he come over to Washington from Johns Hopkins with you on that day?" And the answer is: "No, I don't believe he did."

There was not any doubt that you did not come over with him.

MR. JONES. Sir, I was doing reportorial work. Why should he take interest in me, when he has his full attention focused—

Senator FERGUSON. Answer my questions for a little while. Did you come over with him on that day?

MR. JONES. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. This is his answer: "No; I don't believe he did. I believe we must have run into him here."

Is that a truthful answer? Why, you were there to meet them down at the place. Now he tells us: "I believe we must have run into him here." Is that a truthful answer?

MR. JONES. Sir, I would like permission to consult.

MR. FANELLI. No. There is no privilege. Give him your honest recollection.

MR. JONES. That is an inadequate answer, certainly inadequate.

Senator O'CONOR. It is a misleading answer, is it not? Because in the one case he gave the committee to understand that his meeting with you was accidental. He said, "run into him." And your testimony is that you came over by appointment and design. The two things are contradictory. Is that not true?

MR. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I am going to read you the next:

MR. SOURWINE. I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr. Lattimore.

MR. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember at all.



You do not think that is a truthful answer, do you?

Mr. JONES. I have no way of judging it, sir. It is a matter of opinion. I don't know how well Owen Lattimore can remember or forget. That is another man.

Senator FERGUSON. The next question: "Do you know how he happened to be invited to that meeting?" The answer: "No. I presume we just ran into each other and went to dinner together."

Is that a truthful statement? Or are you telling the truth now? Which is true?

Mr. JONES. That statement is inaccurate. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is not true, is it?

Mr. JONES. Not the precise truth, but it is not a willful lie, either.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is yours a willful lie, or is this a willful lie?

Mr. JONES. Mine is the truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Yours is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, Mr. Jones, you are giving us, to the best of your knowledge an accurate, detailed description of what happened that day, and you are not withholding anything, and you are giving the facts?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, obviously there is a willful omission in his statement, is there not, of the most important happening of that day of your meeting. Your very purpose in being over here was to carry out your mission, to wit, to get the notes together on which he could base his press release. And he has omitted to state that entirely, or even to refer to it. Is that not correct?

Mr. JONES. He has omitted it, but I have no way of judging whether it was willful or not.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, you describe it as inaccurate, do you not?

Mr. JONES. It is imprecise, yes, inaccurate.

Senator FERGUSON. Now listen to another question:

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was long enough for a casual meeting and then just a suggestion to go to eat?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where you casually met?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, we went to the hotel that Mr. Carter was staying at, where we met Mr. Jones. I don't remember.

Now, that certainly is not the truth, if you are telling the truth.

Mr. JONES. That is plainly inaccurate.

Senator FERGUSON. Plainly inaccurate?

Mr. JONES. Plainly inaccurate. And, Senator, it indicates to me a failure of memory.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to suggest and ask that this testimony be immediately sent to the Attorney General.

Senator O'CONOR. I agree with you, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Because I think if there were ever flagrant untruths in a hearing, that is indicated here.

Senator O'CONOR. It does call for study and consideration, I think, because the two statements are diametrically opposed to each other, yours and his. His indicates that there was a casual chance happening, not by design or by prearrangement. Yours is that there was a

planned meeting or a planned assignment which you carried through from beginning to end.

Mr. SOURWINE. A series of meetings.

Senator FERGUSON. And we cannot function as a committee if we have to take statements like we have in this record on this point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is another statement this witness made which I would like to inquire about, if the Chair will indulge me.

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember stating a moment ago, and I am not sure if I heard you accurately: "I don't know how well Owen Lattimore can remember or forget"?

Mr. JONES. Under these circumstances, yes; under these particular circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you know Mr. Lattimore fairly well, don't you?

Mr. JONES. Not with intimacy. That is a professional——

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not asking you to draw a conclusion. I am going to ask you a series of questions. You don't have to draw one conclusion.

You know him fairly well, don't you?

Mr. JONES. Fairly well; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long have you known him?

Mr. JONES. Since May 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. During how many semesters have you attended lecture courses that he has given?

Mr. JONES. Oh, four.

Mr. SOURWINE. During how many semesters have you attended seminars that he has conducted?

Mr. JONES. Four.

Mr. SOURWINE. During how many months, approximately, have you performed secretarial or research services for him?

Mr. JONES. Oh, about 9 months, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is there any question about the fact that you respect Mr. Lattimore's intellect?

Mr. JONES. None whatsoever.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any question about the fact that you look up to him?

Mr. JONES. I look up to him as a scholar; yes, sir. As a scholar.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, does that jibe with the statement: "I don't know how well Owen Lattimore can remember or forget"?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; it does. Because an academic matter is very different from a matter of daily life.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you heard Mr. Lattimore give lectures for relatively sustained periods of time, giving names, dates, facts, circumstances, knowing that he was speaking accurately and from memory?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, doesn't he have a reputation with his students for having an unusually good memory?

Mr. JONES. Oh, not superior to others——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Lattimore's reputation among his students is for memory?

Mr. JONES. No.



Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know?

Mr. JONES. Not precisely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Lattimore's reputation is among his students for being able to forget?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you don't know how well he can remember. And you don't know how well he can forget.

Mr. JONES. No. I can't give any opinion on Mr. Lattimore's whole mind.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Jones, did I understand you to say before that you were the supervisor of thesis work? Did you say that?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. What was said as to any work that you had in regard to——

Mr. JONES. Well, Mr. Lattimore was merely one of the supervisors of my dissertation. That is all.

Senator O'CONOR. I misunderstood you, and I am just trying to get it straightened out, really. Had you been doing any supervisory work for him in the class work there?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. I want to get it straight.

Mr. JONES. No; it was the other way around.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, Mr. Jones, is Mr. Lattimore's memory as good as yours?

Mr. JONES. That is a question of opinion, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I am asking you for.

Mr. JONES. Yes, his memory is as good as mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't think you have a better memory than Owen Lattimore?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You haven't any question about the clearness with which you remember these facts and details that you have testified to, have you?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask: Do you want to make any changes in your testimony that you have given here?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. JONES. To the best of my ability; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, whatever you are doing here, you are doing willfully, with knowledge.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not right?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are testifying willfully?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, where were you born?

Mr. JONES. I was born in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. From what schools have you graduated?

Mr. JONES. Oh, I graduated from a preparatory school called Hedgehill, Carmel Hill, N. Y., and then I went to the University of Chicago and graduated from there in 1938. I received a master's degree from the University of Maryland in 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in the infantry during the war, were you not?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, did you work as a newspaper reporter at any time?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. For what newspapers?

Mr. JONES. The Daytona Beach News-Journal and the Daytona Beach Sun-Record.

Mr. MORRIS. Any other newspapers?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you told us now all the newspapers for which you have worked?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; all the newspapers for which I have worked.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever live in Chicago?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you work for any newspapers in Chicago?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with a publication in Chicago called the Midwest Record?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I have heard of it.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Midwest Record?

Mr. JONES. Well, to the best of my recollection, it was a little paper put out there for a few years. I have no very precise memory of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you received any other grants or fellowships other than the one you told us about today?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know Philip Keeney and Mary Jane Keeney?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When have you last seen them?

Mr. JONES. I think I saw them somewhere in New York. I ran into them in New York last year sometime. But I haven't seen them in a long time.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently had you seen them prior to that time?

Mr. JONES. About a dozen times; no more.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not close friends of yours?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that either Mr. or Mrs. Keeney either is now or was at any time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I have no reason to believe that.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever known any Communists?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date that you used? January 1, 1942?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. After that date have you known any Communists?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are positive of that?

Mr. JONES. I am positive of that; nobody I knew to be a Communist; no, sir.



Mr. MORRIS. You did know Mary Jane Keeney after that time?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any reason to believe that Mary Jane Keeney is a Communist?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Or has been a Communist at any time since January 1, 1942?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, have you performed any act that is overtly anti-Communist that you would like to let this committee know about?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, I have. In speaking before seminars I have been extremely critical of Soviet Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything of record that you can give this committee by way of—

Mr. JONES. Unhappily, there is no printed record; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with facts about subversive activity at any time?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You have never gone to the FBI?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever gone to any other Government agency to give them facts or information that you may have acquired in your experience?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Jones, right in that connection, without asking you to reveal anything that happened, as to your membership, if such there was, between 1936 and 1942, after 1942 did you ever give to the authorities the benefit of any experience that you had prior to 1942 that might have been helpful to this country in regard to the anti-Communist effort?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn who Louis Budenz was?

Mr. JONES. Oh, I had heard of him back in the thirties.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew him as a Communist?

Mr. JONES. I never knew the man. I knew he was a Communist; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew he was a Communist. Now, how do you account for Mrs. Lattimore and Owen Lattimore in the afternoon session asking you to come up here and take notes on the testimony of a Communist, one whom you knew as a Communist, and as this record rather clearly indicates was a Communist, and when you had been a Communist at one time—asking you to come, of all people, and take those notes? Was it because Budenz knew you?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Budenz?

Mr. JONES. I didn't. I have never met the man, to the best of my recollection. Never met him.

Senator FERGUSON. But you knew him, to see him?

Mr. JONES. From the press I knew who he was; from the press.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew he had been a Communist. He is a confessed Communist. Is not that right?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you, an ex-Communist, coming and taking the notes and taking them back to Lattimore. How do you account for that? Is it just a coincidence?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. On the ground that it may tend to incriminate you? Have you ever heard of the statute of limitations?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I request respectfully that the witness be instructed to answer the question that Senator Ferguson just asked, and which he refused to answer?

Senator O'CONOR. I will ask the reporter to read the question.

(The reporter read the question, as requested.)

Senator O'CONOR. Having consulted with counsel, will you answer the question?

Mr. JONES. I respectfully decline to answer the question.

Senator O'CONOR. The Chair instructs you to answer, and you still persist in your declination?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You know what the statute of limitations means, that a person cannot be prosecuted after a certain number of years. Do you know that?

Mr. JONES. I understand that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And is it not true that the date that you refused to answer on, in 1942, is a longer period than the statute of limitations?

Mr. JONES. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you ask counsel?

(Mr. Jones confers with his counsel.)

Mr. FANELLI. This is a fact, now. It is not a matter of privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. He says he does not know, and I want him to ask you.

Mr. FANELLI. I don't know that there is any statute of limitations on the 1940 statute. You may answer that you don't know and counsel has told you he doesn't know.

Senator FERGUSON. If you do not know, Counsel, that is all right.

Mr. FANELLI. I know of none that applies to that statute.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not the general attitude one that covers it?

Mr. FANELLI. It is not at all clear. The point has never arisen, Senator. At least that is my best opinion and research on the subject, and I have had to advise him in the light of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, did you ever tell Owen Lattimore that you had been associated in any way with the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not asking you now if you ever had been associated in any way with the Communist Party, but did you ever tell Owen Lattimore that you had been?

Mr. JONES. I will still respectfully decline to answer that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. On the grounds that it might incriminate you, Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you are asserting to this committee, through that claim of privilege, that if you answered that question truthfully, it might incriminate you?



Mr. JONES Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Jones, without telling us what the precise conversation might have been, if such a conversation had been held, did you ever discuss with him any possible membership that you may have had? We do not want what the answer was or what the exact information was that you conveyed to him. But was that a matter of discussion between you two?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the American Student Union?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. On the ground that it would tend to incriminate you? You see, if you do not put that in, that is not sufficient.

Mr. JONES. On the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the American Student Union is or was a Communist organization?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the John Reed branch of the Young Communist League?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let us get this record straight. When you say that, do you mean that you refuse to answer on the grounds of the Constitution giving you the protection if it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the record is clear—you just say you refuse to answer that question. And that is not a sufficient claim of privilege.

Senator O'CONOR. We want to understand that, so as to avoid unnecessary repetition. When you say that you refuse to answer, is that what you mean?

Mr. JONES. When I say that, may it be so understood?

Mr. FANELLI. That is his ground. He is not being disrespectful.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to keep interrupting him, but the record is not clear on that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. There might be a circumstance in the record or hereafter in which the witness would decline to answer for any other reason, so I think that should be made clear.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in Europe in 1935, Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any contact in Europe in 1935 with any member of the Communist Party of any country?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of this witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one question. Perhaps it will lead to one or two more.

Have you at any time in the last 10 years been subject to Communist discipline?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you at any time in the past 10 years knowingly and voluntarily collaborated or cooperated with members of the Communist Party for the attainment of Communist objectives or purposes.

Mr. JONES. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. We have Mrs. Jones here, and I can make it a very short hearing, if you want to finish with this case today.

Senator O'CONOR. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Jones, will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mrs. JONES. I am Mrs. Catesby T. Jones.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been sworn?

Mr. FANELLI. They were both sworn.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. I recall that.

Mrs. Jones, will you just speak out loud, so that the reporter can hear you?

Mr. MORRIS. What is your maiden name?

Mrs. JONES. Alice Ratcliffe Gernett.

Mr. MORRIS. Gernett?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

Mrs. JONES. Chicago, Ill.

Mr. MORRIS. What schools have you attended?

Mrs. JONES. You mean grammar school and high school?

Mrs. MORRIS. Well, high school.

Mrs. JONES. Melrose High School, Massachusetts.

Mr. MORRIS. What college?

Mrs. JONES. Radcliffe College.

Mr. MORRIS. What year did you graduate?

Mrs. JONES. 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever do any graduate work?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you do your graduate work?

Mrs. JONES. Columbia University Library School.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mrs. JONES. Class of 1939, 1938-39.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Have you assisted Owen Lattimore in any way in connection with a statement he may have issued in connection with his testimony before this committee?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do for Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. JONES. I helped assemble and staple a 50-page statement. That was before this committee? The 50-page statement was before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. That is within the last month?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And what else did you do for Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. JONES. I found some mistakes in spelling and helped correct them.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, did you assist Mr. Jones in connection with the effort that he made on behalf of Mr. Lattimore back in August?

Mrs. JONES. You mean taking notes? No.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that they were the only acts that you performed for Mr. Lattimore in connection with his testimony before this committee?

Mrs. JONES. No; I think Mrs. Lattimore might have asked me to get a book or return a book or look up a date in the newspaper, or some-



thing like that, some kind of library research or something. But I did one or two errands, just little dirty jobs it would take time to do—or I don't mean dirty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you live close to the Lattimores?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How close?

Mrs. JONES. About—I think about 3 miles.

Senator O'CONOR. Your address is 5413 Falls Road Terrace in Baltimore?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you work?

Mrs. JONES. Not outside the home.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no reason to come in contact with Mrs. Lattimore, then, in your normal activities, do you?

Mrs. JONES. My normal activity is as the wife of a graduate student.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that take you to the campus frequently?

Mrs. JONES. To return books perhaps.

Mr. SOURWINE. When Mrs. Lattimore asked you to do these little favors, would she do that by telephone?

Mrs. JONES. She might do it by phone, or she might——

Mr. SOURWINE. She would not come to see you for that purpose?

Mrs. JONES. Yes; I believe she telephoned me one time and asked me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever telephone her and ask if "there is anything I can do today"?

Mrs. JONES. I believe I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one instance?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you lived 3 miles away?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you compensated for these little favors?

Mrs. JONES. No. May I say anything more?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, indeed, if you wish to.

Mrs. JONES. I have a little girl, who likes to take a ride in the country. And she would like to go with me on such a ride.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Jones, have you been married before?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To whom were you married?

Mrs. JONES. Robert Leroy McLean.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is he now?

Mrs. JONES. He was killed in service, overseas.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the Library of Congress unit of the Communist Party?

Mrs. JONES. I decline to answer on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments and any other constitutional protection that might be available to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named David Wahl, W-a-h-l?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What were your associations with Mr. Wahl?

Mrs. JONES. He was an employee of the Library of Congress when I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you work for the Government outside of the Library of Congress?

Mrs. JONES. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you belong to any other unit of the Communist Party while you were employed as an employee of the United States Government other than the one in the Library of Congress?

Mrs. JONES. When?

Senator FERGUSON. At any time. While you worked for the United States Government?

Mrs. JONES. For the last 10 years, I have not been a member of the Communist Party or had any Communist connections or associations or activities. And beyond that, I respectfully decline to answer on the same grounds.

Senator FERGUSON. My question was, while you worked for the Government. You had several appointments with the Government. At any time were you a member of any unit of the Communist Party?

Mrs. JONES. For the last 10 years I was never a member of any unit of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that time?

Mrs. JONES. Prior to that time I respectfully decline to answer on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last date of employment with the Federal Government?

Mrs. JONES. 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. What position did you have at that time?

Mrs. JONES. Overseas documentation specialist.

Mr. MORRIS. With what branch?

Mrs. JONES. The Libraries and Institutes. I have forgotten the exact name.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. How long have you held that position?

Mrs. JONES. For about 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you give as a reference for that position?

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give David Wahl as a reference?

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember H. Bowen Smith?

Mrs. JONES. Yes; he was a supervisor of mine at one time.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you ever give the name of Philip O. Keeney as a reference?

Mrs. JONES. He was my supervisor. I might have given him in that connection.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give the name of Edward Stone as a reference?

Mrs. JONES. I believe I did. He was my supervisor for a while.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last see Mary Jane Keeney?

Mrs. JONES. I think it must have been 2 or 3 years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you see her then?

Mrs. JONES. In New York.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occasion of your seeing her at that time?

Mrs. JONES. I was in New York for Christmas.

Mr. MORRIS. And you looked her up?

Mrs. JONES. I believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Or did she look you up?

Mrs. JONES. I believe I looked her up.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you work for the War Department in February 1941?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.



Mr. MORRIS. Did you also work for the Office of War Information?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold there?

Mrs. JONES. In the Office of War Information, I was a P-1, and I have forgotten my exact title.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, did you work in Far Eastern Affairs?

Mrs. JONES. No; not Far Eastern.

Mr. MORRIS. You also worked in the Bureau of Economic Warfare?

Mrs. JONES. The Board of Economic Warfare.

Mr. MORRIS. The Board of Economic Warfare.

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you subsequently work for the State Department?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever work for OSS?

Mrs. JONES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, at any time, in applying for various positions, did you indicate that you had been at any time a member of the Communist Party or any organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Government by force and violence?

Mrs. JONES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you work for the State Department?

Mrs. JONES. From September 4, 1945, to June 30, 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. What were your duties in the State Department?

Mrs. JONES. When I first went over there, I was hired individually as an adviser on libraries.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Who hired you?

Mrs. JONES. A man by the name of Worvill. I mean, he was the supervisor, but then there was a personnel man that interviewed me first. And I have forgotten his name, but I might remember it later.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you give as references?

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember, but I suppose I gave the persons who had been my supervisors previously. I mean, I should think I would have done that.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mrs. Jones, might I ask you if at any time during your relationships with either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore, you discussed with them any possible membership you had either in the Communist Party or in any of its affiliated organizations?

Mrs. JONES. No. That is a very long question, but it is "No."

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the Washington Bookshop Association of Washington?

Mrs. JONES. I belonged to the Washington Cooperative Book Shop.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the League of Women Shoppers?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there such an organization as the Washington Bookshop Association, so far as you know?

Mrs. JONES. I am not familiar with that title.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never belonged to such an organization?

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember any such title as that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never belonged to such an organization, did you?

Mrs. JONES. My experience is of paying \$2 to the Washington Cooperative Book Shop, with the idea of buying books at a discount.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you now about—

Mrs. JONES. Now, I may be wrong, or you may be wrong about the wording. Or I shouldn't say you may be wrong. That other designation may be at variance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Consider the possibility that there is more than one organization with the words "book shop" in it. I am asking you if you ever belonged to an organization called the Washington Book Shop Association?

Mrs. JONES. Well, I would have to say I may have. Do you understand me? You do understand me, don't you?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not sure that I do, but perhaps I do.

Mrs. JONES. Well, I believe that I belonged to the Washington Cooperative Book Shop.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will let that stand. Did you also belong to an organization called the Washington Cooperative Book Shop?

Mr. FANELLI. Did you belong to one organization, or two?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fanelli, if you don't mind, let me ask the questions, please.

Mrs. JONES. I would have to say I don't know, because I am not sure what you mean by the Book Shop Association.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is possible that you belong to more than one organization having the words "book shop" in its name?

Mrs. JONES. No; I don't think that is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you stating that you never belonged to more than one organization having the words "book shop" in its name?

Mrs. JONES. That is my belief.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I am trying to ask.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever secretary of local 28 of the United Federal Workers of America?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long did you act as secretary of local 28 of the United Federal Workers of America?

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember, but it might have been about a year.

Senator FERGUSON. And when was it?

Mrs. JONES. It must have been in 1937-38.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever tell Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore that you had been the secretary of local 28 of the United Federal Workers of America?

Mrs. JONES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever relate to them that you were connected with that union in any way?

Mrs. JONES. With the whole union?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, the Federal Workers of America, Local 28.

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were Mr. and Mrs. Keeney, Mary Jane Keeney and her husband, friends of yourself and your husband?

Mrs. JONES. That is a double question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mrs. JONES. I mean, they were friends of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But not of your husband? Do you mean, there was no social intercourse between the two families.

Mrs. JONES. There was the slightest social intercourse.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did visit once or twice?

Mrs. JONES. Once or twice.



Mr. SOURWINE. I note that both you and your husband remembered the last occasion of your meeting, which apparently was in New York some years ago.

Mrs. JONES. Excuse me. Will you repeat that statement? Because I am not sure that I understand the same thing you do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, it is immaterial. I will start again.

You have stated your recollection of your last meeting with the Keeneys.

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you know that your husband has also stated his recollection of the last meeting with the Keeneys?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, would you say Mary Jane Keeney was your friend?

Mrs. JONES. Was? Has been? Is? I haven't kept up with her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she your friend?

Mrs. JONES. I believe she was my friend.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think she may still be your friend?

Mrs. JONES. Will you define "friend"?

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose you define it.

Mrs. JONES. To me a friend can be somebody that you go around with, or can be someone who is not an enemy. I mean, to say I used to know her, when I used to work in Washington—I haven't seen her for ages.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you sufficiently interested to know that she had worked for the United Nations?

Mrs. JONES. I read that in the paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you read in the paper was that she had been fired from the United Nations, wasn't it?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you know why she was fired from the United Nations?

Mrs. JONES. I don't believe that the reason was given. I think it just said she was fired.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't note in the paper why?

Mrs. JONES. I believe it was an administrative firing of some sort. I mean, it was a sort of a privileged firing or something. It wasn't detailed.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't believe Mr. Catesby Jones has been formally excused yet.

Could I address a question to him at this time?

Mr. Catesby Jones?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones, do you remember reading the newspaper accounts of the firing of Mary Jane Keeney by the United Nations?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you are a former newspaper man, and perhaps you read newspaper stories carefully. Do you remember anything in those stories about why she was fired?

Mr. JONES. I am very sorry, sir. I don't remember the exact reason. Under oath, I just can't venture something out of my failure to remember the reason. I just don't remember the reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Jones, do you know that the United Federal Workers of America has now become the United Public Workers?

Mrs. JONES. Yes; I know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe that that is a union controlled by the Communist Party?

Mrs. JONES. I will have to give a separated answer. I have not kept up with that union for some years, so I don't know what is going on now. To my knowledge, when I did know anything about it—to my knowledge, it was—now, what was your question again?

Mr. MORRIS. Controlled by the Communist Party.

Mrs. JONES. To my knowledge, it was not so controlled.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it influenced?

Mrs. JONES. To my knowledge, I can't say. I mean, I don't know whether it was influenced or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that an answer you have given to this committee in good faith?

Mrs. JONES. I don't know how broad you mean "influence." I mean, if somebody died, it influences the whole community.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any influence?

Mrs. JONES. Influence in the sense of predominant influence, not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was originally: Do you have any reason to believe that this union is a Communist union.

Mrs. JONES. Is a Communist union? Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to believe it is a Communist-dominated union?

Mrs. JONES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know it was expelled by the CIO for Communist control?

Mrs. JONES. The United Public Workers of America? I did not know that.

Can you tell me when? I am just curious.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know. I am just asking if you knew that.

I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say this.

We had subpoenaed here today Robert T. Miller, formerly of the State Department, who has been named as a Communist in our hearings, and we had subpoenaed him to give him an opportunity to affirm or deny the allegation made. We received today from Robert T. Miller the following telegram:

Senator PAT McCARRAN,

*Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Senate Judiciary Committee,  
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.:*

Informed by my wife that subpoena left at my home during my absence calling for my appearance Wednesday. Respectfully request either postponement or new subpoena.

ROBERT T. MILLER.

I would like to call your attention to the fact, Mr. Chairman, that that telegram does indicate that Mr. Miller has notice of the fact that the committee wanted his appearance here today.

Senator O'CONOR. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I just ask one question of Mrs. Jones?

Did you know anything about the fact that your husband was coming down here on the 22d and 23d of last August at the Budenz testimony?



Mrs. JONES. Will you repeat that question?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about the fact that your husband was coming down here to take notes or to be present at the Budenz testimony before this committee?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you learn that?

Mrs. JONES. When did I learn what? That he was going to come?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember, but I suppose it would be the day before. I suppose. I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not come down with him?

Mrs. JONES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know anything about the conversation he had with Mr. Lattimore or Mrs. Lattimore about coming down.

Mrs. JONES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know anything about the work that he did here, the making of notes and taking them there at noon and again in the evening and going to the restaurant?

Mrs. JONES. Not of my knowledge. I mean, I have heard what has gone on today.

Senator FERGUSON. But I mean prior to today, you did not hear about it?

Mrs. JONES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that your husband had read the minutes of the hearing last Friday or Saturday?

Mrs. JONES. The hearing last Friday or Saturday? Read that; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That we had given him the minutes of the hearings last Friday and Saturday and that he read it?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he make any comments about the testimony that Lattimore had given, about what took place?

Mr. JONES. He must have said something, but I don't remember what he said.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you recall at all?

Mrs. JONES. He said, "This must be why they subpoenaed me."

Mr. JONES. I did say that.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that about what you said?

Mr. JONES. That is about what I said.

Senator O'CONOR. With that, we will suspend.

The hearing will be adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 6:40 p. m., Wednesday, April 2, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)





# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senator Smith (North Carolina).

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator SMITH. Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Senator.

Senator SMITH. With whom?

Mr. MORRIS. Robert T. Miller.

Senator SMITH. Will you stand up and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear the evidence you shall give in this proceeding being conducted by a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MILLER. I do.

Senator SMITH. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

## TESTIMONY OF ROBERT T. MILLER, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY NORMAN S. ALTMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Miller, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

Mr. MILLER. Robert T. Miller, 2731 Palisade Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. MILLER. Public relations.

Mr. MORRIS. In what respect do you engage in public relations?

Mr. MILLER. I am a public-relations consultant.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you work for a particular firm?

Mr. MILLER. I consult for a firm, self-employed, but I consult for a firm.

Mr. MORRIS. For what firm do you consult?

Mr. MILLER. Medical Pharmaceutical Information Bureau.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is that office?

Mr. MILLER. New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Where?

Mr. MILLER. 80 Sixty-first Street.

Mr. MORRIS. What has been your most recent employment, that is prior to that?

Mr. MILLER. With Randall Philleys Associates in New York, a firm which no longer exists, public-relations firm.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Miller, at any time have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MILLER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever paid Communist Party dues at any time?

Mr. MILLER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with Elizabeth T. Bentley?

Mr. MILLER. I knew her under another name.

Mr. MORRIS. What other name did you know her by?

Mr. MILLER. Helen John or Johns.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the circumstances of your knowing her?

Mr. MILLER. She was introduced by a businessman whom I knew in New York in 1940 or 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that businessman?

Mr. MILLER. A man whom I know as Jacob Friedman.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that Jacob Golos?

Mr. MILLER. So I have learned to believe. I have been shown a picture of this person who used to be him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Gregory Silvermaster?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony before this committee by Elizabeth Bentley to the effect that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MILLER. I have never read an actual transcript of it; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Miss Bentley has testified before this committee that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MILLER. As far as actually seeing it in a committee transcript, I haven't, so that to that extent it's hearsay, but I believe she did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mrs. Hede Massing?

Mr. MILLER. Hede Massing? No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man named Julian Gumperz? Do you know a woman who was the wife of Julian Gumperz?

Mr. MILLER. The name means nothing to me. No, I don't know them.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a woman who was the first wife of Gerhart Eisler?

Mr. MILLER. No; I have never known any such person.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you do not know of such a person, or you cannot recall such a person?

Mr. MILLER. I do not know any such person.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your association with Gregory Silvermaster?

Mr. MILLER. We were neighbors. We lived in Chevy Chase, just a block or two from there.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been in his home?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions?

Mr. MILLER. I wouldn't remember. We knew them over a period of at least a year or two.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Miller, were you dropped from the State Department for security reasons?



Mr. MILLER. I resigned from the State Department without prejudice.

Mr. MORRIS. I have noticed in the House hearings, Mr. Miller, that a record was introduced at the time which reads as follows:

Mr. Miller is presently employed in the Department as Assistant Chief of the Division of Research and Publications in charge of the Publications Branch, P-7, salary \$7,437.50. The information developed by the FBI in its current investigation of Mr. Miller supports the conclusion that his continued presence in the Department constitutes a strong risk to the security of the departmental functions and to the classified information of this Department. It is recommended, therefore, that his services be terminated in accordance with Public Law No. 490.

Are you acquainted with that, Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. My only acquaintance with that is when Mr. Stripling read it at that hearing. As I said then, I had absolutely no knowledge of it before that whatever.

Mr. MORRIS. Your impression is that your termination of employment with the State Department was brought about by your resignation?

Mr. MILLER. That is my impression. That was actually the case. In fact, I am quite sure I had a paper that shows I resigned without prejudice.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read the testimony of Mrs. Massing in connection with the witness?

Senator SMITH. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the testimony taken before this committee on Thursday, August 2, 1951: (Part 1, p. 243.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, did you know a man named Robert T. Miller?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what you know about Robert T. Miller?

Mrs. MASSING. I know not too much about him really. I met him on, I believe, my second courier trip on a boat. He was on his way to the Soviet Union. I didn't know him then. I met him on the boat and we started to discuss politics. As far as I remember, he was anti-Soviet. I tried, as I tried during those years, to convince everybody that the Soviet Union was the solution to all problems in this world.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this?

Mrs. MASSING. That was probably in 1934. I would not know exactly. It might have been 1935. It must have been 1934. We discussed at great length. He was going on a trip to the Soviet Union quite determined not to like it. I told him that he doesn't understand, that he doesn't know, and I offered to give him a letter of recommendation to Mrs. Louis Fischer, Markoosha Fischer, provided that he take chocolate to the sons of Louis Fischer, who were little boys at the time. There was no chocolate in the Soviet Union and everybody who had a chance to send food in the Soviet Union did, and I told Miller if he would buy a lot of chocolate in Germany, I would in exchange give him a letter of introduction to Markoosha Fischer, who would then show him around in Moscow and explain the Soviet Union. She, being a Russian and the wife of an American newspaperman, was the appropriate person to introduce to him the great secrets of the Soviet Union. He accepted it. He did buy chocolate and he did meet Markoosha Fischer, who took him to the Moscow Daily News, where the indoctrination was completely taken out of her hands because he married an American Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the American Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. I don't know. I heard her name. I don't know her personally. I wasn't there. He stayed on some time, I understand, and left as a Communist. This is all I know about him. I have never seen him since.

Do you remember such an episode, Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. I certainly don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet anyone in Moscow whom you subsequently married?

Mr. MILLER. I certainly did.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you meet in Moscow?

Mr. MILLER. I met an American citizen named Jenny Levy.

Mr. MORRIS. What was she doing at that time?

Mr. MILLER. She was working as a secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Of what organization?

Mr. MILLER. She was working for an American business woman.

Mr. MORRIS. In the Soviet Union?

Mr. MILLER. In Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Did she subsequently work for the Moscow Daily News?

Mr. MILLER. She worked for it before that.

I would like to say specifically she wasn't a Communist then or ever.

Mr. MORRIS. You say she was not a Communist?

Mr. MILLER. Was not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it be possible to work for the Moscow Daily News without being a Communist, Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. Oh, sure, sure; at least well, I certainly shouldn't speak with such authority, but I believe so; perhaps not now, but I think it would have been then. If you recall, that was the period in Russia when there was a certain amount of friendliness developing toward foreigners.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mrs. Louis Fischer?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Markoosha Fischer?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you first meet her? Did you have any letter of introduction to Mrs. Fischer?

Mr. MILLER. That was 20 years ago. I don't think so. I have no recollection of any. The way that was was that when a new American arrived in Moscow there were very few others there and everybody met everybody else quite soon.

Mr. MORRIS. And you cannot recall being introduced to Mrs. Louis Fischer, or Markoosha Fischer, with a letter of introduction such as was described by Mrs. Massing in this testimony?

Mr. MILLER. Absolutely not.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with Elizabeth Bentley, is it your testimony you did not at any time pay Communist dues to her?

Mr. MILLER. It is my testimony that I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is your testimony that you were not in the Communist Party and that you did not know her to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MILLER. Was not and did not know her to be one.

Mr. MORRIS. However, you did know Elizabeth Bentley under another name?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Jacob Golos under another name?

Mr. MILLER. So far as his being identified with the picture that I saw, the man I knew under another name, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might ask a question? I apologize for being late. Does the record show the other names under which the witness knew these two persons?



Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Miller's name came up in the IPR files as someone who had conversation with Mr. Edward C. Carter and Mr. Alger Hiss.

Did you ever have a conversation with Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. MILLER. Yes, I had one.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that conversation?

Mr. MILLER. That was a conversation just about research on foreign affairs and about research in general which I had with him, as I recall, early, probably in January 1947. It was not intended to lead to anything in particular and it didn't. I didn't see Mr. Carter again. We just discussed our mutual interest in that field.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Alger Hiss at that time?

Mr. MILLER. I had just met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the letter in question here is a letter from Edward C. Carter, dated February 5, 1947. It is written to Alger Hiss.

It reads:

DEAR ALGER: Yesterday at your suggestion I had a delightful and illuminating talk with Robert T. Miller, whom I hope to see again. He brought me the good news that you had succeeded Dr. Butler as president of the endowment. I hope this will mean frequent visits to New York, if not permanent residence.

Is it your testimony you did not see Mr. Carter again?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And your testimony, as you just described to this committee, refers to this "delightful and illuminating talk" referred to in this letter by Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. MILLER. It must be; but, of course, if it means anything, I had no idea he was going to write Hiss about this. I didn't really know what that's all about.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever had a partner named Jack B. Fahey?

Mr. MILLER. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a partner in what project?

Mr. MILLER. The Hemisphere project, which published a weekly newsletter of Latin America.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Communist publication?

Mr. MILLER. No, indeed. It was subscribed to, I might say on that point, by practically all, or all American diplomatic missions in Latin America, by many banks, by many Government departments, many business firms.

Mr. MORRIS. When you liquidated that corporation, what did you do with the assets?

Mr. MILLER. We transferred those to Washington—

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "to Washington," what do you mean?

Mr. MILLER. The organization was put under contract to the Coordinator of American Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. And it was taken over by the Coordinator?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any intermediate step?

Mr. MILLER. It worked under contract for about a year or so and then the whole thing was just merged into the Coordinator's office.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else was associated with you on that project?

Mr. MILLER. Well, the other principal person was Joseph Gregg, who was a friend of Jack Fahey's.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Joseph Gregg a Communist?

Mr. MILLER. Certainly not, to my knowledge, and I would have said not.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen any testimony to the effect that he was a Communist, seen or heard of any?

Mr. MILLER. I can't honestly say I remember any; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Jack B. Fahey a member of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?

Mr. MILLER. I don't know. I just don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he serve with the American Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain?

Mr. MILLER. Yes, he did; but the point I am making is that I don't know whether he joined the veterans of the international brigade of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, whatever it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you had any association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MILLER. No, sir; other than that one conversation with Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, do you have any questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. It may be that this point has been covered. If it has, I do not want to inquire. Has the point been covered, Mr. Morris, as to whether in bringing to Mr. Carter the good news which is referred to in this letter of Mr. Carter to Mr. Hiss, whether the witness was acting at someone's request? Let me go into that a little bit.

Mr. MILLER, do you recall telling Mr. Carter of the succession Alger Hiss to the position of president of the endowment succeeding Dr. Butler?

Mr. MILLER. No; I have no recollection of that. I do remember that that fact was around. I gather from this letter—I had completely forgotten the context—that it must have been in the stage of unpublished scuttle butt at that point, but evidently I mentioned it to Mr. Carter. I frankly am surprised that I was the first person to tell him about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know at the time that you were the first person to tell him?

Mr. MILLER. I frankly don't remember it at all. I evidently didn't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how you learned about that?

Mr. MILLER. I don't. I don't; unless it must have been around the State Department.

You see, Mr. Carter, again, to the best of my recollection—I couldn't be a hundred percent certain of this—but, as I recall it, I talked to Hiss, just within a week or two before or after leaving the State Department, about research in general on the basis that he was going into this new job, to see whether he had any plans where any project of mine might fit, and so on, and in the course of discussing research, he mentioned evidently Mr. Carter. My recollection is that he suggested that he was somebody I should see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that why you went to see Mr. Carter?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On Mr. Hiss' suggestion?

Mr. MILLER. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that it was quite natural for you to mention Mr. Hiss' new job when you saw Carter?



Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not a case of Hiss suggesting that you tell Mr. Carter about it as though you went as a messenger, in any sense?

Mr. MILLER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just that you went to Mr. Carter at Mr. Hiss' suggestion?

Mr. MILLER. Yes; and I'm sure that I couldn't have been a messenger, but, again, this is years ago, but I am practically certain there were a number of people in the State Department that knew about Hiss' job at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your reason for bringing it up was not primarily that you thought Mr. Carter might have any interest, but because Mr. Hiss was the man that had sent you to Carter?

Mr. MILLER. Roughly, I suppose; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Ludwig Ullman?

Mr. MILLER. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What were your associations with Ludwig Ullman?

Mr. MILLER. He was living with the Silvermasters at the time we knew them.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been to Alaska in the last 7 or 8 years? -

Mr. MILLER. No; I've never been to Alaska.

Mr. MORRIS. I think they are the only questions we have.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one general question.

Mr. Miller, do you know anyone in the State Department with respect to whom you have any reason to believe that person to be a member of the Communist Party or a person who knowingly and willingly has collaborated or cooperated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. MILLER. No, sir; I do not.

Senator SMITH. Is that all, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Very well.

Senator SMITH. Do you have another witness, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. We have Mr. Frank Farrell.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Farrell, will you stand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear the evidence you shall give in this hearing being conducted by a Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FARRELL. I do.

### TESTIMONY OF FRANK FARRELL, COLUMNIST FOR THE NEW YORK WORLD-TELEGRAM AND SUN, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, what is your present occupation?

Mr. FARRELL. Newspaper columnist for the New York World-Telegram and Sun.

Mr. MORRIS. Where do you reside?

Mr. FARRELL. Hotel Weylin, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the address of the Hotel Weylin?

Mr. FARRELL. Madison Avenue and Fifty-fourth Street.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, were you a Marine Corps officer during the last war?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What rank did you attain?

Mr. FARRELL. I went into active duty status as a lieutenant and subsequently have been promoted to a major in the reserve.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with your duties in the Marine Corps, were you ever on the prosecution staff in the prosecution of Walther F. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could that name be spelled for the record?

Mr. FARRELL. The full name was Dr. Walther, W-a-l-t-h-e-r, middle name was Franz, F-r-a-n-z, last name Heissig, H-e-i-s-s-i-g.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Heissig's formal position in China, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Ostensibly he was a university professor and a scholar, linguist, and a Far Eastern expert on the subject of Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he make his living?

Mr. FARRELL. As a spy for the German High Command while he was in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that as a matter of fact, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; I have records.

Mr. MORRIS. How did Walther Heissig first come to your attention, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. He was arrested by the United States Armed Forces.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was he arrested?

Mr. FARRELL. China theater. He was arrested in Peking, China.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was he arrested?

Mr. FARRELL. He was arrested because he was a member of the German High Command Intelligence, Sabotage, and Propaganda secret underground in the Far East, and because this corps continued action hostile to the United States and other nations of the United Nations on behalf of the Japanese Armed Forces subsequent to the unconditional surrender of Germany up until the final surrender of Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of the official surrender of the German Army?

Mr. FARRELL. May 8, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Dr. Heissig and others continue their resistance after May 8, 1945?

Mr. FARRELL. They continued until the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this group of which Dr. Heissig was a member collectively arrested?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people constituted that group?

Mr. FARRELL. Collectively 27 people were brought into the court room.

Mr. MORRIS. What relative rank within that group did Dr. Heissig hold?

Mr. FARRELL. Outwardly he was a cog in the wheel, actually second in command of the Peking branch of the German High Command Intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that he was associated with the German intelligence?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, in the round up of these people after we acquired information as to what they had been up to—



Mr. MORRIS. You were then with what organization, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. I was on detached service from the First Marine Division on a series of secret intelligence missions in the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. What particular assignment did you have in connection with the arrest of Mr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. At that time I was attached to the Judge Advocate's Office of the United States Army in Shanghai and my particular assignment with them was chief investigator or chief investigative officer of this Far Eastern network of German high command intelligence, and subsequently was named a special prosecutor on the prosecution staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you examine Heissig on the witness stand?

Mr. FARRELL. I personally did not examine him. Colonel Jeremiah J. O'Connor, who was Assistant Judge Advocate conducted the examination.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you act as the assistant prosecutor?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it generally known that Dr. Heissig was in fact a German intelligence officer?

Mr. FARRELL. It was not generally known. It was only generally known that he had some attachment to the consular offices in Peking and among the people in German intelligence they knew he was in some subordinate role, or they suspected he was in a subordinate role.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you come to discover his affiliations with the German intelligence?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, we captured documents, in the first place, a couple of days after August 15 which gave us almost everybody on the staff of what was known as the Bureau Ehrhardt. Senior among the personnel in the branch office at Peking was the name of Dr. Heissig. Subsequently, unknown to Heissig, I uncovered documentary proof that he was much more important in the Far East intelligence network than he posed as, and even much more important than his own German confederates suspected.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that, Mr. Farrell.

Mr. FARRELL. In trying to get rid of records the German embassy in Nanking made one mistake and on account of that mistake some very important papers came into my hands. Among them was one of which I hold a photostat in my hand and a translation in English of the German document.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has described this as a document which was seized by the United States military authorities, a copy of the document seized by the United States military authorities in Peking.

Mr. FARRELL. This document was seized in Nanking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not a copy, Mr. Morris; a photostat.

Mr. MORRIS. A photostatic copy.

Who made this translation, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. I think the name might be on there. It was the United States Army there. There's no name attached to it, but it's a United States Army translation of the original.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the original of this document one of the documents that was used in the trial in which you were one of the prosecutors?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right, and it is part of the court record.



Mr. MORRIS. Under the circumstances, Mr. Chairman, will you receive this into the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 744" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 744

18/42

51/43

5.12.

Heinking  
Feking

Walter  
Frens

Wien

Einbürgerung 1935

Osterreich seit 1935 gottgl. arisch

verh. 1 1941

1913 Dr. Phil., Ethnologe

Karl Staatsbeamter arisch

Helene Pitsch arisch

Aenne Heissig, Darmstadt-Griesheim, Pfützenstr. 25<sup>b</sup>

Aenne Müller arisch D.-Griesheim, Pfützenstr. 25b

Realgymnasium, Univers. Berlin/ Wien Englisch, Mongolisch

SS Berlin

Ers.Res. I

Mai 1941 Wien

Hsinking, Kenkuro Hodo 4044-3344

Wien IX, Hsrlgasse 9

Bezirksamt Wien Wien II

Polizeiamt Wien II 17. Febr. 41 17. Febr. 1943



Beratungsbüro mit Arbeitsstelle

30.11. Peking China 23 Ta Hsiang Feng Htg.

Brigitte

1935-1936 Schützen Rgt. 2 Meiningen, v. 1939 - 1941 bei einem Schützenregiment, Kradschütz Komp. (Panzer Division)

Consular Office in  
Hsinking  
Peking

No.—  
18/42  
51/43

Last name: HEISSIG. First name: WALTER.

(2) First name: Walter. Middle name: Franz.

(3) Birth date: Day: 5. Month: 12.

(4) Birthplace, state ----- Borough ----- County -----  
Vienna.

(5) Obtained German citizenship through ----- foreign citizenship.  
Naturalization 1935.

Former citizen of Austria. German citizen since 1935.

(6) Religion: Believe in God. Race: Arian.

(7) Family: Married. No. of children: Sons: 1 (Year of birth, or death).  
Daughters: 1941.

Year of birth: 1913.



(8) Profession: Dr. Phil., Ethnologist. Present Occupation -----  
 Profession: Father's first name: Karl. Profession: Civil Service. Race: Arian.  
 Died on -----  
 Cath.: Mother's first name: Helene, nee Pitsch. Race: Arian. Died on -----  
 Prot.: (9) Brothers: (Year of birth and death). Sisters: (Year of birth and death).  
 Pg.: Address of the next of kin: Aenne Heissig, Darmstadt-Griesheim, Pfuetzen Street 25b.  
 DUF: Wife's first name: Aenne, nee Mueller. Race: Arian. Address: D-Griesheim, Pfuetzenstr. 25b.  
 Org.: (10) Schools: High School, Univ. of Berlin, Vienna.  
 (11) Foreign Languages: English, Mongolian.  
 (11a) Any connections with branches of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Worker's Party) etc. Date of Entry, leaving. S. S. Berlin. Grade of foreign army service for which qualified: 1st Reserve  
 (12) Special family or commercial connections  
 (13) Moved here on May 1941 from (former residence, state and borough): Vienna.  
 Address: Hsinking, Higashi Jun Jiro 201.  
 (14) Last address in Germany: Vienna 9, Hoerlgasse 9.  
 (15) Member of the NSDAP or affiliated organizations -----  
 (16) Member of German clubs or organizations -----  
 (17) Home Office certificate issued at the Borough Office, Vienna ----- in Vienna 2 on the ----- valid until -----  
 (18) Passport issued at the Police Station in Vienna 2 on the 17 Feb. 41. Valid until 17 Feb. 1943.

## CHANGES AND ADDITIONS

- (1) Address: Moved on the 30.11 to Peking. State—Country: China. Street: 23 Ta Hsiang Feng. no. Htg.  
 (2) Family: Wife. Sons ----- Daughters: Brigitte.  
 (3) Military Service: 1935-36. Rifle Rgt. 2 Meiningen, from 1939 to 41 served in a rifle Rgt., Kradschuetz Company (Panzer (Armored) Division).  
 (4) Club memberships -----

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that document, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. This is the usual form that a person in a foreign country, that is, a German person, would fill out for his embassy. It's a fairly routine record of his name, birth, birthplace, education, parents' names, the schools that he attended, his party connections if any, his last police check with the Gestapo, his current residence, and a brief of his military service that was required by the Third Reich.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any significant bits of information on that document, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. There is one very important line in this document. That's the line which registers him as a party connection with the Gestapo in Berlin.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is that, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. That is on line 10a, where it says: SS Berlin.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that indicate he is a member of the SS Corps?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that Sicherheitsdienst?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes.

In the case which lasted from October 1946 until February 1947, Dr. Heissig generally and specifically set forth that he had no party connection whatever. He posed purely as a scholar and a professor. He belittled whatever espionage efforts he had made in behalf of the German Government.

Under oath on the witness stand he swore that he had never done anything against the United States and absolutely denied that he had any connection with the SS or the SD.



Mr. MORRIS. What is the SD?

Mr. FARRELL. The SD is a German designation for the Sicherheitsdienst, which is the internal corps of SS Intelligence. This was a select group of highly qualified men who were operating under cover at all times, usually as secretaries or attachés, the way Richard Sorge was in General Ott's office in Japan, for the specific purpose of reporting directly to the High Command in Berlin on the loyalty of embassy and consulate personnel, including the ambassador and the consular general and consuls.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you confront Dr. Heissig with that document?

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel O'Connor actually confronted him with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you present at the time?

Mr. FARRELL. I was present at the time and straight on through the prosecution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he admit his SS association at that time?

Mr. FARRELL. He was coldly stunned by the appearance of this document in the trial.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "he was coldly stunned," exactly what do you mean, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Up until that time Dr. Heissig was very self-confident of himself and extremely arrogant—

Mr. MORRIS. Self-confident?

Mr. FARRELL. Self-confident and extremely arrogant on the witness stand. As of the moment this was presented to him for identification and explanation, he paled and seemed to be on the verge of faint.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he admit his associations with the SS?

Mr. FARRELL. He subsequently admitted this document was a genuine document and that the—

Mr. MORRIS. That the facts on it were correct?

Mr. FARRELL. That the facts were correct on it.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he did admit that he had been associated with the SS Corps?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes. He went into no further detail about that. It was interesting to note that upon presentation of this document and revelation that he was actually a member of the Gestapo and of the SD, I would say, most of the prisoners who were in the dock with him were as surprised as German people in the court room who were watching the proceedings.

Mr. MORRIS. How about his co-defendants?

Mr. FARRELL. The co-defendants?

Mr. MORRIS. The co-defendants were surprised at the revelation of the connections of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he convicted by that military court?

Mr. FARRELL. He was convicted by the military court and sentenced to 30 years at hard labor to be served in our military prison in Germany. I forget the designation.

Mr. MORRIS. But it was in Germany?

Mr. FARRELL. It's the prison where the major war criminals are incarcerated.

Mr. MORRIS. During the course of that particular military proceeding, did Owen Lattimore intervene on behalf of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Owen Lattimore's name surfaced in this before the criminal proceedings.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. FARRELL. As early as 1946 when the question of repatriation of certain Germans who were considered detrimental to the interests of the United States in the Far East was concerned, Owen Lattimore entered an almost immediate plea, as soon as the subject of repatriation came up, and the plea was specific for the exemption of Dr. Walter Heissig.

Mr. SOURWINE. How was that plea entered?

Mr. FARRELL. It first came to my attention verbally through the G-2 of General Wedemeyer's staff of the China theater.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean orally?

Mr. FARRELL. Orally; I'm sorry. It was hearsay at first and subsequently I got an oral confirmation of it from the G-2 himself that Lattimore was interested in this man's case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Lattimore made any representations in writing in that regard at that time?

Mr. FARRELL. At that time, I was under the impression that he had, but I wasn't positive that he had written a letter. Subsequently, according to testimony here, Mr. Lattimore testified before this committee that he wrote one letter and that it was not a very strong letter and under no circumstances could it be considered pressure.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that testimony now before this committee, or before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. I am not positive of that. I have the file of correspondence.

Mr. MORRIS. The one that you have in front of you there is the testimony of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. FARRELL. That's the file I refer to.

Senator SMITH. Look at the title page.

Mr. FARRELL. I just changed books. Somebody gave me the wrong book on that when I first came in here.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you subsequently seen letters that Owen Lattimore did write on behalf of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he did write a number of letters, did he not, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. He wrote a great number of letters, apparently.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about your experiences back in China at the time of the prosecution of this case?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, will the Chair permit me an intervention at this point? "A great number of letters," is very indefinite. What do you mean by that?

Mr. FARRELL. It's certainly more than one and I had very tangible indications from my position in the Far East that if there were not letters outstanding there were other communications. Whether it was cable by way of State Department communications, or cable by way of military communications, or courier, I am not aware, but I became painfully aware of Mr. Lattimore's interference in this case.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many letters or communications did you see from Mr. Lattimore about this case?

Mr. FARRELL. Unfortunately, on my echelon, I have no access to general officers or embassy mail.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not have to say whether it is fortunate or not; just how many did you see?



Mr. FARRELL. Well, it was unfortunate in my case because I wasn't able to ascertain where the brickbats were coming from, but actually I did not see any letter while I was in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many letters do you know he wrote or other communications?

Mr. FARRELL. There is a file of numerous letters right here.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "right here"?

Mr. FARRELL. In this book.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the appendix of the reports of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. What pages?

Mr. FARRELL. It starts on page 1881 and continues through 1892, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about those letters beyond what's in that book?

Mr. FARRELL. No; I only know them to be documents submitted by Owen Lattimore, as the file of correspondence that he had in behalf of Heissig.

Mr. SOURWINE. That record will speak with regard to what they are in that record, will they not?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply wanted the record to speak with regard to the great number of communications that you spoke of.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, that may be my fault. I was asking him in connection with these things that he had heard back at the time of the prosecution, that letters had been written, and it was I who asked him if—

Mr. SOURWINE. It is no question of fault. You asked the question as to whether there had been more than one and he said "a great number" and I wanted the record to indicate what he meant by "a great number."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, will you continue to tell us to what extent you had heard that Owen Lattimore was intervening in that case? You have testified that the G-2 did confirm to you that in fact Owen Lattimore had intervened on behalf of Dr. Walter Heissig.

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any other efforts that were being made at that time on behalf of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. I did not know at that time what correspondence was outstanding in terms of type of correspondence or actual numbers of letters, cables, or other communications involved. However, from where I was working, I got a great number of indications that there were many more than one communication involved in Mr. Lattimore's imploring on behalf of Dr. Heissig.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what those indications were?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, in the first place, I heard—and this was through G-2 channels—that Mr. Lattimore had employed Doctor Heissig. I subsequently heard that this had to do with the purchase of books on Mongolia, for which Mr. Lattimore had given him money. Then, I learned that this man, who was an enemy national and listed for repatriation as dangerous to our interests in the Far East and who also was the subject of a war crimes investigation and possible trial

for same, was bearing a letter of credentials from Mr. Lattimore attesting that he was a representative of Mr. Lattimore and Johns Hopkins University.

Subsequently, I found out that Mr. Lattimore had very carefully arranged for this man to have the privileges of our uncensored Army post office out of China by way of the Army's G-2 office with Colonel Mayer on one occasion, with an OSS officer in Peking on another occasion, and there were other references.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you learn these things, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Because I was curious to know how Dr. Heissig was maintaining communications with Mr. Lattimore and fulfilling his obligations. It had to be through official channels because a German national did not have the use of either Chinese mail or United States mail in that country at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know he was communicating with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FARRELL. I did not know it. I suspected it at first and then subsequently I found out from an OSS officer in Peking that he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was: How did you find out that he was using these APO facilities, and you told us why you found out, because you were suspicious.

Mr. FARRELL. I told you how I found out, too. I said by way of an OSS officer in Peking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that tells us how?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, he told me and he was assisting Dr. Heissig. As a matter of fact, he was one of Dr. Heissig's witnesses in the trial, so I think I could take his word.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was testimony that came to you in your official capacity, then?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I was trying to get at.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, is there any confirmation of that fact that you have just testified to among the letters that you have read by Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; I notice two reference to it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what they are?

Mr. FARRELL. Do you want the reference as to the credentials?

Mr. MORRIS. I think if you just read what they are, Mr. Farrell; they are not very long, are they?

Mr. FARRELL. Suppose I read the excerpts that pertain to what I have testified to:

Under date of March 11, 1946, and addressed to Dr. Walther Heissig, at Fu-chen University in Peiping, China, is a letter from Owen Lattimore, in which he notes:

I am not quite sure when this will reach you. I understand that the air mail is now subject to many delays owing to the shortage of crews to fly the planes and therefore I am sure that it is better to wait until I hear of someone who is actually going to Shanghai.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is writing this, now?

Mr. FARRELL. This is Mr. Lattimore writing to Dr. Heissig.

I am also suggesting to Colonel Mayer that he make inquiries to see whether a request can properly be made that you not be deported from China.



And in another paragraph, he wrote that he is sending \$200 for some books that he wanted, and then quoting another paragraph:

I enclose herewith a letter certifying that you are empowered to act as my agent for purchases of books and manuscripts.

That is all from that communication.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any reference to the APO there?

Mr. FARRELL. No, except that he is arranging to send the \$200 to Heissig by way of Colonel Mayer.

Let me see this. Here is a reference in this letter which pertains to how he is delivering books:

DEAR DR. HEISSIG: Your letter of February 7 and the first shipment of Mongol books have safely arrived. I have already sent an acknowledgment to Lieutenant Walton, but did not enclose a letter to you because I was not sure whether he would still be China or might have already returned to this country.

Lieutenant Walton was an officer in OSS in the Peking branch.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there not a letter dated December 27, 1946, there, American Embassy, Rome, Italy, from Floyd E. Mastin, attaché, to Owen Lattimore which reads:

Shortly before I left Peiping last spring, I mailed you some Mongolian books, ones which Dr. Walter Heissig said he had purchased for you. The books were mailed through the APO on April 5. Naturally I'm curious to learn if the same ever reached you. I'm returning to China next spring (May). If there are some contacts I can make for you, I would be very happy to help you.

Does that indicate in any way that the APO was in fact used by Dr. Walter Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time did the use of APO obviate the use of censorship regulations?

Mr. FARRELL. At that time it did, because censorship regulations diminished and disappeared shortly after the surrender of Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Would the use of an APO insure freedom from censorship to anybody using that APO?

Mr. FARRELL. It would almost guarantee it, unless the package was spot-checked by the United States customs coming into the country. I believe the ratio was something like 1 to 100. There were an awful lot of souvenirs being sent home at that time and the customs opened one package out of every so many.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if I might ask a question on this point.

Mr. Farrell, you just read a letter which mentioned credentials furnished by Mr. Lattimore to Dr. Heissig.

Are those the credentials which you testified about earlier?

Mr. FARRELL. Not yet; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you had found out that Dr. Heissig had some credentials. I wondered if these were the ones.

Mr. FARRELL. These are the ones that I referred to; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anything in these credentials to purport to show that Dr. Heissig was representing not only Owen Lattimore, but also the Johns Hopkins University?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; it's here, if I may read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. FARRELL. Owen Lattimore enclosed with the letter of March 11, 1946, which we have just discussed, another letter dated also March 11, 1946. It is addressed:

*To Whom It May Concern:*

This is to certify that Dr. Walter Heissig is fully empowered to act as my agent in the purchase of Chinese, Japanese, Mongol, Manchu, and other books and manuscripts.

(Signed) OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,  
 The Johns Hopkins University.*

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will these letters be inserted in the record?

Senator SMITH. They will be inserted.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 745-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 745-A

FU-JEN UNIVERSITY,  
*Peiping, 7th February 1946.*

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*Johns Hopkins University, North Charles Street,  
 Baltimore, Maryland, U. S. A.*

DEAR SIR: I hope you have already returned safely to the United States. On the very day after our pleasant conversation—for which I wish to thank you once more—I plunged into the business of purchasing books and have already been able to accumulate a small number. At the moment, however, the book market offers a rather meager assortment, because booksellers are holding back until the Chinese New Year festivals are over.

On the 22nd of January I mailed you the first two parcels of books through the kindness of a friend. Their contents you will find on the attached book list. Meantime I have got together, partly through purchases and partly from duplicates in my possession, a complete series of publications appearing in Kailu (given out under the direction of Bokekesik). These I shall dispatch within the next few days. I was also able to lay hands on an extremely rare Koke sudur edition of thirteen volumes, with 1,985 pages. Since those Kailu publications, collectively and individually, were printed in very small editions, they are very scarce and their prices accordingly high. At the next mailing opportunity I shall also send you a set of the Mongolian monthly periodical, Keketuy (Blue Banner), which was published in Manchuria, as well as a few political propaganda magazines from Inner Mongolia.

The purchase and supply of Mongolian prints from Inner Mongolia is complicated and very slow, since this region is still occupied by the Communists and it will be some weeks before direct contact can be made. However, even then it will be difficult to procure successive series of all Mongolian publications, since the Kalgan Press has been dissolved and many books burned.

I have also obtained a big number of new Japanese publications for you and have already included a few small ones in the first two parcels.

I would greatly appreciate it if you could send me some money as soon as possible, since I am now hardly able to cope with the continually increasing book prices with my own small capital. I have made inquiries here and have been given to understand that you can send me any amount of U. S. currency by means of traveller cheques. Please do not send any money through the bank, because then I shall only receive for one American dollar C. N. C. \$500.—instead of the official Peking exchange rate of approximately 1300.—

It would also be of great advantage if you were to confirm, by letter, the fact that you have commissioned me to purchase books for the Johns Hopkins University on this and that scientific field in the Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese languages. Such a confirmation would not only minimize difficulties when purchasing bigger amounts of books from Japanese, but would also facilitate mailing them and would, likewise, have a certain helpful significance for me.

Many years ago you began the printing of bibliographies in Pacific Affairs with the "Personal Chronicle of the First Manchu Emperor" by Fuchs. May I



now contribute thereto with a "Bibliography of Mongolian Publications in Japanese Occupied Areas from 1939-1945," which is on the verge of completion and will be sent you in the near future. It not only contains dry titles but also brief historical introductions to every section.

Of those books already sent you, I would like to recommend to your special attention the last chapter in *Mongyol un uysayatan kiged teuke sudur* about the autonomic development of Inner and Outer Mongolia, because therein the Japanese viewpoints are clearly recognizable. Also of interest is the Japanese propaganda magazine, "*Tabin on-u Qoyinaki mongyol ayimagan*" (The Mongol Tribes after Fifty Years), wherein valuable material for a history on Japanese politics in Mongolia and their plans is contained.

Once again my very best thanks for the interesting conversation in the Hotel de Wagon Lits. Please acknowledge receipt of the first two parcels of books.

In the hope of hearing from you shortly, I remain, dear Sir,

Yours respectfully,

W. HEISSIG.

Contents of first two parcels:

- 1 Ex. *Tusimei-un jasay-un ciqua-yi quriyaysan bicig*. (Administration), 36 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Yeke jegun aziya-yin bayiduyan* (Propaganda), 67 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Ayimay qubiyaysan jakidal-un bicig*. (Administration), 162 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Lu oboytan-u jokiyaysan baya keuked-un ugulel-un bicig* (Education), 118 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Gung-un juu-yin gegen-u suryal* (Lamaistic), 33 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Yurban bodylya kemeku bicig* (32 pg.) (Education).
- 1 Ex. *Tabin on-u qoyinaki mongyol ayimagan* (Pol. Propaganda), 250 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Sine jil-un qous uyangya* (Folklore), 36 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Eng-un medel-un jayun setub* (Pol. Propaganda), 95 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Boyda-yin suryal-i senggregulku bicig* (History), 162 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Oyirod-un galdan bosuytu qayan-u teuke* (History), 16 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Mongyol usug-un yosun i todorqayilan altan toli* (Grammar), 18 pg.
- 1 Ex. *Mongyol-un ysayatan kiged teuke sudur* (Modern History), 259 pg.
- 1 Ex. (in Chinese) (Lit. History), 161 pg.
- 1 Ex. (in Chinese) (Chrestomatie), 82 pg.
- 1 Ex. (in Chinese) (History), 206 pg.
- Total: 16 Vol.—US \$11.50.

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EXHIBIT No. 745-B

MARCH 11, 1946.

Dr. WALTHER HEISSIG,

*Fu-jen University, Peiping, China.*

DEAR DR. HEISSIG: Your letter of 7 February and the first shipment of Mongol books have safely arrived. I have already sent an acknowledgement to Lt. Walton, but did not enclose a letter to you because I was not sure whether he would still be in China or might already have returned to this country. I am now writing to tell you how much I appreciate your energy and promptness in sending me such interesting material immediately. I am arranging to send you U. S. \$200 through Col. William Mayer, who is an officer on the Headquarters Staff of General Wedemeyer in Shanghai \* \* \*. I am not quite sure when this will reach you. I understand that the air mail is now subject to many delays, owing to shortage of crews to fly the planes, and therefore am sure that it is better to wait until I hear of someone who is actually going to Shanghai. I am also suggesting to Colonel Mayer that he make inquiries to see whether a request can properly be made that you not be deported from China. \* \* \*

In addition to the initial sum of \$200 which I am sending I shall of course be prepared to send further funds for book purchases as soon as you let me know the amount you need. The first shipment is excellent in character and shows that you fully understood the range of my interests. I am just as much interested in material of a propaganda character as I am in historical and literary material, since one of my purposes is to attempt to reconstruct as far as possible the Japanese propaganda and political approach toward the Mongols. I am also interested in any statistical and factual material on population, economics, trade, etc.

I enclose herewith a letter certifying that you are empowered to act as my agent for purchases of books and manuscripts.



With regard to bibliographical articles in Pacific Affairs I shall be glad to recommend your "Bibliography of Mongolian Publications in Japanese Occupied Areas 1939-1945" to the present editor of Pacific Affairs. I myself have had no connection with Pacific Affairs since 1941, but of course I am still closely in touch with the Institute of Pacific Relations and I think I can assure you that the present editor will be interested in your material.

Please give my respects to Dr. Fuchs.

Thank you again most cordially for your promptness and energy.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

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EXHIBIT No. 745-C

MARCH 11, 1946

*To Whom It May Concern:*

This is to certify that Dr. Walther Heissig is fully empowered to act as my agent in the purchase of Chinese, Japanese, Mongol, Manchu, and other books and manuscripts.

OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,  
The Johns Hopkins University.*

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EXHIBIT No. 745-D

12 FANG CHIA HUTUNG,  
AN TING MEN NEI,  
*Peiping, June 6, 1946.*

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: May we ask for your assistance in an urgent matter which concerns all scholars of the Far East. Dr. Walter Fuchs and Dr. Walther Heissig have been ordered deported to Germany and will be interned on June 10, prior to their departure. Local foreign and Chinese scholars are doing everything in their power to have their deportation at least delayed. But after careful investigation we have found that the final decision will, in some curious way, rest with our State Department.

Both Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig have been appointed to professorships at Yenching University: Dr. Fuchs, Professor of Manchu, and Dr. Heissig, Professor of Mongol. President Leighton Stuart has personally appealed to the Chinese authorities to retain both men here.

We have been authoritatively informed that the future careers of these men and their continued usefulness for Far Eastern studies depend upon the opinion which American scholars express to the State Department. We have cabled Dr. William Hung, who is at present at Harvard, and we hope he has already communicated with you. Dr. Hung is fully acquainted with the local situation, and before leaving China in the spring did all he could to help these men. Dr. Stuart's support of them should be ample proof that they in every way deserve the support of American scholars.

We hope that you will intercede immediately with the State Department to forestall this deportation which would deprive us of two outstanding experts. Their inclusion in the deportation list can be based only on oversight or faulty information. It is up to us, their American colleagues, to correct that mistake before it is too late. We have good reason to believe that the State Department will attach great weight to your opinion in this matter, owing to the Department's increased interest in the development of Far Eastern studies.

We are writing on this matter to Professors Goodrich, Lessing, Hummel, and Gardner. If you know of other scholars willing to appeal to the State Department in this matter, we should be very grateful to you for sending this information to them.

Yours truly,

ARTHUR F. WRIGHT.  
MARY CLABAUGH WRIGHT.



## EXHIBIT No. 745-E

HARVARD-YENCHING INSTITUTE,  
Cambridge, Mass., June 19, 1946.

PROFESSOR OWEN LATTIMORE,  
Walter Hines Page School,  
Baltimore, Md.

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: I arrived in Cambridge about two weeks ago and shortly after my arrival I received a cablegram from Mr. Arthur F. Wright in Peiping. It was stated that Dr. Walter Fuchs and Dr. Walter Heissig were in danger of immediate deportation from Peiping to Germany. It was suggested that American scholars interested in Far Eastern studies be mobilized to intercede with the American Department of State on the behalf of these two scholars.

Dr. C. S. Gardner, to whom I have shown the cablegram, expresses his kind interest in the matter and has already written to the Secretary of State and will probably communicate with you as well as other American scholars interested in Chinese studies.

I have now received a letter from Mr. Wright dated June sixth, in which he gives more detail about the matter. It seems that Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig were to be interned on June tenth, to be shipped to Tangu and then to Shanghai, until they were to leave China. Chinese and foreign scholars in Peiping have been doing everything in their power to have their deportation at least delayed, "but after investigation," says Mr. Wright, "We have found that the final decision will in some curious way rest with our State Department."

When I was in Peiping I had already heard rumors about the possible internment of Drs. Fuchs and Heissig. I tried to get some of the Chinese authorities interested in these two scholars and I thought they would be safe from then on. The new turn of events is indeed a surprise to me.

I may state that to the best of my knowledge these two scholars had more or less nominal connections with the Nazi Party, but their interests and activities during the period they have been in China were confined only to scholarly pursuits. Dr. Fuchs is a German sinologist especially gifted in Manchu literature. Dr. Heissig is an Austrian Mongolist. He is probably not as well known as Dr. Fuchs. His recent papers are mostly published in *Monumenta Serica*. According to Mr. Wright's letter, Dr. Heissig's long book on the Genghis Khan Epic appeared on the fourth of June. Of course, I have not seen the book.

Mr. Wright is a Fellow of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. He and his wife were both interned by the Japanese in Weihsien. They were not released until after the Japanese had surrendered.

Dr. Gardner is of the opinion that it would be perhaps better not to have an organized petition to the State Department. It would be better for each scholar interested in the question to write individually to the State Department. I am inclined to agree with Dr. Gardner, and it is my hope that you may do something to help.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM HUNG.

## EXHIBIT No. 745-F

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,  
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES,  
Berkeley, Calif., June 19, 1946.

MR. OWEN LATTIMORE,  
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I enclose a letter I wrote to Mr. Vincent which I hope is self-explanatory. I wonder whether you would join the group of American scholars who are trying to stave off the worst from these two men. I learned today that the repatriation has been postponed for some time so it would not be too late to take action on their behalf.



I understand that you have inquired after Dr. Heissig. All I know about him is contained in the enclosed letter. If you wish to have a list of his publications I can supply it. Today I received a volume of several hundred pages published by him (it is just off the press) entitled, "Bolus Erike." It is a Mongolian chronicle of the 18th century. I am preparing a review of it for the JAOS. Professor Boodberg authorizes me to state that he shares my views regarding the scholarship of both Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig.

I hope that you, Mrs. Lattimore, and David are enjoying the best of health. It would be pleasant to have some news of you.

I am scheduled to give a series of lectures for the Lowell Institute in the last half of October and the first two weeks in November. Following the lectures I plan to go to China on the first ship sailing after November 15th. I will stay in China until August or September of 1947, at which time I shall resume my duties at this University. I am looking forward to the trip to China and hope that the political situation will not interfere with my work there.

With kindest regards to you and all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

F. D. LESSING.

(1) Author: Rasipung Suy.

Ansd.: 13 July 46, Sydney, N. S.

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EXHIBIT No. 745-G

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,  
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES,  
Berkeley, Calif., June 17, 1946.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,  
*Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs,  
State Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. VINCENT: My colleague, Dr. Woodbridge Bingham, has permitted me to use his name in introducing myself to you.

I have just received a letter from Mr. and Mrs. Arthur F. Wright, dated Peiping, June 6, to the effect that two scholars, Dr. Walter Fuchs, a German, and Dr. Walther Hessig, an Austrian, residents of Peiping, China, are going to be repatriated within a few days. I am anxious to join the group of American and English scholars who have appealed or will appeal to the State Department on behalf of these two men.

I have known Dr. Fuchs for twenty-two years and I have not the slightest doubt as to his scholarly and personal qualifications. I met him first in 1924 when he was an assistant in the Far Eastern Department of the Museum für Volkerkunde in Berlin, where he had a very fine record. Since that time I have followed his scholarly development with growing respect. I have read his many contributions in the field of Sino-Manchu studies and I share the admiration of my American colleagues who have had an opportunity to use these works. Among these persons I wish to cite Professor Knight Biggerstaff, of Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, whose sound judgment can be relied upon.

My personal relations with Dr. Fuchs have been merely sporadic, but I have always regretted that a closer contact was not possible. As to his political activities I cannot make a statement based on personal observation, but I have indirect evidence which leads me to believe that he has never harbored pro-Nazi views. I base this opinion also on my acquaintance with his family. I have reason to believe that his antecedents would have prevented him from siding with the enemy.

I do not know Dr. Heissig personally, but I have received several letters and reprints of his articles from him since December of last year. The letters furnish me with a clear picture of his scholarly achievements and projects so far, and the reprints give me a clear insight into his methods. I am impressed with the soundness and erudition as demonstrated by his writings, and I am sure that we can expect from him many important contributions in a much neglected field. He is about 35 years old. People who know him speak very highly about his moral character and personality.

To send these people back to what was formerly Germany and Austria would be tantamount to wrecking their scholarly careers and depriving American and international scholarship of the results of a highly specialized but very important work in a field in which they are generally recognized authorities. I understand that very few, if any, collections of Oriental books and manuscripts



are left in Central Europe for the pursuance of research, and it is imperative for the continuance of their research that they have access to original sources.

I wonder whether it would not be better to secure, in some form or other, their cooperation in the development of Oriental studies in this country, or in an American institution in the Orient. I feel that the problems of the postwar period especially in Orientology are so pressing and the scarcity of experienced workers is so great that no honest, well-trained worker can be spared, and we just cannot afford to waste the life work of anyone qualified and ready to work with us. The very fact that judicious Dr. Leighton Stuart has singled out these two men and appointed them professors at Yenching University should vouchsafe for their reliability and capability.

I trust that it will be possible for you to take immediate action on behalf of these two men.

Very sincerely yours,

FERDINAND D. LESSING,  
*Agassiz Professor of Oriental Languages.*

EXHIBIT No. 745-H

MUSQUASH LAKE, MAINE, 21 June 1946.

MR. JOHN KULLGREN,  
2800 Woodley Road NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN: We are on our way through to Nova Scotia, and yesterday in Bangor we picked up a batch of mail, in which was your letter, mentioning Torgny's MS and also Heissig and Fuchs. I was very much relieved to hear the Obergs had got the money I sent them, and I hope I shall be able to find a publisher for the MS, though on a thing like that you never know. I very much appreciate your taking the trouble to bring the MS.

You must have had a fascinatingly interesting time, staying in Peiping as much as three weeks. I was there only three days, and wasn't nearly satisfied.

About Heissig and Fuchs, I'll write to the State Department. I don't feel that I can give a *carte blanche* recommendation for the clearance of men when I don't know yet whether the military have cleared them. However, in the case of Heissig I had already cabled Chu Chia-hua, Minister of Education. The Chinese certainly need scholars in Manchu and Mongol; and if Yenching is willing to offer them jobs, so much the better, as their work will also be available to American scholarship.

We'll be back in Baltimore about August 1.

With regards to both you and your wife,

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745-I

MUSQUASH LAKE, MAINE, June 21, 1946.

MR. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,  
*Division of Far Eastern Affairs,*  
*Department of State, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR JOHN CARTER: We are on our way through to Nova Scotia, and in Bangor yesterday a batch of mail caught up with us. In it were letters from John Kullgren, who is, I believe, still a civilian employee of the War Department, and from Arthur F. Wright, writing from 12 Fang Chia Hutung, An Ting men nei, Peiping—both writing about the cases of Walter Fuchs and Walther Heissig, the first a German scholar in Manchu (and in several other languages), and the second a German scholar in Mongol.

Both men have been accused of Nazi intelligence activities in the part of China occupied by the Japanese, where they spent the war years. Fuchs, however, has now been offered a professorship in Manchu at Yenching University, and Heissig a professor in Mongol. President Leighton Stuart of Yenching has interested himself on behalf of both men.

Fuchs and Heissig are, however, both liable to deportation from China by the Chinese Government. The question is whether American scholars should show an interest on their behalf, and express their interests to the Department of State.



My feeling is that political clearance of these men depends primarily on the opinion of them formed by the Army's investigators in China. Without knowledge of their views, I should certainly not recommend the admittance of either man to America. On the other hand, I can see good reasons why both men should be allowed to stay in China. The Chinese are seriously short of men trained in the Manchu and Mongol languages. If these two men can be employed at Yenching, their work will be accessible to American scholarship also.

Since Leighton Stuart has already interested himself in their behalf, I believe that a favorable expression of interest on the part of the American Embassy would be appropriate.

Regards to Betty. We'll be back about August 1.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745-J

JANUARY 23, 1947.

Ambassador LEIGHTON STUART  
*American Embassy,  
Nanking, China.*

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: A friend has shown me a clipping from a Shanghai paper, already several months old, indicating that at that time Walter Heissig had not yet been either cleared or sentenced as a Nazi. This news was a surprise to me, as I had earlier heard that he had already been repatriated to Austria. Because I believed he was no longer in China, I had taken no further steps to help him; but if he is still in China, and if you should think that he deserves help, I should be glad to do anything further in my power.

My attitude in the matter is that I do not want to do anything to help any man who was a genuine Nazi. I do not, however, believe in persecuting people who merely because they were in a position where they were under the control of Nazis complied enough to "get by." The newspaper clipping which I saw indicated that you were sufficiently convinced of Heissig's good character to offer him a position at Yenching.

I am glad to have this opportunity to tell you how much I admire the teamwork between you and General Marshall. I am convinced that we may yet see a coalition Government in China in which "coalition" does not consist of the appointment of powerless men who are only nominally not members of one dominating party, and does consist of the grant of proportionate power as well as proportionate representation to all major political movements and regional interests in China.

Wishing you every success.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745-K

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
*Nanking, February 7, 1947.*

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,  
The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.*

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I have your letter and am writing at once to explain that I had made active efforts on behalf of Walter Heissig before coming into my present post. This was based on what I had known of him and had learned from others who knew him better. When, however, the American military authorities demanded his detention for investigation because of information they had, there seemed nothing more that I could do. I understand that the inquiry was as thorough and impartial as would be expected under these circumstances, but I have no inside knowledge as to the evidence against him.

Thanks for your kind words about what General Marshall and I have been attempting. It was no slight compensation in all these difficulties to have the opportunity to know him at close quarters. I wish it were possible to discuss these problems with you and in the light of the latest developments benefit by your opinions.

With warm personal regards.

Very sincerely yours,

LEIGHTON STUART.



EXHIBIT No. 745-L

JANUARY 23, 1947.

Mr. FLOYD E. MASTEN,  
*American Embassy, Rome, Italy.*

DEAR MR. MASTEN: Many thanks for your letter of December 27. I am delighted to have this opportunity of thanking you for the Mongolian books which you mailed to me on behalf of Dr. Walter Heissig. I am also glad to know that you are going back to China again. Since you have imperiled yourself by making the offer, I shall almost certainly pester you with requests of one kind or another. After the great difficulty of publishing books and research work during the war in China, a number of good publications are beginning to come out, and I am anxious to get hold of those which deal with Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria.

I should appreciate it very much if you would write me your frank opinion of Dr. Heissig. He made a very favorable personal impression on me on the one occasion on which I saw him; but it is always possible to be fooled. I have tried to help him as far as I could on the question of being repatriated from China. My feeling is that as a German he was in a position where he had to comply with requests for reports when these were demanded of him. On the other hand, the volume of scholarly work which he produced while in China would indicate that he did not have much time left over for spying. My attitude in such matters is that I see no need for persecuting people whose choice was between martyrdom and stringing along with the Nazis who had control over them. I like to be cautious, however, because I decidedly am not interested in helping to save the skins of people who really believed in the Nazi cause and really worked to make it succeed.

Your very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745-M

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
*American Embassy, Rome, Italy, 27 Dec. 46.*

Dr. OWEN LATTIMORE,  
*Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.*

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: Shortly before I left Peiping last spring, I mailed you some Mongolian books, ones which Dr. Walter Heissig said he had purchased for you. The books were mailed through the APO on April 5. Naturally I'm curious to learn if the same ever reached you. I'm returning to China next Spring (May). If there are some contacts I can make for you, I would be happy to help you.

My address in China will be % American Consulate General, Shanghai, China.

Very truly yours,

FLOYD E. MASTEN, *Attaché.*

(Return address on envelope:) Floyd E. Masten, Am. Embassy #1, P. M., N. Y., N. Y., APO 528.

EXHIBIT No. 745-N

DEARING FARM,  
*Bethel, Vermont, July 12, 1948.*

Dr. WALTHER HEISSIG,  
*(13b) Landsberg (Lech), Hindenburgring 12,  
 American Zone, Germany.*

DEAR DR. HEISSIG: Your letter of June 9 has reached me safely and I am delighted to be in touch with you again. I am particularly encouraged to know that in spite of all difficulties you are able to some extent to keep up your Mongol studies. I shall of course continue to keep in touch with your case, though I must frankly say that my influence is extremely limited.

I am writing this from the country, where I was working for the summer. Consequently, I do not have most of my Mongol books with me. The Japanese book about Old Stone Monuments in Manchuria may be with some other Japanese books which I lent to a colleague who reads Japanese. I am writing to Baltimore to see if he can identify the book. If so, I shall ask him to have photostats made of the two inscriptions which you need. Otherwise, this may have to wait until I get back to Baltimore at the end of August.



I was out in California 2 weeks ago, and there had a very pleasant visit with Arthur and Mary Wright.

Yours very sincerely,

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EXHIBIT No. 745—O

(13b) LANDSBERG (LECH) HINDENBURGRING 12,  
June 9, 1948.

Dr. OWEN LATTIMORE,

*W. Hines Page School of International Relations,  
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.*

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: Thank you so much for your kind letter which I received the other day. I am very thankful that the interest you have shown on my behalf and I sincerely hope that your efforts will prove successful.

I was greatly relieved by your information that you received all books purchased formerly at Peking. That I could not finish my biography of all the Mongol modern publications published during the war makes me feel sorry. But there remained many other things I could not finish. But Lowenthal's information is right: I am able to keep my knowledge intact. I am working in a very limited way during my leisure on the biography of the Lamaist missionary Neyici toyin who was in the seventeenth century the great adversary of Shamanism in eastern Mongolia. I have with me the Peiping xylograph of his Mongol biography and am transcribing and editing it, as well as preparing an English translation. The problems arising from it are fascinating: it is the only Mongol authentic source which tells us about the ways in which the subjugation as well as amalgamation of Shamanism has been done. But as long as I am here nothing final is to be expected.

It might be of some interest to you that Messrs. Roever, Reel, and Donovan, Attorn. Boston, Pemberton-House, Pemberton Square, will file or have already filed a habeas corpus writ for the whole case in which I am involved. Besides that it was sent to Judge Sears, International Institute of Buffalo, 610 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo 2, N. Y., Judge of the Appellate Court of the State of New York and a former presiding judge at Nuremberg, an elaborate statement about the particular phase of the Peiping group. I do not know what Judge Sears undertook, as we have no answer. It may interest you to contact Judge Sears and obtain the brief for further information.

In the last paragraph of your letter you proclaimed your willingness to do something for me. My chief aim is to leave my present whereabouts in order to proceed in my research work. The present ratio of nourishment in Germany does not help to remain fit for work, however. I may ask you in the next weeks to help me in obtaining some material concerning the seventeenth century in Mongolia.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

P. S.—Amongst the books I have purchased for you was also a small booklet in Japanese language about Old Stone Monuments in Manchuria. It deals about two stone inscriptions concerning early Lama missionaries in Mandju, Mongol-Tibet, dated 1638 and 1658. Of the text of these two inscriptions I urgently would need fotostates. Could you kindly arrange that for me?

HEISSIG.

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EXHIBIT No. 745—P

LANDSBERG (LECH) HINDENBURGRING 12,  
14.111.49.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,

*Johns Hopkins University,  
Baltimore.*

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I feel ashamed that I trouble you again with a letter within such a short time. Yet I think it necessary to inform you about the present state of my affairs because you showed all the time such friendly interest in my fate.

Developments here in Germany were the following:

(1) Few weeks ago a Reviewing Board under Judge H. Piethford, of the Judge Advocate Office, Munich, reviewed the Nanking Case by order of the



War Department as well as of the Judge Advocate General, Heidelberg. The results of this review were: (a) All prisoners convicted in the Nanking case (amongst them I) are *not guilty*; (b) did not commit any war crime; (c) would not have committed a war crime even assuming all facts charges with were true.

(2) Result of this review were handed over to JAG Heidelberg, where a Colonel Fleischer is the officer in charge of this case. He promised to deal with this case within the next weeks. Colonel Fleischer informed at March 3d, 49, a spokesman of the Evangelical Churches, that General Clay does not intend to intervene in the form of clemency and that instead of it the outcome of our procedures before the Circuit Court of Washington concerning habeas corpus will be waited for.

Development in U. S. A. were the following now:

(1) Our lawyer, Mr. Frank Reel (Roever, Reel, and Donovan, Boston, Pemberton House), filed an appeal against the denial of habeas corpus with the Washington Court of Appeal. There was already one session, in which the president of the court declared that he was much more bothered about the legal situation uncovered there than he had ever expected to be. Final decision is still pending.

(2) In the cause of this procedure our lawyer had to publish all legal material pertaining the question of jurisdiction, etc. Amongst them were some very peculiar documents from the side of the respondents, i. e., Mr. Royall, Forrestal, etc. From these documents, held until now as restricted or secret material, but uncovered now by the course of legal procedure, the following things could be detracted: (a) the trial at Shanghai was held for purely political reasons. Telegram, April 19, 1946, sent by the China Command to Washington asking permission to start a trial against Germans, has the following passus: "Local political situation makes trial by United States military commission in China strongly advisable" (cf. Respondents Exhibit No. 3).

(b) Upon this telegram granted Washington, War Department, with telegram, July 6, 1946, authority to the United States Forces, China Theater, to try "violations of the laws and customs of war and German soldiers, civilians \* \* \* who are charged with violation of the German surrender terms" (cf. Respondents Exhibit No. 4). Authority was granted to try the Germans "provided the Chinese Government acquiesces."

(c) The Chinese Government acquiesced not earlier than November 26, 1946, to try before an American Military Commission war criminals only who had committed crimes against Americans. At that time I and the other men of the Nanking case were already arrested by the American authorities for several months, served with charges, and the prosecution had at that time already nearly finished their part. When at the beginning of the trial in the early days of October a Chinese defense counsel, Mr. Yang, of Shanghai, asked for dismissal of the accused on the basis that no authorization by the Chinese Government could be shown, the court ruled against him, although at that time existed in reality no such authorization. I, furthermore, have to point out, that Washington had made distinct discrimination between "the violations of the laws and war" and "violation of the German surrender terms," and that the Chinese Government at November 26, '46, acquiesced only to trial of war criminals. Yet we were charged with violation of surrender terms, for which no authorization was given by the Chinese and which constitutes no war crime.

(3) When Mr. Frank Reel, our American lawyer, inquired with the War Department about the finding of the Munich Reviewing Board, he was answered that "although action is being considered, probably in the nature of clemency, as yet no final action had been taken," (letter of Mr. Reel, February 16, 1949). To this Mr. Reel gives the following commentary: "My guess is that the opinion to that effect, that the prisoners did not commit a war crime, even assuming all facts charged were true, may never be published, and that instead clemency will be granted so that the habeas corpus remedy ceases to exist."

In spite of the fact that we legally are already for nearly three years imprisoned innocently and unjustified, nobody seems now willing to take the responsibility for set us free. Public opinion seems to be stronger than justice.

I wrote all this in details to you because I think it is now the time to do something about. Already many Senators and leading people took an interest in this case. It will over a long be impossible to prevent leaking the truth out.

The turning point seems to be that the same person who as Judge Advocate of the China Theater conducted the trial in Shanghai, is today in a responsible position in the War Crimes Section of the War Department. But is it justified that the face of somebody is saved for the price of the fate of 18 men who according to the finding of all law experts are not guilty and no war criminals?



It might interest you, that a professor of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Mr. Ernest W. Puttkammer, working on his own about this case, came to the same opinion as the Reviewing Board at Munich. Now Mr. P. has offered his services, as well as that of some colleagues of his of the University of Chicago, to the Judge Advocate General in Heidelberg for making an expert's opinion about the legal situation.

Thus things from the legal point are clear but nobody wants to take the responsibility—and I am still here and wonder how long that shall continue although it is now black on white that I am not guilty and no war criminal.

The facts I presented to you are no allegations; you can find them printed in the booklets presenting the exhibits for the proceedings before the appellate court. Mr. Reel, of Roever, Reel and Donovan, Boston, Pemberton House, will gladly give you access to this.

I beg you to understand me why I wrote you in such a length. I sincerely hope that there is a way to bring this stagnant situation to a solution. To create a legal scandal is in nobody's interest; there must be a way to solve all this mix up.

I hope you received my letter as well as the paper about Nayici toyin. Please let me know what you think about. Once more, forgive me for stealing so much of your valuable time with this my letter.

Sincerely yours,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

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EXHIBIT No 745—Q

LANDSBERG (LECH), HINDENBURGRING 12.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,

*Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., U. S. A.*

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: Thank you so much for your kind letter of April 20th. I am very much delighted about the news that you shall bring my Neyici Toyin edition to print. I hope it can be done. As already announced in my previous letter, I shall forward to you the final manuscript (which contains only minor changes) within the next few weeks. I am, of course, well aware of the fact that my notes—i. e., the English of my notes—need to be brushed up. But I hope that will make not too great a difficulty.

I have to thank you too for your quick consent to the translations of your two books by Mr. Albricht and me. Would you kindly let me know soon of the results of your inquiry about the copyright situation, as I should like to convey this to the interested German publishers. I hope that the copyright situation will not make insurmountable difficulties, because I have learned that in many cases of translations of American books the copyright situation made no difficulties at all.

Your consent for having the books translated by Mr. Albricht and me is for us a good asset in further negotiations with the publishers. In case it should be necessary, I perhaps shall have to ask for a more explicit authorization to do the translations, yet I do not think it necessary.

In the meantime I think you will have heard from my attorney, Mr. Reel, about my legal situation. Since my previous letter I have learned that a Senate committee, consisting of the Senators Mr. Richard B. Russell, Estes Kefauver, and with Raymond E. Baldwin as a chairman, is going to investigate the legal situation of the whole China case.

And now I want to bet you for the favour to get a copy of your newest book—*Situation in Asia*—which was due for (Ea ar).

Once more, thank you very much for all your kindness, and I hope you will let me know soon more about the possibility of having the Neyic Toyin Monogr. published.

Finally I send you my congratulation to the enlivening of Mongol Studies at your university, which doubtlessly is due to your efforts.

I remain,

Your very sincerely,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

Mr. FARRELL. I was pointing out a series of events which brought home to me that there was pressure and fairly powerful pressure being brought to bear in some very high place in China that caused the amount of curiosity involved in this case, because no sooner was Dr.



Heissig apprehended and confined in the Ward Road jail along with others than a number of propositions were made. One coming directly from Lattimore was one in which it was suggested that Dr. Heissig was a very valuable man on the subject of Mongolia and that he should be released from jail and employed by OSS. I wish to emphasize that this was done in the face of war crime charges outstanding against the enemy national at that time. I wish also to point out that Mr. Lattimore in making this move ignored the fact that this intervention on his part on behalf of Dr. Heissig had to do with the entire war crimes case as it was stacking up because the other enemy nationals who had been arrested and charged as a group would have to be released if we released Dr. Heissig because he was an important enough personality in this general group for us to require his presence in the court room for trial.

There was a letter written to the United States Ambassador in China that came to my attention when I was called up to the Embassy in Nanking by the minister plenipotentiary, W. Walton Butterworth, who informed me that Mr. Lattimore was interested in this case and it seemed complicated.

Mr. MORRIS. Butterworth told you that Lattimore was interested in the case?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Senator SMITH. What was Butterworth?

Mr. FARRELL. He was minister plenipotentiary in the United States Embassy in Nanking at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what positions he subsequently held? Do you know anything about his subsequent movements?

Mr. FARRELL. I had a Christmas card from him in Stockholm. Well, he returned to the United States before I did, and I had a Christmas card from him when he was head of the Far East desk and subsequently I had another card from him when he was in our Embassy in Stockholm, and I haven't heard whether he's changed from there. I don't know his present location.

I explained the case to Mr. Butterworth, and in the strongest terms he asked me to convey a message to the judge advocate in Shanghai to prosecute the case with all vigor.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "in the strongest terms," Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Mr. Butterworth explained to me that he had similar difficulties with Nazi or German enemy nationals in Spain. I don't recall the specific position he had in our Spanish Embassy, but it seems that he was confronted with a problem immediately after the German surrender.

He told me that he could have repatriated every considered dangerous enemy national from Spain back to Germany within the first 2 weeks following the Germany surrender if the Army had given him any cooperation or if the Air Force had given him any cooperation, but failing in that, he was stuck with these people, and the longer they were allowed to tarry in Madrid the more arrogant they became and the Spanish antipathy toward them dwindled coincidentally, so that what originally might have been a justified removal of these people who were going to use Spain as some place not to be extradited from fizzled while he was waiting for transportation, and he



intimated that I could expect the same kind of delays in dealing with the Army and that I was not to be discouraged by it, that he would give me any help that he could.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was his attitude one of ordering you with regard to taking certain action with regard to Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Actually I don't think Mr. Butterworth could have ordered me because this was half in the military province and half in the State Department province and this was an effort to bring the military and the State Department together on one subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was asking you about his attitude, because you said he made this request "in the strongest terms."

Mr. FARRELL. He encouraged it in very strong terms, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was urging it upon you?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, he was urging it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any other efforts that Mr. Lattimore made on behalf of Dr. Walter Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. I cannot say for sure whether he communicated with General Marshall, but I gathered on my next trip back to the Embassy that he did, because I was told by Mr. Butterworth that the general had become interested in the case and wanted full particulars on it, and I suggested that perhaps in dealing with the general it would be better for the judge advocate, who was in command of the operation from a military standpoint, to see General Marshall, and that was done.

Mr. MORRIS. And did the judge advocate see General Marshall?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, he did. That was Col. E. H. Young.

May I point out a quick succession of things that happened that also indicated pressure from above on this case?

Mr. MORRIS. If it is in line with the general questions directed toward you, will you tell the committee whatever you know about what efforts Owen Lattimore made on behalf of Walter Heissig?

Mr. SOURWINE. I might insert one question before he begins that testimony.

Were you told anything by Mr. Butterworth as to how he learned of Mr. Owen Lattimore's expression of interest in this matter?

Mr. FARRELL. Not specifically.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not tell you whether Lattimore telephoned or called someone else, or wrote him a letter or what?

Mr. FARRELL. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can answer Mr. Morris' question now.

Mr. MORRIS. You were going to give more evidence in reply to that question.

Mr. FARRELL. I was going to give a similar example of the worry on the part of our senior command officers as to this case, not because of its merits and not entirely because of its complications, but because of somebody higher than them was worried about it and they wanted to know what their footing was. That's what I gathered in talking to Gen. Ray T. Maddocks, who was General Wedemeyer's chief of staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Morris, forgive me if I might interrupt. I think we need a little closer tie.

Mr. Morris' question was about any other instances you know of of intervention by Mr. Lattimore. You have prefaced your remarks by a statement that you were going to tell about other instances of concern by persons in the Armed Forces because their superiors were in-



terested. That is not quite a close enough tie to show that it is responsive to Mr. Morris' question.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish, Mr. Farrell, you would just restrict your answers to evidence that came to your attention directly or indirectly that Owen Lattimore had intervened on behalf of Dr. Walther Heissig.

Mr. FARRELL. General Wedemeyer's staff G-2 at that time was a Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton and he called Colonel O'Connor, the judge advocate's assistant to his office and said in words, to this effect: That this was a hot potato, that Mr. Lattimore was interested in the case, and that it left the Army in the position of taking the words of a marine captain against the word of Owen Lattimore as to whether Dr. Heissig engaged in the things that he was charged with.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at this interview?

Mr. FARRELL. No; but Colonel O'Connor reported this to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any evidence adduced at the prosecution, Mr. Farrell, that would indicate that Dr. Walther Heissig was guilty of the charges preferred against him?

Mr. FARRELL. May I have that question again, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the question back for the witness, please? (Whereupon, the record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. FARRELL. The United States military authorities, that is, the United States military commission which tried the case, believed the evidence presented and Dr. Heissig was convicted and sentenced.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the evidence presented to the court? Will you tell us about it?

Mr. FARRELL. The evidence presented at the court had to do with a description of the functions of the intelligence organization with which Dr. Heissig was connected. I think I can best and most compactly describe these to you by quoting from the Japanese intelligence officers who took the stand and testified as to what kind of intelligence the Germans were collecting for themselves and for the Japanese high command.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the testimony of the Japanese officers who testified at that trial?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this testimony that you heard, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. This is testimony that is in the court record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you presenting an authenticated copy of the court record?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I am. These are original documents from the court record.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you just generally summarize it for us, Mr. Farrell? We don't need great detail.

This is really a collateral matter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want those documents in the appendix?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I would like them introduced in the appendix.

Senator SMITH. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 744A" and appear on p. 4439.)

Mr. MORRIS. Will you just very quickly tell us the general nature?

Mr. FARRELL. Here are the general functions: Bureau Ehrhardt, German high command intelligence function in the Far East continued activities in defiance of the German surrender on behalf

of their Japanese axis allies. These functions were described by Col. Hidaka Tomiaki, former G-2 in charge of foreign intelligence, China headquarters, of the Japanese Army in Peking.

The principal missions of the organization in Peking were to get all available information on the following:

1. Possible landings of United States forces on the China coast.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this subsequent to May 8, 1945?

Mr. FARRELL. This is before and after May 8, 1945.

They continued in the same operations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, any acts committed before May 8, 1945, would not have been actionable before your court, would they?

Mr. FARRELL. That is true. These men would merely have been serving their government in the capacity assigned to them.

Mr. MORRIS. So anything prior to May 8 should not go into the record at this time because they would not have been crimes for which they would have been convicted.

Mr. FARRELL. No, sir. The Japanese have testified that this is what they were doing before and after, so in entering these functions this is also what German intelligence actively engaged in subsequent to the German surrender.

2. Movements of the United States Air Forces against north China.

3. United States Naval Fleet movements.

4. United States submarine activities along the China coast.

5. Relations between United States and Russia.

6. Relations between United States and Yenan.

7. The Soviet supply route in Northwest via Lanchow.

8. The supply route of the Chungking Chinese armies via Hsian.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, without interrupting, what we would like to have would be a very concise statement of what the evidence was to the effect that Heissig did, in fact, carry on his hostile activities against the United States after May 8, 1945.

Could you not give us just a general résumé of that? We cannot go into that much detail. We have to adjourn shortly.

Mr. FARRELL. He and the others concerned with the Bureau Ehrhardt were engaged in the collection of military, economic, and secret intelligence against the United States and its allies in the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. And individual incidents and individual acts committed by Heissig were testified to during the court proceeding?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; as to what his functions were in the organization in Peking; what was he doing.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the military court find him guilty on the basis of that testimony?

Mr. FARRELL. It did.

Mr. MORRIS. And he was in fact sentenced to 30 years?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. During this period, Mr. Farrell, was there any evidence that came to your attention that Dr. Walther Heissig may have been connected with some Soviet organization?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; there were several instances of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. The first came from the colonel whom I was just referring to.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the Japanese military intelligence colonel?



Mr. FARRELL. Japanese military intelligence chief in Peking, Colonel Hidaka.

He complained somewhat bitterly about Mr. Heissig, looking back after the Japanese surrender, when he realized that for months prior to Russia's entry into the war against Japan in the Far East, Heissig, whom he had counted on as his most reliable intelligence source, had repeatedly assured him that this was entirely out of the question. It must be understood that Heissig was an analyzer of code intercepts and open broadcasts by way of Russia and Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. This came out in testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. In testimony during the proceeding?

Mr. FARRELL. And the Japanese, through their lighter probing along the Manchurian border, had reason to believe that the Russians were mounting an offensive, but repeatedly looking back on the situation, Colonel Hidaka sized it up as being absolutely deceitful on Dr. Heissig's part that he should have tried to persuade him to believe that not only were the Russians not mounting an offensive, but they were, on the contrary, demobilizing.

Mr. MORRIS. So this Colonel Hidaka told you that Dr. Heissig was giving him misleading advice as to the mobilization of Soviet forces with respect to the Japanese forces; is that right?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right, and he suspected that, if not from the beginning of Dr. Heissig's intelligence operations in the Far East in 1941, then certainly for from 6 to 9 months before the Russian attack across the Manchurian border into Japanese territory, certainly during that time he was in some way playing a double agent on behalf of both Russia and Berlin in the same pattern that Richard Sorge had done in Japan.

There was another instance of this from one of the more prominent members of the German community of China, and that was from Baron Ernst von Reichenau, who was the brother of Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he the man who conquered Poland?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Baron von Reichenau had probed pretty deep into Soviet infiltration of the German communities in China, so much so that, at the end of the war, our intelligence agencies established very close liaison with him to procure the information that he had.

Baron von Reichenau said that he suspected Heissig of being a double agent working for both the Soviet Government as well as the German.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he cite any instances to support his conclusion?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes. He mentioned something about an intercept of information that was made along the camel-caravan route across Mongolia which indicated that Heissig had some clandestine contact with Soviet interests on the other side of the desert that Nazi intelligence knew nothing about. For that reason, a Gestapo man named Schmidt was sent from Shanghai to Peking.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. FARRELL. Schmidt, S-c-h-m-i-d-t.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this still part of what Von Reichenau said?

Mr. FARRELL. No; I finished with Von Reichenau.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom did he say that?

Mr. FARRELL. Mr. Schmidt told this to me.

Mr. MORRIS. The Gestapo agent did tell you this?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing at that time?

Mr. FARRELL. He had Dr. Heissig under surveillance as a suspected double agent. Beyond that, a French intelligence officer connected with the French consulate—

Mr. MORRIS. Let me see if I understand that. This Gestapo agent, Schmidt, told you that in fact he did have Dr. Walther Heissig under surveillance in connection with a security check that the Nazis were conducting on Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Which indicated to you that they suspected him of betraying—

Mr. FARRELL. It indicated that the Gestapo chief of either China or Japan was double checking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it merely indicate it, or did Schmidt tell you that Von Reichenau had suspected—

Mr. FARRELL. Schmidt had nothing to do with Von Reichenau.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said Schmidt told you about the Von Reichenau story, or perhaps I am confused.

Mr. FARRELL. I'm sorry if I have confused you.

Von Reichenau told me what I testified to.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to find out. I misunderstood you, I guess, because I thought you said that Schmidt told you what von Reichenau had to say.

Mr. FARRELL. No; Von Reichenau gave me his personal observation.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did he tell you then that he did suspect Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; he did.

Schmidt, I might add, was an unsavory character whom it was generally rumored in the German community in Shanghai had disposed of a German suspect with Soviet connections in the Shanghai community via the American gangster route of being taken for a ride.

After this was done, he had moved up to Peking and when we questioned him there we weren't concerned with what he had had to do with Shanghai police or with his orders as far as the suspected murder in Shanghai was concerned; we were interested in what his regard for Heissig was.

I mentioned also a French intelligence officer in Peking.

Mr. MORRIS. What's his name, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Lieutenant Leouzon. He informed me that I should look into Dr. Heissig's past, it might involve or prove very interesting because he had a long history of double dealing, and that he suspected that he was a double agent during the—I think it was a year before the final surrender—serving both Soviet and Nazi intelligence but he gave me no tangible evidence that I could investigate further in that except that I went back into Heissig's history and found out that here is a highly intelligent Austrian who served in the Austrian Legion, which was an organization that provoked riots and caused incidents that gave the Ribbentrop command its excuse for moving in to quell disturbances.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that show up on any official document that you introduced into the record?



Mr. FARRELL. It shows up in an interesting way in that this man, besides suddenly changing citizenship as of the date—I don't understand German. Is there an English copy?—besides changing citizenship in 1935 and adopting German citizenship, suddenly turns out to be an SS officer almost overnight, which is according to German thinking his reward for having served and betraying his own country, Austria, to the German high command, or having helped to do it.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Dr. Heissig now, do you know?

Is he still serving his 30-year sentence?

Mr. FARRELL. I am under the impression that through the intercession of a number of people along with Owen Lattimore, Dr. Heissig, whom I regard as one of the most dangerous international espionage agents that I have ever read about or come across, is now free in our occupied zone of either Germany or Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Because after the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Shanghai military commission—

Mr. MORRIS. Under which Dr. Heissig was convicted?

Mr. FARRELL. Under which he was convicted—and I am referring to the United States Supreme Court—after the Supreme Court confirmed their convictions and the jurisdiction in the case, in answer to any pleas that came to my cognizance, I believe all the people who were sentenced in Shanghai were released in Germany. I can't say this as a matter of fact, but there again you run into the same thing—if you freed any, you would have to free all, because the sentence in this case ran from life, 30, 20, 15, and down.

Mr. MORRIS. This line of questioning, Mr. Chairman, is directed to what Dr. Heissig is doing at the present time.

Senator SMITH. But now we are getting into a discussion of something else, it sounds like.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you given us your full information, Mr. Farrell, as to the present whereabouts of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes. I don't know specifically where he is, but I should like to call attention to these letters already in your record without my reading them into this testimony—

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any knowledge bearing on the letters that are already introduced into our record?

Do you have any knowledge that will add to the letters that are in the record?

Mr. FARRELL. I have one observation that might be valuable to you, and that is that in this document [indicating transcript] Mr. Lattimore testified that quite by chance and for only a half hour, he met in Peking, China, a man named Dr. Heissig, and became so fascinated with him for some reason that he has spent an enormous amount of time obviously—

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what Mr. Lattimore testified to in that record?

Mr. FARRELL. How is that worded again?

Mr. SOURWINE. What did Mr. Lattimore testify to in that record?

Mr. FARRELL. Mr. Lattimore testified in here—when questioned on whether or not he had written a letter or whether he had been intervened in behalf of Dr. Heissig—he said that he remembered writing a letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say you have some comment on that?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I do.

It is my understanding that this is supposed to be Mr. Lattimore's complete file of correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "this"?

Mr. FARRELL. The letters entered in here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which we have already by reference inserted in this record?

Mr. FARRELL. All of the pages that we mentioned a while ago.

Senator SMITH. Letters in the Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. MORRIS. They are in our record, too, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. FARRELL. This is supposed to be a complete record and this testimony reveals another letter that does not appear in here and it has no date, strangely.

I am curious about the date because it recommends Dr. Heissig's services to United States military intelligence in Germany, a letter addressed to an American general.

Mr. MORRIS. That was General Thorp, was it not? That is the reference to General Thorp in the Lattimore testimony?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge of Mr. Lattimore's dealings, if any, with Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. No, I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if he ever met him and if so, where, and for how long?

Mr. FARRELL. I only know from his testimony that he said he met him for a half hour in Peking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge as to when he met him, where, and for how long?

Mr. FARRELL. No, I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you told us all the instances of which you have any knowledge of intercession by Mr. Lattimore in behalf of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. All except a peculiar incident that occurred during the trial in which a man, whose name I don't recall at the moment, but who was assigned by the State Department as special adviser to T. V. Soong in Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was this?

Mr. FARRELL. During the closing weeks of the trial in either—it probably was December of 1946 or January of 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right; go ahead.

Mr. FARRELL. This man approached one of the members of the United States Military Commission in Shanghai and represented himself as bearing the sentiments of Owen Lattimore and told this member of the military commission that the United States Embassy in Nanking was not in any way interested in this case, and thought the whole thing detrimental to the prestige of the United States in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the member that he approached?

Mr. FARRELL. He approached Colonel Mallan who was the senior member of the court.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who told you about it?

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel Mallan decided that there was something suspicious about this—

Mr. SOURWINE. Who told you about it?



Mr. FARRELL. I am trying to explain how it came to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know who told you about it.

Mr. FARRELL. A conference was called by the judge advocate, Colonel Young—

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know who told you about it. You can explain it afterward.

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel Young. May I tell you the circumstances?

Mr. SOURWINE. Please do.

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel Mallan thought this of such serious and such extraordinary nature that he went to the judge advocate—

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know what Colonel Mallan thought, do you?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I do; as a matter of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know?

Mr. FARRELL. Because he expressed himself in the group that was assembled. The judge advocate called together the entire prosecution staff and the entire defense staff—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hear Colonel Mallan say what he thought?

Mr. FARRELL. I heard Colonel Mallan tell all of us that morning what had happened to him—

Mr. SOURWINE. A minute ago, you said that a man by the name of Young told you.

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, and Colonel Young called us together, and before the meeting Colonel Young told me—after all I was on his prosecution staff—he told me what the prosecution was.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not trying to hamper you or to hurt your testimony, but if you heard somebody tell what his state of mind was, you can tell this committee what it was. Otherwise you have no way of knowing what a man's state of mind was.

Mr. FARRELL. Perhaps I am approaching it obliquely, but when I tried to tell you in a progression, you interrupted me, and brought me back to Colonel Young.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did that because I do not want this record to indicate a deviation.

Mr. FARRELL. Is it straight now?

Mr. SOURWINE. I hope so.

Go right ahead.

Mr. FARRELL. It is straight as far as I am concerned, I think.

Colonel Young called Colonel O'Connor and myself to his office and told us that somebody had approached one of the military commission, ostensibly with a message from the United States Embassy in Nanking that it was no longer interested in this case, and so forth, and that he was calling a meeting of both staffs in the morning to decide what the various lawyers thought they should do about it, whether there should be a mistrial, or a check on whether this message was correct or not.

Subsequently a courier was dispatched to Mr. Butterworth to check with both General Marshall and Ambassador Leighton Stuart, and reassure the court that there was no such—

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, do you know whom he checked with?

Mr. FARRELL. I know that Colonel O'Connor went up to see Mr. Butterworth.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Butterworth said he checked?

Mr. FARRELL. Mr. Butterworth said that he checked and informed Colonel O'Connor to go back to the court and say that there was no truth at all to that, that the attitude of the United States Embassy had not changed with regard to the trial.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Butterworth said he had checked with both General Marshall and Leighton Stuart?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then you heard from two persons with regard to this matter, two colonels?

Mr. FARRELL. With regard to what, this visit?

Mr. SOURWINE. That's right.

Mr. FARRELL. There was another meeting called the following morning—there was a recess in the trial—and both staffs were present and Colonel O'Connor reported back his conversation with Mr. Butterworth.

Mr. SOURWINE. As to the state of mind that we spoke of just a minute ago, you heard the colonel himself express his state of mind?

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel Mallan?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; I did.


Senator SMITH. Is that all?

Mr. MORRIS. I am finished; yes.

Senator SMITH. We will recess, then.


(Whereupon, at 3:45 p. m., Friday, April 4, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)





This is a certified true copy of a diagram of German intelligence sources in Peiping, the services of which were available to the Japanese army in North China. The original of this diagram was given to U.S. Army Headquarters in North China by Colonel Hidaka's Office in Peiping.

/s/ F. T. Farrell  
/t/ F. T. FARRELL  
Capt., USMC





## STATEMENT

Colonel HIDAHA, Tomiaki, former G-2 in charge of foreign intelligence of China Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Peking, makes the following statement of his own free will and desire and without any payment or other consideration therefor:

At the time of the German surrender in May, 1945, we were advised by Tokyo radio that, in surrendering without notice to Japan, Germany had deserted her Axis partner and should be treated as an enemy.

However, as a matter of actual fact, the Germans in the Far East were treated differently. That is because so many important Germans were willing to cooperate with the Japanese. For instance, German Ambassador Stahmer and the German Gestapo Chief in the Far East, Mr. Meisinger, were extremely pro-Japanese. The German firms such as Defag and Melchers in Shanghai offered us their stocks of merchandise.

When the United States Forces took over Defag in Europe I asked Dr. Haas, head of Defag here in Peking, what his sentiments were. He told me that no matter if Defag officials in Europe cooperated with the U. S. Forces, the Germans in China will continue to collaborate with the Japanese.

The German Embassy office in Peking never announced to the Japanese any formal surrender of Germany. I have an opinion concerning this. In my opinion the Germans believed that it was possible for Japan to carry on the war for an indefinite period. During that period it was possible that the United Nations would split or sue for peace with Japan. In either event since (CHOP) the Germans in the Far East had never surrendered formally to anybody, it was possible for them to consider themselves a German Government in exile somewhat like the DeGaulle Government of France when France was occupied. If the United Nations split, suffered reverses, met (CHOP) defeat by some long chance, or if the United Nations sued for peace with Japan it was possible under this unique device that the Germans in the Far East might have been able to salvage something from the severe terms of unconditional surrender for Germany in Europe.

It is my opinion that Ambassador Stahmer and Mr. Meisinger had something to do with such an arrangement in Japan, and that this was the reason the Japanese did not treat the Germans as deserters, that this was the reason for the German desire to cooperate to a certain extent with the Japanese after the German surrender, and that this was the basic reason behind the fact that the Germans in China never formally notified the Japanese Government of surrender.

Although I do not speak or read English well enough to understand this, I have had it translated for me by my interpreter, Mr. Richard Hiroshi OYAMA, and I fully understand what I am about to subscribe to officially.

This statement consists of two (2) pages.

I swear that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection of the facts.

[s] T. Hidaka  
[t] HIDAHA, TOMIAKI.  
[s] (In Japanese characters)  
(CHOP)

Witnessed this 27th day of May, 1946, in Peking, China, by:

[s] F T Farrell

[t] F. T. FARRELL, *Capt., USMC.*

Pros, Trans. Ex. #.

## STATEMENT

(CHOP)

Colonel HIDAHA, Tomiaki, former G-2 in charge of foreign intelligence of China Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Peking, makes the following statement of his own free will and desire and without any payment or other consideration therefor:

(CHOP)

The principal missions of my organization in Peking were to get all available information on the following:

- (1) Possible landings of United States Forces on the China Coast.
- (2) Movements of United States Air Forces against North China.



- (3) United States Naval Fleet movements.
- (4) United States submarine activities along the China coast.
- (5) Relations between United States and Russia.
- (6) Relations between United States and Yen-an.
- (7) The Soviet supply route in the Northwest via Lanchow.
- (8) The supply route of the Chungking Chinese Armies via Hsian and Lohoku.
- (9) The relations between Chungking and Yen-an.
- (10) The military intentions of Chungking and Yen-an in North China.
- (11) How United States assistance to Chungking was progressing via Persia, Armata and the Northwest Route.
- (12) Russian shipping via Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk.

Of course, the German intelligence agency in Peking under Mr. Fuellkrug submitted to me any information it obtained on all of the above subjects. However, the principal missions of the Fuellkrug Office were to collect all available intelligence concerning:

- (1) Russia and her political and military intentions.
- (2) Chungking and her political and military intentions. (Mr. Fuellkrug got his Chungking information by radio interception by use of a head agent who was a former Chinese Government official from Ninghsia who worked agents in and out of Hsian, and from the headquarters of the Bureau Ehrhardt in Shanghai.)
- (3) Yen-an and the political and military intentions of the Chinese Communist Government.
- (4) The Russian shipping out of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, ship to shore communications and communication between Moscow and Vladivostok. All Russian coded messages intercepted were sent to the Bureau Ehrhardt in Shanghai to be decoded and analyzed.

By agreement Mr. Fuellkrug's office gave me copies of all intelligence it obtained and was prohibited from collecting any information concerning the Japanese in North China.

Although I do not speak or read English well enough to understand this, I have had it translated for me by my interpreter, Mr. Richard Hiroshi OYAMA and I fully understand what I am about to subscribe to officially.

This statement consists of two (2) pages.

I swear that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection of the facts.

Witnessed this 27th day of May, 1946 in Peking, China, by:

[s] T. Hidaka

[t] HIDAKA, TOMIAKI.

[s] (In Japanese Characters)  
(CHOP)

[s] F. T. Farrell

[t] F. T. FARRELL, *Capt. USMC.*

Pros. Trans. Ex. #.

11 APRIL 1946.

Major Hidaka, Takashi, former staff officer of the Japanese Chinese Expeditionary Forces in Charge of Information in Nanking, now Liaison Officer between the American and Japanese forces in Nanking, makes the following statement of his own free will and desire without payment or other consideration therefor:

I assumed charge of the information office at the Japanese Army Headquarters in Nanking in April, 1945 and continued in that post until the end of the war.

During that period we received information from ten radio intercepting posts in China, the most important of which were Canton, Shanghai, Peiping and Hankow.

The principal concern of the Japanese was in an American landing on the coast of China and as a result the most important information furnished us was that regarding American Fleet and troop movements.

We received from the Misumi Kikan in Canton much information secured from monitoring American military and naval broadcasts. We were not able to break the American codes so with messages sent in code we kept track of the frequency on which they were sent and kept a record of the number of messages and the number of times they were sent.



During the battle of Okinawa and certain movements of the American Fleet we were able to get reports on the radio conversations between elements of the forces on Okinawa and between warships which were in clear English.

The Japanese did not have high-speed apparatus in Canton so it was not possible for them to pick up much of these American broadcasts. The Germans in Canton under Captain Heise did have this high speed apparatus and furnished us with the intelligence regarding American movements. I never met Captain Heise nor asked him for this information nor expected it after the German surrender. But he continued to furnish the Misumi Kikan with information regarding American Fleet and troop movements.

Upon receipt of this information I would evaluate it and then send it to the Chief of the Second Section (which is concerned with information), who would in turn pass it on to the Chief of Staff. The information would then be given to the Officer in Charge of Operations for action, either in Tokyo or in China. In the event that an intercepting post would get news of immediate importance such as the location of a crippled American airplane carrier in the South China sea, it would send this message immediately and simultaneously to all airfields or battleships who would be in a position to take action.

I neither read nor speak English but this statement has been translated for me by Lt. Kimura, Shoji who reads and speaks both English and Japanese fluently and I understand the meaning of this statement completely.

This statement consists of two pages.

I swear that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection of the facts.

[s] TAKASHI HIDAKA.

[s] (In Japanese characters).

Witnessed this 11th day of April, 1946 in Nanking, China, by :

[s] John T. Thompson,

[t] JOHN T. THOMPSON.

Pros. Trans. Ex. #.





# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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SATURDAY, APRIL 5, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:40 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

Mr. MORRIS, have you a witness to testify this morning?

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Miriam Farley is here to identify two documents, Senator. Miss Farley has just been sworn in executive session.

Senator WATKINS. The record will show that she has been, and you may proceed with the examination.

## TESTIMONY OF MISS MIRIAM S. FARLEY, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, ESQ.

Mr. SOURWINE. For this record, Miss Farley, will you give your name and address.

Miss FARLEY. Miriam S. Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your address?

Miss FARLEY. American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your present employment?

Miss FARLEY. I am a member of the staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where do you reside?

Miss FARLEY. In New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your address?

Miss FARLEY. 622 West One Hundred and Fourteenth Street.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Farley, I hand you a manuscript entitled "Communism and the Hukbalahap," by Henry Wells, and I ask you if you have seen it before.

Miss FARLEY. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I might explain that this is a manuscript which is in our records and I ask permission to identify it by our exhibit number for our record.

Senator WATKINS. You may do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this a manuscript which you read at some time, Miss Farley?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are the marginal notations in the manuscript yours?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. They are in your handwriting?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you desire to tell us anything about the circumstances in connection with your reading of this manuscript, how it came to you, and make any explanation you wish about the marginal notations which you made on it?

Miss FARLEY. I would like to make a very brief statement on that point, if I may. This manuscript was submitted to the Far Eastern Survey in 1949, when I was the editor, by Mr. Wells. I liked the manuscript very much and told Mr. Wells so. I was anxious to publish it. I thought that it could stand improvement at a few points. I made, therefore, a number of suggestions to Mr. Wells for his consideration which I thought would improve the article. Mr. Wells did not reply to my last letter to him, and he eventually published the article elsewhere. I therefore concluded that he was one of those authors who cannot take criticism, even friendly criticism.

With regard to the statement or implication by Professor Rowe that my marginal notations on this manuscript showed a pro-Communist bias—

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me. Is this a manuscript concerning which Professor Rowe testified—

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before this committee?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And have you read his testimony?

Miss FARLEY. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Miss FARLEY. I would like to reject the insinuations that there was any pro-Communist bias in the suggestions which I made to Mr. Wells, which I think will be borne out by a detailed examination of the notations on this manuscript, and if I may, Mr. Chairman, I should like to submit to the committee another article which did appear in the Far Eastern Survey on the same general subject as that by Mr. Wells.

Senator WATKINS. Is that about the same time?

Miss FARLEY. About 2 years later.

Senator WATKINS. May I see it?

Mr. MORRIS. Is that on the Huks?

Miss FARLEY. That is on the Huks.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is the author of this article you have now offered?

Miss FARLEY. Prof. Russell H. Fifield, of the University of Michigan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this during your editorship of the magazine?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this a substitute for the Wells article?

Miss FARLEY. No; there was no connection between them.



Senator WATKINS. I understand this was written 2 years later.

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Actually, Miss Farley, you don't know when this was written, do you, but it was published 2 years later?

Senator WATKINS. We will assume it was written probably somewhere near the time of publication.

Miss FARLEY. If I remember correctly, Mr. Rowe stated that I had cut out of Mr. Wells' article everything which identified the Huks movement with the Communists. If I might draw your attention, sir, to the two passages which I have underlined in that article, I would like to put them in the record, if I may.

Senator WATKINS. I do not see a date on this.

Miss FARLEY. It is down at the bottom, sir, in the little box.

Senator WATKINS. That was in January 1951, is that correct?

Miss FARLEY. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire?

Senator WATKINS. You may.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Farley, is it your purpose to refute or deny the charge made by Mr. Rowe with respect to what you cut out of this manuscript that you have identified?

Miss FARLEY. It is my purpose, it is my desire, to refute Mr. Rowe's allegation that my editing is biased in a pro-Communist direction, which I deny.

Mr. SOURWINE. You speak specifically of his charge that you had cut out of this article or indicated for deletion all the passages identifying the Huks as Communists.

Miss FARLEY. That is not true.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to get at. You say that is not a true charge.

Miss FARLEY. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize, of course, that the question of what was published in an article 2 years later has nothing to do with that charge, don't you?

Miss FARLEY. I think it bears on Mr. Rowe's testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it has nothing to do specifically with the question of what you cut out of this article, does it?

Miss FARLEY. Yes. Well, I did not cut out of this article everything which identified the Huks with the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wonder if you would point out in that article the passage identifying the Huks as Communists which you did not cut out or indicate for deletion.

Miss FARLEY. There are several of them. Here is one right on the first page of the Wells' manuscript.

Senator WATKINS. Give the first name of this Wells man.

Miss FARLEY. Mr. Henry Wells [reading]:

In the Philippines, as in China, southeast Asia and the Balkans, the Communists have turned long-standing agrarian troubles to their own advantage. Using familiar Communist techniques of propaganda and of organization, they have won a following in the region—

and so forth.

Mr. MARKS. I think Miss Farley neglected to read the whole sentence there.

Mr. SOURWINE. The whole thing is in the record. (Exhibit No. 614, pt. 11, p. 4020.)

Mr. MARKS. As long as you have asked for an illustration——

Mr. SOURWINE. I was asking Miss Farley to point out what she considered to be the passages in this article which identified the Huks as Communists and which she neither cut out or deleted. The choice is hers. We are not limiting her.

Miss FARLEY. There are other examples. I will continue with this sentence [reading]—

they have won a following in the region where the peasants grievances (poverty, usury, absentee landlordism) have long been most acute—i. e., in central Luzon, where they control the peasant movement known as the Hukbalahap.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your marginal comment?

Miss FARLEY. None on this comment.

Mr. SOURWINE. What are the notes written on that page?

Miss FARLEY. That is on the next paragraph.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where does that note appear? Opposite what paragraph does it appear?

Miss FARLEY. The next paragraph, following the one I just read.

Mr. MORRIS. It appears between the first and the second, does it not, Miss Farley? I mean, doesn't the arrow indicate there that it appears between the first and the second paragraph?

Miss FARLEY. It apparently relates, as far as I can tell, to the following paragraph which apparently I suggested cutting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you read that note, Miss Farley.

Mr. MARKS. Before we leave that——

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Marks, if you please.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that.

Miss FARLEY. As near as I can tell, from looking at this manuscript, I suggested cutting out the next paragraph following the one I just read.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you read your marginal note?

Miss FARLEY. And substituting the following sentence [reading]:

In one sense, the Huk movement may be viewed as part of the world-wide scheme of Communist expansion. In another sense, it is a product of local conditions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, because the question has arisen as to where a marginal note appears in the margin with respect to certain language, I ask the Chair to order that in our record this document appear in facsimile.

Senator WATKINS. May I see the record? May I see the manuscript? By that you mean substitute a photostat?

Mr. SOURWINE. We will have it photostated and have it reproduced as plates in the record, sir, because of the difficulty of expressing in the written or printed word the exact relationship between a marginal note and other paragraphs. There is an arrow there which my description would be inadequate to convey a proper appreciation of.

Senator WATKINS. If you put it in as it is, in facsimile, it will indicate just what the markings are, the markings of the arrow indicating that it might possibly apply to the first, but then you have the line drawn, sort of brackets, which takes in the two next paragraphs and you have a long diagonal line, a pencil line, drawn through the two paragraphs below. Of course, the witness would be entitled and should explain just what she intended, if she remembers at all what



she intended to cut out, and to have this marginal note appear as the substitute for it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It will be ordered, then, in facsimile?

Senator WATKINS. Yes, you may have it. Do you mean the whole document?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I believe that is desirable. There are changes all the way through.

Miss FARLEY. I should be very glad to have the whole document with notations in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the fairest way all around. And I believe that answers the objection Mr. Marks was going to voice.

Mr. MARKS. That is exactly right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will note the position of the arrow here on this marginal note which you have read, and I would like to ask you whether it was your intention that that note be inserted at the point where the arrow is, that is, following the first paragraph of the article itself.

Miss FARLEY. Apparently that was my intention.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have inserted that note preceding the matter which you read from in the article, would it not?

Miss FARLEY. No; after.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the material you had read from.

Miss FARLEY. After.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Would you indicate the other portions of that article, if any, which you feel identify the Huks as Communists and which you did not cut out or mark for deletion?

Miss FARLEY. Yes, one moment. This sentence on pages 6 to 7, I will read it in the form as edited by me with slight verbal changes:

Organized in March 1942, the—

that is, the Huks—

conducted effective guerrilla operations against the invaders and against Filipino collaborators while serving also as an instrument of political and economic change and of Communist propaganda.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, are there any other passages you want to call attention to?

Miss FARLEY. There are several more which I can mention.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you should have that opportunity.

Miss FARLEY. Continuing from the part I just read:

Communists controlled the Hukbalahap from the very beginning, but they were careful at first to direct their efforts along the lines that would attract a large following.

That is the end of that quotation. I think there was another on page 11. This is perhaps more important than the one on page 11.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the page of the one you just referred to?

Miss FARLEY. Seven; six to seven. There is one on page 14. This is referring to Luis Taruc, the leader of the Hukbalahap. I am quoting from Mr. Wells:

On August 12 he issued a press release which read in part—

this is quoting from Taruc—

the Communist Party of the Philippines, of which I am a member, besides fighting for the eventual achievement of socialism is also fighting for land for the peasants and other agrarian reforms—

and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. What page is that?

Miss FARLEY. That is page 14.

Mr. SOURWINE. You passed page 11, then?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That is material that you say you left in that indicated——

Miss FARLEY. This is material which I left in which Luis Taruc identifies himself as a Communist. There is also a footnote to this quotation which I would like to read. The footnote says "A few weeks later, Taruc stated in a letter released to the press, that in case of war he would side with the Soviet Union which 'represents the cause of democracy, peace, and progress in the world' against the United States which 'represents imperialist aggression, war-making and Fascist tendencies.'"

This again identifies Taruc with the Communist line.

Mr. SOURWINE. The portion that you have read previously, from page 6, at the bottom of page 6, and 7——

Senator WATKINS. Let her finish this, and then go back to that.

Miss FARLEY. I am willing to let it go at that, to save the committee time. I think two or three others could be found.

Senator WATKINS. Never mind the time, if it is important.

Miss FARLEY. If the whole document is going into the record——

Senator WATKINS. It is already in the record, the whole document is in the record. Please do not make any other marks on there. The marks are now in question and we shouldn't put any more on there.

Miss FARLEY. Yes, that is one reason I had trouble in identifying it.

Mr. MARKS. We don't have an extra copy here, and it is difficult to work with.

Miss FARLEY. Is it permissible, sir, to read one or two characteristic notations from Mr. Fifield's article which I did publish?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fifield's article has nothing to do with this one.

Miss FARLEY. I think it bears on the question of my editing.

Senator WATKINS. It may bear on that, however it is 2 years later. We will check this article and see whether it is material or not. We are already getting a very large record and if it does not have a bearing, and does not throw light on the inquiry, we probably won't want to put it in the record. But if it does, it will be received. You can make your explanations to why you did what you did, why you struck them out. If you do not tell us why you struck these articles out, we will probably ask you. So if you want to save time, you can indicate why you struck the paragraphs out that you did, or deleted the language.

Miss FARLEY. That is another question.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chairman will permit, might I inquire about the instances that Miss Farley has specifically mentioned. Would that be in order?

Senator WATKINS. Yes, and then we can come back and let her explain why she suggested a deletion of these articles or a change.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the bottom of page 6, Miss Farley, you read a sentence. Originally, as the manuscript came to you, that sentence read, did it not—"Organized in March 1942 it"—referring to the Hukbalahop, "functioned partly as an army conducting effective guerrilla operations against the invaders and against the Filipino



collaborators, but more importantly as an instrument of Communist propaganda and of political and economic change."

Is that correct?

Miss FARLEY. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you change that sentence or indicate that it should be changed to read "organized in March 1942, it conducted effective guerrilla operations against its invaders and against Filipino collaborators while serving also as an instrument of Communist propaganda, of political and economic change"?

Miss FARLEY. That is not quite right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, correct me.

Miss FARLEY. I read this whole thing before.

Mr. SOURWINE. You read it correctly before.

Miss FARLEY. With Communist propaganda coming at the end of the sentence. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. You changed it to read "An instrument of political and economic change and of Communist propaganda."

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Now, this sentence started that paragraph "The Hukbalahap, ostensibly launched as a resistance movement against the Japanese, was a lineal descendant of the earlier Communist-dominated peasant groups." Is that correct?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you changed that to read "The Hukbalahap, launched as a resistance movement against the Japanese, was a lineal descendant of earlier Communist-dominated peasant groups."

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 14, you have a note in the margin which appears to read—can you read that note? It is difficult to read on this photostat.

Miss FARLEY. "Taruc denied responsibility. Has Huk responsibility been proved?"

Mr. SOURWINE. What Huk responsibility were you referring to there?

Miss FARLEY. This refers to footnote 12, referring to the murder of Mrs. Quezon.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were questioning whether the Huks were responsible for the murder of Mrs. Quezon?

Miss FARLEY. I was questioning whether it has been proved that they were responsible for that particular atrocity.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if the witness desires to make any further comments about her editing of this manuscript, it might be a good time.

Senator WATKINS. If you wish now to explain why you altered or suggested an alteration of the manuscript, or changed it to read differently than it was submitted, please take the time now to do so, and indicate where you are doing it.

Miss FARLEY. Yes. May I point out in the first place that all of these notations on the manuscript, and so on, were suggestions to Mr. Wells to be adopted or not adopted as he saw fit. This is a very usual process of consultation between author and editor.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you convey those suggestions to him?

Miss FARLEY. Partly by letter and partly orally. I believe he came in the office once.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you return this manuscript to him?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get it back in the IPR files?

Miss FARLEY. It is not in the IPR files, as far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Miss FARLEY. With regard to some of these passages, which I apparently indicated should be cut out, to the best of my recollection it was partly because he thought they were largely repetitive, that he had made his point once and there was no use in saying it over and over again. It may also have been simply for the purpose of saving space, though that I do not precisely recall at the moment. But it is clear that I did leave in a good many passages which identified the Huks with the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in editing this article, reduce its anti-Communist tenor in any way, modify its anti-Communist attitude?

Miss FARLEY. I think that would be a matter of opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking your opinion as the editor.

Miss FARLEY. In my opinion, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions about that article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions of this witness, except this one letter that has been in the record that I would like to ask the witness for one comment on. I refer to your exhibit No. 95, part 2, page 395, Miss Farley, which is a letter from you to Mr. Holland, written April 8, 1946, from Japan. In your last paragraph of that letter you say:

I have been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly report. There will be a sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with. What did you mean by that?

Mr. MARKS. May we see that letter, please? This letter is where, Mr. Morris? I see, top of page 396.

Mr. MORRIS. You have seen that letter before, have you not, Miss Farley?

Miss FARLEY. I have seen the stenographic transcript of this part of the hearing. Do you wish me to read the whole letter?

Mr. MORRIS. No, I would like to know what you meant by the last sentence there. Will you read the last sentence.

Miss FARLEY. The one you just read?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Will you read it for the chairman?

Miss FARLEY (reading):

I have been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly report. It will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

That is obviously a flippant and somewhat humorous statement in a letter to a friend. It is always very difficult to explain a joke, but I will try.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean that was a joke?

Miss FARLEY. Yes. With the chairman's permission. At that time, quite a number of us who had previously worked for private research institutions, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, had gone into Government service, and we used to kid each other about being bureaucrats and so on. We did wonder, there was a serious point behind this, about the extent to which, as research workers working for the Govern-



ment, we would be able to apply the same standards of objective research which we had been trained to use in the IPR and other similar organizations. What I may have had in mind in connection with this, with the monthly report, was certain discussions which I had had quite openly with senior members of Government sections in Tokyo where I was employed.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say, Miss Farley, "what I may have had in mind," do you mean by that that you do not recall this particular episode?

Miss FARLEY. I don't recall writing this particular letter; no. But I am willing to take it that I did write it.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you then testify that it was a joke?

Miss FARLEY. By interpreting it now. I think I can interpret my own words.

Senator WATKINS. Does it bring back any memories of the situation when you wrote it, and what you intended to put in the letter?

Miss FARLEY. It does. It brings back memories of the general situation at that time.

Senator WATKINS. Was there any reason why you should say that you wondered how much you could get by with? What did you have in mind when you said that, even as a joke?

Mr. MARKS. You are explaining it, Miss Farley, I think.

Miss FARLEY. Yes; I was just trying to. What I think I had in mind about getting by with was getting by with what I had been trained to believe were proper standards of objective research. As I was saying, I recall having several discussions on this point with senior colleagues in the Government section with regard to the drafting of the political section of General MacArthur's monthly reports to which I was assigned for a time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those persons with whom you had had discussions, had they led you to believe, or given you any reason to believe, that there was objection in MacArthur's headquarters to proper standards of objective research?

Miss FARLEY. The discussions as I remembered them were on this line: That I contended that so far as space and our facilities permitted we should give a full and balanced record of what had happened in Japan in the month in question, that when things were going well we should report that and occasionally when they were not going so well we should also report that. My contention was that on the whole the occupation was going very well and the record was a good one and that if we put out a report which had nothing but favorable data, it might hurt the reputation of SCAP, of which I was a member, because such reports would be accused by unfriendly critics of being a whitewash. That idea did not find favor in the higher quarters, however, in SCAP. The tendency was to omit anything which could conceivably be construed as unfavorable.

Senator WATKINS. Is that the instruction of any of your superiors, that you leave out anything that might be considered unfavorable?

Miss FARLEY. I would not say that there was a specific instruction to that point; no; but that was the idea which I gathered, from instructions, from conversations, with my superiors. I discussed this with them quite openly once or twice, and I did not get by with my argument. That was what I was trying to get by with. Following that, I quit arguing and in all the reports which I prepared for SCAP

I followed the instructions as to how such reports should be prepared even when I personally did not altogether agree with the instructions. I considered that my duty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any more comment that you care to make about this article now before we pass to another matter?

Miss FARLEY. Only that I should like to read into the record just one sentence from a document which I did publish which is an additional example of material which I did not cut out but actually published, which identifies the Huks and the Communists very clearly.

Mr. MORRIS. You do understand this is 2 years later, and at that time the Huks were much more openly Communists than they were in 1949. So the issue isn't the same.

Miss FARLEY. I think the issue of my alleged Communist bias is the same. I have had no pro-Communist bias at any time.

Senator WATKINS. I think the witness will be permitted to read the sentence and comment on it. It will be the question of the weight of the testimony anyway, considering that it is 2 years later. So if you wish to do that, you may proceed.

Miss FARLEY. I would like to offer this whole article for the record as an example of an article on the same general subject as Mr. Wells' article.

Senator WATKINS. That we will decide a little later after we have read it. We have not had an opportunity to read it.

Miss FARLEY. And it was one which I did publish. The general conclusions are similar to Mr. Wells'. The difference, in my opinion, is that Professor Fifield's article is done in a rather more scholarly manner. The general nature of Professor Fifield's article is indicated by these two sentences which I quote:

The Communist movement in the Philippines, commonly called the Hukbalahap, has not been successfully checked, is spreading in the islands and is now in a dangerous stage of political development.

The second sentence, also on the first page of the article [reading]:

Although the Hukbalahap movement originated in the long-standing agrarian unrest of central Luzon, the leadership has now been completely captured by the Communists. Its goal is at last openly stated as the overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed force, and the Huks are now an integral part of the general Communist efforts in Asia.

I would appreciate it if the whole article could be put in the record. Senator WATKINS. We will have it checked, and if we feel it is material at all—it is a rather long article—if we feel it is material, it will all be put in. But it is subject to that checking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a letter on the letterhead of the Far Eastern Survey, office of the editor, dated February 19, 1952, and purporting to be signed by Miriam S. Farley, with the handwritten name of Miriam. It is addressed to Mr. John P. Fairbank, and it was offered by Mr. Fairbank for inclusion in the record. That request is found on page 6147 of our record. He requested it. I would like to hand it to the witness and ask if that is hers and if that is her signature.

Miss FARLEY. That is my letter and my signature.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that this letter be inserted in the record at the point where Mr. Fairbank offered it with appropriate cross-references to this identification in the record.

Senator WATKINS. That may be done.



Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions of Miss Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, thank you.

(For the material referred to, see Exhibit 559A, p. 3797.)

Senator WATKINS. Who is your next witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Lattimore.

Senator WATKINS. Give her full name.

Mr. MORRIS. Give your full name and address to the reporter, please.

Senator WATKINS. Have you been sworn before? I am going to swear her, but I would like to have it in the record who we are swearing.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give your full name?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. My name is Eleanor Lattimore. My residence is Ruxton, Md.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you appeared in executive session before this committee?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I appeared with my husband in executive session last July.

Mr. MORRIS. You were sworn at that time?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I was sworn then.

Senator WATKINS. Are you sure the record shows she was sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know who the chairman was at that particular session.

Senator WATKINS. Maybe you had better stand and be sworn. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are giving in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do.

#### TESTIMONY OF MRS. ELEANOR LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, I asked Mr. Morris if he would kindly have a subpoena for Mrs. Lattimore because she has not been subpoenaed, and I assume that you will give that to Mrs. Lattimore after the hearing or at your convenience.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, what would your ruling on that be?

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the purpose of that?

Senator WATKINS. She is appearing at her own request?

Mr. FORTAS. No; she is appearing at the request telephoned to me by Mr. Morris.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no question about the fact that her appearance is at the request or, if you wish to put it that way, at the order of the committee.

Mr. FORTAS. I would rather have it "order."

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no objection to the record showing that is the reason for her appearance.

Mr. FORTAS. Can't you supply her with a subpoena so the record will be clear on this?

Mr. SOURWINE. There seems to be a considerable confusion about subpoenas before congressional committees, and as I am sure counsel recognizes, the subpoena of a congressional committee is really in the nature of a summons. The question is, Did the witness have notice

or knowledge that the committee desired, requested, or commanded appearance at a certain time?

Mr. FORTAS. Is there any difficulty about supplying Mrs. Lattimore with a summons or order in the usual form?

Mr. SOURWINE. None whatsoever; I simply wanted the record to show as to why she desired it at this time.

Senator WATKINS. I simply wanted to know if she was here at her own request. If she would like to have a subpoena issued, a subpoena will be issued, and it will be dated in time in which she can respond in response to that subpoena.

Mr. FORTAS. I telephoned Mr. Morris about this, and asked that she appear, so she is here by order of the committee.

Senator WATKINS. The record already shows it, and if it will help any you can have a subpoena.

Mr. SOURWINE. She is, I might say, Mr. Fortas, entitled to her witness fee on the basis of her appearance and response to the committee's request, whether there is a formal request or not.

Mr. FORTAS. At the hearing of Mr. Catesby Jones before committee on April 2, 1952, there were certain comments made by members of the committee that were based, in my opinion, upon an inaccurate or incomplete recollection of the examples of Mr. Owen Lattimore on February 28 and March 21, 1952. For the committee's convenience, I have prepared a memorandum summarizing the record. If you would like me to state very briefly what is in this, I will be glad to.

Senator WATKINS. You may leave it with us, and if it will help us in the analysis of the record, and the record will have to stand on its own feet and the testimony likewise, if it will help us in that we will use it. But I cannot say to you now we are going to include this as a part of the record.

Mr. FORTAS. I merely thought it would be helpful because there was a confusion as to dates and a confusion as to persons referred to.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will try to avoid that confusion today.

Senator WATKINS. Let it be offered and left with us for our information and our staff in checking the matter.

Mr. FORTAS. I thought in particularly Senator O'Connor and Senator Ferguson might like to see that. I believe it is an entirely factual memorandum.

Senator WATKINS. Thank you. We will receive it for that purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might state that Mrs. Lattimore has been asked here, as the chairman knows, specifically for the purpose of attempting to clear up what appears to be contradictions in testimony with respect to the occasion of a meeting between Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones and Mr. Carter on the 22d of August 1951. Mr. Carter has also been asked to come over here to testify with regard to that matter, and will appear subsequent to Mrs. Lattimore's testimony. Is it the Chair's desire that I proceed with the inquiry now?

Senator WATKINS. I think you may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Lattimore, do you remember the occasion of the dinner which you and Mr. Lattimore had with Mr. Carter and Mr. Catesby Jones at the Aldo Cafe in Washington the 22d of August 1951?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us how it came about that you four had dinner together on that evening?



Mrs. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection we were together before the dinner and someone suggested that we go out and eat together, and I believe Mr. Jones suggested this particular cafe which was unfamiliar to us, and we went there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Jones testified before this committee with regard to that matter?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I read the transcript of his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you know, of course, what Mr. Lattimore testified because you were here, were you not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the occasion in question, you have said you were together. Where were you together on that day prior to the dinner?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I said we were together. I didn't say "weren't together."

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I said, "Where were you together prior to the dinner?"

Mrs. LATTIMORE. We were in the offices of Arnold, Fortas & Porter.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were you doing there?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. My husband was preparing a brief statement for the press in connection with the hearing which had taken place here that day.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you there together in those law offices for a matter of several hours?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think Mr. Jones was there for much less than several hours.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you and Mr. Lattimore were there longer?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Mr. Lattimore come over to Washington on the morning of that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't actually remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, did you come over on the afternoon of that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Lattimore, weren't you in Mr. Fortas' office at the noon hour of that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Mr. Jones has so testified, and I do not dispute his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, but your own memory.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not actually remember myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember whether you were in Mr. Fortas' office during noon hour?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it Mr. Lattimore or was it you who made arrangements with Mr. Jones to come over on that day and attend the hearings before this committee and take notes with regard to Mr. Budenz' testimony?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. It was I.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do so at your husband's request?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was entirely your own idea?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Lattimore desired to issue a press release on Mr. Budenz' testimony or following it?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your purpose in seeking to have Mr. Jones take these notes, cover this hearing for you, so to speak?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. There were two purposes: One was that I thought it probable that newspapermen would be calling my husband after Budenz' testimony, asking for a statement. I did not wish to go myself, and so I asked him to go and take notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had attended a number of other sessions of the committee; had you not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. At that time, I think I had attended only one. I attended a number after.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why was it you didn't want to go yourself?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I thought it would be a very painful experience.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did Mr. Jones come over from Baltimore with you or with your husband?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you come over from Baltimore that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you own an automobile?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you drive?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Probably.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you go home that night, or did you go home that night?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you don't remember how you came or how you went home, whether by train or automobile?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Bus or taxi?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who drives the car, you or Mr. Lattimore? What was the answer?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who drives the automobile, you or your husband?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. We both drive it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Normally, if you were coming over from Baltimore, would there have been any usual arrangement as to who drove?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, it isn't a case of he usually does or you usually do?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it happen that you met Mr. Jones in Mr. Fortas' office after our hearings on that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I told him that we would be there and met him there.

Mr. SOURWINE. We; meaning you and Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Lattimore know that Mr. Jones was going to cover the hearings?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I suppose so, but I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wouldn't make an arrangement like that without even telling your husband about it; would you?



Mrs. LATTIMORE. He knew someone was covering the hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. He knew that you had arranged to have someone cover the hearing?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he didn't know who it was?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am not sure. He may have known.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones was his student; was he not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Jones also a good friend of yours?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you happen to select Mr. Jones for this particular job?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. He had asked a number of times if there was anything he could do for us, and he—I don't remember how I happened to select him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you call him up on the telephone or send him a written communication about it?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I certainly didn't send him a written communication. I probably called him up. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember that. Do you think it possible that he might have simply been there at your home at the psychological moment and you told him you wanted him to come over?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't consider that possible? Is there any other possibility other than a phone call that you do consider within the realm of possibility as to how you communicated with him?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I simply don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. That answer is not completely responsive.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. If you want me to speculate, the other possibilities would be that I saw him at my husband's office or at the Page School but I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think those are both possibilities?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Jones was at the Fortas law office at the noon recess on the 22d, would that have been because you instructed him to meet you there?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Probably.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any memory as to whether you did so instruct him?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am sorry; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do remember that you told him to meet you there in the evening; is that right, after the hearing?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, it is very difficult for me to distinguish between what I actually remember and what I was reminded of by his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not remember his testimony, but I am afraid I do not actually remember myself what I said to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean, by that, that, having read his testimony, there is nothing in his testimony to which you take exception?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is nothing in Mr. Catsby Jones' testimony which to you sounded unlikely, improbable, or untrue?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. As far as I remember.

Mr. FORTAS. You mean as factual statements?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. I had no reference to any opinion that Mr. Jones might have expressed.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. As far as I remember, there is none.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do want to go just a little further with this question of your own memory. Do you remember being in Mr. Fortas' office on the following day; that is, on the 23d?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not actually remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember seeing Mr. Jones there again on the 23d?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember at any particular time taking from Mr. Jones any notes that he had made concerning Mr. Budenz' testimony before this committee?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not remember taking notes from him; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Receiving notes from him?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I had notes from him. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get them?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I would therefore assume I had received them; but, if you ask me if I actually received them, I assume I received them.

Mr. SOURWINE. For all you know, your husband might have handed them to you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Possibly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just don't know how they came?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When is it that you remember having those notes in your possession? At what time did you have them in your possession according to your present recollection?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. At some time subsequent to the 23d.

Mr. SOURWINE. At some time subsequent to the 23d. You were the keeper of the files, so to speak; weren't you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And still are?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Did you get an answer to that?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been the normal and routine thing for such things, if notes, if retained, to have found their way into your hands at some time subsequent to the 23d for the files; is it not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what happened?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no further questions of this witness, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a few questions?

Senator WATKINS. You may.

Mr. MORRIS. Generally, did you have what might be called a team working here in Washington covering our hearing in Washington, Mrs. Lattimore?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I attempted to have someone here at all hearings at which I could not myself be present.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have anybody else working for you, other than someone covering the hearings?



Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that, if you think that is proper testimony at this time, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. What is claimed for it?

Mr. MORRIS. Just general information on that general subject of to what extent Mrs. Lattimore has had people working on our hearings in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question bears properly on the witness' recollection with regard to the coverage of these hearings. There have been questions with regard to her recollection of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Jones' coverage, and I think it would be interesting for the record to find out what she remembers about other coverage in that nature.

Senator WATKINS. We will let her answer.

Mr. FORTAS. I am afraid the question is not clear. I am not sure that Mr. Morris and Mr. Sourwine are asking the same question.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have anybody working on these hearings other than the one person that you just testified to has been covering the hearings at all times on behalf of you and Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about them, please?

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, I don't believe you intended your questions to mean that Mr. Jones covered the hearings at all times.

Mr. MORRIS. No. She tried to the best of her ability to have somebody cover all hearings. Did you not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. As I understand, you want to know who it was.

Mr. MORRIS. No; I don't, Senator. I want to know who else has been working for Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore in connection with our hearings here.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I thought I just said.

Go ahead and answer it.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I will try my best to answer that question, to the best of my recollection. Over a period of 8 or 10 months, a great many people have offered in any way they could and a number of people have been of use to us. It is very difficult for me to remember just who did what.

Senator WATKINS. Well, of course, you have a perfect right to have anybody cover the hearings you want to. These hearings are public. You can come yourself or have your lawyers or anybody else come and cover them for you. It is in connection with Sourwine's statement that I am permitting it to be asked.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I will be more specific. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 4, 1951, addressed to Mr. William Holland, and signed "Eleanor Lattimore."

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you this letter and ask you if you can recall having written that letter. Will you read it for the committee, please, Mrs. Lattimore? Will you read it aloud for the committee?

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me lay a foundation. Is that your signature, Mrs. Lattimore?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, that is a photostat of the letter.

It isn't the real letter. Let's make it letter because, when we say "Is that your signature?" that is a photostat of your letter.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is a photostat of my signature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read the letter aloud and tell the committee whether you remember having written it?

Mrs. LATTIMORE (reading) :

DEAR BILL—

Mr. MORRIS. That is addressed to Bill Holland.

Mrs. LATTIMORE (reading) :

EXHIBIT No. 747

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,*

*1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York City, N. Y.*

DEAR BILL: We went over to Washington yesterday morning expecting to find you there with the transcripts of the first two hearings for us to look at. I had understood from Carter and from your telephone conversation with me that you were coming down on Thursday for a few days.

If you have a minute to let us know your plans, we would appreciate it. Owen is anxious to see the transcripts as soon as possible as he feels that he has a great deal of work to do in preparation for his hearing and needs as many early warnings as possible about the accusations he will have to deal with.

One thing he would like to know right away is just what Fred actually said and what Carter said about whether Owen did or did not talk with Currie about Fred's commission. Owen can remember absolutely nothing about this, and as you know, O'Connor has been taunting him about his dodging comment on it. If you do not have the transcript of the second day, or cannot spare it yet, perhaps you have some notes on this part.

If you cannot spare the transcripts within the next few days, perhaps I ought to come up to New York to read them, and see a few people at the same time who might do some useful work for us. I am enlisting some help both in Baltimore and Washington, but I am finding it difficult as everyone we know is out of town. By next week I think I will have a good team in Washington, who could do leg work for you as well as us if you need any help. Be sure to let me know.

We have a lot to tell you when we see you.

All the best from both of us.

Mr. MORRIS. Read the P. S.

Mrs. LATTIMORE (reading) :

Could you return my Pacific Affairs file?

Mr. MORRIS. The question addressed to this witness was who made up the team that Mrs. Lattimore had working in Washington that is referred to in that letter.

Senator WATKINS. Let her answer. That is the information you want?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Well, I think, as often occurs in a personal letter, perhaps we aren't very exact in our terminology. There was nothing like an organized team. I used "team" in the very loose sense.

Mr. MORRIS. We would like to know. Whatever it was, Mrs. Lattimore, will you tell us?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. In Baltimore, there were several of my husband's students and colleagues who helped to some extent.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned the team in Washington.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes. And I hoped to find people in Washington, but at this moment I can't seem to remember that I did.

Senator WATKINS. At least you had someone here each day, did you not, while the hearings were going on?



Mrs. LATTIMORE. At the hearings we had someone here each day when we thought that it was probable that there would be something come up which had to do with my husband.

Senator WATKINS. A matter of investigating when his name would come up. You never knew.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. So you had to have someone here practically all the time.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. At the beginning we didn't, because we didn't realize how much he was going to be brought into the hearings. But after a half dozen hearings in which he had been brought in we did try to have someone here each time.

Senator WATKINS. You know who the people are who you had come here, generally speaking. If you cannot name them all, you can at least name most of them, can you not, who came to cover the hearings?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. One that came over one day is Mr. Harold Vreeland, who is a colleague of my husband's in the Page School. At a number of the hearings there was always someone here from the Institute of Pacific Relations. So if someone from the Institute of Pacific Relations, such as Mr. Carter, was going to be here, we didn't always try to have someone else. I came to a great many of them myself, after the first few.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire at that point, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. Let her finish. You understand what we want now. Try to give us the names of the people you had doing this work for you.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. The only person I remember who came to a hearing at my request was Harold Vreeland.

Senator WATKINS. How many times did he come?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. He came once.

Senator WATKINS. We have had numerous days of hearings. That would not begin to cover it.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No. But I believe Mr. Carter was here at most of the early hearings.

Senator WATKINS. And he was covering it for you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No; but I attempted to see him after each hearing and hear from him what happened. After the first hearings, as I said, I was here most of the time myself. But in this letter I meant not only covering hearings but looking up various things that we needed to know which we could not remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else worked for you on that, looking up various things you needed to know, or otherwise assisting, so far as you can remember, if you can remember any names?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. My husband's secretary did a great deal.

Senator WATKINS. Give us the name.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Her name is Dorothy Kreger. And I know that other colleagues and students of my husband's did, but I am not just sure. I am sorry; I am sorry that I don't remember more specifically, but this is a very confused time for me and a very painful time, and we were working very hard. I am very sorry that I don't seem to remember more accurately just who did what, but there were a number of people who helped us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were these people who had come at your request, or with whom you had made arrangements that they should help, these persons whose names you don't remember who were students and associates of your husband? Were they the persons with whom you had made arrangements?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. These are people who had done things for us in Baltimore, I suppose at my request.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether it was at your request or your husband's request?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am sure some of it was at my request.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember specifically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vreeland, then, and Mr. Catsby Jones are the only two who you remember of being requested to do certain things?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. To come to hearings.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Dorothy Borg here at any time for you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes; she was here for us and also for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Vreeland make notes for you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he give the notes to you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that he did?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you can't remember whether Mr. Catsby Jones gave notes to you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I had his notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But there is a difference there. You remember that Mr. Vreeland did give you his notes?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I remember that I did have Mr. Vreeland's notes. I don't actually remember his having handed them to me, but I remember having the notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your situation there is the same. After the hearing you did have them, they did go into your files which you were keeping, and you don't know just how they came to you. Is that right?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if it doesn't interrupt your line of inquiry, I would like to go now to the question of the dinner now, briefly. On the occasion of this dinner at the Aldo Cafe, do you remember seeing anyone in the cafe that you recognized?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Outside of our party?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that is all Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that letter which was read by Mrs. Lattimore and identified as having been written by her go into our record?

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been read by Mrs. Lattimore. Would the purpose be served if it is given an exhibit number?

Mr. MORRIS. I think not. There is one other question I would like to ask. In connection with that footnote, they mentioned your Pacific Affairs files. Did Mr. Holland return it to you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think he did; as far as I recollect.



Mr. MORRIS. Will you make that available to this committee?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Senator WATKINS. The letter will be received into the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 747" and was read in full.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Before the witness leaves the stand, here is a formal subpoena covering your appearance today, Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make arrangements with Mr. Fortas whereby we can obtain the Pacific Affairs files which is mentioned in that letter.

Mr. FORTAS. Yes; my office will transmit it to you as soon as Mrs. Lattimore furnishes it. Can you furnish it next week?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. This file you will give us will constitute the whole file that is referred to in this letter?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. May I say that this was a file which was prepared for a Tydings committee hearing and which we had still in our files.

Mr. MORRIS. A great part of the testimony of Mr. Lattimore concerned his editorship of Pacific Affairs, and I think as such it is relevant to this inquiry.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one concluding question, if the Chair will permit.

Senator WATKINS. Wait for Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fortas will supply it and Mrs. Lattimore now testifies that what she will supply Mr. Fortas will be the whole file which is referred to in this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. My concluding question is, having read, as you have testified you did, the testimony of Mr. Jones and having been present during Mr. Lattimore's testimony, did you find any conflict therein?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I found no conflict.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you disagree with Mr. Jones with respect to his characterization of Mr. Lattimore's testimony?

Mr. FORTAS. Don't you think, after all, that that is a question that ought to be made very specific. Mr. Jones' testimony is quite confusing in terms of the opinions that he stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I will separate that into two or three different parts. Do you agree with Mr. Jones that Mr. Lattimore's testimony on this point was inadequate?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't believe he used that word, did he?

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, I ask that you consider whether you wish to allow that question. This is a wife that is being asked to comment on a characterization of her husband's testimony.

Senator WATKINS. I will say very frankly it probably would not be permitted in court, but we have rather a broad latitude here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I withdraw that question and rephrase it.

Senator WATKINS. I think you had better withdraw it because I think probably it is not necessary to have that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Lattimore, is there any comment you desire to make before you leave the witness stand with regard to the completeness, adequacy, or accuracy of Mr. Lattimore's testimony concerning this dinner and concerning Mr. Catsby Jones' presence here?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think the difference between Mr. Catsby Jones' testimony and my husband's testimony was that Mr. Jones simply remembered more than my husband remembered.

Mr. SOURWINE. He remembered more than you remembered, too; did he not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. He remembered more than I remembered. But I think this was quite natural.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all.

Senator WATKINS. Anything further?

Mr. MORRIS. Nothing further, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Anything further?

Mr. SOURWINE. Nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

#### TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, ESQ.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Carter, you have been previously sworn and have previously testified several times, have you not?

Mr. CARTER. I have, Senator Watkins.

Senator WATKINS. All right, we won't swear you again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, do you remember the occasion of the dinner at the Aldo Cafe on the 22d of August 1951, present at which were, in addition to yourself, Mr. and Mrs. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I remember a dinner. Whether it was August or September I couldn't remember. I have looked up the Journal American and saw that reminded me of some aspects of it, and then I understand that there was some reference to it in one of the reports which I have not seen. I mean, I don't know whether there is a discrepancy in dates in various accounts or not. But I can't remember specifically on what date the dinner was. I know such a dinner—I was one of four at such a dinner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember eating a dinner with the other three persons named in the Aldo Cafe?

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't have remembered the name of the Aldo Cafe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the grapes which have figured in the testimony here before?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Late yesterday afternoon when Mr. Morris asked me to come down here, he referred to the Aldo Cafe and that didn't ring a bell. But he said there were grapes hanging from the roof, and then I remembered very vividly a semi-open-air restaurant with a lattice at the top and not phony grape vines but real-life grapes hanging down.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did eat dinner in that restaurant with Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. Well, until reminded by the Journal American, I wouldn't have remembered the name Aldo Cafe, but I remember the grapes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did eat dinner in the cafe described and identified by the grapes with Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I did so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do so on more than one occasion?



Mr. CARTER. I don't remember a meal at that restaurant at any other time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been back to that restaurant at any time since?

Mr. CARTER. It was warm weather and I left my hat, and I went back a day or two later to retrieve my hat.

Mr. SOURWINE. That wasn't what I was trying to get at. I meant had you ever been back to the restaurant for another meal since then.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember any such.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, your memory is that you only ate dinner at this particular cafe once?

Mr. CARTER. It was a single feed.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would remove, it would appear, a question as to dates. You do not remember the date but you were there only once, and other witnesses have testified positively with regard to the dates.

Mr. CARTER. Do the witnesses, Mr. Sourwine, agree as to the date?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you please, the record will speak as to what the witnesses agree on. I want to ask you now, Do you remember being present at this committee during the testimony of Mr. Louis Budenz?

Mr. CARTER. I remember being here during part of it. Whether I was here the whole span, I can't specifically answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you first meet Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. In Washington. And I just wanted to add, Senator Watkins, that my impression of him was not sufficiently vivid to have remembered what his name was, or I am not certain that I could describe whether he was blond or brunette. If he came into the room, I probably would remember him as the person who ate dinner.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you could have had dinner with Mr. Catesby Jones, a man of his dark complexion, and with his dark mustache, and have been unable afterward to have said whether he was a blond or brunette? You didn't really mean that, did you, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I did. He just passed out of my mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us where in Washington you first met Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet him at the office, the law offices of Mr. Fortas and his partners?

Mr. CARTER. I did, but on what date or what time on that date I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at those law offices during the noon recess of this committee on the day Mr. Budenz testified, August 22, 1951?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You might have been?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you there on the afternoon or evening of that day?

Mr. CARTER. I believe that I was either present in the late afternoon or early evening and that at some point there was a discussion, it was the end of the day, of where we should have dinner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. And I do remember that, as it was a warm night, that I suggested the air-cooled coffee shop at the Statler. I imagine this

Johns Hopkins student graduate suggested something a little more decorative and ultimately we went to the live-grapes joint.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go in a group?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. I know we went by motorcar.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whose car?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember it was—I know it wasn't a taxi. I don't know whether it was the Lattimores' car. I don't know whether Mr. Catesby Jones had a car, and if he did, whether that was the car.

Mr. SOURWINE. You went in either Mr. Catesby Jones' car or the Lattimores' car; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. I would swear to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who drove?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't the faintest recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't drive, did you?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you sat in the front seat or the back seat?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the dinner, where did you go?

Mr. CARTER. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you went back out and got in the car you had come in; didn't you?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; and was dropped, presumably, at whatever hotel or home I may have been staying at.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know where you were staying?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you take any notes during Mr. Budenz' testimony before the committee here?

Mr. CARTER. Very scrappy. I unfortunately don't take shorthand, and I think they were very rough, abbreviated notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did take some notes?

Mr. CARTER. Usually someone gives me a pad and I scribble down a few notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you said they were very brief, short, scrappy notes. I am simply asking you did you take some notes. Is that correct?

Mr. CARTER. Clearly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what did you do with those notes, do you remember?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, you were up at Mr. Fortas' law office. Mr. Lattimore was attempting to write a press release. Mr. Catesby Jones had provided his notes. Didn't you also provide your notes? As a matter of fact, didn't you give either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore your recollection of what took place and supplement them with your notes?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember doing so, Mr. Sourwine. At that period I was relying almost exclusively on the Alderson Reporting Co.'s notes, and I remember several times I went to the Alderson office the next morning so that I would have their very accurate record.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was the evening of the hearing that I am talking about, the afternoon.

Mr. CARTER. The reporting company's notes would not have been available the same day. You can't get them until the next morning.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Lattimore was planning to write or was going to write a press release with regard to Mr. Budenz' testimony?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember specifically, but my recollection is that he was at least contemplating it and may have been working on the draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were you doing in that office for several hours, if you weren't aiding in the getting out of that press release?

Mr. CARTER. Well, frankly, I was very much interested in Mr. Lattimore because of his long connection as a distinguished colleague of mine in the institute—

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course you were, and you were there to help, and you did help, didn't you?

Senator WATKINS. You can answer that. That doesn't seem to me it should take so long, whether you did or did not.

Mr. CARTER. I was there ready to help. Whether my notes were of any use or not, I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you were there ready to help and you helped to the best of your ability, is that your statement?

Mr. CARTER. Certainly, absolutely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you all remained there. Your dinner was delayed until after this press release had gotten out, isn't that correct?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't leave before the press release had been gotten out, did you?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. I may have gone out to do an errand or I may have stayed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you have said you were very much interested in this.

Mr. CARTER. Yes. But it was Mr. Lattimore's press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Well, in any event you didn't all go to dinner before the press release had been gotten out, did you?

Mr. CARTER. I assume we didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew that Mr. Lattimore was in charge of getting out this press release, didn't you?

Mr. CARTER. He was the master draftsman.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mrs. Lattimore had a function or duty to perform in connection with getting it out, didn't she?

Mr. CARTER. She was Mr. Lattimore's chief of staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. And you had some function in that regard, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I was at least a friendly wall flower.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, so it is conceivable to you that you would have all gone off to dinner before that job of getting out the press release was completed?

Mr. CARTER. The gentlemen of the press would know when the deadline was of getting it out.

Senator WATKINS. We are trying to get it for the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are trying to ask what your recollection was. I don't know why we should have to fight about this.

Mr. CARTER. I am not fighting at all. I am just trying to remember whether I stayed until the press release was finally composed or whether I slipped out on some errands.

Senator WATKINS. Did you see it and read it before you left?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Senator WATKINS. Did you see that press release before it was issued to the press?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it possible that you slipped out and did not come back and actually didn't go to the Aldo Cafe in this car?

Mr. CARTER. No, I went to the Aldo Cafe, and I must have known the general outline of the press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. You went to the Aldo Cafe with Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Jones, didn't you?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. From Mr. Fortas' office, didn't you?

Mr. CARTER. That, I can't remember. As I say, some time late in the afternoon of early evening I am almost certain I slipped out. Whether the four of us left Fortas, Porter, and Arnold's office at the same time, or whether they picked me up at whatever hotel I was staying at, and then going to the Aldo Cafe, I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection on that?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, can you tell us whether you went from the morning session of this hearing on the 22d to the office of Arnold, Fortas & Porter?

Mr. CARTER. I can't. I remember some time, in midday, going to one of the hotels near here, where occasionally I stayed, the Congressional or the Dodge, and sometimes going to—

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking about this particular day.

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember on this particular occasion whether you came back and attended the afternoon session of Mr. Budenz' testimony?

Mr. CARTER. I am almost certain I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you remember whether, after that afternoon session you did go to the office of Arnold, Fortas & Porter?

Mr. CARTER. I am sure I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did there meet Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they all there when you got there?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility that you went from here to that office with Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. Conceivably.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wouldn't you remember it if you had?

Mr. CARTER. No. Mr. Catesby Jones was not a prominent figure in my life at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us whether you came down here to the afternoon session with Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. It would be likely, if we had been together in the noon hours.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would be likely. But you can't remember?

Mr. CARTER. Can't remember.



Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you come here on the second day of Mr. Budenz' testimony, that is, on the 23d of August?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you come here with Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, after the conclusion of that morning session, go back to the office of Arnold, Fortas & Porter?

Mr. CARTER. I may have, or I may not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you went there with Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember anything about the occasion of writing of the press release or the dinner that you haven't told us about?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, I think at the restaurant there was some kind of very attractive shellfish that we ate or that I ate, and I think that at the Arnold, Fortas, and Porter office, as you now refresh my memory by your questions, I am pretty sure that Mr. Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore were busily preparing a press release, and I stood around available in case they thought I had anything to contribute. Whether I had anything to contribute or not, I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, as a matter of fact didn't you all have veal scallopini for dinner that night?

Mr. CARTER. That is Italian, isn't it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. I should have sworn that I had some shellfish.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you had brought up shellfish and I simply wondered. Your memory was good enough to remember what you ate. Were you just tossing in the shellfish or do you remember eating shellfish there.

Mr. CARTER. I couldn't swear one way or the other. I may have.

Senator WATKINS. In fact, the matter is that you do not remember very much about this but you went to dinner?

Mr. CARTER. The grapes.

Senator WATKINS. And it was a joint, as I think you said.

Mr. CARTER. I will edit that in case the manager of the restaurant feels hurt about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, while you were in the Aldo Cafe on that evening of the dinner, did you see anyone there whom you recognized?

Mr. CARTER. Other than the three other people at the table I saw no one. Apparently some one who identified us was also there but I saw no one. Well, I don't remember seeing any one that I had ever seen before other than the three guests.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone at the table say anything in your hearing about having recognized anybody in the cafe?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. They may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Just one thing. Is it also your testimony that you do not recall the name Catesby Jones? When it turned up in these hearings, that name meant nothing to you?

Mr. CARTER. It meant nothing to me until it turned up in these hearings. When you are introduced to people, sometimes you have a photographic memory, and yet sometimes the introducer sort of mumbles, "Do you know Mr.——."

Mr. MORRIS. But you do have a flair for interesting names, don't you, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't have a flair for that name.

Mr. MORRIS. The name Catesby Jones was not interesting for you to remember 7 months later?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read Mr. Jones' testimony before this committee?

Mr. CARTER. I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not read it. Do you know what he testified to before this committee?

Mr. CARTER. I saw the story in the April 3 New York Journal American.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all you know about it?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Holland told me that at another session of this committee if I remember rightly, some reference was made. But I don't remember just what the point was. I think Mr. Holland's point was that maybe this wasn't the whole story and that one should read other parts of the testimony. I had no copies of the testimony covering this period, and haven't looked it up since.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read Mr. Lattimore's testimony with regard to the occasion of this dinner?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you discussed it with him or with Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any more questions, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Mr. Chairman, I do have a few questions by way of identifying documents to address to Mr. Carter in view of the fact that he is here. I have taken up these two matters with Mr. Carter and his attorney. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original handwritten memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, with L. E. S. marked in the corner, words looking this——

Mr. MORRIS. Just identify the document.

Mr. MANDEL. There is no date on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It came from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I offer you that document and ask you if that is your handwriting there.

Mr. CARTER. It is.



Mr. SOURWINE. Are you offering that for the record, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I want to be sure that Mr. Carter identifies it as his handwriting.

Mr. CARTER. It looks to me, Mr. Chairman, as though it were a piece of scrap paper—

Senator WATKINS. Please do not write on it now.

Mr. CARTER. On which I made two separate memoranda. One is in ink, which appears to read "boarded type" either 10 cents or \$1, and then "341 face armory, rent." That is in ink. Then in pencil is "friend of Alger Hiss," and then underneath that line is the name "Robert Miller." And up in the left-hand corner, in pencil, are the initials "L. E. S."

Mr. MORRIS. L. E. S. stands for Lawrence Salisbury?

Mr. CARTER. I should presume so. What he would do with either of these pen scratchings, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't the notation there written that Robert Miller is described as a friend of Alger Hiss?

Mr. CARTER. That could be so interpreted. That line reads "friend of Alger Hiss," the next is "Robert Miller."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there has been a conflict of testimony before this committee as to whether Mr. Carter knew Robert Miller and knew him to be a friend of Alger Hiss, and also when we had Mr. Miller on the stand yesterday, Miller did not concede that he was a friend of Alger Hiss. In view of that conflict may this be introduced in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, I don't mean to interfere with the offer of this for the record. I think it should go in the record. But at this point, it should go into the record as a piece of paper coming from the Institute files and as a piece of paper that the witness discussed. The evidentiary value is for the committee to determine.

Senator WATKINS. Go ahead. We will hear your question and the answer, and maybe that will help.

Mr. CARTER. May I ask my attorney for a comment on the question?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you want to consult with your attorney, consult with him.

Mr. MARKS. I was just going to suggest this facsimile procedure. I am not going to talk about any answers to any questions, but the question of how it gets into the record. If this is part of the printed record, may we have this in facsimile, as we did with Miss Farley.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that should be done.

Mr. CARTER. And I would hope some device would be had for showing that one item was in pen and the other was in pencil.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record shows that the upper item is in pen and the lower item and the initials in the upper left-hand corner are in pencil.

Senator WATKINS. You have so described it accurately and definitely.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you if you remember anything about this memorandum.

Mr. CARTER. As Mr. Morris hinted, I think, I forgot even what hearing it was, I was presented with a letter from myself to Alger

Hiss who, at that time, was president of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. This was several years ago. And in that letter, if Mr. Morris will refresh my memory, I told Hiss that I had had lunch with Robert Miller. "I had a delightful and illuminating talk." Then I call attention to the fact that he brought me the good news that Hiss has succeeded Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler as president of the endowment and that I hoped Columbia University would be as eminently successful in getting a successor to Dr. Butler as the endowment has been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is all of that responsive to the question, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I thought Mr. Morris asked me to read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember what the question was? Do you remember?

Mr. CARTER. I asked if I could see the text of the letter and he handed it to me.

Senator WATKINS. There is no question.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a question pending and the witness has gone far afield. I wonder if the reporter would read the question back so we can all know what it was.

(The reporter read from his notes as follows: "Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you if you remember anything about this memorandum.")

Mr. CARTER. I remember that this letter was introduced—

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's get back to the memorandum, Mr. Carter. We have rambled on to this letter once before. I want to know if you remember anything about this memorandum. It is before you. You have laid the book on top of it. But I want to know if you remember anything about this memorandum.

Mr. CARTER. I see.

Mr. SOURWINE. That book wasn't anywhere near your hands when you were asked that question.

Mr. CARTER. The memorandum had the name of Miller.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Do you remember anything about that memorandum?

Mr. CARTER. I remember nothing except that Mr. Morris, before this morning's session began, handed it to me and asked me to identify it as to whether it was my handwriting, and I affirmed that it was my handwriting.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember nothing else of the circumstances on which you made that notation; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. And has it refreshed your recollection, Mr. Carter, on whether or not you do, in fact, remember Robert T. Miller?

Mr. CARTER. I remember nothing more about Robert Miller other than what I testified here, and my memory at that session was very vague, except that in answer to my question in your office this morning as to who he was, you explained that he was public-relations man, and then you added something—

Mr. MORRIS. That he testified he was a public-relations man.

Mr. CARTER. I stand corrected.

Mr. MORRIS. Will this go in the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. That will be placed into the record in facsimile.



(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 748," and is as follows:)

125      Rounded up.      \$ 101.90  
 341 Paul      face armory.  
                  Rent.  
  
 Friend of Alger. Kiss  
 Robert M. Pl.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I give to the witness our exhibits 478, part 9, p. 3136, 485, part 9, p. 3172, and 519 part 10, p. 3323, which are minutes of meetings which took place in Moscow, and ask Mr. Carter if he can recall who actually prepared those minutes?

Senator WATKINS. Are these already in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. They are already in the record, the three exhibits I have read.

Senator WATKINS. All right. Do you want to see them before you try to answer?

Mr. SOURWINE. He has photostats in front of him.

Mr. MARKS. We don't have the exhibit numbers.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have been mentioned for the record. You have the documents.

Mr. MARKS. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore could not testify, when he was asked, as to who actually prepared those minutes. You were present at those meetings and we are asking you if you know who prepared those minutes.

Mr. MARKS. Has Mr. Carter testified that he was present at the meetings?

Mr. CARTER. My initials are on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at those minutes and indicate whether or not they can aid you in answering the question, Were you present at those meetings?

Mr. SOURWINE. If there is any question about that we had better clear it up, because Mr. Lattimore has testified that he was present.

Mr. CARTER. It is a meeting of April 6; the year is not given, but I assume that it was 1936 because that was the only year in which Mr. Lattimore, as far as I know, was in Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the only year that you were in Moscow?

Mr. CARTER. No, no. I think I have said before I have been there ten or a dozen times. A meeting April 6. Motiliev, that is a Soviet geographer who was the chairman of the then Soviet IPR; ECC, myself; OL, Owen Lattimore, presumably; FD, Faith Donaldson—she was one of those who was acting as one of my voluntary staff, and an American—

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Carter. I have also given Mr. Marks exhibit 518 which is a similar copy of minutes of one of these meetings.

Mr. MARKS. This is a copy.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the fourth one.

Mr. CARTER. Is that the same one?

Mr. MORRIS. Either one of those four meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. The first three are photostatic copies of the original and the fourth one referred to just now by Mr. Morris is a mimeographed copy of the exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. All we would like to ask you, Mr. Carter, is if you can tell us who the person or persons were. Who actually prepared these.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question has been raised as to whether Mr. Carter was there. Let's settle that.

Mr. CARTER. I was present.

Mr. MORRIS. At those four meetings?

Mr. SOURWINE. We want the witness to testify as to whether he was present.

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I was present at those four.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now Mr. Morris' question.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what person or persons prepared the minutes of those four meetings?

Mr. CARTER. They probably were different at different times.

But I will have to scan them to make certain.

In the April 6 meeting, they might have been recorded on the Russian side by Mr. Harondar, who was a part-time secretary of the Soviet IPR, and an expert in American movies. On our side, either F. D. or H. M. FD, Faith Donaldson, a woman speed champion, and Harriet Moore, who was studying Mongolian problems in Moscow at the time, on behalf of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did both of those women write in shorthand?

Mr. CARTER. I don't think either of them did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility that minutes prepared by Mr. Harondar would have found their way into the files of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. I think it is extremely unlikely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do these appear to you to be and can you identify them as memoranda which were prepared on your side, that is by—

Mr. CARTER. Absolutely.

Mr. SOURWINE. By the American delegation?

Mr. CARTER. Or the international—I was there as secretary general of the Pacific council.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were prepared by someone under your authority who had gone there with you?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, under non-Soviet authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. These are the minutes which were kept for your information and for your files; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Now we are going to identify the others as to who prepared them.

Mr. CARTER. April 6—the previous one, I have not looked at.

April 2. Mr. Carter; Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore; H. M., that would be Harriet Moore; Harondar, the Russian. I have not read this, but it is a discussion regarding the exchange of books and periodicals.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is in our record. You don't necessarily need to describe it. The question is who prepared it so far as you can tell. If you can tell.

Mr. CARTER. There is no signature at the bottom.

Presumably, Harriet Moore.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Go on to the next one.

Mr. CARTER. April 2—you got April 6?

What is the next consecutive one? Meeting on Pacific Affairs, April 8, Motiliev, Voitinski—he was the research man in the Soviet IPR in China—E. C. C., myself——

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your best description of Mr. Voitinski, research man in what was it you said?

Mr. CARTER. In the Soviet IPR. He was in the IPR world. That was his role. He had been out in that role because he had been in China at a certain purple period in Chinese political history, vis-à-vis Russia, and a very tough guy. He had been a prisoner of war in Kamchatka.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel the phrase you used adequately describes Mr. Voitinski?

Mr. CARTER. The phrase describes his formal IPR connection. He was chairman of the research committee of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. CARTER. E. C. C., myself. O. L., Owen Lattimore. Harondar, the Soviet man. H. M., Harriet Moore. And this was—well, you aren't interested.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who prepared it?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably Harriet Moore.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, now, the fourth one.

Mr. CARTER. April 12, Motiliev; Voitinski; ECC, Carter; O. L., that is Owen Lattimore; R. M., Harriet Moore; and Harondar.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who prepared that?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably Harriet Moore. I imagine that as she was making the draft she finally showed it to me, to see whether I felt that it gave a fair and balanced impression of what happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would say you had approved these as fair and balanced reports of what did happen?

Mr. CARTER. To the extent that I made a few copies and circulated them to a few of my colleagues.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would say they were——

Mr. CARTER. I did not submit them to the Soviet IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, no; but they were for your information and your files, weren't they?

Mr. CARTER. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was no reason to submit them to the Soviet?

Mr. MORRIS. If there had been any serious inaccuracies you would have corrected them?

Mr. CARTER. I would hope so.

Mr. MORRIS. And to the best of your recollection, Harriet Moore was a good and active reporter of meetings?

Mr. CARTER. Excellent.

Mr. MORRIS. And Faith Donaldson?

Mr. CARTER. Faith Donaldson had not had the benefit of a Bryn Mawr education that Miss Moore had.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of the fact that on three of these occasions Harriet Moore was present and Faith Donaldson was not, do you have any feeling as to who actually prepared the minutes on the occasion when both of those ladies were present?

Mr. CARTER. The major drafting would have been done by Miss Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. Monday, April 7, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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MONDAY, APRIL 7, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Will you be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF IGOR BOGOLEPOV

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name to the reporter.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. My first name is Igor, I-g-o-r. My last name is Bogolepov, B-o-g-o-l-e-p-o-v.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am a Federal employee in the service of the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. You are in service abroad, are you?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the Russian Empire.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1904.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you born in Siberia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What has been your service in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I graduated from the University of Petrograd, now Leningrad.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year did you graduate from the University of Petrograd?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1923. I entered the foreign service of the Soviet Union, the foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. In that same year, 1923?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At the end of 1923.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you entered the foreign service of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your first position in the Soviet Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the legal department of the foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in the Soviet Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time until 1926.

Mr. MORRIS. Until 1926.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you have during the period 1923 to 1926?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First I was secretary of the department and then officer of the department.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you terminate your connection with the Soviet Foreign Office in 1926?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I did for a time.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you do that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was drafted into the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you serve, therefore, with the Red army?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First I was a private in the First Rifle Division in Moscow. Then I finished the school for second lieutenants, and in the summer of 1927 I was assigned to the general staff of the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your rank at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Second lieutenant.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the extent of your military training at that particular period?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did that end, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As I said, in the summer of 1927.

Mr. MORRIS. In the summer of 1927.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was transferred to the general staff of the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain on the general staff of the Red army?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until the middle of 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Then what did you do?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was liaison officer between the general staff and the foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. With what rank?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Colonel.

Mr. MORRIS. The rank of colonel.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Correct.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain liaison officer between the Soviet Foreign Office and the Red Army?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. About one-half year.

Mr. MORRIS. One and one-half years?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.



Mr. MORRIS. What was your next assignment after that, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In that time I participated in the conference on disarmament at Geneva.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As interpreter and secretary of the Soviet delegation.

Mr. SOURWINE. What year was that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1927-28.

Mr. MORRIS. That is while you were in military service?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. I was secretary to the military delegation of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in 1927 and 1928?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And that coincides with the period of your military service which you have just described to this committee?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. With the general staff, that is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened to you after 1929?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Then I returned back to the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was an officer in the trade relations and policy division first. Then in 1931 I was working for a short time in the press department of the same office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you retain your military rank during this time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. I was officer of the reserves.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the reserves.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now will you tell us your further experience in the Soviet Foreign Office after 1931?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. From 1931 to 1937 I was acting as assistant to the chief of the League of Nations division.

Mr. MORRIS. Chief of the League of Nations division of the Soviet Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, assistant.

Mr. MORRIS. From the period 1931 to 1937?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, with some interruption for the Red Army again.

Mr. MORRIS. Then in 1937 you say you were impressed into the service with the Red Army again?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In 1937 I was sent to the army armored forces school in Leningrad for 3 months. I learned then the Spanish language, and I was sent with our troops to Spain, where the civil war was going on at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You used the expression "our troops." You mean the Soviet troops?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I meant Soviet troops.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you have in the Spanish Civil War?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was liaison officer between Marshal Kulik—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that name?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. K-u-l-i-k. And General Paalov—

Mr. MORRIS. Were you liaison between him and General of the Army Paalov and Spanish Republican General Miaja? Is that M-a-i-h-a?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. M-i-a-j-a. And other Communist and Republican leaders of Spain.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Several weeks only because in December 1937 a special commission from Moscow came to Spain and proceeded to arrest all the generals and the officers.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you arrested then, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was arrested with all other officers or most of the other officers who were sent previously with me, with two Soviet marshals and then we were sent back to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now will you explain the nature of those arrests, if you know?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the prison I was first told that I was an agent of General Franco and a Trotskyist.

Mr. SOURWINE. A Trotskyist, you say?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. The same kind of accusation was against the whole group of the Soviet military people.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the real reason? That was the formal reason given, wasn't it?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the real reason, if you know? Will you tell us if you know the real reason for your arrest at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I wasn't told other than what I told you. So I spent several months in Lubianka jail. That is central political prison in Moscow. And then I was released with reinstitution of all my rank and capacity.

Mr. MORRIS. You were reinstated?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was your arrest at that time connected with the arrest of Marshal Tukachevsky?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Tukachevsky was arrested first in June of 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. When was your arrest?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was arrested in December 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you know there was no connection between the two?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say that. The people who arrested me later were themselves arrested and shot, so I can't say what happened.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were reinstated in 1938?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you then hold?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Then I was assigned back to the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was made foreign editor of the publication of the Foreign Office in the French language in Moscow, Journal du Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that for the committee, please?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. J-o-u-r-n-a-l Moscow, M-o-s-c-o-w.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that connected with Izvestia in any way?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, a little bit, but it was not connected with the Foreign Office. It was an unofficial publication of the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. About 1 year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if you will permit me, I was unable to hear whether the witness said that was an official publication of the Foreign Office or an unofficial one.



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. An unofficial, thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Foreign Office controlled it, is that right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Indirectly.

Mr. SOURWINE. And dictated who should be its editor?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is how you got your job?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was not an official publication?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, it was not an official publication.

Mr. MORRIS. During this period, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, I wasn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you not a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was impossible at that time for people of non-proletarian origin to join the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were of nonproletarian origin?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; I was descended from a bourgeois family.

Mr. MORRIS. You were descended from a bourgeois family and therefore you were ineligible at that time for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was your father? Do you have any objection for security reasons to telling us who your father was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have no objection because my father is dead now.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us who he was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He was a professor, he was a member of Academy of Science of the Soviet Union, he was a member of State Planning Commission, he was a member of the board of directors of the State Bank of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in the czarist government?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the Soviet Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever apply for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you apply?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened when you applied in 1939 for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time after the 18-party congress, after the big purges when the party and the administrative apparatus and the army were deprived of much of their prominent members, the decision was taken that they should have new members, and so although they formerly rejected people of nonproletarian origin, now they started to drag them into the party. As a matter of fact, my application was done not involuntarily, but I was asked to make application.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not volunteer, but you were asked to apply for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is correct, but I will add to it that even if I wasn't asked, I did it because it was my long-time intention to get into the Communist Party and to get a prominent position in order to sabotage the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, what was the first movement on the part of the Soviet authorities to your application, to your formal application for membership in the party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. What do you mean by the first move?

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, did you become a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I filed the application, and they checked the application for several months because I was, as I told you, arrested. It was a rather complicated matter. They had to go through many instances in order to approve. Then I became, according to the rules, a candidate for the party.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you a candidate for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until the time I left the Soviet Union in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1942.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. So in the period between 1939, which was the date of your application, until you left the Soviet Union in 1942, your status was that of candidate for membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. I became the candidate in 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. You became candidate in 1940.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were in the legal office of the Foreign Office; is that right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time I was already chief of the League of Nations Division of the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that an extension of your work in the legal office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; that was nothing to do with legal work.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position then subsequent to 1939?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Immediately after I received the candidate card there was no more instances to my work as it was before. As you have seen, I was merely in a department which has no political assignments, the legal department or I was acting as an expert. But now when I became a candidate and was a member of the party, I had the same right and the same opportunity concerning a career in the Soviet Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I interrupt, Mr. Morris? If the Chair will permit? Did I understand you correctly, sir, that while you were permitted to work in the Soviet Government before you became an applicant or candidate for membership in the party, up until the time when you did become such a candidate you were kept in nonpolitical jobs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And after you became a candidate you are now about to tell us you branched out into or were transferred into political jobs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were permitted to handle political jobs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead and tell us about that.



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. So after this I was assigned to the job of counselor to the foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. Counselor to the foreign office.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in the period following 1939?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. In that capacity I was able to attend the meetings of the Foreign Commissar Litvinov and his assistants. I have the possibility of probing in top secret files, to read ciphered telegrams which referred to my immediate task, and my immediate task, consisted again with the problems of League of Nations first and in part with the problems of organization infiltration of our influence on the Western Press, administration, and social life.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until Litvinov was dismissed and Molotov came in, and Molotov didn't like Litvinov and his work, so in a very short time, actually in several weeks, he dismissed all people who had been working with Litvinov.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was 1939, in the summer of 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that have anything to do with the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Litvinov was dismissed because of the coming Stalin-Hitler pact.

The CHAIRMAN. Who succeeded Litvinov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Molotov.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next assignment?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Then I was transferred to the Radio Moscow system, to that part of Radio Moscow which dealt with the foreign broadcast programs, and I became first the vice chairman of the Soviet Foreign Broadcast System and later chairman of this system. Soviet broadcasts were translated in 18 and later in 21 foreign languages, including English and American. In that capacity I had under me a lot of American people who were working in broadcasts for America, and at the same time I was able to contact the Comintern people.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you did have working under you Americans, and this is the Voice of Moscow, is that right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us who those Americans were?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, I can't because according to the rules of the organization I knew only the first names of these people.

Mr. MORRIS. So you can't identify them?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They were John, and so on. Even to me, the Chief of the Service, their real names were not disclosed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether they were native born Americans? Were they people who had been born in this country?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, I didn't ask that question.

Mr. MORRIS. You couldn't tell by their accent? Did they have an accent or did they have all the appearance of being native born Americans?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. There was one Negro, and there was one lady who was dismissed because the American Communist Party sent us a letter saying that our feminine speaker was not very good, that she had not an American but an English cockney accent, and that was the reason

why she was dismissed. I guess these people were at least not from South America.

Mr. MORRIS. Not from——

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not from the Southern States.

Mr. MORRIS. Not from the southern part of the United States?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; because I couldn't understand——

Mr. MORRIS. You could understand?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can understand better people from the North.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us for how long you stayed in that assignment, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until the summer of 1940, 1 year. In June 1940 I was sent with Vishinsky, Zhdanov, and Dekezoniov—Zhdanov was a member of the Politburo then and right hand of Stalin, Vishinsky was then Vice Foreign Commissar, and Dekezoniov was Deputy Foreign Commissar, and at the same time Chief of Foreign Service of the Political Police.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where were you sent with these men?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. To Baltic countries, for the occupation of the Baltic countries.

Mr. MORRIS. By that time the Baltic countries had been taken over by the Soviet Union.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not yet. We came under false names and false passports. They were independent countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequently those Baltic countries were taken over by the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Very soon.

Mr. MORRIS. You were there to work on the sovietization of those particular countries?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Right. I became director of the radio system of the Baltic countries.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until the beginning of the war which came, as you know, for the Soviet Union on the 22d of June 1941, for 1 year again.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened at the commencement of the war? What happened to you?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I joined the staff of the northwestern front of the Red Army, defending the Baltic countries and the approach to Leningrad, first under Marshal Voroshilov, later under Marshal Zhukov.

Mr. MORRIS. With the rank of colonel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The rank of colonel.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about your military experiences commencing on June 22, 1941.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. For about 1 month I was with the retreating army from the borders of the Soviet Union through Latvia and Estonia to the approach to Leningrad. We arrived in August 1941 to Leningrad, but without our army, which surrendered to the Germans; only general officers and commissars, no army. At that time we got new reserves and made a good stand against the Germans on a front around 100 kilometers of Leningrad. At that time I got word from a good friend of mine, General Vlassov, who was one of the commanders around Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was one of the commanders?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Defending Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Constituting the defense of Moscow.



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You got word from him?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I came to Moscow to see him. I talked with him about the political and military situation of the Soviet Union. I knew him pretty well. He knew pretty well myself. We took the decision that the time had arrived to bring about a great change, to use the defeat and the war in Germany for the overthrow of the Soviet Government. The best solution—

The CHAIRMAN. Give me that again, please, that last sentence. The time is ripe for what?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. For overthrow of the Soviet regime in Russia. In this conference with General Vlassov I, with another general, decided that the best way is to go over to the Germans, to join the 4 million Red soldiers and officers already in German hands—

Mr. MORRIS. You say 4 million?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. About 4 million; yes—and to try to convince the Germans of the possibility of turning arms against the Communist regime in our country. General Vlassov surrendered to the Germans in March 1942. I escaped across the front lines at the very beginning of 1942, and I met him again in a German PW camp.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in that PW camp?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was first in a Gestapo jail, and then after the Germans cleared me—because it was the order of Hitler to shoot all commissars and all Jewish people. First, I wasn't a Jew, and second, I wasn't a commissar. The Gestapo carried me back to the German Army officials, and the German Army officials let me free and proposed that I work on propaganda against the Soviet Union. I agreed to do this, and for about 1 year I was leading a powerful transmitter for the German Government on the outskirts of Berlin, carrying out the anti-Communist propaganda. It wasn't until 1944, due to the political quarrels between different groups of Nazis, the Wehrmacht, the German Army, and the German Propaganda Ministry under Goebbels, that they were ready to help us to carry out propaganda, and so on, and even to organize an anti-Communist army, whereas the Ostministerium, Rosenberg and Hitler himself were against it. One of the results of the struggle between the different cliques of Nazis was that my station was shut down, and I retired.

Mr. MORRIS. This is what year now? You retired in 1944 when your station was shut down?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Then I tried to do some work with General Vlassov, who at that time was also relieved from the camp, but soon I discovered the impossibility to work with the Germans.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you discovered the impossibility of working with the Germans?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. It was not that the Nazis were too bad. When I came over and knew that they were no good. But I didn't know that the Germans were so silly as they are. Here I made my mistake. In 1944 I simply retired to a German farm in Bavaria, working as a manual worker on a German farm and waiting until the American troops came and the war was over, which was in April 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened then in April 1945?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In April 1945 I and many other people like me, the Russians, the French, the Poles, and so on, went to meet the Amer-

ican troops with the first spring flowers as our liberators, but the people from Eastern Europe were obliged to hide from Americans because they started to consider us as collaborators and to turn us over to the Soviet repatriation commission. So from 1945 to the beginning of 1947 I was obliged to keep myself hidden in Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you generally with a group of people with General Vlassov at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. I have the opportunity and the honor to be before you now only because I left the troops of General Vlassov and his organization, because Vlassov troops and the organization of Vlassov who believed the Americans and capitulation which was signed by the general and the surrender were all turned over to the Soviets.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people were involved in that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say precisely, but according to the estimates of my comrades there were only a few left. We had had three full divisions, which means around 45,000 people.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, are you from your experiences in Moscow acquainted with an organization called the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have mentioned to you that at the same time when I was working for the Foreign Office I was involved in some literary and scientific activities in so-called Communist Academy or, better to say, in the Institute for World Economics and Politics, whose chief was Eugene Varga.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Institute for World Communists?

Mr. SOURWINE. World Economics and Politics.

The CHAIRMAN. World Economics and Politics, the official name of the institute?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As you perhaps know, the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations was a part of this institute. So actually I was working under the same roof and with the same people who were connected with the American Institute of Pacific Relations. Here was the chief source of my information, which I will give you right now. The second part of my information I got directly from the secret files of the Soviet Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what was the Institute of Pacific Relations as you saw it at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First, it was not an institute, but a desk or a group of research workers on China, Japan, and other far-eastern countries.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was a group of research workers on the countries that you just named?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, yes; a Chinese group, a Japanese group, and so on. At that time, I think it was the beginning of the thirties, they did literary research work.

Mr. MORRIS. You say in the early thirties they did research work?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. They worked as Marxist and Communist scholars, but still as scholars. But in the course of time, toward the middle of the thirties, the situation became, in my opinion, changed. First, the people were changed who were working in our Institute of Pacific Relations.



Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us some details on that? You say the people were changed in the middle 1930's. What changes do you know from your own experience?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. From the old people who were working in the twenties and the beginning of the thirties in this body about which I am speaking now, only one person remained. The other sinologists—

Mr. MORRIS. Sinologists? Experts on China?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. On China and Japan—had disappeared and were out then instead of them came in the true Communists who had not very much to do with science, but very much to do with some other matters.

Mr. MORRIS. What other matters do you refer to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean military intelligence and political intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us who the one person who remained was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That was Anatole Kantorovich. He was a nonparty man. He was a real scholar and very nice person.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the people who came in and took the place of the scholars that you just described?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You want me to call the names?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; to the best of your ability.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First of all was a certain Mr. Voitinsky.

Mr. MORRIS. Voitinsky. Will you tell us who Mr. Voitinsky was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mr. Voitinsky was known to me in different conferences as a man who in the 1920's was a big wheel, big cog, big shot in Siberia when he liquidated a lot of former officers.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he liquidated them?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. He was vice chief of the Siberian Cheka according to this own words. That is the first name of the secret police.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Comintern man?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Just a minute. For this he had the Order of the Red Banner which he displayed often to us. I can't tell you all of this, but at the time when I met him he was already an old hand in the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was an old hand in the Comintern?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. To me he was not a scholar and not a member of the institute with which I had been working, but first a man of the Comintern. He was carrying through the political line of the Comintern, and science was to him only a media to carry out his political Comintern line.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Voitinsky has appeared throughout our hearings as one of the officials of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He presided at several of the meetings on which we had considerable testimony here during the last few weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The second whom I remember of this group was Mr. Abramson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you go to Mr. Abramson, I would like to ask you a question about Mr. Voitinsky, if the Chair will permit.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Voitinsky a research man? Did he himself engage in research?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Will you please repeat the question? I didn't get it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what research is?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Research. Did Mr. Voitinsky do that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, with the help of other people. He didn't work himself. He had a lot of secretaries and assistants to whom he gave directives to get him the data, and he arranged all this or more often it was that he put only his signature on articles which were written by other people.

Mr. Abramson, not unlike Mr. Voitinsky, was a scholar. Of course you must understand that when I use the word "scholar," you can't compare it with your American or western notion of scholar, because in our Soviet country a scholar is a politician who is working in the field of science. He is not a pure scientist. He does not know what objectivity is, and he doesn't care to be objective. He is carrying out the slogan of Lenin even before the revolution, saying that there is no impartial science, that there is only party science. So when I say that Mr. Abramson was a scholar, he was a Marxist and Communist scholar. Sometimes he met Mr. Abramson in a military uniform, not of course in the rooms of the Institute for World Economics and Politics, but outside. He was clad in the uniform of the fourth division of the General Staff of the Red Army, the military intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. So Abramson was an officer in the fourth division of the Soviet Army which was the military division?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I saw him in military uniform in his bureau in the fourth division of the General Staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember his rank? Was the rank indicated on his uniform?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am afraid I would make a mistake. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a high officer?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Either a colonel or major.

Mr. MORRIS. To the best of your ability you would estimate him to have been a major or colonel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a field officer? Do you know that he was a field officer?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, he was a staff officer.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the other people who came into the Institute of Pacific Affairs at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Then I can mention a man who has two names, Abolin, and the second name Avorin.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that is one person?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. One person, yes. In Moscow he was known as Aborin, in Manchuria when he was for a time consul general either in Munkiang or Kirin, I don't remember he was Avorin. He has a surname which I do not remember. Under this surname he was known to me in the same fourth division of the Red Army, but I do not remember how he was called then there. That is about Abolin or Avorin.

This man succeeded Kantorovich. When Kantorovich was arrested and executed, then Avorin took up his functions of secretary general of the Soviet Council of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Arosev?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mr. Arosev, yes I knew him personally. He was chairman of the VOKS. That is Soviet for Cultural Relations between Soviet Union and the Western World.



Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the nature of the operations they were conducting in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sorry. I would like to add one more.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me. Go ahead, please do.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have to mention one more name, that is, a certain Kara-Murza. This man was also intelligence officer, in charge of Mongolian relations. Later when I have to testify about some of the American members of some of the institutes this name would be mentioned by me once more. That is why I bring it up.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the nature of the operation that they were conducting in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As I told you before, with the change of personnel, the nature of the activities of our institute changed, too.

Senator EASTLAND. Military intelligence took it over, did it not? Soviet military intelligence?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mostly Soviet military intelligence, also the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator EASTLAND. It became an agency of the Soviet Government.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

I didn't work myself in military intelligence, so I can't tell you precisely what kind of operations the Fourth Division of the General Staff had carried out concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations. I can only guess from indirect facts. For example, in the files of the Foreign Office I met more than once evidence that the people who were working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations had been asked to ask their American counterparts to give some information concerning the fisheries in the Pacific area, and looking into the file I found always that as background for this information was always the request of naval intelligence. So I feel myself better prepared to answer the second part of the question rather than military intelligence activities. Perhaps when you will ask me some questions I will remember some isolated facts.

I got the impression from talks with my comrades working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations, in the Foreign Office, that they considered this institute as a very valuable organization from two points of view. As one of my former comrades expressed it, it is like a double-way track. On one line you get information from America through this institute. On the other hand, you send information which you would like to implant in American brains through the same channel of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the double-way track that you refer to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean two channels. One was the in-going channel, the second out-going channel.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The in-going channel was military intelligence. We extracted military information.

Mr. MORRIS. When you talk about two-way track, do you mean that military intelligence was extracted from outside the Soviet Union through the medium of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And on the other hand, by the out-way track you mean information that you wanted to impart to the outside world was transmitted through that medium?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Propaganda, you mean. Soviet propaganda that the Foreign Office desired implanted in foreign minds would be sent through the facilities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is what you mean?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is mostly propaganda, but I would say even a little more than propaganda, because not only organizational propaganda but even the organization of a network of fellow travelers in your and other countries.

Senator WATKINS. I want to ask this, Mr. Chairman: I understood you to say that you got this information from talking with your associates.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Were you free to converse back and forth about what this group was doing?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly not. If I had been free I could give you more information.

Senator WATKINS. How did you get what you did get? Were they not under some sort of surveillance, and not able to talk freely or speak freely as to what they were doing?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, when we discussed some common business, necessarily you have to exchange information. Of course it was not a full report about what this or other bodies were doing and what are their functions, but when I had, for example, to deal with the problem of fisheries in the Pacific, necessarily we had to speak about this matter. I gathered information from them and they got some information from me. Besides this, the human relations even in the Communist world are still human relations, and if you have good friends you can always say a couple of words, not so much, but something.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you could discuss it some.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not too much, but still you can do a little bit, very few, of course.

Senator EASTLAND. You had access to the documents, you said, secret files?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I pause in the interrogation at this point to review our exhibit No. 430, part 8, page 2701, which is one of the many exhibits we have introduced on the questions of minutes taken at Moscow?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the minutes taken in Moscow during the meeting in Moscow?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. This is our exhibit No. 430 used in the open hearings of February 12, 1952:

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL CONVERSATION AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY,  
VOLKHONKA 14, MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1934

The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes, Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese.

1. Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September Pacific Affairs on the romanization of Chinese. They invited Voitinsky to write for the December issue on the land problems of Soviet China or the land problems of China generally.



I would like to skip down to paragraph 3, Mr. Chairman, and read this paragraph to the witness:

3. Mr. Voitinsky said that he believed the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports on the following subjects:

(a) The inner situation in Netherlands India—the economic interdependence of the peasant and the city worker, and also the interdependence of these on capital and trade in Holland. The whole situation as portrayed in official documents in Netherlands India and in Holland would be of the greatest interest to the Communist Academy. The academy would also welcome information on the nationalist movement in the Netherlands India. At the moment the academy has no Dutch-speaking member, but could easily get all Dutch documents translated.

(b) He would appreciate—  
this is Voitinsky again—

all the information the IPR can send him regarding the agrarian movement in Japan and the financial dependence of Japan on other countries. He would like to compare Lenin's theses on Japan, which he feels is stated in algebraic terms transformed into arithmetical terms, through a study of finance and trade. He would like very much more information than is at present available on the evolution of the labor movement and the close relation between the village and the city.

Mr. Chairman, he goes on at length, and it all indicates that Voitinsky, about whom we have been taking testimony, was asking in this meeting for information through the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Is this the same Mr. Voitinsky about whom you have been testifying?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I guess so.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this document reveal anything to you, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I do not remember myself this problem of ours.

Mr. MORRIS. This particular meeting, you mean?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not the particular meeting, but this particular problem which you enumerated here, but it seems to me very familiar because I do remember other occasions when, as I told you, military intelligence, the foreign office or Cominform asked questions of other people to get from their American colleagues.

Mr. SOURWINE. To get what from their American colleagues?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Information. If you would like an example, I remember a question posed concerning some parts of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was posed concerning parts of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. By Voitinsky to the American members of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did he do that? Had someone asked him about that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was a command either of military intelligence—

Mr. SOURWINE. Military intelligence wanted that information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Through Voitinsky?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. From the American IPR?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he got the information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the nature of the information that he asked for?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They mostly asked——

Senator FERGUSON. No; on Alaska.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. On Alaska? Concerning the construction of roads, the food situation, and especially about the climatical conditions for polar flights.

Senator FERGUSON. From whom were they to get this information? You say the Institute of Pacific Relations. Who in the institute?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Was any name mentioned?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; you have to understand that when names were mentioned, it was the business of intelligence work.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you made the policy as to what you desired.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. As to who was to do it. That was intelligence.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That was not our business. That was military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Who suggested that the Institute of Pacific Relations might get you the information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That particular case which I am speaking about was taken from the file on Pacific relations of the Foreign Office, and unless I make a mistake a list of the questions concerning Alaska and the Aleutian Islands was written and presented for approval of the foreign office before it was sent to Voitinsky or who else I don't know, and was approved by the chief of the far eastern division of the General Staff of the Red Army and the far eastern intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what year this was in?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not quite precise, but it was 1936 or 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was this conversation?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was not a conversation. It was official correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. Official correspondence. Where was it written?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was in our foreign office files. There was a copy of a letter of the military intelligence asking us to go through the Institute for World Economics and Politics investigations concerning thus and thus problems.

Senator FERGUSON. That file was in what city?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Moscow, in the foreign office. The military intelligence never asked directly. In this case they asked it through the Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. The military intelligence asked the Foreign Office to ask the institute?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose job in the Foreign Office would it be to ask the Institute of Pacific Relations for that kind of information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Office, which was occupied with the problems of China and Japan.



Senator FERGUSON. Mr. MORRIS, don't we have some evidence in the record now showing that they inquired about some economic and geographic information in the Far East?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir. There is considerable on that. I had given this as a sample of that.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean there was some other testimony, was there not?

Mr. MORRIS. Abundant, Senator. I will offer you these, which are documents which we will be coming to soon, if you would like to look at them.

Senator FERGUSON. No. If you are going to put them in the record I know they exist.

Mr. MORRIS. Some are in, and some we plan to put in.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it wouldn't interrupt the train of discussion at this point I have one thing to clean up, Mr. Chairman.

Do you know what the address of Soviet IPR was in Moscow, the Moscow address of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First it was located at 14 Volkonka, the same apartment the institute was located in.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are sure about that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. And then later I guess when Motylev took over he put the whole business in his own office on Razin Street. I don't remember the number.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it 20 Razin Street?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that document, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do that, was the American Institute of Pacific Relations and the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations housed in the same building? Were they in the same building, under the same roof?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Americans?

Mr. MORRIS. When the members of the American Institute of Pacific Relations visited Moscow, did they spend time in the same building as to the Soviet Council of the IPR members spent their time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say that, sir, because on only one occasion I saw myself the American members of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Moscow.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a Russian Institute of Pacific Relations, wasn't there, a branch of the American?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they both housed in the same building, the American and the Russian?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. What Americans? I can't understand.

The CHAIRMAN. The Institute of Pacific Relations was the international, and there was the Russian branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they all in the same building?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, the Americans came only from time to time to Moscow. So far as I am informed, they came not often to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Whenever they were there they had temporary quarters there?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Temporary quarters, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Since you did mention, Mr. Bogolepov, the fact that you did see some Americans, will you at this time tell us about that meeting?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. All right. But I have to call to your attention that the second part of the activities has not yet been covered.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by the second part? Tell us about that.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The second part of our utilization as a media for propaganda infiltration of general ideas favorable to the Soviet Union and some particular problems which we would like to implant in American minds according to the aims of Soviet foreign policy. For this aim the members of the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations by way of their personal meetings, by way of suggestions to solve the problems, by way of sending their own writings and in other ways tried not only to influence the American colleagues of their own but to make of these people media for infiltration of ideas favorable for Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose policy was that, the intelligence of the army or was it the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office we have had a special, I think you call it joint committee, where representatives of different branches of the administration were present. In this joint committee we present the members of the Foreign Office, then of military intelligence, executive committee of the Cominform, and a representative from the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This important body was responsible directly to the political commission of the Politburo for carrying out the infiltration of ideas and men through the iron curtain to the Western countries. I have to make the point that the problem which we are discussing right now with you, the problem of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to me in Moscow was only a small and not a greatly significant part of the activities. It was a very big business of ours.

Senator FERGUSON. What was? Propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The infiltration.

Senator FERGUSON. Infiltration in other countries.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In other countries. Ideological infiltration, the creation of fellow travelers, inducing the western intelligentsia to write books and articles which were favorable to the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that one of the missions of the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. To get people in other nations to write articles and books in favor of Russia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In favor of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ever pay any money to get that done?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The singular or the particular character of the situation is that the majority of the Soviet agents outside as well as inside are unpaid workers.

Senator FERGUSON. State that again. I did not quite get you.



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean it is the general situation that we do not pay the agents. The agents work out of their sympathy toward the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you get people to write books without paying them subsidies, and so forth?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Why do we have to pay for books? There are American publishers to publish the books and pay for them. Why do we spend our own money?

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Senator Ferguson, may I offer this letter. I think this is directly in point here. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this, please?

Senator FERGUSON. You don't think, then, that Russia would print any books in Russia favorable to America.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In Russia, but not in the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I meant, in the Soviet Union.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Report of the visit of the secretary general to Moscow," dated December 20-31, 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. I am reading from page 10 of this document, Mr. Chairman. Here it gives a list of people who were present at the particular meeting which Mr. Carter, the secretary general, attended and apparently was responsible for these minutes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this document in our record, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Not yet, sir. I am going to comment on it and ask the chairman if you will introduce it into the record. This is on the 25th of December 1934. I won't read all the names of the people present, but present was Kuliabko, the acting president of VOKS (Arosev was in Paris), Rabbins of the VOKS staff, Carter, Moore, Wingfield Digby, Mitchell, Morris, Mr. Cherniavsky, Miss Linde [reading]:

Mr. Kuliabko asked Mr. Carter what, in his opinion, would be the most arrangement for distributing VOKS publications in the United States.

It reads just that way.

The CHAIRMAN. What is VOKS?

Mr. MORRIS. The witness has just testified to the nature of VOKS, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read this whole paragraph and then I will go back to this particular thing [reading]:

Mr. Carter suggested three possibilities, (a) through the medium of the Russian-American Society, (b) through some commercial publisher by having them take a stock on consignment, and (c) through the American Council of the IPR. This last method could not be offered officially until Mr. Carter had consulted the American Council.

Mr. Kuliabko also requested information as to the names and personnel of American societies and institutions in the fields of ethnography, physics, ethnology, and geography with which VOKS should try and establish relationships. Mr. Carter promised to have this information sent from New York.

Will you tell us again what VOKS is?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The name of VOKS, the official translation of this abbreviation is Society for Cultural Relations Between Soviet Union and Foreign Countries. Actually it was one of the cover organizations for, again, these double tracks, getting information from abroad to the Soviet Intelligence, and sending infiltration of ideas and selling Communist ideas to the west.

Mr. MORRIS. He talks here of distributing VOKS publications in the United States. Would that be Communist propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it necessarily be Communist propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly. We have no other propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, I then offer this as an example of a concrete example of what the witness has been testifying to.

Senator WATKINS. What page were you reading from?

Mr. MORRIS. Page 10.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. May I give another example to Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Give another example of what you were talking about.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me. Mr. Chairman, as such, may this go into the record as a document identified by Mr. Mandel as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator WATKINS. What does the document purport to be?

Mr. MORRIS. This is a report of the visit of the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations to Moscow, December 20 through 31, 1934.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom was it compiled? I do not believe we have enough about it.

Senator WATKINS. Specifically, who did it?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter was the secretary general. As to who on his staff actually prepared the minutes I am not prepared to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has this been identified by Mr. Carter?

Mr. MORRIS. No, it has not. It has been identified by Mr. Mandel as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we ask Mr. Carter if he will authenticate it?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I would like to have one more link in the authentication of it, who prepared it, whether it was anyone connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. A fugitive instrument might creep into the files of the Pacific Relations. I think it can be identified.

Mr. MORRIS. On its face, Senator, it is a report of the secretary general, you see.

The CHAIRMAN. On its face it appears to be. Does the secretary general identify it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, since this document has been discussed with the witness, would the Chair wish to order it into the record as the document the witness has discussed, subject to future identification by Mr. Carter?

The CHAIRMAN. It may go in the record now. The question as to its weight and as to the admissibility will be finally fixed when, as, and if it is identified by Mr. Carter or someone else.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 749," and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 749

#### REPORT OF THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO MOSCOW

December 20th-31st, 1934

The newly formed Soviet Council of the IPR could hardly have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the Committee (listed on page 2 of the October issue of IPR NOTES.) are members of the Party. All are influential and all are operating large organizations with substantial resources.

Dr. V. E. Motylev, the Chairman, as Director of the Great Soviet World Atlas, has a budget of 12 million roubles per year, a large staff, and the cooperation of every leading scientific institution and library in the U. S. S. R.



Voitinsky, the Vice Chairman, as head of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Communist Academy, likewise has substantial library and staff resources at his command, as well as funds for editing "Pacific Ocean" and other research studies on Far Eastern subjects.

S. S. Joffe, who, together with Schmidt, was the hero of the Chelyuskin expedition, is famous as a mathematician, as an aviator, as well as an explorer. It is commonly said that Joffe and Schmidt are in charge of everything in the U. S. S. R. north of the 62nd parallel, a region which includes vast mineral and timber resources and a population of five million people.

A. S. Swanidze is Director of the Bank of Foreign Commerce which finances all of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics, speaks English perfectly, and is naturally extremely well-informed on the international relations of the U. S. S. R.

Janson, as Head of the Chamber of Commerce, has a large organization at his command, which not only issues information on economic questions, but carries on extensive research work for the improvement of Soviet products.

The Institute of Oceanography is also a very important body. It handles both the economic and the scientific side of the entire U. S. R. R. fish industry. Its work is of great importance to the whole future food supply of the U. S. S. R. and has a direct political bearing on the situation in the Far East because of the constant friction between Japanese and Soviet fishermen, and because of the scientific competition which exists between the U. S. S. R. and Japan in the development of the fish resources.

A. Kantorovitch, Secretary of the Soviet Council, is able, frank, and well-informed and a most efficient administrator. He speaks English rapidly and vigorously. He was a member of the Soviet Embassy in Peiping. His special field of study is American policy in China and he has just completed a book on this subject which will be published shortly.

Kantorovitch has as his assistant Eugene Harundar, who speaks English, French, and German fluently and can take dictation and type rapidly in all. Harundar was recently political, or foreign affairs, secretary to the Commissar of Heavy Industries.

The office of the Soviet Council is housed in the headquarters of Institute of Scientific Publications which is producing the World Atlas. It therefore can make use of the machinery whereby the Atlas staff can draw on every library in Moscow for books and other materials.

During his stay in Moscow the Secretary General had several very full and lengthy discussions with the members of the Praesidium of the Soviet Council, Motylev, Voitinsky, and Kantorovitch, and with Kantorovitch alone, at which the organization of the IPR, the personnel of the different National Councils, the research program, the conference technique, the publications of the Institute, its financial set-up, and many other institutional questions were thoroughly discussed. The members of the Praesidium showed the keenest interest in learning of the activities of the IPR and an obvious desire to cooperate fully with the other Councils and with the International Secretariat in every way possible. Full details of all these discussions are on file in the Secretary General's office. The following is merely a summary of the more important points which developed.

### *1. Standard of Living Studies*

The Praesidium was anxious to know:

- (a) What was the purpose of these studies?
- (b) What type of studies will be made?
- (c) Does the scope of the studies go beyond wages and hours?
- (d) How will the final report on standards of living appear?
- (e) What is the conference to be held in connection with these studies? Is it regional or international?

Mr. Carter explained the reasons which had led the International Research Committee to select this field of study. It is hoped that the studies will serve, first, to gather more accurate and complete data on the way people in certain selected industries and communities live. The groups selected for study will be chiefly those whose products enter directly into international trade and competition. From the data obtained it should be possible to determine whether there is any scientific method for comparing the living standards among different countries. The eventual aim is help in finding means of raising the standards of living in all countries. The methods used are at the moment largely experimental. Each country is expected to describe, in addition to the usual data on wages, hours, budgets, etc., the factors peculiar to its own standard of living, i. e., its



special social and psychological values which play an important part in the question of how the people's needs and wants are being satisfied under present economic and social conditions.

The research conference to be held in Tokyo will be as international as possible and will attempt to work out a common methodology for all future work in this field and Mr. Carter hoped that it would be possible for the Soviet Council to be represented. If possible, he hoped that Mr. Motylev could arrange to advance his trip to the Far East by a few weeks so that he could be present.

Mr. Motylev explained that this might not be possible, but that he would very much like to go if it could be arranged. Meanwhile, the Soviet Council would consult with various specialists in the field of standards of living and would then send to Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland a memorandum embodying the Soviet Council's views on the question of possible research projects in this field within the Soviet Union.

## 2. *Exchange of Publications and materials between the Soviet Council and the Pacific Council, the American Council and the other National Councils of the IPR, especially Chatham House*

Mr. Kantorovitch explained that in accordance with the arrangements made by letter with Mr. Carter and Mr. Field, 73 books and magazines have already been sent to New York for the Pacific Council's Russian library now housed in the office of the American Council, with Mrs. Kathleen Barnes as librarian. This consignment does not by any means cover the whole field of modern Soviet scholarship on Pacific problems. There are some fifty more which he could send if desired. There are also a number of more general books on Russian economic and political problems. He asked what books the Soviet Council would receive from the United States in return.

Mr. Carter replied that these could be classified into three categories:

- (a) All IPR publications. These would all be sent to Moscow.
- (b) All important American books on the Far East and the Pacific area. These books would be sent if Kantorovitch desired it.
- (c) General books on American economies, politics and social conditions.

In this third category it was agreed that the exchange should consist of a small carefully selected collection to be decided on directly by Kantorovitch and Field.

Kantorovitch asked whether a similar exchange arrangement could be made with Chatham House. The Soviet Council is prepared to supply Chatham House with all important Russian books on the Pacific area. Mr. Carter promised to take this matter up with Miss Cleeve when he returned to London.

On several occasions Kantorovitch, Voitinsky and Motylev all expressed the wish that some arrangement could be worked out whereby the Soviet Council could be supplied regularly with a list of what the IPR groups in the United States and Great Britain considered the important books appearing in the English language on subjects important to the Pacific area. Such a list, with possibly the addition of such reviews as had appeared in reliable journals, would be of great value in the Soviet Union. If possible such an information exchange might be developed among all the National Councils. The lists when received could be used by the Council receiving them in any way it chose, i. e., for educational purposes, to spur translations, to stimulate an interest in language study, etc.

## 3. *IPR conference*

The members of the Praesidium were deeply interested in hearing about the organization of IPR conferences, the "round table" technique, the methods used for guiding the discussion, the work of the program Committee, the round table Chairmen and Secretaries, etc. Mr. Carter explained all these matters very fully and Mr. Motylev expressed satisfaction with this form of organization which he said would be something quite new in Russian experience. He felt that it had many advantages, one of the most important being that it gave each member of the conference an opportunity to express his opinion on the subjects under discussion.

Mr. Motylev also discussed the points raised in the letter sent by the Secretary General to the members of the Institute from Amsterdam on December 18th, 1934. In general he was in full agreement with the provisions contained therein. With regard to a few specific points he felt that it would be better to leave the question of the Status of Manchoukuo for discussion under topic "(e)", rather than follow the suggestion of the American Council that it could be discussed



under "(c)" and "(d)." Mr. Voitinsky felt that topic "(e)" was very well formulated and should prove valuable in summarizing the problems brought out during the discussion of the first four topics.

With regard to the data papers which the Soviet Council will prepare, Motylev explained that it had been decided to combine Nos. 4 and 5 into one paper dealing not only with the economic but also with the political struggle in the Pacific. This paper will therefore furnish the Soviet data for the final Round Table.

Motylev raised the question as to whether the National Councils were still to be allowed to prepare an optional paper, as stated in the Secretary General's June 21st memorandum. Mr. Carter said that this provision still held good. Motylev explained that the Soviet group had not decided on any additional paper, but wished to be free to contribute one if international conditions should make it advisable.

Kantorovitch added that the Soviet Council would send a definitive list of data papers to the Secretariat by April 1st, 1935, a list of probably conference members by December 1, 1935.

Mr. Carter told the history of the various suggestions as to the location of the 1936 conference, and said that at present there were three places under consideration, Tokyo, Hongkong and California. The Soviet group much preferred California.

#### *4. International Committee appointments*

Mr. Carter explained that each National Council was entitled to representation on the various international committees of the IPR, the Pacific Council, the Program Committee, the Finance Committee, the Research Committee, the Publications Committee, and a correspondent for *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*. He described briefly the work of these Committees, and the Praesidium agreed to discuss the matter with the Council and to inform Mr. Carter of their nominations.

#### *5. Pacific affairs*

The Soviet Council had already received a letter from Lattimore and are willing to cooperate. Voitinsky will try to write his article on the Chinese Agrarian problem sometime in the near future. Kantorovitch is very favorably impressed with the magazine, especially by Toynbee's article in the March issue. He was also eager to work out some method whereby regular Soviet contributions could be assured. Mr. Carter asked that Kantorovitch write directly to Lattimore suggesting possible articles and authors. Lattimore could then choose those which best fitted into his general editorial program. This Kantorovitch agreed to do. He also promised to send a regular Soviet contribution to *IPR NOTES*.

The Soviet Council also ordered a full set of all back issues of *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*.

#### *6. The proposed Bibliographical Service*

Kantorovitch had noted in the annual report of the American Council a mention of the proposed bibliographical service, and wished to have more specific information about it. Mr. Carter explained the steps which had already been taken, emphasizing that the whole project was still entirely tentative. He then asked Kantorovitch whether it would be possible for the Soviet Council to provide a central staff with a list of, say, the 100 most significant books and articles on the Far East and the Pacific, appearing each year in the Soviet Union, together with a short description and critical comment on each. In answer to Kantorovitch's questions, Mr. Carter explained that the plan, as tentatively sketched, would call for books and articles to be reviewed and criticized, first, by a competent group in the country concerned, second, by competent scholars of a different nationality, and, finally, by the central staff. The service would be either annual or semiannual and would most probably be centered in New York. The reason for the threefold character of the review would be to set a truly qualitative standard, and to get an agreement that the books and articles included were of real international significance. To achieve this form of critical review would, of course, require the voluntary cooperation of scholars in every country. In discussing the question as to what form the final critical note would take, Kantorovitch favored a "symposium review" rather than a synthesis of the various opinions obtained. He felt that two or three short paragraphs of comment, each signed by the author, and representing widely differing schools of thought, would carry greater weight than an impersonal integration of contradictory attitudes and opinions.

With regard to the number of books and articles which should be listed each year, Kantorovitch thought 100 was a rough estimate, and that there would undoubtedly be more articles than books.



At this discussion and at later meetings with the Praesidium some doubt was expressed as to the desirability and feasibility of such a service. In the opinion of the Soviet group there was considerable doubt as to whether it would be possible to make a qualitative judgment on books dealing with controversial subjects, in view of the radically different ideologies among the countries of the IPR.

They felt that a mutual exchange of information among the National Councils, as to what books and articles were appearing, with a brief descriptive comment of each, would be of greater value, and would obviate the need for critical comment.

Mr. Carter explained that there were many among the numbers of the IPR who were anxious to get away from the exhaustive, uncritical type of bibliography, and to work out some method for a qualitative description. Kantorovitch agreed that this was desirable and remarked in this connection that there were two standards of quality which were always employed in the Soviet Union in judging the worth of a new book. First, whether it contained new material, or material presented from a fresh view point. Second, whether the author showed that he was thoroughly familiar with everything that had already been done in his field.

It was obvious that the Praesidium felt that in a bibliographical service conducted from New York or Washington, by a staff which would presumably be predominantly capitalistic, it would be difficult to describe either Soviet or other books in a manner which could be regarded as objective by both communist and capitalist readers. It was even more obvious that unless the service included English language publications, it would not be greeted with any very enthusiastic support in the Soviet Union.

#### 7. *Exchange of Staff and research workers*

On behalf of Mr. Frederick V. Field of the American Council, Mr. Carter extended a formal invitation to Mr. Motylev to send Mr. Kantorovitch to New York for a period of three to six months for the following purposes:

(a) to confer with Mr. Field regarding the establishment of a regular exchange of IPR research workers between New York and Moscow, according to which, for several months each year, a Soviet student proposed by the Soviet IPR would study in New York, and an American student nominated by the American IPR would study in Moscow.

(b) to confer with the American IPR with reference to the whole question of the American study of the language and life of the Soviet Union.

(c) to study the program and methods of the IPR in the United States.

He also extended an invitation from Mr. Field for Mr. Motylev to follow Mr. Kantorovitch's visit with the appointment of a Soviet research worker who will go to New York to pursue some line of study, under the direction of the IPR in Moscow and New York, which could be better carried out in the U. S. A.

Mr. Carter explained that Mr. Field hoped that for an experimental period of three years there can be an annual exchange between New York and Moscow, similar to the present unilateral appointment of Miss Harriet Moore.

Mr. Carter suggested that it might be possible to work out a plan whereby the IPR group in each country would be responsible for the travelling expenses of its representatives, but that all living expenses would be paid by the Council to whom the representative was sent.

Mr. Carter emphasized that this form of bilateral exchange was something in which the Pacific Council was deeply interested, and that as Secretary General he would do everything possible to aid in establishing and extending it.

Mr. Motylev said that he was thoroughly in agreement with the principle involved in the matter of staff exchange. He added that the financial aspect need not prove a handicap. The Soviet Council could, if it desired, send students at its own expense, as it had been given a certain endowment in valuta. The working out of the principle might, however, take time, as the Soviet Council would first have to attract research workers and students interested in the idea of such an exchange.

Mr. Kantorovitch expressed his gratitude at the invitation of the American council. It was, of course, impossible for him to leave Moscow at present but it might be arranged at a later date.

In this connection Mr. Motylev expressed regret that Miss Moore had not asked for more help from the Soviet council. He explained that his Institute had a special department for securing all necessary materials for his staff, and he hoped Miss Moore would make full use of it. He also promised to arrange any special consultations with experts in various fields which would be useful for Miss Moore in carrying out her study. Miss Moore expressed her appreciation



of this offer and explained that up till now she had been concentrating on her study of the language and had not yet begun much actual work on her research project.

#### 8. *The Language Problem*

(a) The Russian language School in the United States.

(b) Experiments with Basic English in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Carter described the work of the Harvard Summer School and the plans for the School at Columbia University in the summer of 1935. He mentioned the need for a second instructor and the fact that Prince Mirsky's name had been mentioned in this connection. The Praesidium knew nothing of Mirsky's qualifications, but saw no reason why he should not be approached if it seemed advisable.

The question of teaching methods and textbook materials for use at the School was discussed, and they agreed to put Miss Moore in touch with someone who could give her the best information on this question, which she could then pass on to Mrs. Barnes in New York.

Mr. Carter then described briefly the IPR's interest in basic English as a method of learning and teaching the language in a much shorter length of time than that required by the usual methods. He told of Litvinova's work and showed Motylev, Krupskaya's letter in PRAVDA, in which she mentions Basic, and urges better language teaching, the leader in PRAVDA which says how bad Russian language teaching is, and third, Litvinova's letter in reply, which was edited to omit any mention of Basic.

Mr. Motylev expressed great interest and promised to get in touch with Litvinova at once.

#### 9. *The Proposed Activities of the Soviet Council*

(a) The Soviet Council is preparing a catalogue of all Russian materials on Siberia, the Far East, and the Pacific area. This catalogue will be available in the office for use of all students working on any subject in this field.

(b) The Soviet Council has agreed to contribute a section to each of the two international research projects, *Status of Aliens*, and *Communications*.

(c) In addition to the data papers for the next conference, the Soviet Council is planning to prepare, in English, a symposium of articles on the foreign relations of Pacific countries. Although the plans for this were not yet definite it will probably include the following:

- i. Sino-Japanese relations during and after 1931.
- ii. The end of the Washington Agreement and its effect on China.
- iii. The unification of China.
- iv. Anglo-Japanese Trade rivalry.
- v. The ideological preparation for war in Japan.
- vi. Internal Economics in Japan.
- vii. The Mongolian Problem.
- viii. The Silver Policy in the Far East.
- ix. Nationalities in the Far East.
- x. The great northern sea passage.

In connection with this symposium which is expected to be ready in June 1935, The Soviet Council asked Mr. Carter whether he thought it would be possible to arrange for its publication in either America or Great Britain, as they felt that this would secure a much larger distribution. Mr. Carter said that he would be glad to take up the matter with an American or British publisher when the manuscript was ready.

#### 10. *Finance.*

At the request of the Praesidium, Mr. Carter described the financial organization of the IPR and gave the contributions which each National Council had made over the last few years. He also explained the financial set-up of the International Research Committee.

Mr. Motylev said that so far the IPR had not proved itself in the Soviet Union sufficiently for him to guarantee a definite financial contribution at this time. It was, however, not a question of principle—the Soviet Group can and wants to participate fully in all the work and responsibilities of the IPR. The question of financial support will be discussed with all the institutions represented in the Soviet Council.

The Secretary General had expressed the desire to visit as many of the members of the Soviet Council as possible in their own organizations in order that he might learn from them of the activities on which they were engaged. Mr. Kan-



torovitch accordingly arranged for the Secretary General and his party a number of interviews, brief notes of which are herewith included.

*Meeting at the Communist Academy, 25th December 1934*

At this informal discussion there were present, in addition to the Secretary General and his staff, Varga, Director of the Communist Academy, Voitinsky, head of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet, A. S. Swanidze, director of the Bank of Foreign Commerce (who interpreted for Mr. Varga), Miss Frieda Utley of the research staff of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet.

Mr. Varga described the organization and program of the Communist Academy, its publications and its main lines of study. Mr. Voitinsky then described in more detail the work of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet which is primarily concerned with the study of China, Japan, and the Far East. The conflicts and contradictions of imperialism as manifested in the Pacific area are being investigated, both in their present stage, and in their historical background. The social problems of Japan and China are also being studied, as well as the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements in these countries. The foreign relations of the Far Eastern countries, the role of the S. M. R. in the expansion of Japan, Anglo-Japanese trade rivalry, etc., are other subjects on which research is at present going on. Attached to the staff are translators who study and translate the leading press articles from China and Japan.

In discussing the future of China, Voitinsky expressed the view that the mass of the Chinese people would sink lower and lower as long as they continued to be oppressed by the landlord and militarist classes. The leaders in China were beginning to realize this and to come out with agrarian policies, partially inspired by the challenge of Soviet China. He also felt that it was impossible to reconcile the capitalist and the precapitalist factors in China's economic organization and that it would be better to skip the stage of capitalist organization entirely in favor of some form of agrarian cooperation more suited to the traditional way of life of the Chinese peasant population.

Mr. Carter asked if there had been material economic results in Soviet China. Voitinsky said that the program had been a difficult one to realize and that many mistakes had been made, particularly in the methods used in redistributing the land. He felt however that some definite results had been accomplished and that "Communist China," even if destroyed will prove to be a big factor in the future agrarian policy of any Chinese government.

Mr. Carter asked what solution could be found for the densely populated agricultural regions of China, where the subdivision of land had been carried so far that any method of modern mechanized farming was impossible. Mr. Varga mentioned three possible solutions. (1) There was still a great deal of unutilized land in China. Most of it was elevated and required a new system of water supply to make it available. (2) An improved water supply would also mean that the land at present under cultivation could be better utilized. (3) Inner colonization to Mongolia and the Northwest provinces might do something to relieve the more densely populated areas.

*Meeting at VOKS, 25th December 1934*

Present: Kuliabko, the Acting President of VOKS (Arosev was in Paris), Rabbits of the VOKS staff, Carter, Moore, Wingfield Digby, Mitchell, Morris, Mr. Cherniavsky, Miss Linde.

Mr. Kuliabko asked Mr. Carter what in his opinion would be the most arrangement for distributing VOKS publications in the United States. Mr. Carter suggested three possibilities, (a) through the Medium of the Russian-American Society, (b) through some commercial publisher by having them take a stock on consignment, and (c) through the American Council of the I. P. R. This last method could not be offered officially until Mr. Carter had consulted the American Council.

Mr. Kuliabko also requested information as to the names and personnel of American Societies and Institutions in the fields of Ethnography, Physics, Ethnology, and Geography with which VOKS should try and establish relationships. Mr. Carter promised to have this information sent from New York.

Mr. Carter mentioned various matters which he thought would be of interest to VOKS. Among these were the CHINESE ATLAS, recently published by V. K. Ting, W. W. Weng, and S. Y. Tseng, the most important piece of cartography ever done in China. A copy of the Atlas was to be in Moscow within a few days,



and would be presented to Dr. Motylev in connection with his work on the Great Soviet World Atlas. The I. P. R. was at present exploring the possibilities of having an English edition of the Atlas produced, either in Great Britain or in China. Mr. Carter also described the Russian Summer School and other efforts on the part of the I. P. R. to further the study of the language and contemporary life of the Soviet Union, particularly in the United States and Great Britain.

Mr. Kuliabko then described some of the work which VOKS is carrying on at the present time:

VOKS represents 218 institutions and societies in the Soviet Union, scientific, cultural, literary, musical, and artistic. Its purpose is to establish relationships with similar organizations in foreign countries. It also maintains direct contacts with many universities and schools in other countries. It organizes exhibitions of the work being done in the Soviet Union and brings foreign exhibitions to the U. S. S. R. Its book exchange now amounts to many thousands of books each year. It furnishes facilities to foreign students. It publishes a journal and numerous special periodicals in English, French, and German. It arranged for the American Institute which was held in Moscow last summer and which is to be repeated in 1935 for all English-speaking foreigners, etc.

At the end of the meeting Mr. Carter asked two questions:

1. How can foreign students live honestly and cheaply in Moscow?

Ans.: No general arrangement is possible but ways are always found for meeting individual cases.

2. What relations has VOKS established with the recently formed International Cultural Society in Tokyo, and does political tension make any difference in the amount of cultural cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union?

Ans.: Political tension has made no difference, and there is a good deal of cooperation between the two countries. No relation has as yet been established with ICR because it has so recently been formed.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### *Moscow Chamber of Commerce*

Mr. Carter and his staff had a conversation with Janson, President of the Chamber of Commerce, at its headquarters in what was formerly the Moscow Stock Exchange.

Janson described the research and publicity activities of the Chamber of Commerce; its fortnightly and bimonthly publications on economic conditions in the U. S. S. R.; its efforts to improve the quality of Soviet products; and the meetings which it arranges at which members discuss questions of foreign and internal trade. At present there is a membership of some 200 economic organizations, with branches in all leading cities of the Soviet Union.

Both the export and import trade of the Soviet Union have been greatly reduced in the past two years, as nearly every machine, previously imported, can now be manufactured in the Soviet Union. The future development of foreign trade will therefore depend on the conditions offered by other nations.

A very striking exhibition of Soviet products was being arranged in the building; the resources, principal exports and imports destinations and sources of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union being displayed by means of samples of goods, maps, charts, etc., in a most effective manner.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### *Institute of Oceanography*

Mr. Carter had a long conference with the eight heads of the departments of the Institute. Research is being carried on with reference to all of the underlying principles of Oceanography, including hydrography, hydrographical chemistry, ichthyology, the organization and technique of fishing; the economic advantages of mechanization; the economic return from fishing in the open sea and along the coasts; technical problems of packing, salting, and improving the final product.

It is estimated that the Soviet Union's capacity to consume fish will always be greater than the capacity of all the lakes, rivers, and oceans to produce fish, in spite of the enormous gains made through scientific research and the mechanization of the industry.

The Institute presented Mr. Carter with a complete set of all the most important Soviet publications on every aspect of the fish industry to be sent to the Pacific Council library in New York.



INTERVIEW WITH TRININ,\* OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOVIET CONSTRUCTION AND SOVIET LAW (20, RAZIN STREET, DECEMBER 28TH, 1934)

Mr. Trinin called to see Mr. Carter at the office of the Soviet Council. Miss Moore and Mr. Digby were also present.

The function of the Institute of Soviet Construction is scientific study of the social, political, and legal questions of the whole U. S. S. R. Mr. Trinin himself is particularly informed with regard to matters pertaining to the Minor Nationalities in the Soviet Union.

In a short sketch of the Nationalities policy of the Soviet Union, Trinin emphasized the contrast with the old regime, under which national minorities had been exploited and oppressed with the present system under which they are given every chance of economic and cultural development, and of acquiring or maintaining national characters. The use of their own language was encouraged, schools have been established, and the economic resources of the various regions developed.

The principle of self-determination is firmly adhered to. The right of secession from the Union by vote is provided in the Soviet Constitution. According to Trinin there was no further danger of secession movements in the Ukraine, which, when it had had an independent government had failed to deal with the agrarian problems of the region. The present Ukrainian government has from 70 percent to 80 percent Ukrainians in it.

Trinin said that minorities within minorities were well protected, e. g., Tatars and Germans in the Crimea.

He thought that the loyalty of the Far Eastern Province to the Union was very strong, owing partially to the fear of Japanese aggression.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Secretary General and his party had expressed a desire to learn more about the agrarian policies and program of the Soviet Union, especially the development of collectivized agriculture. The Soviet Council accordingly arranged a meeting at the Communist Academy at which the following were present:

D. G. Lurie, Director of the Agrarian Institute of the Communist Academy.

J. A. Anisimov, Director of the Institute of State Farms.

A. A. Karavaev, Assistant Director of the Agrarian Institute.

V. Mullin, Scientific Collaborator of the Agrarian Institute.

S. P. Matzkevich, Scientific Secretary of the Agrarian Institute.

Stankevich, Assistant Scientific Secretary of the Communist Academy.

Kubanin, Agricultural Economist.

INTERVIEW WITH LITVINOV AT THE COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
DECEMBER 29TH, 1934

The Secretary General discussed with Litvinov the founding of the new Soviet Council of the I. P. R. Litvinov expressed himself as extremely gratified that the Soviet Union was to participate fully in the work of the I. P. R. He had always wished for this, but had not felt until the present time that adequate cooperation on the part of scholars in the Soviet Union was possible because they were all so busy with their other activities. Mr. Carter assured Litvinov that he felt confident that the Soviet Council would contribute fully and valuably to the work of the I. P. R. Mr. Carter also expressed his deep satisfaction with the personnel of the I. P. R. group and the splendid way in which they were undertaking their responsibilities as members of the I. P. R.

Mr. Carter also mentioned the talk he had had with Litvinova with regard to her work in teaching Basic to a class at the Foreign Office, one in the Kremlin, and one in the Red Army. He explained the I. P. R.'s interest in Basic as a method for teaching English in a shorter length of time, as one avenue of attack on the language barriers separating the different member countries. Another method by which the I. P. R. was trying to meet this problem was the intensive three months' course in the Russian language which the I. P. R. in the United States had put on in cooperation with Harvard University in the summer of 1934 and which was to be repeated at Columbia University during the summer of 1935. In this connection, Mr. Carter told Litvinov that Mirsky's name had been mentioned as a possible Instructor for the School, and asked whether there would be any difficulty in his getting permission to go to the United States if the offer was made and he wished to accept. Litvinov explained

\* (Committee records indicate name should be spelled Trainin.)



that the granting of passports was in charge of the Commissar for Internal Affairs, but that he did not think there would be any difficulty if Mirsky or any other candidate wished to go.

In addition to these more formal discussion meetings, there were many opportunities for the Secretary General and his party to talk freely and informally with the members of the Soviet Council and others, both with regard to their own work and to conditions in the Soviet Union, and the foreign relations of the U. S. S. R.

The atmosphere of the entire visit was one of the most friendly hospitality and cordial cooperation. It seemed evident that the Soviet Group has determined to cooperate fully with the I. P. R. both in principle and in fact.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING INSTITUTE OF THE GREAT SOVIET WORLD ATLAS

(Director, Dr. V. E. Motylev)

Dr. Motylev is an economist by training, but has a wide background of experience in other social and physical sciences. He was formerly head of the Soviet Encyclopaedia. He speaks English and German well and has traveled widely in both these countries.

At the request of the Secretary General, Dr. Motylev described the program of the Great Soviet World Atlas, and the methods being used in its preparation. He then took the Secretary General and his staff on a tour of inspection of the Scientific Publishing Institute to see the maps in process of preparation, and also the great collection of other Atlases, ancient and modern which Motylev has collected from every country in the world.

The aim of the Atlas is to give a Marxist-Leninist cartographical picture of the world, i. e. a comprehensive picture of the epoch of imperialism and particularly the period of the general crisis of capitalism. The Atlas will be three times the size of any existing Atlas, containing 150 two-page maps of 43x53 cm, and a like number of one page maps of 23½x43 cm printed on the reverse side of the big maps. The Atlas will be divided into three sections, maps of the world, maps of the U. S. S. R. and maps of foreign countries.

In the work of preparation the Institute has enlisted the help of specialists and scholars from every part of the Soviet Union, and has the right to call on any Scientific institution for aid. Extensive research has gone into questions of scale, projections, colour and design and the proper type for the various denotations.

The special interest of the Atlas lies in the special economic and social maps which supplement the more usual maps on climatic conditions, political divisions, hydrography, soils, etc. A few examples of these special maps will show the difficulties of the task which is being attempted, as well as the great interest which the Atlas will have for all students of economic and social conditions. Thus, the section devoted to maps of the world includes maps of agriculture, of raw materials, of international agrarian relations, of fisheries, mining, power and fuel resources, electrification, metallurgy, chemical and textile industries, trade and goods traffic, the struggle for raw materials, the international financial dependence of the countries of the world, the problems of the Pacific area, etc.

In the section on the U. S. S. R. the chief emphasis is on the contrast in economic and social development of the various regions and republics of the Soviet Union with conditions in Tsarist times. Maps showing agrarian development light and heavy industries, power, fuel and mineral resources, foreign and internal trade, communications, schools, literacy, etc. both for the whole Union and for the separate regions, are contrasted with maps illustrating the same factors under the old regime.

In the section on the principal foreign countries, the political and physical maps are accompanied by maps on agriculture, the general economic organization and resources of the country, industrial resources and development, and also by maps showing revolutionary movements, the position of minorities, spheres of influence of imperialist powers, etc.

The general underlying aim of the Atlas is to present as fully as possible the contrasts between the two great systems of the world, capitalist and communist, in their social, economic and political policies, objectives and achievements.



## INTERVIEW WITH MRS. V. N. KLUEVA, FROM THE TECHNIKUM OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

The Technikum provides for the teaching of Russian at Komintern, the Moscow Daily News, the Foreign Workers Publishing House, and for groups at the Technikum itself. None of this teaching is in intensive courses, because all of the students have regular work in addition to their studying.

The method of teaching at the Technikum is called the "synthetic method" (Coblenz method). No text books are used. Each lesson is prepared in connection with the special interests and needs of the group being taught. For instance, the students at the Daily News must learn to talk for reporting while the students at Komintern need a more particularly political and economic vocabulary for reading. Therefore the selection of vocabulary taught to the two groups differs.

The "Synthetic method" is based on the principle that the sentence is the unit of speech and that it is impossible to translate literally, word for word. It is only possible to translate the idea. Therefore in each lesson there is given a "standard." A "standard" is a sentence, such as "*I have a book*" which is the idiomatic way of conveying that idea and which also provides the idiomatic structure of all similar ideas, such as "*he has a pencil*." Every "standard" must have: 1. a whole idea. 2. a grammatical aspect. 3. the possibility of being used as the form for expressing another, similar idea.

They teach their students to speak and from the use they learn the grammar. The grammar is never taught separately. After the fifth lesson, the students have to give oral reports. They find that with the nominative, genative, and prepositional cases it is possible to speak intelligibly.

Not until the second year do they do any translation, except in short reviews, and then only from Russian into English.

They have started to compile a minimum vocabulary. They already have the sets of words that they find most necessary for the specific groups with whom they are working. They find that the newspapers provide a good political vocabulary and they use the Komsomol Pravda.

They have done some work on slavic roots, but they do not use them as a teaching method.

The Foreign Workers' Publishing House is also doing some research work on teaching. Some of the military schools and possibly the Institute of Vostokvedenie may be giving intensive courses in Russian, but, of course, these wouldn't be for English Speaking students.

## INSTITUTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE I. P. R.

Institute of Scientific Publications of the Great Soviet World Atlas. 20, Razin street.

Supreme Board of the Great Northern Sea Passage. (S. S. Joffe) 12, Razin street.

Voks (All-union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) (A. J. Arosev) Bolshaya Gruzinskaya, 17.

All Union Chamber of Commerce (J. D. Janson) Ilyinka, 6.

Foreign Trade Bank (A. S. Svanidze) Neglinnaya, 14.

Institute of Oceanography of the U. S. S. R. (K. A. Mekhanoshin) Krasnoselskaya, 17.

Institute of World Economics and World Politics (G. N. Voitinsky) Volkhonka, 14.

AKO (Kamchatka Company) (Adamovich) Nikolskaya, 6.

Vostokryba (Eastern Fisheries Trust) (J. M. Berkovich) Nikolskaya, 6.

## CONFERENCE AT THE AGRARIAN INSTITUTE, DEC. 29, 1934

## Volkhonka, 18

D. G. Lurie, Chairman of meeting, Director of the Agrarian Institute, Doctor of Economic Sciences

J. A. Anisimov, Director of the State Farms Institute, Professor

A. A. Karavaev, Assistant Director of the Agrarian Institute, Professor

V. Mulin, Scientific Worker, Specialist of the Agrarian Institute

S. P. Matzkevich, Scientific Secretary of the Agrarian Institute

Stankevich, Assistant Scientific Secretary of the Communist Academy

Kubanin, Professor of Economics of Agriculture



CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSTITUTE OF OCEANOGRAPHY,  
KRACNOSELSKAYA, 17, DEC. 28, 1934

Prof. Baranov, T. E.  
Prof. Chesnokov, M. J., Chairman of meeting (Assistant Director of the Institute)  
Prof. Somov, M. P. from Murmansk Branch  
Prof. Ilyin, B. S.  
Prof. Bogorov, B. G.  
Dr. Ambroz, A. J. from Vladivostok Branch  
Dr. Iniasevsky, A. N.  
Prof. Chugunov, N. L.

CONFERENCE AT VOKS, BOLSHAYA GRUNZINSKAYA, 17

Mr. Kuliabko, Vice President  
Mr. Rabbins, Head of the Reception dept.  
Mr. Cherniavsky  
Miss Linde

INSTITUTE OF SOVIET CONSTRUCTION AND LAW, FRUNZE, 10

Mr. Trainin, Specialist on nationalities

COMBIMATE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES, SRETENSKI BOUL., 9

Mrs. V. N. Klueva

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you give the other example.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You asked me how they had made—

Mr. MORRIS. Through the Foreign Office you had people in other countries write books favorable to the Soviet point of view.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. One British and one American. You certainly remember the British labor leaders, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, very reasonable people. They visited the Soviet Union in about 1935 or 1936, and the result of their visit was a two-volume work, Soviet Communism and New Civilization.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, after the Webbs got back to England, having been in Soviet Russia—

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. They wrote a two-volume work on Russia or the Soviet?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now give us an example of Americans.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I didn't finish it yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me. Go ahead.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The materials for this book actually were given by the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. Given to the Webbs.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. They had only to remake a little bit for English text, a little bit criticizing, but in its general trend the bulk of the material was prepared for them in the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Soviet Foreign Office.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the Soviet Foreign Office, and I participated myself in part of this work.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were really preparing it under the Soviet, giving it to the Webbs so they might write it in English so it could be distributed in English.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Anything more on that book?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. An American example. You know perhaps Professor Hazard of Columbia University. He is an expert on the Soviet

legal system, as you know. Professor Hazard before leaving the Soviet Union, where he spent 2 or 3 years, was given by the Soviet Foreign Office a bunch of papers concerning the Soviet law system and courts, which were later translated by him into English and published here in the United States as his own research work. Actually a lot of that material was presented to him in Moscow and is either Soviet propaganda or nonsense having no relation to the Soviet at all.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Foreign Office was careful to see that the Soviet line, the Communist line, was followed, and they could do that by preparing the information, and the American or the British or the other country's subject would take that and merely translate it and put it into books that would look as if it was the Webbs or the Hazards own material collected as facts, is that correct?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How large a staff or how large an organization did you have in the Foreign Office to do that kind of work?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It wasn't necessary to have all these people in the Foreign Office itself. It worked this way. For example, we had to write for Hazard concerning the legal system, so we passed the order through the central committee of the party to the Soviet legal experts and they wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. And they would prepare the material and pass it in to the Foreign Office and you would give it to Hazard?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did the Webbs, of Britain, write on? What subject did the Webbs write on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They described the Soviet way of life, which they found better than the British way of life.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would they find that material? Where would that come from to the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. For example, the chapter concerning the very humanitarian way of Soviet detention camps and jails was written by the Soviet secret police itself.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I received it from the chief of one of the divisions of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police.

Senator FERGUSON. You personally received?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Personally I received from him when he came to my office in the Foreign Office, and then I gave this material to the chief of the western division of the Soviet Foreign Office, the vice chief of the western division, Veinberg, who was attached to the Webbs and who proceeded to translate that material.

Senator WATKINS. Did you read the English books after they were published, and you have compared the information with what was given out?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. When I came here to the west, I found this book and I read it with much interest. I found that the material which I prepared was so well done that the Webbs didn't change it any.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the English people or the American people would take a book like that written by the Webbs, who were at least Socialists at the time, Marxists, and it was in fact prepared by the secret police of Russia.



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In that particular part.

Senator FERGUSON. In relation to the jails.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So, the American people would get the idea that this was a British writing on a subject and, therefore, at least it would be true facts.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That was the idea. Once I read a memorandum written by Molotov in our secret files where the problem was discussed of our participation and utilization of the western press. I have to explain that before 1931 it was a general rule that the Communists should not write in the foreign press. It was a shame. It was a disgrace. But Trotsky was expelled from the Soviet Union and he had written articles against Stalin in the Daily Express, and these articles became very popular because they were written in the British newspaper. This gave the idea to the Soviet authorities that it was wrong to seek only the Communist papers. In the memorandum of Molotov, which evidently laid down the foundation for the new trend of Soviet policy, written in 1931, it was stated [reading]:

Who reads the Communist papers? Only a few people who are already Communists. We don't need to propagandize them. What is our object? Who do we have to influence? We have to influence non-Communists if we want to make them Communists or if we want to fool them. So, we have to try to infiltrate in the big press, to influence millions of people, and not merely hundreds of thousands.

After this argumentation the position was taken that we had to change drastically our policy, as I said before, and do our best in order to carry out the Communist ideas through non-Communist press.

Senator FERGUSON. The so-called policy or line then was changed in 1931.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. By Molotov's order.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes. It was the Politburo. Molotov made the report, and that completely turned over our policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a part of Molotov's program for seeking recognition of the Soviet Union in the Western World?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No. I can't make a connection between these.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other example of an American coming to Russia and getting material and coming back and its being published?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I do, but——

Senator FERGUSON. You are not rich enough to defend yourself in a libel suit?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have named one American, and I am reluctant to call any more.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you understand, if you are telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth——

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Testifying before this committee on question, you cannot be sued for libel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; I don't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the law. With that in mind, now can you honestly state any other authors?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I can.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any other books?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I can.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you do it now?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Frederick Schuman, Soviet Politics Abroad and at Home.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he write on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He wrote a book which, in my opinion, is full of nonsense.

Senator FERGUSON. Outside of its being nonsense, what was it on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was very important nonsense because, if you learned the wrong things about the Soviet Union, your thoughts are also wrong. That was the idea, to sell nonsense to the foreign newspapers.

Senator WATKINS. Can you give us an example?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Give us an example of what was in the book.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. All right. For example, the book by Frederick Schuman stated that the unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Western World was not caused by Communist doctrine or any other consideration on the part of the Soviet leaders themselves, but it was caused by western intervention during the civil war. Mr. Schuman lets the American readers of his book believe that it is only because the American, Japanese, French, and English peoples made their so-called intervention on the side of the Russian national against the Communist that the Communist Soviet Union is now reluctant to have good relations with the British. If you compare Schuman's book with the corresponding page of the official History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union you will very easily recognize that they say the same thing. Frederick Schuman got his ideas from the Soviet propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any others?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I recall Mr. Joseph Davies, the former American Ambassador to Moscow. Mr. Davies was in very good relations to Foreign Commissar Litvinov, in such good relations——

The CHAIRMAN. Joseph Davies?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Davies. [Continuing] In such good relations that some of the instructions which this American Ambassador received from the State Department——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the American State Department?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. [Continuing] Along confidential lines were simply read by the American Ambassador to Foreign Commissar Litvinov. He received a cable from Washington. He came to the office of Litvinov and he consulted Litvinov on what to do with this cable.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't understand that, Mr. Bogolepov. Will you explain that again?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Foreign Commissar Litvinov told me when I asked him how he happened to know this thing. He asked me directly what to do, and I asked him, "Why do you assume that the Americans will do this?"

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you knew that the Americans were going to react in a certain way on a particular problem?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what problem that was?



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; that was the problem of intervention in Spain.

Mr. MORRIS. Intervention in Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were speculating with Litvinov as to what the American reaction was going to be on the intervention in Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Litvinov told me, before my going to Spain: "We have to say this-and-this thing." I don't remember all of the details; and, when I asked him "Why do you suppose the Americans would do this thing and not another," he said, "Well, I saw only the day before yesterday the American Ambassador, and he read me the card from Washington, with instructions on this card."

Senator FERGUSON. That was just the reverse of what you have been saying. You said that they gave to the Americans what to write.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a case where you said that it reversed; that Mr. Davies told the Russians what our policy was.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, but I don't know what Litvinov told Davies, and when I read the—

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reverse of what you have been telling us. Do you know anyone else that got the propaganda from the Foreign Office or any Russians to write and did write in American books or in British books or outside books, or outside of Russia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the same book of Davies I found, for example, his considerations of the trials in Moscow in 1937 and 1938. Now I think about the book Mission in Moscow. There the point of view is represented that this big trial in Moscow should be considered by Americans in a favorable light, because Stalin got rid of the fifth column, and saw the forthcoming disposition against the forthcoming attack. It is not known to me whether Mr. Davies was instructed particularly on this.

Senator FERGUSON. You said "it is not known" to you.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not known to me. But it is known to me. I read myself in the record that this explanation of the program should be implanted in western minds during the year.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any actual instructions like you gave on the Schuman book, and the Webb books, and the Hazard book, whether the material was prepared by the Foreign Office and given for writing?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the case of the Davies book, Mr. Bogolepov, you only know that you have seen a directive on that idea, and the same idea showed up in Davies' book. You don't know, as a matter of fact, that it was the same.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; in this particular case, I don't know. Well, the first sample I can give you was a book of Kahn and Sayers, two American authors.

Senator FERGUSON. Albert Kahn.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it Manuel Sayers? Michael B. Sayers?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. I do not remember the title of this book. It was something about the spies or aggression against the East; something like that.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that book?

Mr. MANDEL. Conspiracy against the Soviet Union, by Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; go ahead.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The largest part of this book which is known to me was written by a certain Veinberg, who was a vice chief of the southwestern division of the Foreign Office in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. What part of the book?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The largest part of the book.

Senator FERGUSON. The largest part of the book?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. I saw myself the Russian manuscript before it was sent to New York to be there.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was written by a Russian, Veinberg, who was the fourth secretary.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Vice chief of the southwestern division.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the third?

Mr. MORRIS. And you say you saw the manuscript before it was sent to New York?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The Russian manuscript; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Before it was sent over here?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you read the book now?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I looked through it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the same as the manuscript?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; it was. They rearranged it, perhaps, but the facts and the ideas are the same. That is why I mentioned it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the Foreign Office dealing directly with the writers of that book?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, sir. We have had, as in the case of Institute of Pacific Relations, many cover organizations. For these things, on which I talked to Senator Ferguson, we had a special organization which name is Litag. That is the abbreviation for the name literary agent. This was a nonparty organization, independent organization, as you in the west like to have them. Very solid people were in the head of this organization, a Russian professor, and the Foreign Office used this organization in order to contact the foreign scientists, scholars, to give them materials or even, as in the case of the Webb mentioned books, the full text was sent of them.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you have established here in America and in other countries an agency that Americans can go to and get material in order that they may write books. In other words, we find that Russia's Foreign Office is really ghost writing American books. Do you know what I mean by "ghost writing"?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; not quite.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, having somebody else prepare all of the material and then the writer merely puts it out as his own.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, or even he changes to American taste. But still the ideas and the main facts are given.

Senator FERGUSON. The facts are from Russia. It is the party line, and they just change it enough to make it palatable to the American people. Is that right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How much of that is going on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can say only about the books which I saw myself.

Senator FERGUSON. The ones you saw yourself.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.



Senator FERGUSON. But did they have a large office there in which they did this work?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can say, sir, it is a big operation.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a big operation.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. A big operation.

Senator WATKINS. What I would like to ask you about is this: You say they prepared these statements and furnished this information for these men who wanted to write books. What about the information? Was it accurate? Was it an accurate picture of what was going on in Russia? Was it the truth?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; it was propaganda. It was perverted.

Senator WATKINS. Let's take the ones, for instance, on Ambassador Davies, the information he wrote in his book. What about the statements about the courts or those trials, those purges?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was completely untrue. It was a mere propaganda, a full perversion of truth.

Senator WATKINS. You understood what was taking place with respect to these purges? Did you know first-hand about those, about the purges?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, I knew about those.

Senator WATKINS. You know the facts?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, I knew the facts.

Senator WATKINS. And you knew that this information that they gave out was not true?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As I told you, I was myself arrested at that time, and I came through all these proceedings, so I am speaking from my personal experience.

Senator WATKINS. There was one other matter with respect to those conversations between Mr. Davies and was it Litvinov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. You said he read his instructions to him, or was it what was supposed to tell the Russian Foreign Office, or was it the instructions that were given to Mr. Davies personally to govern his conduct?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He received a cable from the State Department on one particular problem, the conditions in Spain, and instead of speaking, as Litvinov said, discussing with him the problems, the whole background here, he simply took from his vest this document and gave it to Litvinov.

Senator WATKINS. Gave the instructions to him as Ambassador?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Rather than the material that he was to give out to the foreign office of the Russian Government.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Perhaps these instructions were to go to Commissar Litvinov and tell him this and that and that, but do not tell him this and that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what was in that table?

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, he showed him the telegrams? The telegram stated what the American policy was toward Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he gave Litvinov that information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Litvinov, then, was able to advise you how this country would react?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because he had seen the American Government's secret instructions to its Ambassador to Moscow; is that true?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Were the instructions secret?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I haven't seen myself the instructions, so I can't say that.

Senator EASTLAND. What Americans connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations did you meet in Moscow?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Just one.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mr. Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you meet him?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I met him just once in Moscow, in Volkhonka 14, in the spring or in the winter, I guess, of 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the headquarters of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Institute of World Economics and Politics.

Mr. MORRIS. But the Institute of Pacific Relations was in the same building.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time.

Mr. MORRIS. What were you doing in that building at the time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As I told you, besides my work for the foreign office, I was also a member of the institute, a research worker, and I used to work two or three times a week in the library of this institute. In this library, by the way, worked also Mrs. Freda Utley, which name I remember having seen during your investigations. And when I was working in this library one of these mornings, a group of people entered the room, the library, headed by Eugene Varga, who was director of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Varga, V-a-r-g-a. Eugene Varga. There were in this group of people some of them which were known to me and some which were unknown to me. Among the people known to me, I remember Mr. Abramson, Mr. Kantorovich, and Mr. Kara-Murza.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me ask you to pause there. Varga was a Comintern man?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Varga was a member of the executive committee of the Comintern, the highest body.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Kara-Murza?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Kara-Murza was intelligence officer in charge of Mongolian relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Abramson?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Abramson, as I told you, was a member of the Pacific group of this institute, and at the same time also intelligence officer.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you say among them was Owen Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. He has not said that yet.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Was two or more foreigners, and among them was Mr. Lattimore. And when they entered the room and while talking, they moved towards me, and I was sitting not far from my big map of central Asia, covering Sinkiang, Mongolia, and a part of Man-



churia. Mr. Kara-Murza just returned from a big trip to Mongolia on some other mission.

Mr. MORRIS. Kara-Murza returned from Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. So the talk started between these people, who went into the room, concerning the Mongolian relations.

Senator WATKINS. Was it in English?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was partly in English, partly in Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that, partly in English, partly in Russian?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean it was in translation. My own English at that time was particularly bad, so I couldn't present myself what the American guests were speaking. But I do understand what kind of answers they were giving in Russian, which were later translated into English. I didn't participate myself in the conversation, for as I have told you I have no connection with the affairs of this Institute of Pacific Relations. I was just witness there, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you meet Mr. Lattimore there at that time? Were you introduced to him, or did you meet him?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Mr. Varga said that is Mr. So, and that is Mr. So, and this way. But I didn't speak neither to him nor to any other of the group. My memory retains two topics of conversation: One was discussion of the route through Mongolia from Manchuria, or to Manchuria, I do not remember whether it was discussing the way from the east to the west or vice versa. And while discussing this problem, Kara-Murza, who I mentioned before, observed that showing on this map, this route, saying that "this way is the best one for we are using it always in our relations with the Soviet parts of China."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Kara-Murza pointed out the route to the foreign visitors that they were using to deal with Soviet China.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a secret fact?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly it was not revealed anywhere.

Mr. MORRIS. That was not well known, what route they were using at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; to nobody it was never published. The nature of our relations with the Soviet region of China were never discussed in the press or anywhere. So I little bit wondered when I heard such observations in the presence of foreign visitors. Then Kara-Murza got explanations of how the sovietization of Mongolia is progressing, and he described how they are purging the Mongolian population from the parasitic class of clergymen.

Mr. MORRIS. They are purging the parasitic class of clergymen from the Monogolian people?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Explaining that our policy there is to get Mongolian people, get them from the feudal state to the communism, passing away this state of capitalism.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Kara-Murza's explanation to the foreign guests?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Lattimore, you say, was present at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He was present.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he engaging in the conversation?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; they talked. But I give you only the summary of the conversation which I remembered, because I couldn't

follow each word. By the way, I was not standing by. I was a little apart, two or three desks further. After the society left the room, I asked Kara-Murza to remain with me, and who were these people, Comintern people or not, bearing in mind that he told a little bit more than is advisable to tell to the foreign visitors. He said that "No, they are not Comintern, not Comintern people, not quite Comintern people, but that is quite all right with him."

Senator EASTLAND. Not quite Comintern, but it is all right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have nothing to say.

Senator FERGUSON. You asked the question?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I only registered the fact and, to say the truth, I had forgotten this fact, because I saw so many people coming to Moscow and getting information, and giving information, that to me it was not a very unusual factor to see.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you had forgotten the fact. For how long had you forgotten that fact?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. How long? It was in 1936. So perhaps 8 months or 9 months in 1937—7 or 8 months, I don't remember—I was reporting on the station of the collegium of the Foreign Office. Collegium, that is the meeting of the Foreign Commissar and his other commissars, five people in all. This Board of Commissars is convened twice a week.

Senator FERGUSON. You were personally reporting to them?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was personally reporting, yes, as every chief of the service is reporting the matter of his interest to this Board of Commissars.

Mr. MORRIS. And this, you say, is approximately, to the best of your recollection, 8 months after you had met Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was in the winter or early spring of 1937. Because in 1937 I left already for military service for Spain.

Mr. MORRIS. So it was sometime before you left.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes. The problem was, which I have to report, of getting the so-called popular Republic of Mongolia into the League of Nations. The Soviet Union was very eager to get one voice more in the League of Nations. Mongolia was, just before the Second World War, just one satellite country of the Soviet Union. In the west there was a strong feeling that Mongolia is not an independent country, not a country at all. And when I reported the information which I received from our delegates to Geneva, then I asked in the meantime, by preparing my own report, the opinion of our Ambassadors in the United States, in Paris, and in London. And, summarizing all these unfavorable reports about the prospective of getting Mongolia as a member of the League of Nations, Litvinov said, "Well, the situation is still not ripe. We have to prepare the terrain."

Mr. MORRIS. Prepare the terrain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; prepare the terrain for the action.

Senator EASTLAND. You mean you had to prepare public sentiment.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. That is what I would like to say. "It is necessary," said Litvinov, "to mobilize the writers and journalists and other people, to describe for the Western World the progress which is achieved in Mongolian Popular Republic, to say how life is progressing," and so on and so on. This was the first decision which



was taken after my report. The second part of decision, the second point, was considering who will make this in different countries, whom we have to charge with this—how do you say, sir?

Senator EASTLAND. You mean the man who will be placed in charge of mobilizing public sentiment in the west?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, whom we have to ask to do the job.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that man who was decided upon?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Litvinov asked the officer of Mongolian desk of the Foreign Office, who was present——

Mr. MORRIS. What was his name?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Parnoch, P-a-r-n-o-c-h—whom he would recommend, and before Parnoch could give his answer he asked “Lattimore, perhaps?”

Senator EASTLAND. Litvinov said “Lattimore”?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. “Lattimore, perhaps”? yes. And Parnoch answered, “Yes, we will try to do that.”

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a formal decision made by that body?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. There was a formal decision which was obliging for the corresponding bodies of the Soviet foreign group to take measures in order to fulfill the decision.

Senator FERGUSON. After that, do you know whether Lattimore did write anything in relation to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, sir; because as I told you, in the spring of 1937 I was sent to Spain, and for more than a year I lost any contact with the Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask the research director now as to whether or not he knows of anything written by Mr. Lattimore after that time on Mongolia.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Lattimore has written several books on Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. MANDEL. We can give you the exact title and date.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to put that in the record.

Senator EASTLAND. I do not want to lead you too far off, but this is something for my information. About how many soldiers did the Soviet Union send to Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They didn't send soldiers. They sent only generals, officers, and surgeons. As you see now, in Korea, the Soviet Union never fights with his own soldiers in foreign countries. He has always enough——

Senator EASTLAND. Sent officers to train the Spanish Army.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. To train and direct them.

Senator FERGUSON. How many officers and agents did they send to Spain, if you know?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I was in headquarters of the so-called Segrae-Ebro front, in Barcelona.

Senator FERGUSON. You were there yourself?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was there myself; yes. And I was one of a body of approximately 2,000 Soviet officers.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they general officers? What was your rank?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was colonel.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a colonel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How low in rank and how high did they go, these 2,000?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. From sergeant in the tank corps or our fliers, up to the marshals. We had two marshals.

Senator FERGUSON. You had two marshals?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. That 2,000 was on one front?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, in Barcelona only. The bulk of our instructors were on the Madrid front.

Senator FERGUSON. About how many were there?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Thousands?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Thousands.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know a man named Gustavo Duran in Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Duran?

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know a Durano?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, at this point, Senator Smith has called a meeting of the subcommittee of the alien property investigation. He wants a short meeting. I suggest that we cannot finish with this witness this afternoon, and tomorrow we have another witness, a very important witness. But I think at the conclusion of that testimony we can conclude with this witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the other witness is due at 11. Suppose I try to get in touch with him and ask him if he can be here at 10. Perhaps he can finish in the morning and then we can have this witness in the afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that very much because it is very important to conclude both of these witnesses tomorrow. I might say now, that the witness tomorrow will be Mr. William Bullitt, former Ambassador to Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the Foreign Office when he was there?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, sir. I remember him in Moscow.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection we will now recess. I think both the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Michigan are on that subcommittee.

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir; I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not? Well, the Senator from Michigan is. I think we will have to go to Senator Smith's office.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m. Tuesday, April 8, 1952.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bullitt has been sworn in executive session. Inasmuch as a different chairman presided at the session I thought perhaps you might like to swear him again in open session.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BULLITT. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM C. BULLITT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, will you give your name and residence to the reporter, please?

Mr. BULLITT. William Christian Bullitt, 2447 Kalorama Road NW., Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BULLITT. At the present time I write articles, on foreign affairs usually, of one kind or another.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, will you relate your diplomatic experience to this committee, please?

Mr. BULLITT. I think I might begin toward the end of it, otherwise it will be a long document. I was Ambassador to the Soviet Union from the autumn of 1933 until I was appointed Ambassador to France in the summer of 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. You then were the first United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union?

Mr. BULLITT. I was.

I then was Ambassador to France from 1936 to the autumn of 1940. In 1941 I was personal representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador for all countries. Those are the only strictly diplomatic jobs that I have held since 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, yesterday we had testimony from a former official of the Soviet Foreign Office about the connection between Mr. Owen Lattimore and the Soviet Foreign Office. This committee would like to know from you whether, while you were Ambassador to the Soviet Union, you had ever encountered Owen Lattimore.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. In the end of March 1936 I received a note from Mr. Carter, who was the secretary-general, I believe, of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was written from a Moscow hotel, and it said that Mr. Owen Lattimore was arriving.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Bullitt. May I interrupt at this point? Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 28, 1936, addressed to the American Ambassador, Moscow, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, you mean this is a photostat of a document which was in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that document was a carbon copy of a letter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, I will ask you if you will look at that letter and tell us whether or not that was the letter that you received from Mr. Carter.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes; that, I believe, is a photostat of the letter that was sent me by Mr. Edward C. Carter with regard to Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. You were testifying on this point, Mr. Bullitt. Will you proceed?

Mr. BULLITT. I received this letter and I told one of the secretaries in the Embassy that I would see Mr. Lattimore after he arrived in Moscow. I also told him to invite Mr. Carter and Mr. Lattimore and the other members of their delegation—I think it can be called a delegation—there were a number of women, if my memory is correct, as well as men—to an Embassy meal at some time, and they did so. In the early days of April Mr. Lattimore asked for a definite appointment, and I received him. He told me that he was there for this meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations with, I believe, the Soviet section of the institute, and that he wanted to meet the men in charge of Far Eastern Affairs for the Soviet Foreign Office, especially Stomonyakov and Karakhan.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell the names?

Mr. BULLITT. S-t-o-m-o-n-y-a-k-o-v, Stomonyakov; and Karakhan, K-a-r-a-k-h-a-n.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what positions they had in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BULLITT. Stomonyakov was Assistant Commissar in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs, and Karakhan had been for many, many years Assistant Commissar. Indeed when I was sent in to negotiate with the Soviet Government, sent in by the American Government in 1919, he was already an Assistant Commissar. Whether at that particular moment his title was Assistant Commissar I cannot say actually, but he was a man that I knew very well.

I told Mr. Lattimore that I would ask one of the secretaries of the Embassy to attempt to arrange such an appointment or appointments for him.



Mr. Lattimore then began to give me a long description of the situation in the Far East as he saw it. Finally, he said, "I have"—I should rather not make this a direct quotation, but indirect. He finally said that——

Mr. MORRIS. This is Lattimore talking?

Mr. BULLITT. This is Lattimore talking. He finally said that he had one very important matter that he wanted to take up with me, that a most inspiring thing had happened, that the Mongols had at last achieved full independence and he hoped they were once more going to start on the road to being a great nation as they had been many years in the past. He said that in his opinion the so-called People's Republic of Outer Mongolia was fully independent. I asked him if there was no Soviet control of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia or rather they call it the Mongolian People's Republic. It is in Outer Mongolia, not Inner Mongolia. And he replied that there was no Soviet control whatsoever. I asked him if the Red Army had no control there, and he said no. I asked him if the GPU which at that time was the title of the Soviet secret police, had no control there, and he said they did not, that the Mongolian People's Republic was independent, and that his advice, which he urged me to telegraph at once to President Roosevelt, was that the American Government should immediately recognize the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.

This to me was a very extraordinary statement, and I therefore questioned him further on it, and he reiterated what he had said and reiterated his advice that the United States should recognize at once the Mongolian People's Republic.

I have said it was an extraordinary statement for several reasons. In the first place, Outer Mongolia, which was ruled at the moment by the so-called Mongolian People's Republic, was under Chinese sovereignty. It was a part of China.

Mr. MORRIS. That is formally speaking.

Mr. BULLITT. Formally. In 1921 the Communists had set up a Communist republic there, as much Communist as anything can be in a country largely inhabited by nomads. Then there had been a series of wars back and forth until 1924, when the Communists got pretty well on top. However, in 1924 the Soviet Government in a note which was signed I believe by Chicherin, recognized the Mongolian People's Republic as a part of the Republic of China, but stated in that note that it enjoyed autonomy. It did enjoy a certain amount of freedom as nomads do, and in the autumn of 1934, if my memory is correct, the Soviet Government got a bit disturbed, and I received information that Karakhan, one of the gentlemen referred to before, had been sent out to Outer Mongolia, the People's Republic, so-called, to finish off any signs of restiveness under Soviet control. When he returned from that trip he came to the Embassy——

Mr. MORRIS. Did he return in 1934?

Mr. BULLITT. He returned toward the end, I believe. Actually on November 27, 1934, there was made a gentlemen's agreement for mutual assistance. In other words, this was a——

Senator FERGUSON. Between what countries?

Mr. BULLITT. Between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. This was kept quiet for a time. Karakhan returned, if my memory is correct, after the signature of that agreement. He came

to the Embassy one day, and I said to him—I don't mind testifying about Karakhan because he has since been shot and therefore no harm can come to him from the testimony that I am to give.

Senator FERGUSON. Who shot him?

Mr. BULLITT. By the Soviet Government.

Senator FERGUSON. He was liquidated?

Mr. BULLITT. He was liquidated.

I said to him that I heard he had been out there to finish off the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia or rather any signs of independence in it, and he said indeed he had, but it was a very small affair—

Senator FERGUSON. You were telling Lattimore this?

Mr. BULLITT. No; I never said a word to Lattimore about any of this. I am explaining to you why the statement that he made to me was so extraordinary. He said that he had indeed been sent out to finish it off, but he had only been sent out at the last minute, that the Soviet Government first completely infiltrated the Outer Mongolian Army and police force with GPU agents and that when everything was prepared to liquidate the Mongols that the Soviet Government did not like there, that he had been sent out simply to oversee the operation, that he had gone out, and then he explained, "After all, in a country of nomads there are only 300 or 400 people that count, and all I did on a given night was to have about 400 people seized by the GPU agents in the army and police force, and I had them shot before dawn and installed the people that the Soviet Government wished to have installed and Outer Mongolia is now completely ruled by the GPU"; that is to say, the Soviet secret police.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the substance of whose statement to you?

Mr. BULLITT. Karakhan's.

Senator WATKINS. What position did he occupy in the Soviet Government?

Mr. BULLITT. At that time he was Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Senator WATKINS. Do you not think that rather strange, that he would take you into his confidence and tell you what he had done out there?

Mr. BULLITT. I had known Karakhan since 1919, and he was in the habit of talking to me with great frankness. Karakhan had been No. 3 in the Soviet Foreign Office when I was sent in there by the American Government to attempt to negotiate a treaty ending the 21 wars then in progress on the territory of the former Czarist empire. The Soviet Foreign Office at that time consisted of Chicherin No. 1, Litvinov No. 2, and Karakhan No. 3. I had known him since that time and he was a fellow who was in the habit of talking to me with a great deal of frankness.

Senator WATKINS. I wondered about the explanation because ordinarily the Soviet officials wouldn't talk to you with that degree of frankness, would they?

Mr. BULLITT. A great many of them talked to me with considerable frankness. Karakhan at the particular time he was talking to me was at daggers drawn with Litvinov. Litvinov wanted him liquidated and he wanted Litvinov liquidated. After all, even human beings who are engaged in doing nefarious things have their personal emotions, as you see when we get a gang war. They are apt quite often to talk quite frankly. At least they were at that time.



Senator WATKINS. I felt that that situation required an explanation. That is the reason I asked you those questions.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

All this preceded Mr. Lattimore's visit to Moscow. On the 12th of March 1936 about a month before Lattimore arrived in Moscow, the Soviet Government and the Mongolian People's Republic Government, controlled by the GPU, signed a protocol of mutual assistance at Ulan Bator, which is the capital of the so-called Mongolian People's Republic. This was not revealed at the moment, but on March 27, before Mr. Lattimore's arrival in Moscow, there was a news dispatch from Ulan Bator saying that this protocol had been approved by the Little Khural, which is the legislative institution set up there. On the 2d of April 1936, this protocol was officially communicated to the Chinese Government. On the 7th of April the Chinese Government made the strongest kind of a protest against this infringement of the sovereignty of China. On the 8th of April the Soviet Government through Litvinov replied, "Neither the fact nor the signing of the protocol nor its separate articles violate in the slightest degree the sovereignty of China," et cetera.

Mr. Lattimore therefore at the time when the Soviet Government did not yet dare to come out and say that Outer Mongolia was no longer under Chinese sovereignty, was advocating to me that I should persuade the President of the United States to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and the cessation of Chinese sovereignty.

I was obliged to conclude that either Mr. Lattimore knew nothing about the subject on which he was supposed to be the leading American expert or that he was deliberately attempting to assist in the spread of Communist authority through Asia.

I left the matter at that, with a question mark in my mind. I had seen him only once. I did not know what sort of man he was.

Senator WATKINS. Of course you did not follow his advice.

Mr. BULLITT. Certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he explain to you his negotiations with the Russians in relation to IPR and getting articles from IPR?

Mr. BULLITT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. He didn't talk over the details of the IPR?

Mr. BULLITT. No; not with me.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. He talked over with you this recognition, is that correct?

Mr. BULLITT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. There was a witness yesterday who testified that Russia's aim, the Communist line at that time, was to try and show independence of Outer Mongolia, as an indication——

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In order that it might become a member of the League of Nations.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore would give to Russia through a satellite another vote.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now, from that testimony and Mr. Lattimore's name being mentioned in relation to the idea of proving to the western world that Outer Mongolia was an independent nation, that that had anything to do with the conversation he had with you about its independence and the recognition by America?

Mr. BULLITT. It was entirely obvious that if we should recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, since the Soviet Government was in complete control of Outer Mongolia, it would give the Soviet Government another vote in the League of Nations.

Senator FERGUSON. If Mongolia became a part of the League of Nations.

Mr. BULLITT. If it became a part of the League of Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this letter be introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted into the record.

(The letter was marked "Exhibit No. 750" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 750

HOTEL METROPOLE,  
March 28, 1936.

The AMERICAN AMBASSADOR,  
*Moscow.*

DEAR BULLITT: To meet my colleague Owen Lattimore, who arrives via the Trans-Siberian from the Far East, I have just arrived in Moscow, and shall be here for at least the next ten days. Since I saw you last I have been again in China and Japan, also British India, Australia, and New Zealand. Lattimore comes fresh from North China and yet another trip into Mongolia.

You are so alive to the relation of the Far Eastern developments to the international situation in general, that I know you will want to get from Lattimore his fundamental analysis of land versus sea power in the whole of eastern Asia. I, too, am eager to see you and talk with you regarding Soviet-American relations, and more particularly facilitating full Soviet participation at the conference of the Institute in Yosemite Park next August. This I want to do fairly soon.

I ought to report to you that Lattimore is accompanied by Mrs. Lattimore and Miss Dolly Tyler, who has been doing in China much the same work on Basic English that Litwinowa has been doing in the U.S.S.R. With me are Miss Harriet Moore, whom you will remember as one of the I.P.R. experts on the Russian Language, and Miss Faith Donaldson, my private secretary.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you encounter Mr. Lattimore again, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. As far as I am aware I have seen him only once more, except that I am under the impression that he was at dinner, at that dinner which, as I told you, I told the secretary to arrange for the whole outfit from the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in Moscow in 1936?

Mr. BULLITT. In Moscow in 1936, but so far as I can remember I had no conversation with him on that occasion. I talked mostly with Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us as to whether or not Mr. Carter or any other member of the delegation explained to you what IPR was trying to do through Russia?

Mr. BULLITT. No, Senator, but it is perfectly possible that they explained to one or another of the secretaries of the Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. But not to you personally?

Mr. BULLITT. Not to me personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I should like, if the Chair will permit, to read two or three pages of the testimony of a previous witness before this committee and ask this witness to comment thereon.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question on the matter we have just been discussing? It would be part of your job to find out just what this delegation from Mr. Carter and Mr. Lattimore were doing there, would it not?



Mr. BULLITT. The business of the delegation which arrived there, supposedly at that time and so regarded, was as a scientific organization, organized for the purpose of gathering facts. There was a great deal of business to be done in Moscow at that moment, and I have no doubt that either Mr. Loy Henderson, who was acting as First Secretary at the time, or Angus Ward, who was another First Secretary, or some other one of the Secretaries followed this up and made a report on it, which is perhaps in the Department of State files. But that sort of thing was not followed up by me personally ever.

Senator WATKINS. What I meant was at least the officials of the Embassy would find out what they were doing there and what they were attempting to do.

Mr. BULLITT. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Because it might involve the United States——

Mr. BULLITT. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. And its citizens in some difficulties.

Mr. BULLITT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I request that you advise counsel to see whether or not we are able to get a report from our Embassy in Moscow in 1936 in relation to the delegation that was there and what they were doing?

Mr. MORRIS. That is, the report that Mr. Bullitt mentioned that may have been made to Mr. Loy Henderson or Angus Ward.

Senator FERGUSON. Or somebody else.

The CHAIRMAN. Any memorandum or report bearing on this subject. That will be the order to the staff.

Senator WATKINS. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine wanted to read from the record already made. From whose testimony did you wish to read?

Mr. SOURWINE. The testimony of Mr. Owen Lattimore, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. To avoid reading out of context I will read everything from the point where I begin.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Page 3634 of part 10 [reading]:

Question. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having testified here with regard to whether you ever suggested in any of your writings that Soviet Russia might be reaching out for Mongolia or might be planning to take over Mongolia?

Answer. No, I don't recall that.

Question. Do you recall whether you ever did suggest?

Answer. No, not offhand.

Question. Did you ever take the opposite tack, that Mongolia was independent, and that there was no threat of Soviet domination?

Answer. I think I have frequently written that Outer Mongolia is an independent state in the sense of never having been incorporated in Russia; but I have also qualified that by describing it as a satellite state.

Question. You think now it is a satellite state?

Answer. Very much so.

Question. How long have you held that opinion?

Answer. That would be hard to say. I think it would be hard to say particularly, because the expression "satellite" is a postwar expression.

Question. When would you say you first expressed the opinion that Outer Mongolia was a satellite state, if you did ever express it?

Answer. Probably about 1945.

Question. Now, prior to that time, did you take the view or hold to the view that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian influence?



Answer. Not free of Russian influence. I think in the terminology of that time, before people were using the word "satellite" I would have referred to it more as a Russian protectorate or a state under Russian protection, or something of that kind.

Question. Let me rephrase the question, or perhaps I should ask a different question.

Did you ever take the position or argue that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian domination?

Answer. Yes, I think I did, before the war, describe it as free of domination.

Question. You have changed your view since then?

Answer. I think the situation has changed since then.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Have you changed your view?

Answer. I have changed my view, in line with what I consider to be a changing situation.

Question. When do you think the situation changed? Can you give an approximate date?

Answer. No. I should say some time after the war, if I had been able to get to Outer Mongolia, I might have a more sharp opinion on that, but it is very difficult to determine from outside.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: When do you think the situation changed? If you do not know, you can say so.

Answer. I don't know. Some time after the war.

Question. When did you first reach the conclusion that Outer Mongolia was an independent state and free of Russian domination? Do you know?

Answer. Some time in the 1930's.

Question. Do you know when you first argued that or first expressed that view publicly?

Answer. No.

Question. Can you tell us now when, in fact, Outer Mongolia did become an independent state and free of Russian domination?

Answer. Well, I would say that—I forget the exact year; 1920 or 1921 or somewhere along in there, the Mongols who had previously declared their independence of China came into close relations with Communist Russia, and certainly the Russian influence from that time on was very strong. But my impression was that it was primarily at the request of the Mongols themselves.

Question. You say the Russian influence was very strong from about 1920 or 1921 on?

Answer. That is right.

Question. Now, if I understood you correctly, you said a moment ago that the situation changed after the war. What war did you mean? The First World War?

Answer. No; the Second World War.

Question. How did it change? Did the Russian domination become stronger after the First World War?

Answer. No. I would roughly characterize the 1920's and 1930's as a period when the close relations between Russia and Outer Mongolia could hardly be described as Russian domination, because it was largely or chiefly at the instance of the Mongol Government itself.

Question. There was, however, during that time a large measure of Russian influence. Is that your testimony?

Answer. Surely.

Question. And you recognized that at the time?

Answer. Oh, surely.

Question. And you never argued to the contrary; is that your testimony?

Answer. I don't believe so.

Would you comment on that, sir?

Mr. BULLITT. It is a very long statement to comment on offhand. I can only say that when Mr. Lattimore talked to me he certainly attempted to produce in my mind the impression that there was no Soviet Russian influence in Outer Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was in 1936?

Mr. BULLITT. That was in April of 1936.

The CHAIRMAN. Just so we may get the date straight with reference to the time that you had the talk with the emissary from the Soviet who was sent in to—



Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Karakhan?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karakhan. When was it that you had the meeting with Lattimore, the conversation?

Mr. BULLITT. The meeting with Karakhan took place more than a year before my conversation with Lattimore, to the best of my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. So, at the time of your conversation with Lattimore you had in mind or had a right to have in mind the statements that had been made to you by Karakhan?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, you started to relate to us other experiences during which you met Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. BULLITT. I have seen Mr. Lattimore so far as I know only once more in my life, and that was when he and I were invited to take opposite sides of debate by the Town Meeting of the Air.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. BULLITT. I have here the volume that the Town Meeting of the Air people publish here, and I can give you the exact date. That was January 6, 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened at that time, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Lattimore and I obviously were having a debate, but we also had an argument on a given point inside the debate. Mr. Lattimore stated—I am quoting from the record here—"on the contrary, it has become clearer and clearer that the Communists"—these were the Chinese Communists—"rely mainly upon American equipment surrendered by disgusted, war-weary Government troops."

When it came my turn to speak again I said:

I should like to ask Mr. Lattimore a question. He states in his address that the Communists rely mainly on American equipment surrendered by disgusted, war-weary Government troops. I spent a very considerable period in China and Manchuria this summer, and I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore if he doesn't know that it is true that there were no Chinese Communists in Manchuria on VJ-day, that the 250,000 were brought into Manchuria and armed by the Russians with the excellent equipment of the Japanese Army.

I don't think you will be interested, perhaps, in the whole of this. If you want the whole text I will be very glad to read it. If I may just be allowed to give you excerpts, you might have it printed later.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Lattimore, I thought, dodged the answer to this question in the subsequent reply, so I said again, quoting from myself:

Again my question has been evaded. I don't want to take up the entire time this evening on that subject, but I should like to ask this: The Chinese Communists moved into Manchuria. They were there equipped with Japanese equipment. The equipment they have today is Japanese equipment. They got that equipment from the Soviet Government. Is that true or not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore replied: "I don't know. I wasn't there."

Whereupon, I commented:

You don't know, you weren't there, but everybody who was there knows and the American Government knows and the American Army knows and you should know. You are the head of a school on international relations. You have no right to evade it.

From this extraordinary statement of Lattimore's, the first statement that I read, "that the Communists rely mainly on American equipment surrendered by disgusted, war-weary Government troops,"

from the fact that Mr. Lattimore made this statement over the air to a Nation-wide audience, when everyone who took the trouble to read the columns of the New York Times or any other newspaper which prints foreign news knew that the equipment of the Chinese Communists in Manchuria was the equipment which had been surrendered to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Army—this led me to conclude that either Mr. Lattimore was once more behaving either as a man who was interested in promoting the conquest of the Far East by the Communists or, as I said before, that he was simply a charlatan who knew nothing about the subjects on which he took positions and that he had no business to be at the head of a school on international relations of a distinguished university.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, one of the trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations was Mr. Alger Hiss. In your diplomatic experience did you ever hear any suspicion voiced about Alger Hiss, or something stronger than suspicion?

Mr. BULLITT. Once.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. In the autumn of 1939 the French Prime Minister said to me—

The CHAIRMAN. Where was this?

Mr. BULLITT. In the autumn of 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. Where.

Mr. BULLITT. In Paris. I was American Ambassador to Paris, and this specifically was in the office of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister said to me that he thought I would be interested to know that the French Intelligence Service had given him a report that there were two officials in the Department of State who were Soviet agents. I replied that I would be very much interested indeed and that I would like to know their names. He then looked at a memorandum that he had there, and he said, "They are two brothers named Hiss." When he said this I, in my ignorance, laughed. I said to him that I had never heard of any official of the Department of State named Hiss, I didn't think there was any official of the Department of State named Hiss, and that furthermore Hiss wasn't even a name. It was a noise made by a snake and that I thought he had better ask his Intelligence Service to get better information.

Mr. MORRIS. This was in the summer of 1939?

Mr. BULLITT. This was in the autumn of 1939. It was after the war was on and was approximately October–November.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you convey that information imparted to you by Premier Daladier to any one in the United States Department of State?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I did. I was firmly convinced in my own mind, very foolishly, that there was nobody named Hiss in the Department of State, but I was having a very serious conversation one day with Dr. Hornbeck—

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was this, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. This was in 1940 about the end of February or the first days of March, if my memory is correct. It was a few months after the conversation with the French Prime Minister. I did a great deal of business in Paris with the French Government on the Far East. We attempted to keep the French Government working with us very closely on all far eastern questions. Dr. Hornbeck, who had been a friend of mine for a great many years, we had worked to-



gether since 1918, used to discuss with me what should be our policy in the Far East. We were having such a discussion, a very serious one, when the door behind me suddenly opened and I turned around, and there was a nice looking young man who said something to Hornbeck. Hornbeck made a reply, and this fellow said something else, Hornbeck made another reply, and then he walked out of the room. I didn't think that anybody ought to walk in on the kind of conversation we were having, so I said to Dr. Hornbeck, "Who was that?" He said, "That is Alger Hiss." I said, "What? Is there a man named Hiss here in the Department of State?"

He said "Yes." I said, "What does he do?" He said, "He is my chief assistant."

I then said to him, "Has he a brother?" He said, "Yes, he has." I said, "Does he work in the Department of State?" and he said, "Yes, he does."

I then repeated to Dr. Hornbeck exactly what the French Prime Minister had said to me, and I advised him to have an immediate investigation made of the reliability of his chief assistant, Mr. Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you what Donald Hiss was doing in the State Department?

Mr. BULLITT. No; I don't know that he knew. I don't recall that at all. I may say that nothing that I know reflects on Donald Hiss in any way, aside from that original statement made by the French Prime Minister.

I left Washington at that time. A few days later I returned to my post in Paris where I was Ambassador. That is all I know about Hiss.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did this conversation take place with Hornbeck?

Mr. BULLITT. Dr. Hornbeck?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BULLITT. In his office in the Department of State. He was at the time Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in Washington?

Mr. BULLITT. His office was on the third floor of the old State Department Building, overlooking the White House, about the middle of the corridor.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, are you acquainted with the operation of the United States Embassy in Nanking in the post World War II period? Were you there at any time?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. I was in Nanking in 1947 for a considerable period, and I was in Nanking in 1948 on two separate distinct trips, one in the spring and one in the autumn.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us anything about the operation of the Embassy at that time as to who operated it and who were in control?

Mr. BULLITT. Could you be more specific? I would be glad to answer any question.

Mr. MORRIS. Did we have an Ambassador in Nanking at that time, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. Dr. Leighton Stuart was our Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Solomon Adler have a prominent position in the Embassy at that time?

Mr. BULLITT. Solomon Adler was, if my memory is correct, financial attaché, and a very intelligent and clever fellow.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Raymond Ludden?

Mr. BULLITT. Raymond Ludden, in 1947 when I arrived, was the ranking diplomatic officer in the chancery. His title, I believe, was first secretary, but there was at that time no counselor of embassy present, and he was therefore the ranking diplomatic officer.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Leighton Stuart exercising his functions of Ambassador at that time?

Mr. BULLITT. Oh, yes. He, however, was not in the habit of going down to the chancery, but of doing his work in his residence, and, as he had a Chinese constantly with him in the residence, the chancery was not in the habit of sending up to him telegrams of a highly secret nature.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, on page 215 of George Bundy's book, *The Pattern of Responsibility*, the statement is made that you submitted a memorandum to the October 1949 round table conference.

Mr. Chairman, we have had considerable testimony in the past on the make-up of the individuals attending the October 1949 conference. Twenty-some people have been identified in varying degrees with the Institute of Pacific Relations. This book reports a fact that doesn't seem to square with the testimony about that particular episode. It says here, "Among those submitting memoranda were such men as Joseph W. Ballentine, William Bullitt, Joseph C. Grew, Roger Lapham, and Admiral Yarnell."

Mr. Bullitt, did you submit a memorandum at that time to the Department of State?

Mr. BULLITT. I received a letter written to me August 18, 1949, by Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large. This is the letter [indicating]. I don't think it is worth while to read the whole thing. Perhaps it is:

EXHIBIT No. 751

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
*Washington, August 18, 1949.*

DEAR MR. BULLITT: As you doubtless know, the Secretary of State has requested Mr. Raymond Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case, and myself, in conjunction with the officers of the State Department concerned with far eastern affairs, to review United States policy toward the Far East as it is affected by current developments there. In making this survey we are seeking, insofar as time permits, the views and guidance of those Americans who have either had extensive personal experience in the Far East or have made the area or some part of it the field of their special study.

We should very much appreciate it if you could find time to draw up and send to us at the earliest possible date a summary of your views as to the objectives which United States policy should pursue and the methods which it should employ at this time either in the Far East as a whole or in that part of it with which you have been particularly concerned. A contribution from you will be most helpful and will assist us materially in providing for our survey the broadest possible base of expert knowledge and advice.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP,  
*Ambassador at Large.*

To that I made—do you wish that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I think, Mr. Chairman, we would like to have that in our record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibits Nos. 751 and 752" and were read in full.)

Mr. BULLITT. To that I replied from the country, R. F. D., Conway, Mass., on the 28th of August 1949. This is my letter to Hon. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, of the Department of State:



## EXHIBIT No. 752

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Your letter, dated August 18, asking for my "views as to the objectives which U. S. policy should pursue and the methods which it should employ at this time" in the Far East, has finally reached me at the above address.

I am reluctant to reply. The Department of State's publication of its White Book on China, after the appointment of Mr. Fosdick and Mr. Case but *before* their report, seems to indicate that those distinguished gentlemen, for whom my respect is high, have been summoned not for the purpose of inventing effective policy but in the hope that some of the weight of the Far Eastern Albatross, which now hangs on the neck of the Truman Administration, may be shifted to their shoulders.

The White Book prejudges the case. By half-truths culled from reports of incompetent public servants it produces a picture so remote from reality that its chief interest lies in its proof of the lengths to which our government officials will go to protect their vested interest in their own mistakes. To publish an inquest on a faithful ally—not yet dead but fighting in despair to preserve its national independence—is incompatible with any standard of decent conduct. And our Department of State has done this not to serve a national American interest but to serve domestic political expediency.

Furthermore, Mr. Acheson, in his Letter of Transmissal, has written:

"The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the Civil War in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed the result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it."

One may say politely that this statement is somewhat doubtful or one may say impolitely that it is an outrageous lie. In any event, it shows a condition in Mr. Acheson's mind which will wreck any effort by anyone to protect the remains of our vital interests in the Far East. For nothing effective can be done so long as Mr. Acheson endorses the acts of the men who have thrown away the security which was won for us by our soldiers, marines, sailors, and aviators who fought and died in the Pacific area. Thanks to the policies of the Department of State, we now face a threat on the Pacific side far more dangerous than the threat of Japan ever was. The men responsible deserve ill of their country. Mr. Acheson endorses them and their acts.

Yet to all the yellow races they smell of death. The most frequent remark I heard in both China and Japan last December was: "Your government is making it too dangerous for anyone in the Far East to remain a friend of the United States." Thanks to the White Book on China, the nationalist leaders in Indochina, Burma, and Siam will now expect similar inquests before their countries too are dead. And they will not begin to recover confidence in our government until all the men responsible for our Far Eastern policy shall have been dismissed from government service. These men although underlings persuaded their superiors, who were ignorant of the Far East, to base American policy on the illusion that the Chinese Communists were somehow not quite Communists and that we—and the Chinese government—could get along with them very nicely. They are the gravediggers of our national security on the Pacific side. Their influence in the Department of State is still great. Mr. Acheson thinks well of them.

For these reasons I consider it useless to add new recommendations to the scores I have made to officials of the Department of State during the past two years—none of which have been followed.

Nevertheless, I have no desire to put the Department of State in position to say that my advice was asked and that I refused to give it. I enclose, therefore, the text of my last public statement on the subject. An address to a joint session of the Texas Senate and House of Representatives on April 27, 1949. And I reiterate four statements which I have made frequently to officials of our Government Departments.

1. Adequate economic and financial aid, and military supplies, should be given at once to all Chinese Government centers of resistance; and the utilization of this aid should be controlled by competent Americans.

A. Chungking: This aid should be given with a view to maintaining nationalist resistance and preventing the Chinese Communists from reaching the borders of Indochina and Burma.



B. Formosa: Adequate economic and financial aid and military supplies should be given at once to the nationalists in Formosa to be utilized under American supervision. Competent American military and naval officers, like Admirals Cook and Badger, should be detailed to advise on defense of the island and enforcement of the nationalist blockade of Communist China.

C. Arms and ammunition and military advisers should be flown at once to the Generals Ma.

D. General Chennault should be helped effectively to build up an air force to supply and defend the Chinese Northwest and the other areas of resistance.

2. Indochina: The French—two years late—have taken more or less the right line in Indochina. But I met no one in Indochina who believed that the country could be defended successfully if the Chinese Communists should reach the borders of Tonkin. Southwest China is the key to both Indochina and Burma. But it is the policy of the Department of State to do nothing to prevent Communist seizure of Southwest China. If this policy should be reversed, an American representative of the highest ability who speaks French fluently should be sent to Saigon.

3. Hong Kong: No commitment should be made by the American Government for defense of Hong Kong. If the Communists take Kwantung the position of Hong Kong will become economically untenable—except on terms which will make Hong Kong an asset to the Soviet Union. Hong Kong lives on legitimate trade and smuggling to and from China. If the Communists should cut off the trade and smuggling of Hong Kong, the city would die rapidly. Furthermore, the white British residents in Hong Kong, who number less than 10,000, have been able to rule 1,000,000 or more Chinese—there are no reliable population statistics—by keeping the highly unionized Chinese divided into Kuomintang and Communist groups hostile to each other. The drift from Kuomintang to the Communist side is now rapid. Strikes by United unions controlled by Communists could strangle Hong Kong swiftly.

These facts are well known to British bankers and businessmen in Hong Kong, and their only hope of economic survival lies in the possibility that they may be able to make themselves so useful to a Communist Government of China that they will be permitted to go on making money. Their dream now is to become compradores for a Communist China. Their fear now is that the Communists may not want their services and that the American Government will consider it contrary to our national interests to permit them to render such services. If the entire coast of China should fall into Communist hands, Hong Kong would be able to earn its own living only by serving the Communists to their entire satisfaction.

4. A personal representative of the President for the Far Eastern area should be appointed at once, with orders to devise ways and means to protect our vital interests. Nothing effective can be done to stop Communist conquest of the mainland of Asia and the islands of the Western Pacific without the presence of one man of high integrity and ability, clothed with authority. General Wedemeyer would be an appropriate choice.

His instructions should be the exact reverse of those given General Marshall. He should be forbidden to attempt to produce reconciliation between Communists and Nationalists, and should be ordered to use all available means to stop further Communist advance.

Secretary Acheson, in his letter of transmissal of the White Book on China writes: "The Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to the foreign power, Russia." They did that 22 years ago. But the officials of the Department of State, including Acheson, have just discovered the fact. And their errors have permitted the Soviet Government to add such areas, races, and resources to its war potential that it will feel strong enough to attack us in its own good time. Our Department of State has thus prepared the ground for a third world war. In our Army, a general who loses a division through incompetence is court-martialed. In the State Department and the foreign service, officials who lose whole countries and endanger the survival of the United States are promoted—if they know the right people.

How much in blood and freedom the people of the United States will have to pay for the prolonged and incomplete education of Secretary Acheson and his associates remains to be seen. Perhaps Mr. Case and Mr. Fosdick can do something to reduce the cost. In any event, they have every good wish from,

Yours very sincerely,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT.



Senator WATKINS. When was that letter sent?

Mr. BULLITT. That letter was written to Mr. Jessup in answer to his letter to me. It was mailed on the 28th day of August 1949 from Conway, Mass.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I have one or two questions raised by what Mr. Bullitt said in this memo. I notice you made some recommendations. I thought I got them. There was a reference to Formosa.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Have you recently been in Formosa?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. I spent the month of last December in Formosa. I arrived I think on the third day of December, and I left the last day of December.

Senator WATKINS. Had you been there previous to that time?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I had been. I went down to Formosa in the spring of 1948. I went all over the island at that time. That was before the Government was down there.

Senator WATKINS. What was the purpose of your visit there?

Mr. BULLITT. When; in 1948?

Senator WATKINS. No; the last time.

Mr. BULLITT. I wanted to see what was going on. I have attempted to keep up with what has developed in China for some years, and I wanted to know exactly what conditions were in Formosa at the present time.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to the recommendations you made in this memo to Ambassador Jessup, what changes, if any, would you make in those recommendations as of today after you have made this recent visit to Formosa?

Mr. BULLITT. When I wrote that letter to Ambassador Jessup in response to his letter, the mainland of China was by no means fully occupied by the Communists.

Senator WATKINS. Where were the battle lines at that time?

Mr. BULLITT. The battle lines were in the south and in the west. The west was still being held by the anti-Communists and the south and southwest also. It was a period in which there were large forces of anti-Communists on the mainland. At the present time there are no forces of anti-Communists on the mainland except the guerrillas. There are a number of guerrillas scattered through the countryside in small bands or larger bands, but there is no organized army fighting against the Chinese Communists in continental China. The only free forces of China are those that are either on Formosa or on the large island of Auemoy, which is at the mouth of the harbor of Amoy, and on various other islands up the coast and down south of Formosa. The main body is in Formosa today. There are about 600,000 men in Chiang Kai-shek's armed forces.

Senator WATKINS. About 600,000?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Are they fully armed?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. But they are badly armed. There are about 320,000 of them who are ground troops and the others are in the air force and the navy. Of the equipment which we promised to send to them by the 1st of July 1951, only 38 percent had been delivered by the 1st of January 1952. Their armament is by American standards entirely inadequate. They have rifles and machine guns and small

artillery, and they have one or two pieces of heavier artillery. In the navy they have six DE's.

Senator WATKINS. They do have a navy?

Mr. BULLITT. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, it has been quite an efficient force, although it is forbidden to act in any way by fiat of our Government which has given orders to our fleet to prevent it from stopping the Communist supply ships going up to Korea. They sail right by Formosa, loaded with Soviet munitions put in the Polish Communist ships in Gdynia. They come all the way around and go right by Formosa and sail past there taking those munitions up, taking those weapons up to be used to kill American soldiers in Korea, and by order of our Government the Chinese Navy is flatly forbidden to stop them on their way up there.

Senator WATKINS. Would the Chinese Navy have the power, except for that order, to intercept them and capture them?

Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, without question, without question.

Senator WATKINS. That was the result of your observation? You know that from your own observation?

Mr. BULLITT. I know that of my own knowledge.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to your recommendation that you made in that memo to Ambassador Jessup, as of today what changes, if any, would you make by reason of the changed situation?

Mr. BULLITT. The situation as it exists today is this: Stalin is engaged in pushing a long-term project to take over the whole of Asia. The first step in that was the conquest of China. He now has recently had built down to the northern border of Indochina a new railroad from Nanning to a point opposite the Lang-sou Gap. He has also had three new airfields built there just north of the border. He also has had the Chinese Communists station 250,000 troops there. They are there, poised to strike. The war in Indochina—

The CHAIRMAN. When you say the border, Mr. Bullitt, what border, please?

Mr. BULLITT. The border between China and Indochina. They are on the Chinese side of the border. The war in Indochina is a bloody stalemate. The thing has gone on now for more than 5 years. The French lose there annually as many officers as they graduate from their military academy, St. Cyr. They have out there an enormous proportion of their officers and of their noncommissioned officers. They have about 175,000 men in the French Army there, and they have about 110,000 in the Vietnamese army who are their allies, of course, and they have in addition about 70,000 Vietnamese auxiliaries. At least those figures are approximately correct. I don't say they are absolutely correct because they change from day to day.

On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh, who is the Communist leader in Indochina, has about 300,000 men. They are now very well trained. Their officers have been trained in China by the Chinese Communists and Russian instructors, and they are receiving a very considerable quantity of military supplies of all sorts from Communist China.

The consequence is that if these Communist Chinese troops north of the border should come across the border and attack as "volunteers" in the manner that they did—"volunteers" in big quotes—the way they did in Korea, they probably would wipe out the French and the Vietnamese. If they were able to take Indochina, the fall of Siam and Malaya would be extremely rapid and the fall of Burma would also be



very rapid. Indonesia would go and finally India. That is what Stalin is playing for in my opinion at the present time. When you get that, life becomes absolutely impossible for Japan unless she accepts Stalin's economic and political terms for trade for the continent of Asia. Japan cannot live except on trade with the continent of Asia. She depends on raw materials from the continent of Asia and selling her finished products there. Therefore, the defense of Indochina is vitally important to the United States.

Senator WATKINS. Where does Formosa fit into that?

Mr. BULLITT. It fits in in a very simple manner. The French cannot be reinforced adequately unless they take every single battleworthy division they have in Europe away from Eisenhower's troops and send them out there. The British will send nothing. And I personally trust no American ground troops are going to be sent to Indochina. It is ideally ill-adaptable to American physique and to American ways of fighting. Actually, in those swamps, in those rice paddies where that malaria mosquito is all over the place, and where prickly heat is also prevalent—which you get no matter how hard you try not to get it—a yellow soldier is much more effective than a white soldier. The white soldier requires 15 times the amount of supply that the yellow soldier requires. Therefore, I trust no one will be foolish enough to send American ground troops to Indochina.

There is only one force that can be used there, and that is the Chinese Nationalist force on Formosa. That force can strike on the flank of any Chinese Communist army going down to conquer Indochina, and I believe that if we do not intend to have that whole area go into Mr. Stalin's hands, it is essential for us to give adequate arms, adequate supplies, to the Nationalist army, navy, and air force on Formosa. I tried to make it brief, but it is too long.

Senator WATKINS. Of course, with reference to Indochina you made that explanation. How about the Korean situation? We are talking about what has happened in the past on the far eastern policy. Now what about the present policy? What about the use of these Nationalist troops on Formosa in Korea?

Mr. BULLITT. Obviously, Chiang Kai-shek offered to send 30,000 troops immediately, just as soon as the attack of the North Koreans took place. Our Government refused to accept them. He not only offered 30,000, he also offered to send as many more as we wanted. I would have taken a great quantity of them. I think if you had taken them, and put them into the fight, we would have won it in the very early days, before Stalin sent an air force out there, and before the Communists came in.

Senator WATKINS. As of January, when you were over there, or as of now, you are talking still about the past, what could have happened if we had had them in a hurry.

Mr. BULLITT. Senator, all I can say is this: With regard to Korea, there you have an extraordinarily complicated military problem. The air force does not want to use what good bombers it has.

Senator WATKINS. You say they do not want to use them?

Mr. BULLITT. They don't want to use them because they think they have to keep them to bomb the Soviet Union in case the Soviet Union should attack us.

Stalin has so many MIG-15s, and we have so few F-86s, that this lot of MIG-15s he sent out there, just as a side issue to the Chinese

Communists, to use in Korea, outnumber our F-86s to a fantastic degree. I don't think it is wise to try to give accurate figures. But to a fantastic degree. The question is now of what we can do, if I may say so. We are caught in this Korean thing, and my own personal instinct is that you don't go to war unless you intend to win the war, and then you use every means you can to win it as rapidly as possible. Whether that is today feasible under the conditions in which Stalin has built up his military strength so much faster than we have built up ours, I don't know.

Senator WATKINS. What about the replacement of our soldiers with some of these Nationalists from Formosa?

Mr. BULLITT. It could be done, and the Nationalists would be delighted to do it.

Senator WATKINS. What is the state of their morale?

Mr. BULLITT. That is the most extraordinary thing because their morale is very high. But it is very high for just one reason: That the Chinese all love their homes and their country, especially their villages, very much. The idea of living permanently exiled from their own native land, their own home, their own village, is intolerable to them. They live with just one passionate idea, which is of being able to fight their way back to their own country. They know they can only go back to their own country as victors. If they go back under any other conditions, they will all have their throats cut because they all went as volunteers to Formosa.

The consequence is that you have this absolute determination to fight their way back, and they would prefer today rather than tomorrow to begin the attempt. In my opinion they would require a period of equipment before they could be used effectively, because although each one of them is equipped they are not equipped with enough modern weapons. Such planes as the Air Force now has are completely antiquated, just as our World War II planes can't live in the air for more than 1 minute with a MIG-15. So that they would need equipment right down the line.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator WATKINS. Yes. We asked Admiral Cooke a number of questions. He had also been over there. I thought we might bring this inquiry as to our far eastern policy up to date.

Do you have any suggestions or recommendations with respect to that far eastern policy?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. I think that we ought to instantly equip the forces, Chinese Nationalist forces, on Formosa so that they can fall instantly on the flank of any Chinese Communist attacks going southward. And if they become good enough, I would risk, certainly, sending them back again. They have a perfect right to fight their way back into their own country if they can do it, and with the present discontent in Communist China, which is absolutely enormous, where you have not only the guerrillas but you have an enormous number of peasants who would like to throw the Communists out, and there is a very good chance that a Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland in a well selected spot and with proper preparation would snowball rapidly—

Senator WATKINS. Is there any considerable body of Asiatics who are anti-Communist other than these Nationalist troops in Formosa?

Mr. BULLITT. Who will fight, you mean?



Senator WATKINS. Yes, who will fight.

Mr. BULLITT. Well, the Vietnamese, who are fighting on the French side, they fight beautifully. But they are already drawing on them to the extent of about 180,000.

Senator WATKINS. That is only a small force compared to the 600,000.

Mr. BULLITT. The difficulty there is training officers, also.

Then you have a number of other peoples who would like to resist but they are not too good. I mean the Siamese certainly don't want to be ruled by Chinese Communists. Actually, the Burmese don't either, although a lot of their country is in the hands of Communists today; and so on. The Malaysians very feebly resist a few Chinese Communists that there are in the jungles of Malaya. The only force out there at the present time that is ready to act is the Nationalist force on Formosa.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I have been told, and I was wondering whether that is true.

Mr. BULLITT. It is true.

Senator WATKINS. That is the only force that is ready of the Asiatics themselves?

Mr. BULLITT. That can be used. And I would infinitely prefer to see fighting on the continent of Asia done by Asiatics rather than I would by American soldiers.

Senator WATKINS. It would be at least making it somewhat different than a white man's war against the yellow people.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. Sourwine had some matters he wanted to put into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have one or two things here which should go into the record in order to make it complete. First of all, here is a letter addressed by the Chairman to the Secretary of State, under date of February 20, 1952, asking for a copy of a letter addressed by the Secretary of State, under date of April 18, 1947, to Senator George, with which was enclosed a memorandum entitled "Analysis of Allegations Against Mr. John Carter Vincent."

What I have is the carbon copy of that letter of the Chairman to the Secretary. I have the original reply signed by Carlisle H. Humelsine for the State Department. He is Deputy Under Secretary. It is to the Chairman, transmitting what Mr. Humelsine says he believes to be the letter requested. Then we have the full text of the letter as requested.

Without attempting to tie this into the record now, Mr. Chairman, I will say that it contains the statements made by the Secretary of State in 1947 with respect to a number of matters which have since been the subject of testimony before this committee, and I believe it should be a part of our record. I offer these three documents for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 753, 754, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 753

FEBRUARY, 20, 1952.

Honorable DEAN ACHESON,

*Secretary of State, Department of State,*

*Washington, D. C.*

Mr. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Information has come to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee with respect to a letter which you addressed, under date

of April 18, 1947, to Senator George, with which you enclosed a memorandum entitled "Analysis of Allegations Against Mr. John Carter Vincent".

It is respectfully requested that a copy of this letter and memorandum be furnished to the Internal Security Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

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EXHIBIT No. 754

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
*Washington, February 27, 1952.*

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: With reference to your letter of February 20 to the Secretary, I am happy to transmit herewith a copy of what is believed to be the letter you requested; namely, a letter from Secretary Acheson to Senator George, dated April 18, 1947, with which was enclosed a memorandum entitled "Analysis of Allegations Against Mr. John Carter Vincent Made in Memo Transmitted With Letter From Senator Bridges of April 7, 1947, to Senator Vandenberg."

Sincerely yours,

[s] CARL HUMELSINE  
[t] CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Enclosure: As stated.

APRIL 18, 1947.

The Honorable WALTER F. GEORGE,  
*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR GEORGE: I refer to Senator Bridges' letter of April 7, 1947, to Senator Vandenberg, which you transmitted to me, and in which Senator Bridges encloses a memorandum submitted to him by someone whose name is not given setting forth a number of charges relative to the policies and record of Mr. John Carter Vincent, whose nomination for the promotion to Career Minister is under consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee. Although Senator Bridges does not express any opinion on the credibility or validity of the memorandum, he believes that an investigation into Mr. Vincent's fitness for the post is warranted.

I have made a careful investigation of all the charges made against Mr. Vincent and believe that they are wholly groundless.

I attach a point-by-point analysis of the allegations against Mr. Vincent. For the sake of convenience I have divided Senator Bridges' memorandum into 12 numbered paragraphs and have followed each paragraph with my answer or comments on the allegations contained in it. I have, in some places, rearranged slightly the text of the memorandum in order to shorten it and to make the charges stand forth more clearly. Inasmuch as the chronology and itinerary of Mr. Vincent's assignments and movements are substantially correct, I have omitted any reference to them from my summary.

I have known Mr. Vincent well throughout my service in the State Department. I recommended him for his present post and have worked intimately with him during my service as Under Secretary during which period he has reported directly to me. Increasing knowledge has brought increasing respect for his judgment and admiration for him as a gentleman and a disinterested and loyal servant of our Republic. He is a man of the finest intellectual quality and the highest character.

I am enclosing two copies of this letter, together with the analysis which you may want to submit to Senator Vandenberg.

Sincerely yours,

[t] DEAN ACHESON, *Acting Secretary.*



ANALYSIS OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MR. JOHN CARTER VINCENT MADE IN MEMO TRANSMITTED WITH LETTER FROM SENATOR BRIDGES OF APRIL 7, 1947, TO SENATOR VANDENBERG

I. It is alleged that "the actions, advice, and recommendations of Mr. Vincent" have been coordinated with the steps outlined in two official Communist documents:

1. "The Program of the Communist International and its Constitution." Workers Library Publishers. 1928. 3d American Edition, 1936.

2. "The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies," adopted as a resolution by the 6th World Congress of the Comintern, Sept. 1, 1928.

*Comment.*—Mr. Vincent advised me that he has never even read the two Communist documents under reference. I have never read them myself. I state categorically that any advice given by Mr. Vincent or any action taken by him was not coordinated, either intentionally or coincidentally, with these documents. The author of the memorandum presented to Senator Bridges does not quote from the documents and does not cite any specific instances in which Mr. Vincent's policies and actions have paralleled the supposed Communist line. The effect of citing these documents at the outset of a bill of particulars against Mr. Vincent is tendentious and unfair.

II. It is charged that while at the Embassy in Chungking in 1941 Mr. Vincent "expressed dislike for Ambassador Gauss," "a general dislike of the Chinese," and "an anti-Japanese viewpoint (prior to adoption of the Russo-Jap nonaggression pact in mid-April 1941)," and that he "expressed sympathy for Communist aims and ideology" and dislike for "alleged American exploitation of cheap Chinese labor."

*Comment.*—The allegation regarding Mr. Vincent's personal feelings toward Ambassador Gauss or vice versa bears on Mr. Vincent's fitness for this promotion only in its imputation of disloyalty. The contrary is the case. Mr. Vincent lived with Ambassador Gauss for two years (from 1941 to 1943), and their relation appears to have been close and amicable. I discover in the record only loyalty on the part of Mr. Vincent, both to the person of Ambassador Gauss and to the policies and actions advocated by him.

The allegation that Mr. Vincent has expressed a "general dislike of the Chinese," I find wholly untrue. Mr. Vincent has dedicated a great part of his life to friendship with the Chinese, the betterment of conditions in China, and toward good relations between that country and the United States of America.

With respect to his alleged "anti-Japanese viewpoint" it is quite true that from the beginning of Japanese aggression—and entirely unaffected by the Russo-Japanese arrangements in 1941, a wholly tendentious insinuation—Mr. Vincent and many others, among whom I include myself, were actively advocating measures to counteract that aggression.

Mr. Vincent has no "sympathy for Communist aims and ideology" and I am willing to state that he has never expressed any such sympathy directly or indirectly.

Mr. Vincent tells me that he knows of no instances of American exploitation of cheap Chinese labor and has never discussed the subject.

III. It is charged that, in 1945 while Mr. Vincent was first Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs and later Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, personnel in the State Department engaged in private correspondence with personnel of the Embassy in Chungking, via diplomatic pouch, and that this private correspondence was "leaked" to the Communists. It is stated that General Hurley's resignation came two months later.

*Comment.*—The implication is that Mr. Vincent conducted or permitted, a clandestine personal correspondence on official matters undermining the policies of General Hurley. It is further implied that the substance of this unapproved correspondence was being illicitly conveyed to the Communists. It is further implied that this was the cause for General Hurley's resignation.

In 1945, Mr. Vincent was at the San Francisco Conference from the middle of April to the end of May, at the Potsdam Conference from early June to early August, at the Moscow Conference from early December to the end of the year.



The entire subject of this alleged unofficial correspondence and contact with the Communists was thoroughly ventilated in the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during December 1945 on the charges brought by former Ambassador Hurley against the loyalty of certain Foreign Service officers. Secretary Byrnes said before the Committee:

"The other complaint of Ambassador Hurley is that some official or employee did not merely express a different view of his superior officer, but advised someone associated with the Communist forces that the Ambassador did not accurately represent United States policy. For such action there would be no excuse. I would be the first to condemn it and to dismiss the person guilty of it. But Ambassador Hurley has not furnished me, nor do I understand that he has furnished this Committee, any specific evidence to prove that any employee was guilty of such conduct."

The Committee took no action whatsoever on General Hurley's charges and failed to find the matter worth a published report. Furthermore, Mr. Vincent has at no time engaged in or countenanced private correspondence on official matters. I think, therefore, that we may consider the case as without foundation.

However, for whatever interest it may have, I should like to point out that on the basis of records available to us, Mr. Vincent's name appears to have been mentioned only three times in the course of these hearings, and not at all in connection with the question of the alleged clandestine correspondence. Ambassador Hurley referred once to a letter addressed to the President by Mr. Maxwell Stewart finding fault with Mr. Hurley, which Mr. Vincent acknowledged on reference from the White House without commenting on the substance of the letter.

Secretary Byrnes in his testimony referred to a report from General Hurley, dated December 24, 1944, and said that "there was a message signed by Mr. Stettinius with the initials of Mr. Vincent in the corner stating that the position of Hurley was sound."

There was only one other reference to Mr. Vincent during the hearings. Ambassador Hurley stated that he did not know Mr. Vincent well in spite of the fact that he and Mr. Vincent shared an office in the Department for a month in the spring of 1945 and went on to say that Mr. Vincent was in sympathy with George Atcheson (now Ambassador and Political Adviser to General MacArthur) and the others who were trying to undermine U. S. policy in China.

IV. It is stated that "a statement issued by President Truman on December 15, 1945, at the time of the appointment of General Marshall as Ambassador, presumably drafted by Vincent, entirely overlooked the principles of the Open Door, made no mention of the November 26, 1941, note to Japan, and in brief invited the Republic of China to 'agree to the Communistic terms for a coalition government or get no more aid from us.' This constituted a repetition in China of the policy so disastrously followed in Yugoslavia and Poland previously."

*Comment.*—This paragraph is a criticism of the policies enunciated in a statement issued by President Truman on December 15, 1945, and its apparent intent as well as the intent of the entire memorandum is to imply that Mr. Vincent had improperly exerted his influence to compel the Chinese authorities to incorporate Communists in the government. This implication is entirely false.

As to the Presidential statement, it was not drafted by Mr. Vincent, or under his supervision. It was prepared under the direction of Secretary Byrnes, General Marshall, and myself. It was revised and approved by the President. Mr. Vincent was in entire agreement with its contents.

The statement at no place indicates that Chinese Communists must be brought into the Chinese Government. The Communists are mentioned only twice. It is stated that the United States Government believes it essential that "a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists \* \* \*" Further on in the document it is stated that "the existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist Army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China." Incidentally, I note that in the above-quoted paragraph of the memorandum under discussion, an internal quotation appears of which the source is not given. If this is intended to summarize the purport of the President's message, it is clearly a misrepresentation.

As is well known, the subsequent course of events prevented the establishment of internal unity in China. When General Marshall arrived in China in December 1945, he found that provision had been made by the National Government for a People's Consultative Council made up of representatives of the National Government party (Kuomintang), the Communists, and two other minority par-



ties. There were also a number of nonparty members. This Council had not met due to inability of the authorities to arrange for a cessation of hostilities. General Marshall immediately exerted his influence to bring about a truce and was able to do so as of January 10. On the same day the People's Consultative Council met. This Council of its own initiative and with the approval of Chiang Kai-shek drew up a series of resolutions and agreements providing for representation by all parties in a State Council (the National Government party retained control over the Council), for the adoption of a constitution, for abolition of one-party government and representation by other parties in the government on a minority basis, and for unification of all armed forces in a nonpolitical national army. It was these resolutions and agreements, freely adopted by the Chinese, which General Marshall used as his guide in his subsequent efforts to assist the Chinese toward peace and unity. He became a member of a 3-man committee (a National Government representative, a Communist representative, and himself) to supervise a truce agreement and prepared for the amalgamation of the armed forces.

Subsequent developments in China gradually undermined and finally wrecked the chances of bringing about peace and unity in accordance with the People's Consultative Council resolutions and agreements. General Marshall has set forth clearly in his statement of January 7 the reasons for this disappointing development.

V. It is stated that "in September 1946, six members of the Military Affairs Committee of the House, visited General MacArthur in Tokyo. They issued (PM, N. Y., Sept. 10, 1946) 'an alarming statement about Soviet intentions in the Far East.' The next day General MacArthur issued a warning about the danger of communism in Japan. This 'was deeply resented by John Carter Vincent.'"

Comment: Mr. Vincent has given me the following account of the incident to which this paragraph apparently refers:

"The story regarding my alleged resentment over a statement made by General MacArthur is as follows: On September 2, 1946, a newspaperman (New York Herald Tribune) called to ask me what I thought of the statement that had just been issued by General MacArthur. I told him I had not read the statement. He asked whether there had been any change in policy regarding Japan. I told him there had been one and went on to explain that American policy towards Japan was expressed in the Potsdam Declaration, Terms of Surrender and certain papers of the State-War-Navy Committee that had been made public. The newspaperman manufactured out of whole cloth the story that 'an official of the State Department' took exception to General MacArthur's statement. The story was untrue; the newspaperman subsequently apologized to me. The fact that he was eventually discharged by the Herald Tribune proves nothing in this connection."

VI. It is charged that:

(a) Mr. Vincent presented a draft statement to Secretary Byrnes "in the fall of 1946" which "recommended withdrawal of all aid to the National government." Senator Bridges' document then indicates that this alleged draft by Mr. Vincent could be compared to the act of the Soviet Union in continuing aid to the Communists in China despite its undertaking to support the Central government in the Sino-Soviet pacts of August 14, 1945.

(b) Mr. Vincent on November 11, 1946, while Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, delivered an address in which he said that it was "unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles; where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament, where the fact or trend of Civil War exists."

The memorandum in reference characterizes this speech as an "indirect expression of American foreign policy in China" and points to the editorial disapproval of the speech as expressed in the New York World Telegram and approval given it by the Daily Worker, the Chicago Star and Communist party dailies.

Comment.—As to (a), I have not been able to find any record of any such recommendation or draft prepared by Mr. Vincent or anyone else. The only draft presented by Mr. Vincent to the Secretary in the fall of 1946 was the paper which subsequently became the basis of the President's statement of December 18, 1946. It was prepared at my request and approved by the Secretary of State, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and by General Marshall. In no draft of the statement was there any recommendation that we withdraw all aid to the National Government. On the contrary, the statement provided, in a para-



graph drafted by Mr. Vincent, for aid to China under the indicated conditions: Mr. Vincent has consistently advocated the extension of credits to China when conditions in China are such that the credits can be effectively utilized to improve economic conditions and promote a revival of American-Chinese business relations. He was, furthermore, active in supporting the grant by the Export-Import Bank of the \$500,000,000 credit to China in March 1946. This was in accord with the expressed view of General Marshall.

I believe that the best comment on the allegation in paragraph (b) above is the text itself of Mr. Vincent's speech. I attach a copy.

There are also attached for your information copies of two letters, one from the National Foreign Trade Council and the other from the China-American Council of Commerce and Industry, the two trade organizations most actively interested in commercial relations with China. You will note that the President of the National Foreign Trade Council states that Mr. Vincent's "enunciation of the attitude and policies of the United States with respect to our interests in the Far East was most impressive." The President of the China-America Council states that Mr. Vincent's speech was discussed at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Council and "appreciation expressed for the clear-cut statement of policy of the Department of State as presented in his address." In addition to these two statements of approval, there have been received in the Department a large number of letters from businessmen, who heard or read Mr. Vincent's speech, expressing their appreciation and approval.

As to press reaction to Mr. Vincent's speech, criticism appears to have been confined to the Scripps-Howard press. It is reported that certain Communist dailies approved this speech but I might add to the list of those expressing approval the following: New York Journal of Commerce, New York Herald Tribune, Washington Post, Washington Times-Herald, etc.

VII. It is stated that Mr. Vincent accompanied "Owen Lattimore, member of the Editorial Board of *Amerasia*, pro-Communist magazine on Asia," and Henry Wallace on his trip to China in 1944. Mr. Wallace's report of his journey is said to have been "prepared with the direct assistance of Mr. Vincent" and it is alleged that it "should be examined for further indications of Mr. Vincent's approval of the Communist program in China, opposition to the support of the Nationalist Government and furtherance of extension of the influence of Russia in China."

*Comment.*—Mr. Vincent was assigned by the Secretary of State to accompany Mr. Wallace, the Vice President of the United States, on the journey mentioned. Mr. Vincent did not prepare or assist in the preparation of the report and does not know what recommendations it contained. Mr. Vincent had never met Mr. Wallace prior to the trip to China, saw him only a few times on official business after their return, and has had no contact with him since his resignation from the Government.

VIII. It is alleged that "examination of the top secret and secret documents required by General Hurley, and passing between the State Department (Mr. Vincent) and General Hurley at the time of his incumbency, would prove revealing of the policy and aims of Mr. Vincent, contrary to the best interests of this country and contrary to its avowed Foreign Policy in China."

*Comment.*—The allegation does not cite any particular document or reference to support the charge that the aims and policies of Mr. Vincent were contrary to the best interests of this country and contrary to its foreign policy in China, and indeed could not do so. At no time have the policy and aims of Mr. Vincent been contrary to our best interests in China or to our foreign policy. No documents ever went directly from Mr. Vincent to General Hurley and any documents from the Department to General Hurley were prepared or approved by Mr. Ballantine, then Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, or Under Secretary Grew who were responsible for the formulation of policy with regard to China at that time, subject to the close review of the Secretary of State and the President.

IX. It is charged that "at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Vincent, aware of the secret Yalta agreement with respect to agreement that Russia was to have certain rights in Manchuria, failed to properly advise Mr. Byrnes of this text, made a great show of opposing Russian demands with respect to China, and furthered a final agreement (which still remains secret) which gave Russia even more than agreed at Yalta. Under date of Oct. 31, 1946, Mr. John M. Patterson, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of Public Liaison, Department of State, replied to the request of the American China Policy Association, Inc., for release that 'No secret agreements concerning China were concluded at the Potsdam Conference.' It is thought that Mr. Vincent instructed Mr. Patterson in the writ-



ing of this letter (Why did Mr. Vincent conceal (if he did) from President Truman and Secretary Byrnes at Potsdam, the precise nature and extent of the previous secret Yalta commitments? It would seem that only the Russians could have been benefited by the concealment, as they were thus able to squeeze more concession from our negotiators who were ignorant of the exact terms which had been squeezed from President Roosevelt).

*Comment.*—Mr. Vincent had no knowledge of the Yalta Agreement until he reached Potsdam. Moreover, Mr. Byrnes was fully informed concerning the Yalta conversations. He attended the Conference and was thoroughly familiar with the full text of the Yalta Agreements before he departed for the Potsdam Conference. It is therefore absurd to suggest that there was anything which Mr. Vincent could have withheld from Mr. Byrnes even if he had known it.

As you are aware, the full texts of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements have now been made public. The Potsdam Agreement does not contain any "final agreement which gave Russia even more than agreed to at Yalta."

Mr. Vincent does not know Mr. John M. Patterson and gave no instruction to him in the writing of any such letter as that referred to.

X. It is stated that "in late July or early August 1945, Ambassador Hurley finally secured clearance to show the Yalta text to the Chinese. He then exerted every effort to force T. V. Soong and Foreign Minister Wang Shi-hsueh to go to Moscow. When they got there, the Russians made additional demands and the Chinese Government appealed to Hurley to mediate. 'Somehow or other Washington learned of this' and Hurley received a cable believed to have read somewhat as follows: 'You will not advise, you will not mediate, you will not assist in Chinese Russian negotiations.' It was signed 'Grew,' but it is believed that Under Secretary Grew, who was then being forced out, did not compose it."

*Comment.*—This allegation is completely inaccurate. There is no record of information reaching the Department at the time cited of any "additional demands" made by representatives of the U. S. S. R. during the Sino-Russian conversations nor of any appeal by the Chinese Government that General Hurley "mediate." The Chinese Government had been informed a year prior to that time that the United States did not desire to place itself in any position in which it might appear as a "mediator" between China and other countries and Ambassador Hurley had been apprised of this as early as six months prior to the alleged time. This policy had the full approval of Mr. Grew and of the President.

XI. It is charged that apparently in the summer of 1945 "Henry Luce of Time-Life-Fortune, who was represented in China by Theodore White, a strong pro-Communist, became uneasy about 'angled' dispatches and applied for a passport to fly out and see for himself. The State Department refused it. He appealed to General Hurley who cabled recommending the issuance. In reply Hurley received a reprimand advising him not to interfere. Mr. Luce finally obtained an official invitation from Chiang Kai-shek which brought the passport, investigated, and fired White for pro-Communist propaganda. White is a great admirer of Vincent and, like him, has been connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations."

*Comment.*—Mr. Vincent has never been consulted or informed with respect to any grant or refusal of travel permission from Mr. Luce.

XII. It is charged that "during the past two years, the Far Eastern Division of the State Department has been denuded of its former heads who were not pro-Soviet. Hornbeck, former Far Eastern Division head, who has been advanced to Political Adviser to the Secretary, was packed off as Ambassador to the Netherlands; Grew was forced to retire, as was Dooman, Drumright, and the Chief of China Section was sent to London. Now in control of the Far East Division, Lattimore and Vincent (Lattimore having no official connection although he lectures to Department personnel, and to the War College, and is known to advise Dean Acheson and President Truman as well as Vincent) have sent to General MacArthur, as well as to China, men and women of Red sympathies. A few names sent MacArthur are John S. Service (ardent pro-Communist, arrested in 1945 for turning State Department papers over to Communist Philip Jaffe of AMERASIA), Theodore Cohen (Labor Adviser), Miriam Farley, and T. A. Bisson of the Institute of Pacific Relations, listed as a Communist front by the Dies committee of 1944, of which Vincent and Lattimore are both trustees). Lattimore, close friend and associate of Vincent, is reported to have loaded the OWI with Reds (both Chinese and American) and helped to secure the appointment of a man without qualifications (also without a Communist record) as head of UNRRA for China and helped him staff this division of UNRRA with pro-Communists."



*Comment.*—This allegation seeks to suggest a purpose and design behind the various personnel changed and transfers referred to which, I can say, from personal knowledge did not and does not exist. Insofar as Mr. Vincent is concerned he had nothing to do with the transfer of Mr. Hornbeck or the retirement of Mr. Grew and Mr. Dooman. Mr. Drumright had long desired an assignment to London which he eventually received.

I do not recollect ever having met Mr. Owen Lattimore; he has never advised me nor has he ever had anything to do with the operations of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. I do not care at this time to go into the charges made against him which, in view of the above, are irrelevant to the present inquiry.

Mr. Vincent had nothing to do with the assignments of any of the persons whose names are listed as having been sent to General MacArthur. With respect to Mr. John S. Service, whose name is included, I would point out that, prior to his assignment to Tokyo, he was cleared of all charges which had been made against him.

Mr. Vincent is not a trustee of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was elected to the post in 1944 with the permission of his superior, Mr. Joseph Grew. He was never able actively to serve in that capacity and was not reelected in subsequent years. It might be pointed out in this connection that such substantial citizens as Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, Mr. Henry F. Grady, Mr. Paul G. Hoffman, and Mr. Robert G. Sproul are trustees of the institution.

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NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL,  
26 BEAVER STREET,  
New York 4, N. Y., December 20, 1946.

The Honorable JAMES F. BYRNES,  
*Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We wish to record with you the appreciation of our Council, and of the Thirty-Third National Foreign Trade Convention, of the attendance and participation of the Government officials, as listed in the enclosed list of over twenty-one hundred delegates at the Convention.

We also have the pleasure to enclose a copy of the Final Declaration which includes "A Proposed Foreign Economic Policy for the United States," and Recommendations in support of this Foreign Economic Policy.

It is also most highly appreciated that the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Hon. William L. Clayton, addressed the Convention, on the occasion of its annual dinner, on the subject of "The Foreign Economic Policy of the United States."

It is also particularly gratifying to refer to the constructive addresses of the Secretary of Commerce, the Hon. W. Averell Harriman, and Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, whose enunciation of the attitude and policies of the United States with respect to our interests in the Far East was most impressive.

This annual convention of leading representatives of Government and foreign trade interests of the United States as a recurrent opportunity for conferences and conclusions has been of the utmost value to a mutual understanding of the problems and policies affecting our foreign commerce.

Sincerely yours,

E. P. THOMAS, *President.*

cc. Mr. John Carter Vincent.

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CHINA-AMERICA COUNCIL OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, INC.,  
December 17, 1946.

The Honorable WILLIAM L. CLAYTON,  
*Department of State, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. CLAYTON: At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Far East-American Council yesterday, the address of Mr. John Carter Vincent at the Far East Luncheon of the National Foreign Trade Council on November 12th was discussed and appreciation expressed for the clear-cut statement of policy of the Department of State as presented in this address.

I take this occasion, therefore, to bring the foregoing to your attention with the thought that the Council's approval as above noted may thus be made a matter



of record in the Department and may further be brought to the attention of other officials concerned with international trade policy matters.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR B. FOYE, *President.*

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it will be remembered that Mr. John Carter Vincent testified at length before this committee with regard to certain memoranda which he had prepared in connection with or antedating the directive which was given to General Marshall on December 15, 1945. Mr. Vincent identified as his draft the memorandum which was signed by the Secretary of State and which became one of the enclosures that was a part of that so-called directive. The directive, the committee will remember, consisted of the President's letter of transmittal, this memorandum of the Secretary of State—to which I have referred—a statement of policy with regard to China by the President, and a press release with respect to that statement of policy.

Mr. Vincent, as I say, identified the memorandum signed by the Secretary of State as his draft. He also said that he had drafted a two-page memorandum which he said he had given to General Marshall, and which had never been returned to the State Department files. He then spoke of a document which he had drafted under date of November 28, 1945, and said he had discovered a copy of that in the Far Eastern Division files, although there was none in the general State Department files, and suggested the committee could get that document if the committee asked for it.

The record appears to indicate some confusion—at least, the record reads as though perhaps the November 28 document was in fact the two-page memorandum which he said he had written and given to General Marshall.

The chairman wrote to the State Department requesting this November 28 document, and I ask, Mr. Chairman, that there may be inserted in the record at this point the letter of the chairman in that regard, which quotes from our record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 755," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 755

MARCH 14, 1952.

HONORABLE DEAN ACHESON,

*The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 2, 1952, in public session, Mr. John Carter Vincent on the stand, the record of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was, in part, as follows:

"Mr. SOURWINE. I also ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to offer for the record a letter under date of October 3 addressed to Senator McCarran and signed by Mr. Humelsine of the State Department.

"Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

"(The letter referred to was admitted as Exhibit No. 390, and was read in full as follows:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. I would like permission to read this letter.

"MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of September 19, 1951, requesting "A Draft of General Marshall's directive which he took with him when he went to China in 1945" referred to by General Wedemeyer in his testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, September 15, 1950; and also the names of individuals who prepared this directive. According to your letter of September 19, General



Wedemeyer testified that he saw the initials "J. C. V." on the requested directive.

"I am enclosing a photostat of the Department's file copy of the memorandum to which, I believe, General Wedemeyer referred."

Paraphrasing, Mr. Chairman, I want to state that this photostat which has just been offered for the record is the photostat which was submitted with this letter from the State Department.

"This memorandum was one of the enclosures of the President's letter of December 15, 1945, to General Marshall. As you are aware, the President's letter of December 15, 1945, and its enclosures constituted General Marshall's written directive for a China mission.

"A search of the Department's files reveals that none of the other documents of the Presidential directive which General Marshall took with him to China in 1945 bears the initials "J. C. V." or the name of Foreign Service Officer John Carter Vincent.

"As to the authorship of the enclosed memorandum, it would be impossible for the Department to provide a list of all those who contributed to or edited the memorandum. At the time the memorandum was drafted, Mr. John Carter Vincent was the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and hence the responsible subordinate officer for the drafting of the memorandum. It should be pointed out, however, that in important memoranda of this kind, it is generally the case that many officers participate in the drafting, even though the record copies (such as the enclosed) only show the name of the responsible subordinate officer. Since this particular memorandum was addressed to the War Department and since it was signed by Secretary Byrnes and approved by the President, it is entirely possible that in addition to Mr. Vincent and other State Department officers, military officers as well as Secretary Byrnes and even the President may have a hand in the drafting.

"In this connection, Mr. Acheson's detailed account of the drafting of General Marshall's directive is contained on pages 1848 and 1849 of part 3, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, First Session.

"Sincerely yours,

"CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE."

So presumably the two-page memorandum which was handed to General Marshall was never returned to the State Department file? Would you assume that from this letter?

"MR. VINCENT. I would assume that from this letter.

"MR. SOURWINE. That memorandum did bear your initials or your name; did it not?

"MR. VINCENT. It did.

"MR. SOURWINE. But it was not in the State Department files in October, so presumably it never came back to the State Department?

"MR. VINCENT. The original never came back to the State Department, but let me testify here that in my search after I came back from leave this time I found a carbon copy of this November 28 document to which I refer, which was in the Far Eastern office files and had never gone into the regular State Department files.

"MR. SOURWINE. How would you identify that so that we might request it?

"MR. VINCENT. I could identify it by date and I could describe it.

"MR. SOURWINE. Would you do that?

"MR. VINCENT. I will put it this way: You don't have to identify it, because I would like to have it now to complete this record of all the difficulty there has been about the draft.

"MR. SOURWINE. I am sure we all would because there has been a lot of confusion.

"MR. VINCENT. It would be well to have it in. I would like to have it. If you would write the State Department, there will be no difficulty in identifying it as the document concerning which Mr. Vincent testified here.

"MR. SOURWINE. Do you think there will be any difficulty in getting it?

"MR. VINCENT. I can't promise that, sir.

"MR. SOURWINE. You at least are anxious that we should have it?

"MR. VINCENT. I would like to have it now. That, I think, would clarify one other thing in General Wedemeyer's testimony, what document did General Wedemeyer see with my initials on it, and I am inclined to think



that what he saw was my November 28 memo when he testified that he saw something over my initials."

If the above-quoted portion of the record makes possible identification of the document referred to, the two-page memorandum written by Mr. Vincent which formed a basis for the subsequent six-page directive to General Marshall, it is respectfully requested that the Department furnish the Internal Security Committee with a true copy or photostat of the document in question. (A photostat would, of course, be preferable.)

You will note Mr. Vincent's testimony that very recently he found a copy of what he refers to as the "November 28 document" in the files of the Far Eastern office. If this "November 28 document" is not the two-page memorandum hereinabove requested, it is further respectfully requested that a copy of this "November 28 document" also be furnished to the committee.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman*.

Mr. SOURWINE. A reply has been received from the State Department, again signed by Mr. Carlisle Humelsine, and enclosing a photostatic copy of the November 28 document referred to by Mr. Vincent in his testimony. This is a four-page document, Mr. Chairman, so it still leaves some uncertainty as to the whereabouts or the identity of the two-page document which Mr. Vincent also said he wrote and gave to General Marshall.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that this letter and the text of the document may be inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 756" and is as follows:)

(See p. 2207, pt. 7, for the November 28 document.)

EXHIBIT No. 756

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
*Washington, March 24, 1952.*

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I refer to your letter of March 14 to the Secretary in which you request a true photostatic copy of a "November 28 document" concerning which Mr. Vincent testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee on February 2, 1952.

Enclosed is a true photostatic copy of what is believed to be the memorandum you seek.

Sincerely yours,

(s) CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Enclosure: Memorandum, Outline of Suggested Course of Action in China, drafted by John Carter Vincent on November 28, 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Chairman, because Mr. Vincent had testified in terms which were not completely clear as to their import, but had testified that he had drafted a statement which—and he did not like the word "basis"—which had been incorporated into the President's statement on foreign policy, the staff of the committee has attempted to make an analysis of this document, a copy of which has been furnished us by Mr. Humelsine, the so-called November 28 document, which would compare it with the statement of policy by Mr. Truman on December 15, 1945. That comparison has been made in the form of a two-column, parallel placement of identified paragraphs from the two drafts.

Now in order to see how that has been done, Mr. Chairman, and I believe it is important for the record, I respectfully suggest that the

text of the President's statement, the text of Mr. Vincent's memorandum, both be inserted with the paragraphs numbered as indicated here, which was the basis for this staff study, and that it then be ordered into the record the study itself showing the parallel columns with the numbered paragraphs placed opposite one another. That will mean a duplication in the actual printing of the text, but it will be done in such a way that the record will show how the studies were made.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the ultimate object?

Mr. SOURWINE. The ultimate object is to show, and it is the opinion of counsel that this does clearly show, that as Mr. Vincent has testified his memorandum was incorporated in the President's statement, that everything in his memorandum got into the President's statement, and that there is not anything in the President's statement that is contrary to what was in his memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. What part did the President's statement play?

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the statement of policy on China which became a part of the directive to General Marshall.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. It will be inserted into the record.

(For the document referred to see p. 2208 of pt. 7.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, those are the only two matters that I have for insertion at this time. I should like to ask, if the Chair deems it not improper, that the insertion with regard to the November 28 document and this analysis of it might be physically placed in the record at the time when Mr. Vincent testified about it, when he identified it as being in the State Department files, and suggested that the Chair write to it.

The CHAIRMAN. That can be done. The January report is out, I think, and in galley-sheet form.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir; it is in galley form. It is a physical printer's problem. It could be laid in, if the Chair will so order.

The CHAIRMAN. If it can be done, that will be the order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, did you know John Carter Vincent?

Mr. BULLITT. No. The only time I ever saw John Carter Vincent in my life, so far as I can remember, was at a large banquet given in Switzerland in 1948, I think it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you add anything from your experience to these series of letters introduced into the record by Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. BULLITT. No; I can't. I don't know anything about Mr. Vincent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I pose this question for the Chair's consideration: The directive that went to General Marshall, as I have indicated, consisted of four documents, a letter of transmittal, a memorandum signed by the Secretary of State, a statement of policy by the President, and a press release with regard to that statement of policy.

The white paper issued by the State Department carries the full text of three of those documents, and omits the full statement of the press release with the statement that the press release was substantially the same as the statement of policy.

Just as a cross check, the committee has obtained from the White House a copy of that original press release. I might say that, on a comparison—not a detailed comparison but a hurried comparison, because it came up this morning—it does appear to be precisely what



the State Department white paper said, substantially the same as the policy statement. Does the Chair desire that this document, which is not printed anywhere so far as I know, should be included in our record, or is this statement with regard to it sufficient?

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a part of the transaction?

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a part of the transaction; yes, sir. It was included in the directive to General Marshall.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it should go into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 757" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 757

HOLD FOR RELEASE

DECEMBER 15, 1945.

*Confidential:* The following statement by the President on United States policy toward China MUST BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE Until released.

#### Note:

Release is for SUNDAY morning (December 16, 1945) newspapers.

Release by radio commentators, news broadcasters, etc., NOT EARLIER THAN 7:00 P. M., E. S. T., SATURDAY, December 15, 1945.

CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT PREMATURE PUBLICATION.

CHARLES G. ROSS,  
*Secretary to the President.*

#### STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

#### UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA

The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations organization.

It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations. Events in this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by methods of peaceful negotiation.

The Government of the United States believes it essential:

(1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces.

(2) That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strife—a solution which will bring about the unification of China.

The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China.

The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945, are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of China.

In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese



influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United States has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The United States Marines are in north China for that purpose.

The United States Recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is convinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective achievement of this end. United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a united, democratic and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in China.

The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party "political tutelage" established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen.

The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army.

In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate. The United States Government feels, however, that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace—a responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese political and military groups.

As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above, the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. In furtherance of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is all of Mr. Bullitt.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, the committee is indebted to you for your presence here, and we are grateful to you for your very intelligent statement.

Mr. BULLETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we do have another witness. When is it your pleasure to hear him?

The CHAIRMAN. We have the witness that we did not conclude with yesterday. I thought we would go on with him this afternoon.

We will recess now and reconvene at 2 o'clock.



Mr. MORRIS. We will have Mr. Bogolepov here at 2 o'clock, Senator. (Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. the same day.)

## AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

## TESTIMONY OF IGOR BOGOLEPOV—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting, April 9." No year is given. Institute of Oceanography, and initials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read several paragraphs from this document which has been identified by Mr. Mandel as a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I would like to ask a few questions of this witness on this document.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Perhaps he can identify it better.

Mr. MORRIS. This, Senator, purports to be a meeting or the minutes of a meeting held in Moscow April 8, which is one of a series of meetings which took place in 1936. The first two paragraphs read:

Mekhanoshin said that they had received the books sent them from America. They were very useful and he apologized for not thanking us for them sooner.

Mekhanoshin said that the general outlines of their work had been explained to Mr. Carter last year, but in 1935 certain changes and reorganization had been effected. The fishing industry needed more scientific work and the biological and oceanographical character of the work had not been satisfactory. Now this work has been improved. Previously they did not know the whole cycles of the life of the fish, but now they are studying it. Their new method of study is to make detailed studies of small regions where the fish are caught. They are now working in the north Caspian on an intensive survey. The study of the physics and chemistry of the sea are brought into practical application. On a basis of their year-round studies they are able to publish bulletins every 5 days during the fishing season telling where the fish are to be found, etc.

They are now doing new meteorological work, making climatic maps of the fishing regions.

Mr. Bogolepov, do you know Mekhanoshin?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. May I see the name, myself?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mekhanoshin is the right name. Yes, I know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Which year is that?

Mr. MORRIS. 1936.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1936? If I make no mistake, at that time he was the vice chief of naval intelligence of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Vice chief of—

Mr. MORRIS. Of naval intelligence of the Soviet Union. Mr. Chairman, we have had considerable evidence up to date in these hearings on the extensive efforts made by IPR personnel in connection with their fisheries project, and this is another document along the same lines; namely, about the fact that they were working on this fishing project. We have asked this witness to identify the man who seems to be in charge of this over-all project, at least the man whose name appears on this particular document, and ask this witness to identify him and to place him as a man who was associated with naval intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was a Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a Russian.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you propose to connect up that he was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, of the Soviet Union?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, these are minutes of the meeting, and he was the—it says here “April 9, Institute of Oceanography, ECC, Mr. Carter, OL, Owen Lattimore, Harondar,” who has been identified, and the next name is Mekhanoshin, head of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything in our record to connect the Institute of Oceanography with the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. This is a meeting at which all these people were present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, but is there any indication in here or in our record that the Institute of Oceanography had anything to do with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov gave testimony on that subject yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. We know that E. C. Carter, Owen Lattimore and Harriet Moore were connected with the International Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. But the Institute of Oceanography might simply have been a Soviet institute and yet they might still have had a meeting with them. Does our record show anything yet as to anything about this particular fisheries project? of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask the witness at the outset whether he knows anything about this particular fisheries project?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, of course. There were two different organizations, this institute where Mekhanoshin was in charge, and the Institute of Pacific Relations. But, as far as American members of the Institute of Pacific Relations called a meeting with the member or the chief of this institute, or another institute, it looks to me all things were connected together. And whether there was no or any formal connection between these two organizations, the facts that the man who was actually working for naval intelligence asked some information from American members of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to me showed that formally or nonformally but still the American Institute of Pacific Relations had something to do with the naval intelligence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, it had something to do with them. Now, as a matter of fact, this only looks as though they had something to do with them. There is nothing here that would indicate that the Institute of Oceanography of the Soviet Union had anything to do with the Institute of Public Relations, is there?

The CHAIRMAN. Except that the initials indicate that members high in the ranks of the Institute of Pacific Relations are on the heading of the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir, and this has all of the appearance of being minutes of the IPR meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is minutes of a meeting taken by some IPR people who were over in Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me read one paragraph of this.

ECC asked if they would be interested in the research to be done by the American and Canadian groups on the penetration of the Japanese in the fishing industry. They said that at the moment the situation in regard to the



Japanese was not serious for them. However they were interested in it and would probably do some research on it in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I am presenting this document in order to show exactly what the connection is from these minutes between the people who were engaged in the work of the Institute of Oceanography and the people who were interested in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are offering it for the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it may be admitted. I think the question is rather, again I say, as to the weight of the evidence. Whether it has any bearing or not is a matter of inference.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 758" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 758

MEETING: April 9, Institute of Oceanography; ECC; OL; HM; Harondar

Mekhanoshin—head of Institute

Chugonov

Chesnokov

Bogorov—Specialist on Plankton

Il'yin

Yansan—head of the Far Eastern filial of the Institute

Freiman—Specialist on sea animals

Klemova—Specialist on sea geology

Mekhanoshin said that they had received the books sent them from America. They were very useful and he apologized for not thanking us for them sooner.

Mekhanoshin said that the general outlines of their work had been explained to Mr. Carter last year, but in 1935 certain changes and reorganization had been effected. The fishing industry needed more scientific work and the biological and oceanographical character of the work had not been satisfactory. Now this work has been improved. Previously they did not know the whole cycles of the life of the fish, but now they are studying it. Their new method of study is to make detailed studies of small regions where the fish are caught. They are now working in the north Caspian on an intensive survey. The study of the physics and chemistry of the sea are brought into practical application. On a basis of their year-round studies they are able to publish bulletins, every five days, during the fishing season, telling where the fish are to be found, etc.

They are now doing new meteorological work, making climatic maps of the fishing regions.

The information on the Far Eastern fishing regions is very inadequate, especially in view of the fact that the industry is growing very rapidly there. The demand for far eastern fish products, especially crabs, is growing. Next summer an expedition is to be sent there to study for two years—to do special regional studies such as are being done in the Caspian.

They are also working on improving the technique of catching fish, getting new instruments, etc. For the first time they are collaborating with the Aero-hydrodynamics Institute (one of the biggest scientific institutes). This work is very important, because fishing technology is very backward and they need to develop cadres of engineers in the fishing industry.

They have started submarine research. Previously the fish were studied from the surface, but now they are constructing special means of studying below the surface.

They have experimented in using electrical currents in fishing. By creating electrical fields in the water they can concentrate the fish in one place, and prevent them from going into other electrical fields. This experiment has now reached the stage where it can be applied on a commercial scale. They have tried it at Murmansk. It is a very important development especially for fishing in gulfs and inlets. Previously they have had to block the mouths of gulfs with nets, which were very expensive and often were destroyed in storms. This idea will probably be used by other countries also.

Last year an institute of studying the preparation of fish products, etc., was added to the institute, and therefore the institute now covers all branches of the industry.

This year there are to be several additions to their investigation fleet.



In Murmansk they have two new ships, in the Far East is a new trawler, and three new ones on the Caspian. They also have an airplane on the Black Sea. They now have 60 investigations of fishing regions. 16 are in the Caspian directing the survey. They have 23 stations in various places. In the Far East they have branch institutes in Vladivostok, on Kamchatka, and Sakhalin, and smaller units in other places along the shore. In the Far East sections there are 471 workers of whom 115 are scientific workers.

The demand for fish in the U. S. S. R. is unlimited. At present the demand of the Kholokhoze is growing particularly rapidly. The supply in the sea is likewise unlimited, but in internal waters is more complicated. The development of new hydraulic works and of irrigation effects the water conditions internally. But, since all these projects come under government control, the fishing industry will be protected and they expect that in the long run the fishing in internal waters will be improved in connection with this construction.

There is little scientific information on the question of the extermination of fish. However they are taking measures to prevent this possibility, especially in connection with the Far Eastern crabs.

The new Volga canal could be disastrous for fishing, but measures will be taken to prevent this. The delta of the Volga will be greatly improved. They have made investigation to find new fishing grounds, both in the internal waters and in the open sea. Each year they are now able to give a forecast of where fish are to be caught and how big the catch will be. These forecasts have become very accurate.

The report that the fishing catch on Kamchatka was low for the first quarter is of no significance, because the season does not really begin until June. The low catch in Murmansk is due to the fact that the herring did not come in to the shore. Likewise the weather was very bad there and the gulfs froze, which is most unusual. In the trawling fishing they are having better results than ever before. The herring didn't come in, because their feeding period in the open sea was much longer than usual. This happens fairly frequently, and makes the industry very irregular. Therefore they are trying to develop "active fishing" which means that they find where the fish feed in the open sea and catch them there, instead of waiting for them to come in to the shore.

They are working on experiments to acclimatize fish in new regions. They have already brought Far Eastern crabs to Murmansk. This is a very complex problem, because they have to select the right species, etc., in order not to upset the feeding complex in the new region.

ECC asked if they would be interested in the research to be done by the American and Canadian groups on the penetration of the Japanese in the fishing industry. They said that at the moment the situation in regard to the Japanese was not serious for them. However they were interested in it and would probably do some research on it in the future.

They also study whales, seals, etc. Most of the whale hunting is done in the antarctic where the new Norwegian methods are causing a real decline in the supply. In the Pacific, where the supply is not as great, the catch is also lower. It is stabilized around 40,000 per year and the balance is maintained. However, in European waters there is real danger of extermination.

The seals which they hunt are migrating entirely within Soviet waters. There are two groups, one of which goes to Alaska and the other to the U. S. S. R., after breeding in the open sea, near Wrangel Island. Each year they estimate the number of seals, by aerial photography. The fur of these seals is not important. In 1929-30 there was a big expedition to the Far East to study sea animals. This was the first thing of its kind, as there is little scientific work on Far Eastern waters. They are very interested in the work that is being done in the U. S. in this connection.

They exchange information with Scripps Institute in California and with Woods Hole. Prof. Vaughan at Scripps; Prof. Bigelow at Woods Hole; Prof. Kafoed at the University of California, San Francisco.

They are interested in getting more of the IPR literature. They plan to study more carefully the problems of the IPR this year. They consider themselves as active members of the IPR. They are also interested in the work done in America in connection with fish hatcheries, with studies of the Great Lakes, etc.

Yanson asked that ECC visit their Far Eastern Branch.

In 1913 the total catch of Russia was 13 million centners; in 1929, 9 million and this year 15 million. The Japanese have the largest catch and the U. S. S. R. comes second, USA third, and Norway fourth.



Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might comment on that, with the Chair's permission, if in fact this was a meeting held by Mr. Carter and the IPR people who were with him, with representatives of the Institute of Oceanography of the Soviet Union, and that institute actually had no connection with the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, this would be an extremely important document for this record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I refer back to exhibit No. 37, part 1, p. 189, which is a document which was put into the record on that day, which was—

Mr. SOURWINE. Exhibit No. 37, Mr. Morris, indicates that Mr. Mekhanoshin was one of the founders of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; isn't that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But this document which has just been admitted into the record does not show a meeting with Mr. Mekhanoshin as a founder with the Institute of Pacific Relations. It purports to show a meeting with the Institute of Oceanography, does it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are drawing too fine a line there. Again, I say it is a question of weight to be given to the instrument itself, and merely shows association of certain parties along a certain venture.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask this witness a couple of questions, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the names which follow that of Mr. Mekhanoshin are those of officials or employees of the Soviet Institute of Oceanography? Do you recognize any of those names as such?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't know the people who were working in the institute, so I can't answer the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; I mean, do you know those names?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, just at this point, I want to revert to a matter the witness testified to yesterday. It has been troubling me to some extent. On yesterday the witness testified to a matter that was related to him by a Russian authority, whose name I can't recall. He was high in the councils of the Soviet Union. And in which it was related by the witness that this man had told him that Mr. Joseph Davies showed him, the Soviet authority, a certain communication. I think that that matter should be cleared up if there is anything more that the witness has to relate as to that incident. It should be cleared up because it is hearsay and extremely remote. I would rather have it cleared up now, if it can be cleared up, if there is anything more to sustain it. Some question should be propounded to this witness as to what more, if anything, he knows, or what more was said to him to tie the parties together, or what was in the communication. Something should be done to clear that situation up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, will you tell us in more detail than you did yesterday about this incident? The question that came up yesterday was casual, Senator, a collateral issue, and was asked by one of the Senators.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. But, to stand there in the record, it is just the same. And that is the reason it has troubled the chairman ever since.

Mr. MORRIS. We would like to reexamine you, Mr. Bogolepov, on the question of Joseph Davies, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Will you tell as specifically as possible, and with as much detail as possible, what you know about Mr. Joseph Davies.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You asked me the question not pertaining to this particular incident I reported yesterday. But you want me to say to you all I know about the activities of Mr. Davies?

Mr. MORRIS. About yesterday, in the first place. You say that he turned over a dispatch, a United States State Department order to him, to a Soviet official; did you not?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not quite.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you say?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I said only that Mr. Joseph Davies, while visiting the Foreign Commissar Litvinov, read to him the contents of the dispatch which he received from the State Department in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Now, you got that information from Mr. Litvinov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Himself; that is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you tell us anything more about Mr. Davies that might cast some light on that particular incident? I think you said yesterday that you did not know that the telegram or the dispatch which Mr. Davies received from the United States State Department was secret.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not know that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't know that it was not secret, but you did not know that it was secret?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything else about Mr. Davies that might cast light on that act?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. This incident I reported yesterday to the committee wasn't extremely amazing to me, because I was informed about the very close and good relations which existed between the Foreign Commissar Litvinov and the American Ambassador, and which, in my appreciation, had gone beyond the official relations which should exist between a foreign ambassador and the Foreign Secretary of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the relations went "beyond" that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They went beyond that.

Mr. MORRIS. What led you to make that conclusion, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time—I mean 1936 or 1937 Mr. Davies was persona grata.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was persona grata?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Persona grata in the Soviet Foreign Office. He called the Soviet Foreign Commissar more often and more informally than any other foreign ambassador could do. At that particular time it had come to my attention that we more than often had in our files photocopies of papers of the State Department of the United States as well as of American Embassies in Moscow and in Paris.



The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that clear. At that time it came to your attention that there were in the files of the department of the Soviet Government in which you operated papers from the State Department of the United States?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say "photocopies"?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Photocopies.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you attempt to link that up with Mr. Davies?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; I do not. I just only state the fact—two facts: the friendship between the American Ambassador and the Soviet Foreign Commissar and the ease with which our Foreign Department could get the papers of the State Department. I have not had any opportunity to link these two facts. I merely relate it to you. Coming back to the person of Mr. Joseph Davies, I know from Foreign Commissar Litvinov himself that on many occasions Ambassador Davies consulted with him about these trips that he had to make as American Ambassador, or some of the points in his report to Washington which he was supposed to write, asking Mr. Litvinov to clarify some points, and his advice on what he had to write to his superiors in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. There would be necessarily nothing improper about that, though; is there, Mr. Bogolepov? I mean, was there anything about that fact that you have just testified to that would seem improper?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You ask my opinion now?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I find it was improper.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, will you give us your reason for it, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't think that any foreign ambassador has to ask the government to which he is accredited what he has to answer for his own government, and that was the case with the American Ambassador asking Litvinov what he has to report about the Soviet Union; whereas, in my opinion, he must have his own conclusions made on these points.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you think of a particular example of such procedure?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was all routine business that was rather difficult for me to remember particular conditions of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question with the Chair's permission?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony that Mr. Litvinov told you that Mr. Davies had asked him, Litvinov, what he, Mr. Davies, should answer in response to a communication that he had received from the American Government?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. Or better to say Litvinov told me that on several occasions, especially during the Moscow trials, Mr. Davies was asking him how to understand this or another thing, and the interpretation of Mr. Litvinov was inserted in the reports of Mr. Davies going to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Litvinov say he knew that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I know that, because I read the reports of Mr. Davies later in photocopies.

MR. SOURWINE. How did you have access to those?

MR. BOGOLEPOV. In photocopies.

MR. SOURWINE. You mean that Mr. Litvinov would tell you what he had told Mr. Davies was the proper interpretation, and you would subsequently see photocopies of Mr. Davies' reports containing that interpretation?

MR. BOGOLEPOV. That is what I mean; yes.

MR. MORRIS. That is your testimony?

MR. BOGOLEPOV. That is my testimony.

THE CHAIRMAN. That clears the matter up to some extent. Standing out as it did yesterday, being brought out here by just an off-hand question which led the witness to make the statement, I didn't like it without further implementation.

MR. MORRIS. Is there anything else, Mr. Bogolepov, that you might add to this now before we close this collateral issue?

MR. BOGOLEPOV. I would like to state only that in all the facts reported by me now, and concerning the personality of Mr. Joseph Davies, I have had and I still have no evidence which linked him intimately with the pro-Soviet activities. I merely stated the several facts which I reported to this committee, which in my opinion shouldn't have taken place in normal relations between a foreign ambassador and foreign government.

THE CHAIRMAN. All right; you may proceed now, Mr. Morris.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here a document that was our exhibit No. 1 in executive session with Mr. Edward C. Carter on June 15, 1951, and was authenticated by Mr. Carter at that time. I will have Mr. Mandel identify it again for the open record, Mr. Chairman.

MR. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 16, 1935, addressed to "Dear Fred," with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of the letter.

MR. MORRIS. And it has been acknowledged, Mr. Chairman, by Mr. Carter as a document—that is what it purports to be on its face—namely, a letter from Mr. Carter to Field.

THE CHAIRMAN. It has a number now in our files.

MR. MORRIS. As of this time in our open hearing, no. It was our exhibit No. 1 in our executive session. Mr. Carter writing to Mr. Field, in January 1935 [reading]:

DEAR FRED: FROM copies of letters which I have already sent you, you must have realized by now that the U. S. S. R. group could not have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the committee are members of the party. All are influential; all are operating large organizations that have very substantial funds.

Motilev, the chairman of the committee, for example, has budget of 12 million rubles a year for the World Atlas. Voitinsky, the vice chairman, as head of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Communist Academy, has a large staff, a large library, and ample funds for publishing the new magazine, The Pacific Ocean.

Joffe, together with Schmidt, the hero of the Cheliuskin expedition, is famous as a mathematician, as an aviator, as well as an explorer. It is commonly said that Joffe and Schmidt are in charge of everything in the U. S. S. R. north of the sixty-second parallel. This does not simply mean millions of acres of ice and sea between the Atlantic and Pacific and tens of millions of reindeer and polar bears; it also means immense mineral and timber resources and 5,000,000 people.

Swanidze is head of the Bank of Foreign Commerce, is the head of the Soviet State Bank, which finances all of Russia's foreign trade. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics; speaks English perfectly; does not look as if he was over 35. Although one of the busiest men in the U. S. S. R., he took it



as a matter of course when he was asked to translate for us at a 2-hour session on December 25 with the great Varga at the Communist Academy.

It goes on to list more individuals who are active, according to Mr. Carter, in the Institute of Pacific Relations. A later paragraph, Mr. Chairman, which I am now reading from, paragraph 8:

I am sending you a list of all of the fisheries publications which the Institute of Oceanography is receiving from the United States. I would be grateful if you would have this checked through to see whether there are any important publications not on this list which they should secure. Would you send this bibliographical information to them through Kantorovich. They would also like to get from you reports from the private commercial firms engaged in every aspect of the fish business in the United States and Canada. I told them that you and Mrs. Barnes would do your best to get these, but that the scientific work of American business corporations are not always very extensive and that their financial statements were sometimes intended to obscure rather than reveal the economic basis of commercial activity. It will, however, pay you to dragnet the two countries to get the reports of the various fish companies, for, about the time you get this letter, your library will receive about a cubic yard of the most important Soviet publications on every aspect of the fish industry. You should immediately notify the principal fishing authorities in Washington and elsewhere of the existence of this priceless and unique collection on your shelves.

Mr. Bogolepov, judging by what I have just read to you, does that seem to be the same project that you have given testimony about before? Namely, that the Soviets were using the IPR to collect information of interest to the Naval Intelligence under the cover of this fishing study?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It looks like so.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, can you develop that any further?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. May I see the document, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, both Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Field, who are being asked to collect this information, have been witnesses before this committee and have refused to say whether or not they were Communists on the grounds that their answers might tend to incriminate them.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, sir, perhaps the best I can do is just to tell that from nine people mentioned here in this document, in this letter from Frederick Field to Mr. Carter—

Mr. MORRIS. That is from Mr. Carter to Mr. Field.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sorry; that is right. [Continuing.] There are only three names which I can identify as having something to do with research work. All of the rest of them are members either of Military Intelligence or of Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify them for the record, please?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Motilev, Professor Motilev, the Red professor, a party member charged by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for leading the project of Council for Foreign Relations; Voitinsky, member of Comintern. Joffe—I would be reluctant to say anything about Joffe because there is no first name and I knew five Joffes in Moscow; so, I don't know about whom you are speaking. Swanidze, who is said to be a director of some kind of bank, in reality was one of the Chiefs of the Foreign Administration of the Soviet secret police, NKVD. Varga, one of the most important people on this list, was the member of the executive committee of the Communist International. Eugene Harondar, who is assigned here as being a secretary of the Soviet Council for Foreign Relations, actually is a man of Political Intelligence—I mean, of the secret police. Jan-



son was also a member of the Foreign Administration of NKVD. And the last person mentioned in this list, Kantorovich, as I told you yesterday, was a nonparty man and a real scholar. They introduced him in order to have somebody who could speak about some research work.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any doubt in your mind that if Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Field, at the suggestion of Mr. Carter, obtained this information from the American commercial firms that it would repose in the files of the Military Intelligence of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I guess so.

Mr. MORRIS. The question is, do you have any doubt?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No doubt.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 12, 1937, addressed to Mr. Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is Mr. Carter writing to Mr. Lattimore, on September 12, 1937. This has been identified by Mr. Mandel as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The first paragraph [reading]:

DEAR OWEN: This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip. He wants to arrange things so that you and he can go together. Because of exceptionally heavy pressure on him in connection with completing the next stage of the Atlas, this year is quite out of the question for him to go to Mongolia. Had he been free he would have come to the Soviet Far East to meet me, but Atlas pressure tied him to Moscow. He sent Bremman, the secretary general of the U. S. S. R. council, who speaks Japanese, and Krasavtsev, who speaks Chinese. As one is a party member and one a nonparty member and each has had the richest kind of personal experience both in the Soviet Union and in the Far East, they made an exceptionally useful, delightful, and informing combination.

Mr. Bogolepov, do you know either of those two men?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The first one by name, simply.

Mr. MORRIS. Bremman?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Bremman.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what the regulations were to foreigners going in to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The same as for the Soviet citizens—no admission.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean Soviet citizens were not allowed to go to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know from your own experience that that was the case?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Because there is no cases when somebody of the Soviet citizens on private business could go to Mongolia. To Mongolia we send only people in charge of military missions, of intelligence or on party duties, and then only on official missions. But no one, private citizen, no scholar, nobody else could go to Mongolia, and certainly no foreigner.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say, to your knowledge, that no foreigner was allowed to go into Mongolia?



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. For a short time, approximately 1936, when I was obliged to work on the problem of admission of Mongolia to the League of Nations, I was rather closely connected with Mongolian matters. I read a lot of things in our Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Office, and this confirmed, in my opinion, that the Mongolian border was closed to anybody else, save the people on highly official missions.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you allowed to go to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I didn't ask about it. If I would ask on my proper interest, certainly I would be rejected.

Mr. MORRIS. You think you would have been rejected?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly. If I would be sent by the Soviet Government, that is another thing. But if I, for my own proper interest, would like to go to Mongolia, certainly the answer would be "no."

The CHAIRMAN. From whom would that rejection come, from the Soviet authorities or from the Mongolian authorities?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. There is not and never was such a thing as Mongolian authority, sir. There is only Soviet authority which commands that.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have been the Soviet authorities which would command your entry into Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. If, as a private citizen, I would like to go there; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this a significant sentence: "Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip"? That is Carter writing to Lattimore.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. What is the date?

Mr. MORRIS. September 12, 1937.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Approximately a couple or 3 months after the incident I reported yesterday to you, when Lattimore was assigned with a mission to prepare the terrain.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Will you tell us about that with a little more detail? We had not quite finished that episode yesterday. Will you tell us again, stretching as much as possible the details, about that decision which you now refer to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You would like me to repeat what I said yesterday?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. All right. As I reported already, in the collegium session of the Foreign Minister and his deputies, which was held twice a week in the building of the Foreign Office in Moscow, the question was discussed about the necessity and ways to bring so-called Popular Republic of Mongolia into the League of Nations, in order that the Soviet Union would obtain one more voice and assume more support.

While making this report, going from the point of view of the statute of the League of Nations and how Mongolia could be accepted, I reminded the negative impression which was received on that particular point from our ambassadors in foreign countries, including Washington, who say that it looks like it is quite impossible.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that all your foreign offices advised that it would have been impossible for Mongolia at that time to be admitted to the League of Nations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, because nobody in the West considered Mongolia as an independent country.

Mr. MORRIS. Because nobody in the West considered Mongolia as an independent country?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Then we discussed a little bit what we have to do on that particular case, and Litvinov said that in that case we have to make some arrangement so that the opinion of the West would be changed in our favor, and he asked that we have to put to work some—I don't remember his expression—did he say the people are on our side or our people—I am not sure on the correct expression of him, but he said that we have to put people to work for us and to make the situation more favorable before we should take any official and formal statement.

While discussing this point, he made the suggestion that some of the foreign scholars and writers, et cetera, in foreign countries—and in the first place in England, France, and the United States—would be put immediately at work on that line.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say these people would be put on that particular assignment—

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Would they be subject to the Soviet Foreign Office direction?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No. As I explained yesterday, the Soviet Foreign Office merely elaborated the suggestions—what would be preferable to do.

You have to understand, gentlemen, that there is a big difference between the Soviet Foreign Office and the State Department, for example, for the role foreign policy of the Soviet Union isn't carried by the Soviet Foreign Office only but through other organizations, first of all through the Executive Committee of the Comintern, through the Soviet Secret Police, and other organizations.

We were working in the Foreign Office only in the diplomatic field which does not correspond always with the political field.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, policy is not always set by the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. MORRIS. More likely by the Executive Committee of the Comintern or by the military police?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. All important suggestions which we make in the Foreign Office had to be submitted to the so-called political commission of the Politburo. This political commission took the decision and then assigned who was to fulfill, to carry out in life this decision, either the Foreign Office itself or the Secret Police, or the Comintern, and so on. And on that particular matter which I am reporting now—I mean, making the people to do some propaganda in our account—that was not the Foreign Office in charge, but some other organization; in the first place, Comintern and intelligence.

So all we did, we made our suggestion that the public opinions in the west must be worked out, must be changed in our favor.

And as far as concerns the United States, Litvinov's own suggestion was to put on this business Mr. Owen Lattimore, who was known to us as one of America's outstanding experts on the far eastern matters. And so this decision was taken. How it was carried out or whether it was carried out, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the decision was made. Was there an actual decision made by that body which convened at that time?



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you describe that yesterday, Mr. Bogolepov—that body that was there convening, that group that was meeting at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is the Foreign Commissar and his deputies, and they took the decision that Mr. Lattimore should write an article, a book, I don't know what about—I don't know what—about Mongolia which makes the situation favorable for the aims and problems of the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. You called that the Collegium yesterday; did you not?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Under the circumstances, would Mr. Lattimore have been under Soviet direction to carry out such an undertaking as you stated at that meeting?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I didn't get the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it have been necessary for Mr. Owen Lattimore to be under the Soviet direction if he were to carry out the assignment which was agreed upon at that meeting which you are now testifying to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In other words, you are asking me whether Mr. Lattimore was obliged to carry out the decision or not?

The CHAIRMAN. He interprets your question just about right. That is not the way you intend it, maybe. He is keen enough to see your point.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain it, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I still don't understand what you want me to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. To put it another way, Mr. Bogolepov, could this decision which was made by the collegium have been a decision merely to seek to hire an independent American writer to do something, or was it in the nature of a decision to send orders to a man who was subject to the orders or instructions of the collegium?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Would you please tell me, Mr. Sourwine, if you will ask me, for example, that I have to kill somebody else, and you will do me this proposal, do you think if you make this proposal I am not prepared to do this business?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, that is not an answer to the question. There is no proposal here that anybody kill anyone.

I would like to have you think over that thing and see if you cannot give us an answer to it which is more responsive to the question than that.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Perhaps I took not a very good example.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, you did not.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. But what I mean is that Litvinov proposes somebody to do some kind of business. Evidently he meant that this business will be done. That is what I mean. It was not a question that "we will go to Mr. Lattimore and ask him to be so kind and write this story, and maybe he will say "No."

In my opinion, it was said so short and in such a categorical form that there was no slightest doubt left to me that Mr. Lattimore was the right man who was to take this assignment. Does that answer it?

Mr. SOURWINE. That answer is responsive.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Bogolepov, we will get back to the second sentence in the letter of September 12, 1937, on which you were giving me an answer, and on which you referred back to this episode which you have now elaborated upon.

The sentence is:

Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. To me, the sentence in the letter you have worded looks like logical development of the story I just reported to the committee. If Motylev was eager to get Lattimore going to Mongolia—you must understand it was not his personal wish and interest because a member of the party has no personal wish or interest. He is acting always on the directive of higher organizations, and so, to me it looks, at least, like a carrying out of the directive of the collegium, at which I was present myself, in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it indicate to you that Mr. Lattimore was acquiescing to this project?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Acquiescing?

Mr. MORRIS. Agreeing?

The CHAIRMAN. Your question there is pretty deep, pretty conclusive. I think you better let the witness testify. He is an intelligent witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I call the witness' attention to the P. S. in this letter, which reads:

P. S.—Perhaps I ought to add that Motylev may not find it easy to get permission for you to go to Mongolia. It took him weeks finally to get permission for me to go to certain parts of the Soviet Far East and I gathered from what he said that he anticipated even more effort would be required in the case of Mongolia. But he is so definitely committed to getting the permission so that he and you can go together that nothing further needs to be except to leave everything in his hands.

Would you comment on that postscript?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, I can. Perhaps you will think that the difficulties or the troubles which the project of getting Lattimore going to Mongolia, which you are referred to do not corroborate with my statement. But I have to draw your attention to the fact that if you think that in the Soviet Union, in that totalitarian police state, everything is O. K., you are certainly mistaken. There is a struggle between the authorities. There is competition between the authorities. One of the greatest enemies of the Foreign Office in the field of internal policy or relations between the different branches of administration was always military intelligence and political intelligence, secret police.

In this case, this particular case, the Soviet Foreign Office would let Lattimore go to Mongolia. But it looks to me like military intelligence didn't like him to go to Mongolia. And so some kind of a struggle was behind the doors on that particular case, but nothing more.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions on that particular letter, Mr. Chairman. May the letters be inserted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. They will be inserted into the record.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 759 and 760" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 759

Copy: W. L. Holland. Please do not publish this letter and do not make any reference to the financial basis of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. This letter should



not be shown to others but you can share its more general information with the officers of the Japanese Council orally.

E. C. C.

SS "CHITRAL,"

Port Said, 16th January 1935.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,  
129 East 52nd Street, New York,  
U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: From copies of letters which I have already sent you, you must have realised by now that the U. S. S. R. group could not have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the committee are members of the party. All are influential; all are operating large organisations that have very substantial funds.

Motilev, the Chairman of the Committee, for example, has a budget of 12 million roubles a year for the World Atlas. Voitinsky, the Vice-Chairman, as head of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Communist Academy, has a large staff, a large library, and ample funds for publishing the new magazine, "The Pacific Ocean."

Joffe, together with Schmidt, the hero of the Cheliuskin expedition, is famous as a mathematician, as an aviator, as well as an explorer. It is commonly said that Joffe and Schmidt are in charge of everything in the U. S. S. R. north of the 62nd parallel. This does not simply mean millions of acres of ice and sea between the Atlantic and Pacific and tens of millions of reindeer and polar bears; it also means immense mineral and timber resources and five million people.

Swanidze is head of the Bank of Foreign Commerce, is the head of the Soviet State Bank, which finances *all* of Russia's foreign trade. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics, speaks English perfectly, does not look as if he was over 35 although one of the busiest men in the U. S. S. R. took it as a matter of course when he was asked to translate for us at a two-hour session on December 25th with the great Varga at the Communist Academy.

Janson, as head of the Chamber of Commerce, has a big organisation at his beck and call, has moved from the old building in which you and I saw the Chamber of Commerce when it was under the direction of Bunsch-Osmolovsky. The new building is the famous old headquarters of the Moscow Stock Exchange. It houses the offices of the Chamber and also its very strikingly arranged exhibit of Soviet products.

The Institute of Oceanography is similarly a very important body. It handles both the scientific and economic side of the entire U. S. S. R. fish industry. Its work is of immense scientific importance to the future food supply of the U. S. S. R., and has a direct political bearing on the situation in the far east because of the constant friction between Japanese and Soviet fishermen and because of the scientific competition that exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R. in the development of the fish resources.

When, for example, I asked to meet the head of the Institute on Oceanography, a group of the eight principal heads of departments came for a long afternoon conference. There were experts from the Bering Sea, the Arctic, the Black and Caspian, and from the rivers. Research is going on with reference to all of the underlying principles of Oceanography, including hydrography, hydrographical chemistry, ichthyology, the organization and technique of fishing, including the type of vessel; the life of the nets; the economic advantages of mechanisation; the economic return from fishing in the open deep seas and along the coasts; technical problems of finishing, salting, packing, and improving the quality of the final product.

I am sending you the list of all of the fisheries publications which the Institute of Oceanography is receiving from the United States. I would be grateful if you would have this checked through to see whether there are any important publications not on this list which they should secure. Would you send this bibliographical information to them through Kantorovich. They would also like to get from you reports from the private commercial firms engaged in every aspect of the fish business in the United States and Canada. I told them that you and Mrs. Barnes would do your best to get these, but that the scientific work of American business corporations was not always very extensive and that their financial statements were sometimes intended to obscure rather than reveal the economic basis of commercial activity. It will, however, pay you to drag-net the two countries to get the reports of the various fish companies for, about the time you get this letter, your library will receive about a cubic yard of the



most important Soviet publications on every aspect of the fish industry. You should immediately notify the principal fishing authorities in Washington and elsewhere of the existence of this priceless and unique collection on your shelves.

The tale of the work of the Institute of Oceanography could be written into a thrilling "Pacific Affairs" article. The mechanisation of the fish industry, the transplanting of small boats with trawlers, the maintenance of motorboat stations, the diversion of fishermen to other industries as the result of mechanisation, altogether a most impressive story.

It is interesting to know that it is estimated that the Soviet Union's capacity to consume fish will always be greater than the capacity of all the lakes, rivers, and oceans to meet the demand, in spite of the enormous gains made through scientific research and the mechanisation of the industry.

Kantorovich, the Secretary-General, is able, frank, well-informed, and speaks English rapidly and vigorously. He was a member of the Soviet Embassy in Peiping. He is not a member of the Party but would never have been made Secretary-General if he was not trusted implicitly by Party members. His special field of study is American policy in China. He has just finished a big book on this subject which will shortly go to the printers. He knew, personally, a great many of our mutual Chinese and foreign friends in China. He has got an excellent critical faculty and is a really first-class administrator. The speed and precision with which he made engagements for us while we were in Moscow was in striking and refreshing contrast to the delays of former visits.

Kantorovich's office is in the office of the World Atlas. His office assistant is Eugene Harondar, who speaks English, French, and German perfectly and can take shorthand in several languages and types rapidly in all. He gives half time to the I. P. R. and the other half is given to deciding what of all that is appearing in the movies magazines in the world in various languages, is worth translating into Russia. He was recently political, or Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Commissioner of heavy industries. He is in close contact with everyone in the Movie, Ballet, Theatrical, and Operatic world.

The housing of the I. P. R. in the office of the World Atlas is appropriate from many points of view. The Atlas is able to draw on every library in Moscow; thus Kantorovich and Harriet Moore have automatically a machinery for bringing to their desks, every needed book and periodical. Molitev himself is an economist, a professor in one of the Universities and was until recently head of the great Soviet Encyclopedia. He has travelled widely in England, Germany, and France. Both his English and his German are excellent. He is likely to go to China and Japan this summer. We are hoping that he will go early enough to attend the Tokyo meeting. He has a gold limit for the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. of four or five thousand gold roubles. If this is not enough for this year's expenses he is prepared to appropriate an approximately equivalent amount from his Atlas budget. He is determined that no necessary piece of work which the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. should do, shall fail for lack of funds.

You have already had the list of the Russian books which the Soviet I. P. R. is sending to the joint Russian library which is now being established in New York under the auspices of the American and Pacific Councils. The list of the books that you are sending is much appreciated. I have just one comment on the list which you have sent. From one of your first letters I gathered that you were going to send quite an important collection of American books that had not been published by the I. P. R. If it possible for you to carry out your plan in this connection it would be enormously appreciated. There are many books coming out in America which are not directly on the Pacific, but which nevertheless are essential in a Pacific library, e. g., the recent books of Alsberg and Hutchins on America's International Economic Relations; the four Brookings Institution books on America's capacity to produce and consume, etc.

I am asking Harriet Moore to write you at length as to her ideas as to what New York should send to Moscow in response to what Moscow is sending to New York.

You will be glad to know that in accordance with a request I have made, Motilev is going to present to the I. P. R. library in New York, not only the twelve volume small edition of the Soviet Encyclopedia, but the entire big edition, which will ultimately be some 66 volumes. Some of the earlier volumes are out of print, but he is having a search made so that a full set of the volumes already published will be sent and copies of the volumes still to be published will be sent to New York as they appear. These two gifts in themselves are so generous that I hope your plan of a presentation of American books to Moscow can be developed on an equivalent scale.



I think I have already told you that von Valree, the head of the Amstal Bank and head of the Pacific Institute in Amsterdam is going this month to Moscow on an unofficial trade mission from the Netherlands, and is to establish direct contact with Motilev. I have already urged you to get Wu to Moscow before Miss Moore leaves.

I have given the British and French groups a fairly adequate picture of the development of the I. P. R. in Moscow. At the meeting of the French group, when I did this, Hirschfeld, the Councillor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was present. He has followed the work of the I. P. R. with interest and is glad that so competent students as Mrs. Barnes and Miss Moore are continuing to labour in the Russian field.

Motilev and Kantorovich will secure every facility that Miss Moore can get from any source. They are highly pleased with the way she has gone about her job. The only criticism has been that she has not made more demands on them.

I saw Litvinova and he, as usual, was frank and cooperative. He said that he had hesitated to urge the formation of the Moscow group when it first proposed it because the Soviet Union was so short of personnel that he did not favour Soviet participation in the I. P. R. until the Soviet contribution could be adequate. He hoped that we would not expect too much at this early stage as they are still short of personnel.

I was told by Motilev that my visit to Litvinova in Geneva last summer had been a decisive factor in the favourable decision.

In connection with our discussions of the language problem and the emphasis on Russian studies in England and the United States, it was possible to take steps which would put Motilev in touch with Litvinova in the matter of Basic English. As you know, Litvinova is teaching classes of Basic English in the Red Army, the Kremlin and the Foreign Office.

The Praesidium informed us the last day that the Soviet group would prepare chapters for the studies on the status of aliens and communications. This was a sort of supreme yardstick of their willingness to cooperate in every major project, because Mackenzie had supplied us as models of what he desired for these two studies; samples which in one case were unfinished and another inaccurate. They were quick to notice absence of editorial mastery which Mackenzie's samples exhibited, but were willing nevertheless to provide their own materials.

Their official hospitality was discriminating and yet overwhelming in its abundance. They realised that our main job was serious discussion, but their provision for entertainment was a striking demonstration of the fact that the whole machinery of the State and of the scientific world was at the disposal of the Secretary-General.

This letter, as you will note, is a mixture of personal impressions and I. P. R. information. It is not, therefore, for general circulation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

SS "CHITRAL,"

Port Said, 16th January 1945.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,

129 East 52nd Street, New York, U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: With reference to paragraph 2 on page 3 of my letter of this date, there is one other very minor comment which I have to make, namely, that you have given titles without authors on your list, so that it is a little difficult to identify just what you are sending.

Sincerely yours,

(s) Edward C. Carter  
EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Handwritten:) The enclosed may be shown to all in the office who are interested & to Jerome Greene. You will know better than I whether Baker & Escott Reid would like to see it. I guess you better *not* show it to Reid because of the mention of McKenzie. Do not have any reference made in print to the financial basis of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R.



## EXHIBIT No. 760

HOTEL RICHMOND, GENEVA, *September 12, 1937.*

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,  
33A Ta Yuan Fu Hutung,  
Peiping, China.

DEAR OWEN: This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip. He wants to arrange things so that you and he can go together. Because of exceptionally heavy pressure on him in connection with completing the next stage of the Atlas, this year is quite out of the question for him to go to Mongolia. Had he been free he would have come to the Soviet Far East to meet me, but Atlas pressure tied him to Moscow. He sent Bremman, the Secretary-General of the U. S. S. R. Council, who speaks Japanese and Krasavtsev who speaks Chinese. As one is a Party member and one a non-party member and each has had the richest kind of personal experience both in the Soviet Union and in the Far East they made an exceptionally useful, delightful and informing combination.

As I think you know, Motylev arranged for me to go to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious and wanted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves. It seems that the justification for my going was as the chief executive of an international organization in which a representative Soviet scientific organization is an active member.

Motylev had been planning to go the Nanking meeting of the Pacific Council and was hoping that if this were possible he might be free soon after to go to Mongolia with you.

Now, of course, the war situation makes the future for him and the Institute most uncertain, so that for the time being it will be a good scheme for you to make your plans for next year in such a way that if Motylev can go to Mongolia and if the war situation makes it possible for him to get your permit and for you to go, a Mongolian trip would be a possibility. But until we know more than we do now as to the duration and consequences of Chinese resistance and Japanese endurance and Soviet involvement there is nothing to do but keep plans flexible as you and I have formed the habit of doing during recent years.

With reference to PACIFIC AFFAIRS the atmosphere was totally different from that which characterized our discussions when you and I were in Moscow. At that time, you will remember, Motylev was on the offensive, particularly because of the Isaacs article and relationship. This year Motylev and Bremman were not even on the defensive. They humbly admitted that they had not carried out their promises to you and me and their obligations to the Institute and that there was no use of their offering the excuse that it was difficult to get Soviet citizens to write for PACIFIC AFFAIRS when neither of them had themselves found time to write articles. They wanted me to explain to you that they were thoroughly ashamed of their failure to send articles and they made the most solemn kind of resolves to themselves write and send you something in the near future.

I told them that both you and I wished that the Voitinsky article had been sent to PACIFIC AFFAIRS instead of being published in TIKHII OKEAN. I said that we both felt that it was precisely the kind of article that we wanted in PACIFIC AFFAIRS, whereupon Motylev meekly admitted that Voitinsky had written the article especially for PACIFIC AFFAIRS, that Bremman and Voitinsky were keen to have it sent to you, but that Motylev felt that the other Councils would regard it as too provocative and tendentious and so had it shifted to TIKHII OKEAN. Bremman, of course, was delighted that you and I sided with him. I think that the incident has this value that Motylev now has a concrete example of what we all would like from the Soviet Council in PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Brennan, who at that time had only seen the first issue of AMERASIA, felt that the policy of the magazine promised to be defeatist, and that instead of educating American public opinion in the realities of the Far Eastern situation, it was likely to intensify the ostrich-like attitude of the American people and the American Government. I told him that I felt sure that both you and Fred would welcome incisive criticism of AMERASIA, in case they wished to contribute an article on the subject of PACIFIC AFFAIRS. I cabled Fred to send Motylev the whole file of AMERASIA from the beginning.



I read between the lines that they welcomed my suggestion that if they didn't think the time had come for them to be the first Council to come out with an article analysing Japanese policy, they might render a very great service by an article analysing either American or British policy.

You will have gathered by now that the Soviet I. P. R. extended to me every possible facility and courtesy throughout my stay in the Soviet Union. The members of no Council have made more comprehensive plans for a visit of an officer of the International Secretariat or incurred as great expense.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,

P. S.—Perhaps I ought to add that Motylev may not find it easy to get permission for you to go to Mongolia. It took him weeks finally to get permission for me to go to certain parts of the Soviet Far East and I gathered from what he said that he anticipated even more effort would be required in the case of Mongolia. But he is so definitely committed to getting the permission so that he and you can go together that nothing further needs to be done except to leave everything in his hands.

Copies: W. H. Holland.

Harriet Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I would like to refer to our exhibit No. 499, part 9, page 3243, which was introduced at the open session of March 1, 1952. This is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev, and it is dated February 10, 1936 [reading]:

This is to confirm our interchange of cables, as follows:

"Lattimore and I propose visit Moscow March Twenty-nine to April seventeen. Please cable whether convenient for you.

"CARTER."

"Will be glad see you. Lattimore suggested time.

"MOTYLEV."

It was delightful to discover that the dates which I proposed would be convenient, for I know Lattimore for a long time has been anxious to meet you, to visit Moscow, and to advance his knowledge of the affairs and ideas of the Soviet Union. After the Yosemite conference he hopes to learn the Russian language with a view of a more extended visit of the U. S. S. R. in 1937. But as a preliminary to all that, the visit which I have proposed in my cable, will, I am sure, greatly facilitate all his future studies of Soviet affairs. As you know, Mongolia is one of his areas of concentration but his interests are wide.

Does that suggest anything to you, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Would you let me see it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The last paragraph, in my opinion, is very interesting.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the last paragraph?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV (reading):

The American Council desires that I raise with you the question of arranging for the Soviet IPR representatives to meet influential groups of American citizens in New York, Washington, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco.

To me, it looks like this organization was used by the Soviet Government as a channel to bring people to the United States who otherwise, perhaps, might have some trouble in getting in under the cover of research work and scholarship, and under the sponsorship of one of the American leading scholar organizations. It would be easier to get American visas. And I know, from my experience, that it was the way on which we have been working, not only on this particular case. We were always trying to put our people not directly but through somebody else, through other channels as neutral as possible, and for this particular thing we plant agents in foreign organizations whose representation was particularly well fitted.



Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that letter is already in our public record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked "Confidential, not for distribution outside the office." It is not dated. There are 11 pages.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph of this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is it signed by?

Mr. MORRIS. This is an unsigned memorandum, Mr. Chairman, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is entitled: "Report on Soviet Relations With the Institute of Pacific Relations, Confidential, Not for Distribution Outside the Office."

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know by whom it was made?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir. It was a letter taken from the files of the Institute.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Paragraph midway on page 3, reads:

The fiction is even more potent in the Soviet Union than, for example, in Japan, but it is quite apparent that the Soviet Union itself is going to maintain it. Several Soviet organizations, such as VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and TASS, the Soviet News Agency, have been established with very careful legal autonomy. Whether the Soviet council of the institute is established under VOKS, or as a separate organization, the institute would do well to regard it in correspondence, etc., as an entirely independent and unofficial organization.

Such a policy would have advantages outside of the field of institute relations with the Soviet Union. It is fairly important to take safeguards against any circumstance arising which might provide ammunition for those non-Soviet members of the institute who may suspect Bolshevik propaganda in the work of the Soviet council. If a clear distinction is established and maintained in institute circles between the Soviet council and Narkomindel, it will help in any such contingency."

What is Narkomindel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comment to make on those two particular paragraphs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't know whether I should, because it is so completely clear.

Mr. MORRIS. What does it mean to you?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It means to me, first of all, that when they are speaking about some legal autonomy of one or the other Soviet organizations, it means that they do not know anything about the Soviet conditions.

Secondly, and what is yet more important, that all the organizations which are mentioned here, this VOKS and TASS of the Soviet Union, besides their direct work, are cover organizations for Soviet intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I know it from my own experience. In other words, when this document, this confidential document, wants these organizations as very respectable and legal, it means to me, as I told you, either they don't know anything about Soviet realities, or they help this subversive organization to be whitewashed in foreign countries.



Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other questions on that document?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions on that document, but I think there is a loose end hanging, if I might revert to something before you go on to another question, with the permission of the Chair.

We had some discussion earlier at today's session with regard to this meeting on April 9, 1936, of certain IPR people with the Institute of Oceanography, and I believe I inquired at that time whether there was anything in our record to show that the Institute of Oceanography was connected with the Soviet council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I believe the record is not clear on that point, and I would like to ask now, is it not a fact that our record does show that when the Soviet council of the Institute of Pacific Relations was founded in 1934, one of the organizations which joined in founding that Soviet council of IPR was the Institute of Oceanography, and that the Institute of Oceanography was at that time represented by Mr. Mekhanoshin, who has been here identified, and whose name appears on these minutes?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I believe I read that from our previous exhibit, No. 37, part 1, page 189, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the Institute of Oceanography is, then, or was, at least in 1936, at the time of this meeting, an affiliate of the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. According to our records.

I would like to ask this witness a question: Did you know of the existence of an organization called the Institute of Oceanography in Soviet Russia in 1936?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that an official organ of the Soviet Government?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; in so much as all organs are official in the Soviet Union. There are no nongovernmental organs.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, there are no private, independent research organizations in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Mekhanoshin, concerning whom you have testified here, held a position in naval intelligence, did you say?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So while he is identified here as head of the Institute of Oceanography, he was also, to your knowledge—what did you say his position was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Vice Chief of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Vice Chief of Naval Intelligence of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, with respect to that last document, may that be introduced into the record as the document concerning which I questioned the witness, and may I also take up with Mr. Carter the possible authentication of that document?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And there was another one yesterday.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

I think if we keep them all together we can do it in one operation.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that this could be identified in a more satisfactory manner. Perhaps, if you hold off until Mr. Carter is brought back on the stand, you can identify both of them—everything you have on that. The only identification now is that each was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I will withhold the ruling on it until you bring Mr. Carter or somebody else to identify it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make reference to our exhibit No. 485, part 9, page 3172, which was introduced into the open record on February 29, 1952. This is a memorandum on a meeting in Moscow at which the following people were in attendance: Motylev, Voitinsky, Carter, Harriet Moore, and Mr. Haronder.

Paragraph 4 reads:

Owen Lattimore said that he would like to meet the Soviet suggestion as far as possible in re having a more definite opinion expressed in PA. He has not been able to do this before because he has not had close cooperation from the various councils. He said that if the Soviet group would start on such a line, he would be able to make the others cooperate more fully. Voitinsky said that the main trouble was that the articles in PA did not come out against the aggressor, and the aggressor was not analyzed from within. Therefore, there was no indication of the internal weakness of the aggressor. OL asked for an article on the structure of the Japanese Empire. This might bring out the point that continental aggression was not antithetical to maritime aggression, but the two supplemented each other. Voitinsky said that this would probably be possible. He also suggested that there should be an article on aggression against Outer Mongolia, as this was so important now.

Do you know the importance referred to in those two paragraphs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1937?

Mr. MORRIS. No, 1936; April 12.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, certainly. Starting with 1932 and 1933, the Soviet Government was pretty well concerned with the defense of Mongolia as well as the Soviet Far East against possible Japanese aggression. It was the time, I remember, when in the high Soviet organizations the mood was rather close to panic because all thoughts indicated that the Japanese might every day start the attack against the Soviet Far East and Mongolia. Whereas, the particular military measures were taken at that time by the defense commissariat, the NKVD was to mobilize the public opinion of the West, especially in England and the United States, in order to make pressure on the Japanese Government and to create an international atmosphere which would disturb the Japanese plan of attack on Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Far East.

So the passage you quoted here and which perhaps might look to you as a discussion between two scholars actually was the carrying out by the Soviet of the political directive of the Soviet Government.

Mr. MORRIS. It says here that this was so important. Voitinsky said that was important—that was important to the Soviet Union.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Important to the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. In the next paragraph, I read here:

OL said that this had been done in regard to the article on the Chinese land tax. A Chinese version of the article had appeared, but this was revised to meet the needs of a non-Chinese audience. The material was the same, but differently organized. OL said that he would like about six articles a year from the Soviet council. Voitinsky said that they would do one on Outer Mongolia to be ready for the next issue, to be mailed on May 20, and then one on Korea and one on the Japanese Empire. He said that he would like to write an article in reply



to White's article. OL said that they would make it possible to have two Soviet articles in one issue. Voitinsky said that these articles would be done on the basis of the material which had already appeared in Tikhii Okean, but would be polished for export.

Did you know anything about such a procedure?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. At the beginning of the operation infiltration, as I can call the big program of poisoning the western mind with the Soviet propaganda, about which I have spoken yesterday, the trouble arose because our people were rather cumbersome. They were accustomed to speak to the Communist-minded people in very rough and political language, and so our first effort to send abroad the article written by Soviet authors failed mostly because of the improper language, and the western reader couldn't digest the Soviet propaganda done in the same way as it is done inside the Soviet Union.

So the question arose, as it is said in this document, to polish our documents which are sent for publication abroad.

And so there developed in the course of time a big branch of propaganda industry—I mean, the preparation of the propaganda material specially designated for western tasks. The quotation which I hear right now is just one of the examples of this kind of business. I can understand from hearing this paper why the Soviet delegates were insisting on bringing the material in the American magazines.

What I can't understand is why the American members were eager to get Soviet propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. It goes on to say here:

He said that the articles would have to be translated here—

“here” being Moscow.

What is the significance of that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is perhaps only taking a point, as far as I understand it.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

OL brought up the question of editing the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles. In regard to the Asiaticus article, he had to revise the vocabulary considerably or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda. In the Kantorovich article, OL had edited out a number of things but the New York office had put them back in. Voitinsky said that that would be impossible with their articles because they cannot give in on their point of view. No such editorial changes could be made without their approval. He said that he understood the problem of PA and knew what sort of thing they would have to write for it.

Have you any comment on that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can say that you heard that an editor is editing the articles, not the author. But in this particular case it is the author who dictates to the editor what to do. That looks to me that way.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have quite a few minutes which have already been introduced into the record. Would you like the record to show their being interpreted by this particular witness based on his expert knowledge of the situation in Moscow at that time?

It might take a little time, and I do not know to what extent we should go into that, Mr. Chairman. They are along the same lines as we have been discussing.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that not a matter for the conclusion of the committee? As a matter of fact, are we not capable of forming our own conclusions?



Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you think that this particular witness cannot add to it——

The CHAIRMAN. He might add to it, but I think it is pretty clear.

Mr. MORRIS. May I go on, then, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. As regards this exhibit that you have offered here and the one that you offered yesterday, it is possible that the present occupant of the chair might not be in the chair at some other meeting and this matter will be up here.

It seems to me that they could be admitted with the understanding that they are to be identified later on. I understand they can be identified by Mr. Carter or by his attorney.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was going to ask Mr. Morris if it was not true that there is a stipulation, an arrangement with Mr. Carter's attorney for a stipulation, of Mr. Carter about the files of the IPR which are authentic.

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what the stipulation is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only that he will, in cases which we offer him for the record and which are authentic, and which he knows to be authentic, stipulate to that effect without going back on the stand.

The CHAIRMAN. And if he does not stipulate to it, then this will go out of the record. Is that right?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, at the Chair's order.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, then; the exhibit offered yesterday and the one today will be admitted under those conditions.

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 761," which is as follows, for "Exhibit No. 758" (see p. 4555).)

#### EXHIBIT No. 761

CONFIDENTIAL—NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE OFFICE

#### REPORT ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

The three folders of documents, which form part of this report, are divided as follows:

1. U. S. S. R.—Pacific Council (this contains correspondence and other papers in reference to the formation of a Soviet Council of the I. P. R.).

2. U. S. S. R.—Research (this contains letters and reports in reference to the centers of research activities in the Soviet Union which have an interest in the Pacific).

3. U. S. S. R.—American Council (this contains correspondence and other papers in relation to the attempts of the American Council to develop and encourage Russian studies in this country).

Whatever the composition of the recently formed Soviet Council, the I. P. R. will have to continue its direct interest in this field for some time. It is unlikely that the new council will be prepaid at once to assume an independent role, direct encouragement will have to be given in the particular projects in which the I. P. R. is interested, and, finally, there is a very large field in connection with Soviet studies, as with Japanese or Chinese studies, in which the Institute and its various councils can do effective work without reference to the national council concerned.

In the past, this activity has been carried on by the American Council on behalf of and in cooperation with the Pacific Council. The ideal solution would be to concentrate it entirely in the hands of an international secretariat. For the present, it would seem to be imperative that the American Council continue to lead in the work, if possible by sharing personnel and resources, such as library materials, etc., with the International Secretariat. Only one of the reasons for this recommendation is the fact that in no other country on the Pacific could a full program be developed in this field at the present time with no fear of legal difficulties.



Because of this situation, the following report will embody recommendations addressed both to the American Council and the Pacific Council. Activities recommended, except under I. below, could most profitably be carried out by a staff located in New York, supported jointly by the American Council and the Pacific Council, until such time as the International Secretariat has a permanent working base adequately equipped to take them over.

#### I. SOVIET MEMBERSHIP IN THE I. P. R.

A. *Pacific Council*.—The Soviet Union accepted membership in the I. P. R. in 1931. The committee which was formed existed only on paper. More recently, a new attempt has been made to organize a Soviet Council, much more promising of success. The formulae of international cooperation are difficult for the Soviets to master, and our chances of getting the full substance of cooperation will decrease in measure as we put emphasis on the constitutional and organizational problems involved.

The Secretary-General, on his trip to Moscow in the fall of 1934, should be able to determine who are the four or five most active members of the Soviet Council, who is the titular head, and how far the services of VOKS will have to be used as a clearing house. As has been the case in China, the best results are likely to be secured by direct cooperation with the individuals and institutions represented on the Soviet Council. It is extremely unlikely that VOKS, or the titular head of the Soviet Council, will serve adequately as a clearing house, like Chatham House for example. The Soviets are not likely to object to any arrangement by which, for instance, projects might be organized directly with individuals in the Soviet Union, copies of the correspondence being forwarded to VOKS or the office of the Chairman of the Soviet Council.

In the past, many of the Institute's contacts in Moscow have been made with Narkomindel, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Several I. P. R. official invitations have been extended to the Soviet Union through this department. In the future, it is recommended that the Institute be punctilious in treating the Soviet Foreign Office as it would the Japanese or British. This means that it is legitimate to cultivate it, and to make every effort to secure its unofficial support. At the same time, it would be well to recognize the same fiction of independence as in other countries.

The fiction is even more potent in the Soviet Union than, for example, in Japan, but it is quite apparent that the Soviet Union itself is going to maintain it. Several Soviet organisations, such as VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and TASS, the Soviet news agency, have been established with very careful legal autonomy. Whether the Soviet Council of the Institute is established under VOKS, or as a separate organisation, the Institute would do well to regard it in correspondence, etc., as an entirely independent and unofficial organisation.

Such a policy would have advantages outside of the field of Institute relations with the Soviet Union. It is fairly important to take safeguards against any circumstances arising which might provide ammunition for these non-Soviet members of the Institute who may suspect Bolshevik propaganda in the work of the Soviet Council. If a clear distinction is established and maintained in Institute circles between the Soviet Council and Narkomindel, it will help in any such contingency.

B. *Research*.—Instead of snowing the new organisation under with the many projects which the Institute has under way at the moment, it would be vastly more effective to concentrate energies on a few. One of the first tasks of the secretary or other staff worker assigned to this field should be to attempt to secure some study for MacKenzie's Status of Aliens coordination and/or for his Communications project from the Soviet Union. The Secretary General should be equipped before his approaching visit with definite suggestions along this line to hand over as the first official Institute request for cooperation.

The Secretary General should also present to the officers of the new Council a short, clear statement of the Standard of Living program with some indication of what kind of contribution from the Soviet Union would be desirable. This is likely to make a special appeal to the Soviets, but a definite effort will have to be made to get them to go beyond the simple accumulation and presentation of whatever studies have already been made in this field. The initial request should be for such a bibliography, and the staff worker assigned to this field could then prepare definite suggestions, to be supported by a grant as in the case of the other national councils, for further work.



*C. Program and Conference.*—It is difficult to predict whether the Soviet Council will be very much or very little interested in this aspect of the Institute, or to decide which would be the more to be deplored. At first, there would be little to be gained by worrying them about this, beyond short discussion of time and place and assurance of the demand for Soviet representation. In reference to data paper presentation, the Secretary General should describe the kind of brief document on the Five-Year Plan with special reference to Siberia which would be desired. With this, as with the other recommendations made above, presentation of a request officially by the Secretary General will be enormously strengthened by the subsequent sending of short, clear, and simple written statements, both to the titular authorities and to the principal scholars concerned.

## II. SOVIET RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS INTERESTED IN THE PACIFIC

As in any other country, the ultimate strength of Institute support depends on the activity and interest of the research and educational institutions which have been drawn into the work. The present favorable sentiment in the Soviet Union towards the Institute is based more than anything else on a questionnaire addressed this summer to the more important of these institutions by VOKS. It is extremely important that this interest be strengthened and extended. In part, over a period of years, this will be possible only by visits on the part of the Secretary General and other staff members. A great deal, however, can be done by intelligent correspondence.

The reports in the attached folder cover the more important of these institutions, with each of which some sort of legitimate contact has at present been made. In addition, the office has now acquired complete published biographical volumes on all the scientific workers of the Soviet Union. The increasing relaxation of antiforeign feeling and the increasing readiness and ability of Soviet scholars to correspond are factors enhancing the possibility of success. Here, as in other correspondence, every effort should be made to establish a basis on which all letters are written in the language of the country where they are written. For this purpose, a Russian-reading staff member is essential. In the Soviet Union letters in English are adequate except where some special importance or diplomatic courtesy warrants their translation into Russian.

Special comment is necessary on the use of letters of introduction, particularly by the Secretary-General or other officers using them officially rather than personally. Big shots and stuffed shirts should be sent to their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union, and not to the Communist Academy or the Institute of Orientalology. Students should be sent only with selection and with restricted appeals to the good nature of the addressees. Tourists should not be given letters at all.

The two most important institutions in the Soviet Union for cultivation are the Institute of World Economics and Politics, which is a part of the Communist Academy and which is itself a sort of holding company for the Institute on China, and the Library of the Communist Academy. These are separate institutions. Their advantages over other organizations are principally two: (1) They have the best of the available personnel and equipment; and (2) they are politically not afraid to move and to take responsibility. As soon as the Institute of Pacific Relations is in a position to show some concrete measure of help, such as a research grant, or possibly a little later an offer for staff exchange between Moscow and some other IPR office, it would be very useful to take advantage of it to strengthen our relations with these two institutions.

## III. AMERICAN COUNCIL ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET FIELD

Because of the reasons stated in the introduction to this report, a great many activities are listed below which would serve in some respects other councils than the United States. If the American Council does not undertake them, it would still be worth while for the International Secretariat or some other National Council to consider doing so. From whatever center they are organized, their results could be made available, if there were a demand for them, through regular Institute channels to the other councils.

*A. Exchange of publications.*—The shortage of valuta in the Soviet Union and the high legal price of rubles to foreigners makes exchange almost the only practicable way of building up resources in books and periodicals about the Soviet Union. Arrangements for exchange of Pacific Affairs and the IPR memoranda are listed in the attached folder. A special file in Miss Austern's charge contains full details of exchange arrangements. With three or four organizations, such



as the Institute of World Economics and Politics, the Communist Academy Library of Moscow and the Communist Academy Library of Leningrad, rather fuller exchange relations have been established, covering printed books and documents. This is carried out by the periodical exchange of lists and the rough balancing of orders against each other, with no cash payments.

The only libraries in the Soviet Union which are at present to be considered in any sense as IPR depositories are the Library of the Communist Academy in Moscow and the Library of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. As the position of the IPR grows stronger in the Soviet Union, it might be desirable to substitute the Lenin Library of Leningrad for the latter of the two mentioned above. Both of those mentioned have received complete sets of the Banff papers and have accumulated substantial collections of earlier IPR publications.

*B. Establishment of a Research Library.*—Except for the New York Public Library, there is no effective Russian library in New York. Especially on questions of current interest and involving the Pacific, there is really no good library at all. Such a library would not be hard to develop over a period of years and the demand for it would be very large. The present collection of the American Council constitutes an excellent nucleus. It has been built so far by exchange and gift, and very little support would be needed to catalogue it and enlarge it.

The possibility of the Soviet authorities endowing or supporting a New York library to the extent of making it a depository for a very large number of Russian publications has been discussed frequently in recent months. If the American Council wished to pursue the idea, and were in a position to provide the necessary staff, there is no reason why it should not be made such a depository for books on international economic and political relations, on Siberia, etc. Such a move would have to be made jointly by the American Council in New York and Washington and by the Secretary General in Moscow. A good staff worker on a full-time basis could probably manage such a library at least in the initial stages. On a half-time basis, any library plan would have to be more modest.

*C. Clearing House for Research Projects.*—There is at present no organization in the United States which collates or even files record of the research projects which are being undertaken in the field of Soviet studies. The Institute has been requested to do so by many of the specialists in the field, and a beginning has been made, documents concerning which are included in the attached folder.

Organization on a better basis and continuation of this work would have advantages for the Institute in constituting a record of what is being done and would fill a real need of American scholarship. Any staff worker engaged in this field would necessarily be in contact with the very few organizations where such projects are important, and it would require relatively little effort to keep a file or card catalogue up to date. The quarterly publications of the learned societies in the humanities and the social sciences provide the best record available at present, but those are scattered, difficult of access, and seldom up to date.

*D. Russian Language Teaching.*—In 1934, through funds secured from the Rockefeller Foundation, a special experiment in the intensive teaching of Russian was begun under the auspices of the American Council at Harvard University. A list of the thirty students admitted to this school is included in the attached folder. A separate folder contains a full record of the school.

It may be considered at the end of the first trial that the experiment is not worth repeating. This does not at present seem likely to be the case. The University of California and Columbia University have officially invited the Institute to cooperate in the establishment of similar summer schools next year, and the attitude of the Rockefeller Foundation toward requests for further assistance is likely to be receptive, although no commitments have been made. Although the American Council should perhaps not engage in the educational field itself, this seems to be a case where an initial project serves to encourage and establish a legitimate activity which otherwise might never have started. As is the case with Chinese and Japanese studies, the Russian field cannot even be adequately surveyed without some initial work on the development of a linguistically trained research personnel. In this sense, continued interest for at least one more year in this project would seem to have much in its favor.

*E. Coordination of the Entire Field of Russian Studies.*—There is no single organization in the United States comparable to the Ost-Europaisches Institut in Berlin or the School of Slavonic Studies in London which serves to center and head up work in the whole field. A small conference of specialists called by the American Council in November 1933, a report of which meeting is included in the attached folder, urged this function on the American Council and specifically



recommended a rather wide range of activities, such as coordination of library purchase plans, readjustment of university curricula, establishment of fellowships, etc.

In view of the central function of the American Council, such a policy as would be required to achieve this would have many heavy liabilities. A great, even preponderant, share of Soviet problems are not in the first instance Pacific problems. The field is relatively new and politically dangerous. Finally, it is a function which could only be performed legitimately and well by a large university. The conference in question was eminently successful in charting an immediate plan for American Council activity. In the future, however, it would seem to be very much wiser to confine activities in this field to specific, limited, and fairly concrete projects. In the first instance, it may be necessary to undertake some projects, such as the Harvard Russian Summer School, which do not appear to have immediate Pacific implications. As they develop, however, they should be turned over more and more to other organizations leaving the American Council free to concentrate its modest resources on the problems of most direct concern to it.

*F. Bibliography on Russian and Soviet Problems.*—There has emerged from time to time a demand for a bibliography or reading list in this field which would be comparable to but better than Quigley's pamphlet on the Far East. The attached folder contains a draft memorandum on the subject prepared in this office in 1933 and now out of date, and a copy of the bibliography used by Professor G. T. Robinson at Columbia.

There is no question but that such a bibliography would be a real addition to the work the American Council has done. Its priority in a crowded program is a different question, and some effective way might be found of checking in advance the extent of the demand for it. The preparation, however, of such a list could be effectively done by the staff member in charge of this work along with other work his job would involve.

*G. Exchange of students.*—One of the specific activities urged on the American Council by the conference called in this office in 1933 was the elaboration of some plans for facilitating the living, archive, financial and other problems of American students going to the Soviet Union for study. A series of documents in the attached folder indicate the reasons which can be adduced to support a negative attitude on this proposal. The difficulties involved, the fate of such projects as the Anglo-American Russian Summer School, and the vastly more pressing urgency of other things point to the desirability of leaving this field strictly alone. Professor Cross, Dr. Duggan, and other American educators who have recently been in Moscow, have reached this same conclusion although they were committed beforehand to some attempt to work at the problem.

For serious students who have already equipped themselves with some command of the language and who are prepared to make the living adjustments necessary, there is a very real service which the American Council can and at present does perform. The only guides to archive material which are available in the East are in the American Council office and are being used by quite a few different outside students. In suggesting centers of research activity and methods of getting the maximum advantage out of them to qualified advanced students, the staff of the American Council could perform a legitimate service.

*H. I. P. R. Memoranda and Book Reviews and Articles for Pacific Affairs.*—Although Soviet contributions to Pacific Affairs are likely to grow in number and quality, the Soviet Council cannot be relied upon to do the necessary work in orienting I. P. R. publications properly in the Soviet field. This applies to some monograph studies, but primarily to the I. P. R. Memoranda and to Pacific Affairs. There is no field, not even the Japanese or Chinese, which is so open and unexploited at the present time, and both the American Council and the Institute stand to gain prestige and reputation by their work in it. The development of an adequate library and particularly the employment on the staff of a well-trained research worker who reads Russian readily and follows the work of others in the field are prerequisites. Without these two, it would be safer to leave the field alone.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, how well did you know General Varga?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. How well?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us how well?



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, I met him in the Soviet Union in Moscow before he left for China. He left for China in 1938 or 1939. I do not know precisely the date. He left as a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek assigned by whom, the Soviet Military Intelligence?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. By the Soviet Government. He was a regular officer of the army. I mean General Vlassow. And he went to Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Chungking, the capital of China. In Russian, it is quite different spelling, so I was having difficulty.

After this, I met him during the war, in the fall of 1941, when General Vlassow was commanding one of the section of the front, defending the approach to Moscow. I had flown to him, from the headquarters of the Soviet troops on the Leningrad front, and I discussed with him the military situation and political situation, too.

We agreed that the time had become ripe for doing anything for a change in the Communist regime in our country. I remember that he and some other people who were present and whom I wouldn't like to identify, because they are still in the Soviet Union now, holding high positions in the Soviet Army, were speaking about the ways in which we can use the confusion which certainly would arise in the case when the Germans would take Moscow.

After this talk, I returned back to the northwestern front, near to Leningrad, and toward the end of the same year, I heard that General Vlassow, after having beaten the Germans at the gates of Moscow, was assigned to the task to pierce through the German lines in order to get across the Baltic countries to the Baltic Sea, at the head of a special second army group created for this purpose.

He attacked with his army, but was defeated. His army was dispersed, and he himself, several weeks later, was captured by the Germans.

Shortly before, I went myself over the front lines to the Germans with some other officers and, as I told you yesterday, we tried to convince Germans to use the many millions of Russian PW's in German camps as a Russian army of liberation. But very soon after our talks with German military and political leaders we discovered that this was not the German object, to make Russia liberated from communism. They wanted to have Russia, Communist or not, as their colony, to enslave our people and to ruin our country.

So there was nothing left to talk with the Germans about. The talks were brought out. I landed in the Gestapo jail in Berlin.

As I told you yesterday, only with great difficulty, with the help of some of the higher officials of the German Foreign Office which were known to me during my work in Moscow. I escaped something worse, and for the third time, I met General Vlassow in Germany already at the beginning of 1943.

We had talked about the possibility, still the possibility, of organization of the Russian anti-Communist Army with the German help, with the German assistance, bearing in mind that first of all we have to get rid of Communist regimes, and then we will see how we could liberate ourselves from the enemy number two—I mean, from the Germans.

During all these talks and conversations, once I discussed with General Vlassow the problem of his China experience in Chungking, and General Vlassow, among other things which are of no immediate interest to this committee so I will not quote them, had spoken about the fact of his intelligence activity in China capitals.

Mr. MORRIS. This is General Vlassow's intelligence activities in the Chinese capital, of Chungking?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. He had some intelligence officers, and certainly he had to carry out all of the intelligence activities.

While speaking about his impressions, I asked him whether it was very difficult for him to do this special work because there were high British and American missions around. He said that, "yes, the British people were rather uncooperative."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you say were uncooperative?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Uncooperative, yes. And I asked, and said, "The Americans?" And he laughed and said, "The Americans were the best channels for my activities."

Mr. MORRIS. What Americans did he refer to there?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Americans—I don't know who. He didn't mention the names, or perhaps he mentioned them and I don't remember yet. But the Americans who were there in Chungking with the American military mission or other organizations working for Chiang Kai-shek.

The meaning of his words was that during his political and intelligence activities, he did get a great deal of assistance from the Americans. Nevertheless the fact that his political and intelligence activities were directed not in the favor of the United States or China but only in the favor of the Soviet Union—

Mr. MORRIS. And there was no further indication of the general classification of what these Americans were? That is, of what general classification they were? Did they work for the United States Government?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; they were officials of the United States Army and the United States Government, which was this mission in Chungking at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, did you know General Feng Y'hsiang?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I knew him—better to say—for he is dead now.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what I mean. Will you tell us what you knew about General Feng Y'hsiang?

Mr. Chairman, along these lines, when Mr. Lattimore was a witness before this committee we asked him to what extent he knew General Feng Y'hsiang, and he has testified in the following fashion on that subject:

Did you know General Feng Y'hsiang?

Mr. LATTIMORE. General Feng Y'hsiang, I met first in Chungking when he was one of the deputies to Chiang Kai-shek, and I met him afterward in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he ever a guest at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He stayed overnight at my home once.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever travel in the United States with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see. I think I traveled from Philadelphia to Boston with him. I had gone up to Bryn Mawr, where I was requested to act as a translator in a speech he gave at Bryn Mawr College.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you did not know or had no reason to believe that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no reason to believe he was a Communist; anything but.



What do you know about General Feng Y'hsiang?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, he was not a Communist, of course, but he got the money from the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean by that, that is the Chinese Marshal Feng Y'hsiang, as we say in Russia, was one of the biggest and more important agents of the Soviet Government in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was an agent of the Soviet Government in China?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. A paid agent, I should say, for I know from Mr. Borodin.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Michael Borodin?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right—who makes business with Feng Y'hsiang first, that he is a very expensive agent. This Marshal Feng Y'hsiang got in connection with the Soviet Government already at the beginning of the twenties, and he got a regular fee from the Soviet Government in order to carry out the line which was prescribed to him by the Soviet Government.

In the vaults of the Soviet office, especially in the files of the Far Eastern Division and in the personal files of the Deputy Foreign Commisar, Karakhan, which was mentioned today by Mr. Bullitt, I saw on many occasions, I remember, that Marshal Feng Y'hsiang was still a paid agent of the Soviet Union.

My last connection with these matters relates to 1937, I guess.

After this, I didn't hear about him any more, save the short notice in Soviet newspapers 2 or 3 years ago that he found accidental death in the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, did you know Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I did know Anna Louise Strong.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you know about Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not very much, because she was a noisy, nice person in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; she was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. What can you tell us about her?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not very much, sir, because I didn't work in any close connection with her. For the last time, I saw her in the office of Michael Borodin, which was just before the war. Michael Borodin was editor in chief of the Moscow Daily News. That is a Soviet publication in English language, published in Moscow. And Anna Louise Strong was working as his deputy editor, I guess. At that time, I know also that the doors of the Foreign Office were closed for Anna Louise Strong when she came in. She talked too much and it was impossible to get rid of her. So there was a strong directive not to let her go in the Soviet Foreign Office, for we have to work, and she took off of it too much time of ours.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean, this was during the time that she was deputy to Michael Borodin, or did you say deputy editor?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Perhaps deputy editor she was. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was closely associated with, and under, Borodin at the time the doors of the Foreign Office were closed to her?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't that a little unusual?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; it wasn't unusual because Michael Borodin was also out of the Foreign Office. He was in disgrace at that time. And I know also that she married a Russian Communist by name Shubin.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you spell that name for the reporter?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. S-h-u-b-i-n; who was formerly, I mean, in the twenties, working in the press department of the Foreign Office but later on, also coming into disgrace, and acted, I guess, as a free-lance journalist in Moscow.

So, as a matter of fact, as you see, I saw this person, I met her on several occasions. But she was not a persona grata in Moscow because I think that there was not much use of her which somebody could extract.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Constantine Oumansky?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I knew him.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Constantine Oumansky an intelligence man?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say whether he was an intelligence man during his stay in the United States and Mexico.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you can or cannot?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't. I don't know. I know only that he came to the Foreign Office directly from the intelligence school, military intelligence school.

Mr. MORRIS. He came to the Foreign Office from the military intelligence school?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him personally?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I know him pretty well personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph from an exhibit that we introduced at the executive session on June 21, 1951, when the witness was Kate Mitchell. This is a letter written to Mr. Holland, dated March 12, 1936. Miss Mitchell wrote in the last paragraph:

Carter and I spent about 4 hours with Oumansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday and got quite a lot of interesting sidelights on the Moscow trials, particularly with regard to Romm.

Can you cast any light on that paragraph for us, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Michael Romm—

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Michael or Vladimir?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sorry. I make mistake on the first name. Maybe I am wrong. He was officially one of the big shots in the Soviet press agency, going the world around. But he and the second big shot in Soviet journalism, Rogov, these two men were also key people in military intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Romm and Rogov were both key men in Soviet intelligence?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I hear you to use the words "free-lance newspaperman?" Did you say somebody was a free-lance newspaperman in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. There are still the remnants of capitalism.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean there are, or were, free-lance newspapermen in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Very few of them; but they still existed; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How recently?



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, for the last time, I saw these people just before the war, 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say free-lance newspaperman, do you mean by that an independent newspaperman who need not be a Communist, who can write what he pleases, for whatever publication he pleases?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, sir; certainly not. I mean only those who are not employed officially in one of the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by free lance, then?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is perhaps right. You have, maybe, another understanding of the word.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to quibble with you, sir. Just what do you mean by it?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean that these people were not employed in one of the newspapers, Soviet newspapers, but simply wrote articles for them. But, of course, they were obliged to write only in the matters which are in the lines of set policy of the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did a man have to be a Communist to be what you call a free-lance newspaperman?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; mostly it was nonparty people who couldn't get a position in Pravda or Izvestia.

Mr. SOURWINE. For instance, would a foreigner be permitted to come in and write as he pleases?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; only Soviet citizens living in Moscow, and they were not important people because all important people were assigned to the staff of the papers, Pravda or Izvestia. But those who, because of their nonparty affiliation, couldn't work in the newspaper, they were just writing some chronicle or some little articles from time to time. Perhaps I use the term not correctly.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have his comments on some of these documents, but it would not necessarily require any open session.

Could he be instructed to stand by and work with the staff a few days on some of these documents?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; he is going to have to stand by anyway. He is under subpoena and will have to stand by anyway.

What is his status? Is he in the custody of the sergeant at arms?

Mr. MORRIS. He is in the custody of the sergeant at arms of the Senate. And several of the United States intelligence services have asked us if he would do certain things for them in the next few days. After that, maybe we can go back and review some of these things in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. I have just a few more points.

You had said that you knew Rogov and Romm to be intelligence agents?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue with that comment on this paragraph:

Carter and I spent about 4 hours with Oumansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday and got quite a lot of interesting sidelights on the Moscow trials, particularly with regard to Romm.

Do you wish to add anything more to that comment? What happened to Mr. Romm, do you know?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He was shot in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was he shot?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Because he was affiliated with opposition inside the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comment on the fact that Edward Carter and Kate Mitchell spent 4 hours with Oumansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday? Is that an unusual amount of time to give a foreign visitor?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It means that these people were considered by Ambassador Oumansky as important people. He had lost 4 hours to give them his instructions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish the identification of some personnel who have turned up in our IPR hearings from time to time.

Michael Borodin?

Mr. BOGOPELOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what his role was in the Soviet organization?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. His role in the twenties was a great deal known. He was the chief engineer of the first Chinese revolution. He was assigned with the duty of conducting the revolution which happened in China in the early twenties into a Communist one. He failed to do this because Chiang Kai-shek, in the very last minute, in 1927, destroyed the Communist plans. This point makes Borodin a lost man. He was called back from China to the Soviet Union. He was under investigation for many, many months, and, as I told you today, the position which he held with the Soviet Union up to the outbreak of war was not a very important one, an editor of a not very important English-speaking newspaper in Moscow. So actually he was a finished man, far from the politics.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have one more document here. I am afraid it will have to be in the classification of the other two. It purports to be a memorandum on the Communist Academy and its China Institute, dated April 1934.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is it taken from?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Communist Academy, Volkonka 14, Moscow, U. S. S. R." It is dated April 1934, and is a carbon copy, which is taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations' files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one excerpt from a paragraph here, and then ask a few questions of this present witness.

I—

The author of this document—

mentioned Chen Han Seng, found that Abramson knew him very well personally, that while they think him still a little nearsighted they consider him the best man in China in his field and a man with a very real future. I referred to the pamphlet he wrote for Banff and was told without a quiver that they not only knew, it, but that it had been translated and would appear, with suitable editorial notes pointing out its inadequacies, in the next issue of Problems of China.

Did you know what the Communist Academy was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was it?



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was the highest scientific organization in the Soviet Union. If you speak of the science in the Soviet Union, you understand only the Marxist and Communist science. So it was the program where the Marxist theory was developed, where the Marxist scholars were prepared for different branches of Soviet administration, for Comintern, for different branches of Intelligence, for journalistic fields, and so on.

It was a very important organization which has been preparing the people for work in Soviet administration.

Mr. MORRIS. I read you again this sentence:

I mentioned Chen Han Seng, found that Abramson knew him very well personally, that while they think him still a little nearsighted they consider him the best man in China in his field and a man with a very real future. I referred to the pamphlet he wrote for Banff and was told without a quiver that they not only knew it, but that it had been translated and would appear, with suitable editorial notes pointing out its inadequacies, in the next issue of Problems of China.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sure that if a Communist says this man is the best one, it is to take to granted he is the worst one, from our point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may we submit this to Mr. Carter under the arrangements for stipulation?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted with the same ruling as the other two. The other letters will also be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 762 and 763," and are as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 762

#### INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—Honolulu—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—  
Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

#### OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

MARCH 1, 1937.

DEAR BILL: Thanks for your letters of the 24th and 25th. I checked with Ishii and found him convinced that Fred had concurred in having the book issued under Institute auspices. I checked with Fred and found that Ishii had been in with his page proofs to show Fred last Friday; that Fred thought you had agreed to have the thing issued under American Council auspices and therefore O'Kayed the text of Ishii's note to that effect on the title page. Fred has now written Ishii explaining the mistake and I have cabled P. S. King as you suggested. Ishii was perfectly nice about it, but naturally a little puzzled because of his recent conversation with Fred.

Fred sent you the Spykman outline last week so I assume it has now arrived. With regard to Waldheim, I'm certainly against giving him another assignment, but it seems to me that Alsberg's letter to him of February 13th is practically a definite promise of at least a two-months job on the shipping study. However, maybe I'm reading it in the wrong way.

The other points raised in your letter have, by implication at least, been answered in Carter's telegram to you.

I have sent the Windett manuscript to Macmillan's but have of course heard nothing from them as yet.

Carter and I spent about four hours with Umansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday and got quite a lot of interesting side lights on the Moscow trials—particularly with regard to Romm.

My best to Doreen, and happy voyagings.

(Signed) KATE.

(Penciled in:) P. S.—What did you and R. L. P. agree on with regard to the page proofs of Problems? Chapter III is presumably coming to N. Y. I would also welcome a chance for a final look at Chapter V—Is a cable needed?



STANFORD UNIVERSITY,

March 6, 1937.

DEAR KATE: This is to answer your letter of March 1 and your wire of March 5. I agree with your suggestion of having the index and page proofs of the proceedings done in London. I was about to suggest the same thing and I suppose we should be ready if necessary to pay Oxford up to about \$50 for the indexing (but only if they raise the question of payment, of course!).

I have still have the following manuscript to send (next week) to Oxford: some additional pages to Chap. II; four or five pages on economic adjustments which, with your permission, I should like added as a tail to your Chap. V; four or five pages of Introduction to the whole book; the Preface which I shall send after showing it to Mr. Carter. I shall send all of this to you for forwarding to Oxford, except the material for Chapter II which I shall send direct, sending you a complete carbon copy of the whole chapter.

I'm telling Oxford to set the remainder of Chap. II direct into page proof as I won't have any further changes. I would suggest that you tell them to do the same with the Preface, Introduction, and balance of Chap. V. I will not want to see proofs of my chapter.

It seems to me that you need do no more from now on except look over the final page proof of the whole book.

Yes, certainly, make any changes you want in the China chapter. I've no doubt there is room for further editing in addition to the considerable changes I made. The chapter is still written in a different key from the rest of the book but I don't know that that matters very much and don't see how we can change it to correspond completely with the other chapters.

I'm intrigued by your tantalizingly brief remark about Umansky's comments on Romm. Do tell. Thanks for fixing up the Ishii affair.

Yours,

W. L. H.

---

EXHIBIT No. 763

COMMUNIST ACADEMY

Volkhonka 14

MOSCOW, U. S. S. R.

APRIL 1934.

VARGA.

KHMELNITSKAYA.

VOITINSKY.

ABRAMSON.

The Communist Academy is the citadel of the faith in Soviet Russia. It is charged with the task of training leaders for the next generation, and it is inevitable that these leaders should be trained essentially as political leaders. The theoreticians and the dogmatists are both trained here. It has of course immense political power, can commandeer funds or people more easily than any other research or educational organization, has access to materials and documents elsewhere unavailable.

It has had almost since its inception a section which dealt with China. It has been variously named and organized, according to the political fortunes of its leaders. At present it retains its old name of the China Institute, but is also known as the National and Colonial Sector of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, which is itself a part of the Communist Academy. The set-up within the Academy is not very clear; evidently there are so-called subject cabinets, and an effort is obviously made to keep the stratifications from growing frozen.

Primarily concerned with China, Japan and the Far East at the moment there are about nine men, with a dozen or more secretaries and translators attached to them. In addition to these, however, there are of course many other experts, on silver, on foreign trade movements, on agriculture, etc. It is difficult to find out who is chief, or how responsibility is divided.



Varga is and has been for many years one of the principal theoreticians on foreign affairs in the Soviet Union. Voitinsky is a theoretician only by virtue of the refusal of the Chinese to make him an executive; he has a long and interesting career behind him in China. Khemlnitsky seems to be the lady who keeps things going around the office of the Institute, although she herself is a person of importance. Abramson is a young fellow, who speaks and reads Chinese, speaks English slowly and makes the best impression possible of an able, well-educated young Marxist.

The staff is floating. Men are called from here for more responsible work, and sent back here for periods of further study. Galkovitch, who was Troyanovsky's right hand man in Tokyo and who is now Consul-General in San Francisco, is one of these perapatetic staff members.

Most of the really good and serious stuff which appears on the East in Russia, outside of the more academic research done by specialized institutes, comes either from or through this organization. It started publishing Materials on the Chinese Problem in 1928. Sixteen numbers appeared under this title. It then became Problems of China, thirteen numbers of which have appeared. Back numbers of both of these are very hard to get. Number 11 of the latter has a good cumulative index. A new journal has recently been started, called Colonial Problems, two numbers having appeared. Finally the first number has been issued of a journal called Contemporary Japan which may or may not be continued. The regular periodicals for the Academy, which are numerous, can also be used for articles on the East.

The more important work is published in monograph form. To list these would be to make a good bibliography of Russian materials on China and Japan. Mif's book on Chinese politics, Madyar's two works on Chinese economics and agriculture, Safarov's history of China, Erenburg's Manchurian Problem, Skatchkov's really good bibliography on China (a continuation of which is being worked on at present)—these are some of them. Then there are the more current and popular books, like Terentiev's Danger of War in the Far East or Skladyar's Manchuria. On Japan, Popov is writing a further study, Avarin is completing his work on the economic relations between Japan and Manchuria (first volume already published). Two of the largest projects at present being done are a study of America and China which will be very long and pretty good, and the 33rd volume of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, which will be on China and which has been turned over entirely to this outfit to be written. The place hums with activity, gives every evidence of being extremely efficient and well-informed. They have a library of over 10,000 books on the Far East, possibly the best in the Soviet Union, which is kept apart from the regular Communist Academy library.

They are very much interested in a dozen other projects. One is the latinization of Chinese. Abramson has worked out an alphabet together with a group of Chinese scholars, and it has been slowly passed through a great many official bodies for approval. It is at present being applied in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and other sections of Siberia, but has not yet been officially adopted. In 1933 they had a conference in Vladivostok, which they claim was attended by representative Chinese, and it was decided to postpone a full international conference on the subject until the results of some practical experience with it could be presented. He claims that a great many sinologues outside of Russia are interested in the proposal, but that it will never get across except against the scholars. Alexeief, the greatest sinologue in Russia, a pupil of Elyssiev's before the war, has finally given a grudging approval, but probably for political reasons, and the Academy does not expect any Chinese scholars ever to support the proposal whole-heartedly. One of Alexiev's students, named Drogunov, has worked with Abramson on it. They are convinced that the problem would not even arise were it not for the enormous illiteracy of China. Since there is no vested interest in the ideograph alphabet except among a closed society of professional scholars, they see no reason to stick to it if an improved alphabet of thirty-eight letters could serve as well. They know a lot about the 1,000-character system but reject it as being typical of the middle class assumption that the poor do not really need to know a great deal after all. They have a paper appearing in Khabarovsk in the new script every other day, and have published a small number of short books in it.



They are very cordial towards the Institute and are eager to cooperate, but we shall have to have concrete proposals before we accomplish anything. They get our publications at present, either through exchange or by direct purchase, and think fairly well of them. Abramson sat down one afternoon and discussed China with me for two or three hours. He referred himself to Buck, Remer, Clark, Fong, Orchard, and a half-dozen other books, knew of our relation to them, and made extremely good criticisms of each of them. Naturally, they are intolerant of much of what we do, but they find other parts of it useful. Remer has been translated in part for office use, and they are at present considering translating the whole book for publication. The last number of their magazine contains a scathing review of Sokolsky's *Tinder Box of Asia*. I mentioned Chen Han Seng, found that Abramson knew him very well personally, that while they think him still a little nearsighted they consider him the best man in China in his field and a man with a very real future. I referred to the pamphlet he wrote for Banff and was told without a quiver that they not only knew it, but that it had been translated and would appear, with suitable editorial notes pointing out its inadequacies, in the next issue of *Problems of China*.

They speak with more reserve, but with evident willingness to explore the matter, of articles for *Pacific Affairs*. If we will give them concrete proposals, length, title, etc., will do their best, and if they can get something they are not ashamed of themselves, they will be glad to let us have it. Book reviews are a little more difficult, and they made the suggestion that we send books to them for review in one of their magazines, printing our own translation of the review at the same time, since the magazines are not likely to compete in any public in the world. One of the principal difficulties here is an old one in the Soviet Union, too few qualified people and too much work. Everyone there is quite obviously overfreighted with work, and they are naturally reluctant to take on new commitments. I think that if possible we should give them a very definite list of articles we want, and then send them, fairly early in the spring, a half dozen good books for review. If we could once get some of their material in *Pacific Affairs*, and a check in payment in their hands, we would find further development relatively easy.

MR. MORRIS. Did you know that the Soviet organization used the Institute of Pacific Relations to collect information not only in the United States but on other countries, such as Japan and China?

MR. BOGOLEPOV. It was my impression that, at that time—I mean before the war—when I was in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Intelligence was more interested not in the United States of America, but in Japan and other countries which were in direct conflict with the Soviet Union.

It was also my impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations was merely used by Soviet Intelligence in order to get, via America, the information on Japan and China and Great Britain.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Ferguson asked, I believe yesterday, for writings of Mr. Lattimore on Mongolia. Mr. Mandel has compiled quite a few of these, and I would like them to go into the record at this time.

MR. MANDEL. We have received from the Library of Congress a list of the writings of Owen Lattimore. It shows that prior to his visit to Moscow in November 1930, he wrote *Political Conditions in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan*, for the *Annals of the American Academy*, and that further he wrote *Mongol Journeys*, published in 1941; *Mongols of Manchuria*, written in 1934; and, also, in his book *Solution in Asia*, published in 1945, there are a good many passages on Mongolia. I offer three samples for the record.

THE CHAIRMAN. Is that in response to Senator Ferguson's request?

MR. MORRIS. That is right. May they go into the record?

THE CHAIRMAN. They will go into the record.



(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 764" and are as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 764

## THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

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[SEAL]

## WRITINGS OF OWEN LATTIMORE

## SELECT LIST

*Books*

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- The situation in Asia. Boston. Little, Brown and Co. 1949. 244 p. DS518.1.L315 1949.
- Solution in Asia. Boston. Little, Brown and Co. 1945. 214 p. DS518.8.L3.
- Solution in Asia. London. The Cresset Press. 1945. 143 p. DS518.8.L3 1945 B.
- Solutions in Asia. Washington. The Infantry Journal. 1945. 138 p. DS518.8.L3 1945 A.

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 What kind of peace for Japan? *New Republic*. June 11, 1951. pp. 13-14.  
 When Japan has a treaty. *Nation*. August 4, 1951. pp. 88-89.  
 Asia reconquers Asia. *United Nations World*. March 1950. pp. 21-24.  
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(Source: Readers Guide to Periodical Literature.)

STEPHEN A. LANGONE,  
*History and General Research Section,*  
*December 4, 1951.*



## THREE SAMPLES OF WRITINGS ON MONGOLIA BY OWEN LATTIMORE

"In Asia the most important example of the Soviet power of attraction beyond Soviet frontiers is in Outer Mongolia. It is here that we should look for evidence of the kind of attraction that Russia might offer to Korea in the future. Outer Mongolia may be called a satellite of Russia in the good sense. That is to say, the Mongols have gravitated into the Russian orbit of their own accord (and partly out of fear of Japan and China); they have neither been subjected to a military conquest nor sold to the Russians by traitors among their own people. They have gone through their own revolution. They have taken away the titles, revenues, and powers of the hereditary princes and aristocrats; but the sons and daughters of these aristocrats are full citizens with full equality of opportunity, including government service."

(Source: *Solution in Asia*, Owen Lattimore, pp. 141-142. 1945.)

"Soviet policy in Outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It certainly establishes a standard with which other nations must compete if they wish to practise a policy of attraction in Asia. Russo-Mongol relations in Asia, like Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe, deserve careful and respectful study."

(Source: *Solution in Asia*, Owen Lattimore, p. 144. 1945.)

"It was not until after the Soviet Union had been formed in 1924 that Bukhara and Khorezm voted to become socialist and applied to join the Soviet Union. Their application was accepted in 1924 and ratified in 1925, and they became the Republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia.

"They were influenced in their decision by the Soviet power of attraction for the majority of the people."

(Source: *Solution in Asia*, Owen Lattimore, p. 136. 1945.)

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,  
WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
Baltimore, Md., April 29, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,  
*Internal Security Subcommittee,*  
*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORRIS: Herewith I am returning the list of my writings which you asked me to verify. I note that this list was compiled by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, using as source *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. As such, the list appears to be fairly representative. It should be noted however that the entry on page 4, "A. E. F. Gets a Chief," from *Time*, July 7, 1941, refers not to something that I wrote but to a news story about me.

Yours sincerely,

Owen Lattimore,  
OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: c

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you will instruct the witness to work with the staff under the arrangement we mentioned a while ago, I think we can adjourn for the day.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

You will hold yourself available, please, to work with the staff of this committee.

When we recess we will recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Some Senator will share the hearing because the chairman will probably not be here.

We will stand in recess until the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 3:55 p. m., Tuesday, April 8, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)





# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF  
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senators Ferguson and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator FERGUSON. The meeting will come to order.

Doctor, will you raise your right hand? You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. YERGAN. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF MAX YERGAN, OSSINING, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

Mr. YERGAN. Max Yergan, Pines Bridge Road, Ossining, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What does that "doctor" stand for?

Mr. YERGAN. Doctor of humanities; also an honorary LL.D.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you obtain that?

Mr. YERGAN. Lincoln University.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Doctor Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. I am self-employed at present as a student of racial and colonial questions.

Mr. MORRIS. How recently have you been abroad?

Mr. YERGAN. Last year. About 8 or 9 months ago I went off to East Africa and to India.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what auspices?

Mr. YERGAN. I went to India under the auspices of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. I went to East Africa under the invitation of some Government officials and African educational leaders. I went to Europe after my return to America from Asia. I went back to Europe during the sessions of the UN for purposes of conferring with Africans and with Government representatives there who carry an administrative responsibility in Africa.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor Yergan, where were you born?

Mr. YERGAN. Raleigh, N. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been an executive of the Young Men's Christian Association?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. From 1916 to 1936, I was an executive of the Young Men's Christian Association.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold in that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. I was secretary for the student interracial division here in America for the first year. In 1916 I was sent out to India as an educational secretary to work among Indian troops. In 1917 I was sent to east Africa to carry on educational work among Indian and Indian and other troops. Then, in 1920 I was sent out to South Africa as the national executive secretary in charge of the work of the YMCA for southern Africa, including the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your highest position in that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. I was what was called the senior secretary of the international committee of the Young Men's Christian Association.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you associated at any time with the National Negro Congress?

Mr. YERGAN. I was. I was back in America on furlough the year the National Negro Congress was organized, which I think was 1936, and I was at its opening meeting in Chicago. I was elected president of the National Negro Congress, I think, in 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, was the National Negro Congress a Communist-controlled organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you knew that at the time, did you not?

Mr. YERGAN. Not at the very beginning.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the circumstances leading up to your becoming involved with the National Negro Congress?

Mr. YERGAN. As I said a moment ago, I went out to the meeting where the congress was organized—I think it was 1936—in Chicago, along with several hundred other Negroes who were interested in all of the questions affecting Negroes here in America. There were Communists present at that meeting, but I paid no particular attention. I did not know them too well.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were these particular Communists that you mentioned at this time?

Mr. YERGAN. James W. Ford was there. Earl Browder was there. I remember there was quite a furor due to the fact that there was a strong feeling in the city of Chicago against Browder speaking and, as I remember, he did not speak.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come back from Africa, Doctor?

Mr. YERGAN. In 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. 1937?

Mr. YERGAN. 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time did you become acquainted with any Communists?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what the Communists did when you came back, you having been a worker among the colored people and for their betterment and welfare? Just what did the Communists do?

Mr. YERGAN. I came back from Africa in 1937. I left the work of the YMCA because I felt that a new committee at that time was needed



which could deal much more directly with the issues then developing in Africa. They were political and economic. I thought that the American public needed to be informed in a way which I could not do too well under the YMCA. Now, the Communists made a strong plea for me when I came back. I knew James W. Ford. I had known him as a student. I think he must have been one of the Communist leaders who was told to make a strong plea for me. I was invited to speak at meetings which ostensibly had the interests of Africa as their purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you later find that this interest was not genuine; that they had Communists rather than the people of Africa in mind?

Mr. YERGAN. Without hesitancy, my experience in these organizations led me as early as 1947 to the conviction that the Communists as such are not interested really in improving the conditions of Negroes or any other minority. They are certainly, I discovered, not interested in improving the conditions of hitherto underprivileged colonial peoples. They are interested in exploiting their conditions. They are interested in exploiting their grievances. They are interested in stirring up strife and in really preventing the solution of the problems along democratic lines.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you find that they wear the cloak of humanity but, in fact, they are not for it at all; they have their own selfish and political interests in mind.

Mr. YERGAN. That is my conviction, sir. Anyone who looks to Communists for moral leadership or for wise political guidance looks in vain.

Senator FERGUSON. When you came back from Africa, will you tell us some of the people that won your friendship and came to you?

Mr. YERGAN. I mentioned James W. Ford.

Senator WATKINS. At that time what position did he occupy that would identify him as a Communist?

Mr. YERGAN. I think even at that time he was sort of a perennial candidate for some office in the Communist Party. He was a member of the national committee, I think, at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom else did you meet and did they have meet you?

Mr. YERGAN. Benjamin J. Davis, I knew. I knew him when he was a student. That was before I went out to South Africa. They had me meet Earl Browder.

Senator FERGUSON. What about William Z. Foster?

Mr. YERGAN. I met him later.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Dennis, the secretary of the Communist Party?

Mr. YERGAN. I met him later, not during the early years.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet Gates, who was editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. YERGAN. I met him at a later date, also.

Senator FERGUSON. But they did have these Communists meet you and in effect take you under their wing?

Mr. YERGAN. They made it possible for me to meet them. I think an accurate description is that I was cultivated. I was sought after. I say that with a degree of modesty. I made some record as one really interested in working out some sort of solution of what we spoke

of then as the racial problem here in this country. I was certainly tremendously interested in the colonial question, as I had studied it and observed it in Africa at that time. I had been given certain awards which Negroes who accomplish things receive, and so they made a plea for me. They made a beeline for me and sought to capitalize my interest in these questions.

Senator FERGUSON. And in effect did they really take you over?

Mr. YERGAN. Not in the sense that I was made a member of the Communist Party, but I suppose I was the victim of their flattery to some extent. I was identified with many of their organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they get to use your name in their organizations?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, yes; my name was placed on a number of their organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. May I just break in there? You were actively associated with Communists during that period, were you not, Doctor?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not as if you did not know the nature of the organization in which you were operating. I mean, you knew the general nature of it?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, yes; I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, you were acquainted enough with the Communist organization that you had access to their headquarters?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have been on more than one occasion at Communist Party headquarters?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been in the office of the Daily Worker?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you met all the Communist officials that Senator Ferguson has mentioned here today?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, did they not in some cases take you more into their confidence than they did some actual party members?

Mr. YERGAN. I think that is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, how long did this period exist? You say it roughly commenced in 1936. By 1940 you had become president of the National Negro Congress, and how long did this confidential relationship exist?

Mr. YERGAN. It continued up to 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened in 1947?

Mr. YERGAN. In 1947 I began to see clearly the nature of the Communist apparatus in the organizations to which I belonged. For instance, in the National Negro Congress I saw how constantly they shifted from one issue to another, which revealed to me the lack of any fundamental interest in improving the conditions of Negroes. I saw, secondly, the absence of ordinary democratic methods. Decisions were taken by a board on which there were Communists and non-Communists. The executive staff very often failed to carry out those decisions and when inquiry was made I was told that the decisions were not carried out because Communist headquarters had advised to the contrary.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Communists were running the thing and they put things down on paper as the object of the



organization, but paid no attention and did only what they wanted to do?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And did they make decisions and bring them in already made and just force them through?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. That is an example of the absence of democratic procedure. Instead of having questions thoroughly discussed, an already decided matter was brought in and instructions given to the executive staff to carry out those instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you now believe those to be Communist decisions?

Mr. YERGAN. I believe them to be decisions, yes, in which the Communists had the major voice and which were a reflection of their interest and of their line at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned that you were associated with several organizations at this time that were controlled by the Communists. I wonder if you would list three or four of the more notable ones at this time, and I want you to include the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy because, as you know, this committee is concerned primarily with the Communists in the far-eastern field.

Mr. YERGAN. I will begin with that. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy in the Far East——

Mr. MORRIS. When was that formed, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. When was your first hearing of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know whether you ever said whether or not you ever met Frederick V. Field.

Mr. YERGAN. I am just about to say that now, sir. Frederick Field asked me to attend a meeting at his house.

Mr. MORRIS. At this time you knew Frederick Field quite well, did you not?

Mr. YERGAN. I knew him well. Our offices were in the same building and I saw him frequently.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, when you purchased some property a deed on record shows that Mr. and Mrs. Field and you were the owners.

Mr. YERGAN. That is right. I represented the Council on African Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. You in your representative capacity and they in their individual capacities were the owners of the building.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, at 23 West Twenty-sixth Street.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that known as today?

Mr. YERGAN. It is known as the home of subversive organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean the general formal name for it.

Mr. YERGAN. 23 West Twenty-sixth Street?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Does that building bear a name?

Mr. YERGAN. It doesn't come to me right off.

Mr. MORRIS. You were talking about this organization, Doctor.

Mr. YERGAN. Field came to me and said that he was under instructions, by way of making clear to me the importance of the project in hand, from Dennis——

Mr. MORRIS. That is Eugene Dennis?

Mr. YERGAN. Eugene Dennis.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he then the head of the Communist Party?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what his office was in the Communist Party?

Mr. YERGAN. Eugene Dennis?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. YERGAN. At that time he was the general secretary of the Communist Party. Field was under instruction to set up a committee and it was very important and urgent, and he asked would I meet with a group of individuals at his home. I said "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. This meeting is going to be in furtherance of the directive Eugene Dennis gave to Frederick Field to form an organization?

Mr. YERGAN. That is a very clear inference to which I subscribe.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what Field told you, that Dennis instructed him to form this organization?

Mr. YERGAN. He did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was calling this meeting to form the organization?

Mr. YERGAN. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. This, then, is the first meeting of that organization to be formed and the meeting is being held in the home of Frederick V. Field?

Mr. YERGAN. This is the organizational meeting, I suppose you would describe it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is more than an inference, then, is it not, Doctor? You knew as a matter of fact before the organizational meeting that it was being called by Mr. Field pursuant to the directive given him by Mr. Dennis?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us who were present at that meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. As far as I can remember, there was Field; a man named Epstein.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that Israel Epstein?

Mr. YERGAN. Israel Epstein and his wife.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she known as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. And then Mr. Stewart Maxwell.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. YERGAN. Maxwell Stewart. There were two meetings. At one of them was the wife of Mr. Snow, Mrs. Edgar Snow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she also known as Nym Wales?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. A Miss or Mrs. Pruitt.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Ida Pruitt?

Mr. YERGAN. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Rose Terlin present?

Mr. YERGAN. Rose Terlin.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Talitha Gerlach present?

Mr. YERGAN. And Miss Gerlach.

Mr. MORRIS. I am now reading, Mr. Chairman, from the names given by the witness in executive session this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You were sworn in executive session and that testimony you gave in executive session was true?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So Mr. Morris is taking the names from that testimony.



Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, was Mrs. Maxwell S. Stewart present at that first meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. She was present at one of those meetings, I know.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, there was a subsequent meeting of the same group and it is your testimony that Mrs. Maxwell Stewart, who is Marguerite Stewart, was present at the first or second meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the relevancy of the testimony today about these people that have attended this meeting is that they have turned up time and again as people involved in the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mrs. Maxwell Stewart at this period of time was the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I mention that, Mr. Chairman, having in front of me the Windows on the Pacific, the biennial report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944-46.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not Field also connected with the Institute?

Mr. MORRIS. Frederick V. Field had been secretary of the organization up until 1940 and was a member of the board of trustees until 1947, but there is other evidence in the record to show that his interest continued beyond that. Marguerite S. Stewart is listed as secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in this 1944-46 report. Israel Epstein was the editor of a publication put out under the auspices of the international secretariat of the IPR in 1949; Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a member of the secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and there has been some association with some of the other people.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear mentioned the Institute of Pacific Relations from any of these people?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, there was reference made at one of these two meetings to organizations that were interested in these same issues that this proposed committee was interested in, and the Institute was among those organization referred to.

Senator FERGUSON. The Institute was mentioned as one of the organizations that was interested in the same cause; is that right?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, I would say that is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, these organizations had the same outlook and the same approach to the questions being discussed by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, the same interests and the same outlook. I am not quite sure about the same approach, but the same interests, the same outlook, the same sphere of interest. Reference was made, for instance, to some of the Institute's literature and there was interest expressed in that literature.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this group approved the literature that had been put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. YERGAN. There was no formal action of approving but there was interest in it.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was discussed?

Mr. YERGAN. It was discussed, that is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the prevailing officer at this meeting, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. Field was the prevailing officer, Frederick Field.

Mr. MORRIS. In the discussions that took place at that time, was there general agreement on the part of all those people participating in the meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. I don't recall any conflict of views on any matters of policy. There was a discussion with regard to the place for headquarters, and there was a discussion also about the name, I recall, but on questions of policy I don't recall any conflicting views expressed. Proposals were brought in by Field, and they were usually adhered to and acted upon favorably.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was Field's policy?

Mr. YERGAN. I would say that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And Field had told you that Dennis had ordered him to organize this for a specific purpose; is that so?

Mr. YERGAN. He didn't go into the purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. But he said Dennis had ordered him to organize?

Mr. YERGAN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they tell you what the purpose was of this organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Well, the purpose was discussed both formally and informally at these two meetings, that being to discredit Chiang Kai-shek, to use all of the influence possible to turn material to the forces in China that were opposing Chiang Kai-shek. That was the general point of emphasis with regard to the purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any word about trying to influence public opinion here on the question of being against Chiang Kai-shek and also in favor of the forces against him?

Mr. YERGAN. There was a fairly general discussion of releases to be sent out, of publications to be issued by the organization, and of meetings to be held.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that to influence American public opinion?

Mr. YERGAN. I would say so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, where they were going to circulate this literature was at the time in the United States?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, primarily in the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Were the Negro people to be used also in this?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. I recall a lady who was identified in an executive capacity, Miss Russell.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Miss Maud Russell?

Mr. YERGAN. Miss Maud Russell; and the Reverend Stephen Fritchman.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he come from?

Mr. YERGAN. He was a Unitarian minister from Boston I think. They came once to me requesting that I give them the names of some leading Negroes whom they wished to have as sponsors both for the organization and for a proposed meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think or do you know that the Communists have used the Negro people in this country to sponsor Communist activities and Communist propaganda?

Mr. YERGAN. I both think it and know it.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us how you know it.



Mr. YERGAN. I know it because of a request made upon me to suggest Negroes who might be brought into various organizations. I think I am an example also of the use that is made. As I said at the beginning, I have reached the considered opinion that this is primarily a use made of people who are carrying on an effort to improve their conditions. I have no confidence in the sincerity or the good faith of the Communist Party or of Communists so far as Negroes and their efforts are concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it does not make any difference; whether it is a white man or a colored man, or whoever it might be, they will use him if they can to further their objectives?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct. I believe that. Negroes in this country are interested in achieving the largest possible measure of democracy for themselves and for the country. The Communists are not interested in achieving that.

Senator FERGUSON. But they claim to get your help, do they not?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, they claim it, but my experience leads me to the conviction that that is a false claim.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a few questions, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Yergan, you spoke a few moments ago about certain objectives of the organization, and you named them. How did you know those were the objectives of the organization? Did Mr. Field say so, or did Mr. Dennis say so, or who said so?

Mr. YERGAN. That statement which indicates what I believe to be the objectives was made at the meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. By whom?

Mr. YERGAN. By individuals who were present. There was general agreement on those statements.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who?

Mr. YERGAN. Field made the statement, and I don't recall any opposition expressed to that statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Field made the statement and that was it?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. Other people amplified it in support.

Mr. SOURWINE. And those objectives were carried out by the actual operations of the organization; is that right?

Mr. YERGAN. I take it that they were. Certainly in the literature that I saw—I only attended those two meetings—afterward indicated that those objectives were being acted upon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you helped to form that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, I was present. I would say that by my presence I must have contributed in one way or another to it. I think that follows.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only way you contributed to it, Dr. Yergan, by your presence?

Mr. YERGAN. I think the fact that I was asked to come indicates that they felt that I would not be in opposition to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. A little more than just being asked to come and the fact that you did go. As a matter of fact, did you not at that time and in that framework actively assist in the formation of that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. I have said that, sir; by my presence there I think that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean by more than your presence there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in the conversation?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, based on your experience with Communists and Communist organizations, and your experience during that meeting and the subsequent meeting that you make reference to, do you have any doubt whatever that that was a Communist organization coming into being at that time?

Mr. YERGAN. No, I don't have any doubt.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you attended a second meeting of this organization, Dr. Yergan.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, I have been talking here about the two meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand that, but I want to make it clear that there were two separate meetings.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anybody at the second meeting who was not at the first meeting whose name you have not mentioned here today? Your estimate of the number of people present at each meeting is what, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, 12 or 15.

Mr. MORRIS. You have not given us that many names.

Mr. YERGAN. No, I don't remember them all.

Mr. MORRIS. You have seen a list of names. We have submitted to you in the executive session a list of names of people connected with the institute and that did not refresh your recollection, did it, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. If I could see that list it might.

(Witness is shown list referred to.)

Mr. YERGAN. Epstein, I have mentioned. Gerlach, I have mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Maud Russell present at either one of those meetings?

Mr. YERGAN. I think so. I am fairly certain that she was. Maxwell Stewart I have mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Gunther Stein present at either one of those meetings?

Mr. YERGAN. I don't remember him.

Mr. MORRIS. Kumar Goshal?

Mr. YERGAN. I knew him, but I don't recall that he was present at one of those meetings. He may have been, but I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, have you told us as much as you can about the policy that was set down as the policy of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy at that time? You said it was to undermine Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How was that to be done?

Mr. YERGAN. To discredit him.

Mr. MORRIS. How was it to be done?

Mr. YERGAN. Through literature, through public meetings, to represent Chiang Kai-shek as the symbol of feudalism and of corruption in government, and to represent the forces that were opposed to him as the forces that stood for democracy.



Mr. MORRIS. Was also an active campaign to be waged that would encourage nonintervention on the part of America and Americans in China?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there also a policy to build up the Chinese policy, that is, to build up the Chinese Communists as people who were free and people of good works?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That was established in both of these meetings as a policy of that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you exhibit No. 174, which has been introduced into our public record. This is from the Daily Worker of Friday, August 17, 1945. It is entitled "Americans in Plea to Truman on China." It reads:

Twenty-one prominent Americans urged President Truman to avert the serious danger of a civil war in China. They demanded immediate steps to prevent American planes and other military equipment from being turned over to the Chungking Government.

Pointing out that Chiang Kai-shek has made a direct appeal to the Japanese troops "to retain their arms and equipment for the maintenance of public order," the telegram to Truman stated that "the only American policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender of Japanese troops to patriotic Chinese groups on the spot."

The message to President Truman noted that the Communist-led Eighth Route and new Fourth Armies which Chiang Kai-shek is preparing to attack "have borne the brunt of the allied fight in north central China."

Among the signers we have Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mrs. Edward C. Carter, Israel Epstein, Mr. Frederick V. Field, and then I believe at the very end is Dr. Max Yergan, Director of Council on African Affairs. Do you recall that particular episode.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. I received a telephone call from Frederick Field asking if my name could be used in connection with that letter and I said "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether that was before or after these two meetings about which you have been testifying?

Mr. YERGAN. It could have been before, but my impression is that it was along about the same time.

Mr. MORRIS. I will mention some of the other names here: Martin Popper, Ilona Ralf Sues, Mrs. Edgar Snow, Richard Watts, and I ask you in general if that is not the same group of people who participated in the two meetings and the organization that was subsequently formed?

Mr. YERGAN. Substantially. I see here the names of many people who were present at those two meetings; not all of them, certainly not.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe that as an incident that was representative of the campaign that was being carried on by this organization?

Mr. YERGAN. You mean——

Mr. MORRIS. This particular incident that took place.

Mr. YERGAN. You mean this letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, I think so. That's typical of the campaign that was being carried on.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave them consent and they used your name?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about the truth of the statements in that letter that was signed at that time, Dr. Yergan? From your experience now, your general over-all experience, will you comment on the truth of the letter that was sent to President Truman at that time?

Mr. YERGAN. I think there was a certain amount of truth. I think there was room for improvement certainly in the administration of Chiang Kai-shek, just as there is room everywhere, but underneath all of this—and I think this is the real issue—the purpose was, as I think back upon it now, to promote the Communist forces, to strengthen the Communist forces, and to discredit the forces in China that were opposed to the Communist forces.

Mr. MORRIS. And they wanted to use the names of all those people, sending a letter to President Truman so that that fact, the facts set forth in that letter, would be brought to the attention of as many people as possible and therefore to influence public opinion?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, do you know whether they obtained any other names through your name on that letter?

Mr. YERGAN. Perhaps modesty would lead me to say perhaps not, but being perfectly frank, I was a man with some influence and I think people noticing my name on this letter would pay attention to it.

Senator FERGUSON. And the President would probably be influenced by the fact that you had represented the colored people, and he would be moved by the fact that you were on there; do you not think that is true?

Mr. YERGAN. Well, I'd put it just slightly different. I think the fact that they sought to involve me indicates that they wanted to use me and to use such influence and such status as I have achieved.

Mr. MORRIS. It mentions here that you were the Director of the Council on African Affairs.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I assume that is one of the organizations that you are going to tell us about today. Will you tell us the general nature of that organization that you are here listed as director of? You were the leading director, were you not?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. There is one organization that constitutes a slight exception. I founded it and when I founded it I was under no influence of the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. That was what year?

Mr. YERGAN. That was in 1937. The only individual that I now recall who was definitely associated with a Communist outfit who was on the committee is Paul Robeson, as I recall. However, Communists were brought into the organization. They were proposed by Robeson. I think I must have proposed some. Certainly I didn't object to those who were brought in, so that I take some responsibility for their presence. This organization had one or two main purposes: One, to inform American opinion about the changes that were taking place in a more or less unknown great colonial area of the world. During the war we sought to involve Africans as fighters on the allied side through correspondence with governments in Europe and the South African governments. We didn't succeed too much in that.



We were interested also in developing a helpful interest, not only from a humanitarian point of view, but in terms of developing the democratic idea and winning Africans who would be coming into positions of leadership to the side of the democratic cause. Now, the Communists saw that and they saw that here was an organization that appealed to Negroes and to non-Negroes in this country, because Africa was then becoming of great interest. By 1945, by the end of the war, the Communists' strength in the organization was considerable. They didn't have a majority of the people, but it was considerable. Robeson was chairman and I was executive head. By the end of the war, actually in 1946, in the organizations to which I belonged, the National Negro Congress, the Civil Rights Congress, I began to see clearly the issues on which and the procedure on which I could not agree with the Communists.

In the Council of African Affairs, particularly, there was a real effort on the part of the chairman and other leaders, the educational director, to use every occasion to criticize American and allied policy with regard to Africa and to promote Russian policy with regard to Africa and the colonies in general. That became so clear and so pointed that it was the basis for the opposition or the conflict that developed in the council between the Communist-led forces and the forces which I led, which were the non-Communist forces in the council.

Mr. MORRIS. The net result of the whole thing was that you were put out of your own organization?

Mr. YERGAN. I was put out of the organization even though I had a majority of votes on my side.

Mr. MORRIS. How was that effected?

Mr. YERGAN. Because the chairman refused to act in accordance with ordinary parliamentary rules.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, they would not count them?

Mr. YERGAN. They would not count them. I had the actual votes and the proxies, but they wouldn't count them and so the usual methods were resorted to until it became perfectly clear to me that I'd use the rest of my life in court or otherwise fighting them, so we lost to the Communists. We lost property. We lost one of the best libraries on Africa in this country, and other things.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying, Dr. Yergan, in effect, that as long as you cooperated with the Communist purposes in the organization it rocked along, but when you refused to do that they forced you out? Is that the fact?

Mr. YERGAN. That is one interpretation, but that is not exactly what I was saying. That is one interpretation, to be sure. I raised the issues. I said this organization was founded and exists to aid Africa, not to promote Russian foreign policy and not to attack everything in America.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long after you raised these issues were you forced out?

Mr. YERGAN. These issues were raised early in 1947. I was forced out early in 1948.

Mr. SOURWINE. And how long prior to the time you raised these issues had the organization existed without friction?

Mr. YERGAN. It had existed from its beginning without too much friction.

Mr. SOURWINE. About 10 years; is that not so?

Mr. YERGAN. From 1937 to 1946, nearly 10 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, are you acquainted with the China Aid Council?

Mr. YERGAN. There's so many of these committees on China.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a letterhead of that organization which has been introduced into the record, our exhibit No. 348. I show this to you.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a member of that?

Mr. YERGAN. I was a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy and the China Aid Council, as I recall, was a sub-division of that over-all organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, how did they ever get you into so many of these Chinese things when you had a task of your own?

Mr. YERGAN. Well, I can think of two reasons: One, because at that time China was considered as a colonial problem, and, secondly, because the Communists thought to capitalize on the fact of color. They sought to lump nonwhites together and indicate that there was a common bond, or should be a common bond amongst peoples who had color in common. The assumption there was perhaps that whites do not have any color.

Senator FERGUSON. They made that cause, though, appeal to you as wanting to help your people?

Mr. YERGAN. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. That if you helped the Chinese cause you would be helping your own; is that correct?

Mr. YERGAN. That's an inference; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So they got your name.

Mr. YERGAN. And the other reason is my name stood for something.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and they were using it wherever they could; is that true?

Mr. YERGAN. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are being completely frank here, Dr. Yergan, I know, and I think your answer to Senator Ferguson's question indicates that. As a matter of fact you are not contending that throughout this you were—

Mr. YERGAN. An innocent victim.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not your contention at all?

Mr. YERGAN. No, not at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, your motives throughout were not entirely for the sole purpose of elevating the condition of the Negro race, were they?

Mr. YERGAN. My motives primarily had a racial basis, and a racial basis in the sense of American Negroes and in the sense of Africa. My primary concern and my primary interests were in the racial question here and in the colonial question in general, but primarily in Africa, and I think it's because they knew of my interest in the colonial question that I was brought into these organizations that dealt with China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps I phrased my question badly. The fact I am attempting to reach is whether throughout this period of 10 or a dozen years of association, whatever it was, where your name was used by Communist causes for the furtherance of Communist ob-



jectives you were during all of that time misled as to the objectives of the organization, or whether you were at the time and for a period an active cooperator and collaborator.

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct. I was not misled in that I didn't know what I was doing.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not entirely innocent?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought at times it would help your cause?

Mr. YERGAN. Frankly, I was conscientious about it. I was naive, as I look back on it now. I wasn't a Marxist. I've known more about Marxism since I've been fighting the Communists than I knew during the time I was considered a cooperator.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back, then, to the China Aid Council? Is there any doubt in your mind either now or then that the China Aid Council was a Communist organization?

Mr. YERGAN. No; there is no doubt in my mind now.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. YERGAN. I know that name.

Mr. MORRIS. I believe that you are associated with that organization at one time; were you not?

Mr. YERGAN. I think so. As I remember, that's one of the organizations with regard to which I was called and I agreed—

Mr. MORRIS. You were a member of the national advisory board in 1939, according to a listing of that organization.

Mr. YERGAN. That I must stand by.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you well enough acquainted with the organization to tell us that that in fact was a Communist organization?

Mr. YERGAN. If I could get the names.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this time, while Mr. Mandel is getting that I might say that during the course of these hearings it has been observed that personnel associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations were associated with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, the organization about which we have been taking testimony here today. Mr. Mandel, director of research, has prepared a list of people who were connected with both organizations, and I would like to offer this to the Chair now and after certain comments and certain limitations are pointed out I would like to ask if the chairman would receive this into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask Mr. Mandel, research director, whether or not he did prepare this list and whether he now says it is accurate.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a list of the interlocking between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy showing the names of the individuals, the connection with each organization, and the source of the information. In all there are 44 such names.

Mr. MORRIS. When there is listed, for instance, after the name of Charles Bidien the word "consultant," how do you know in fact that Charles Bidien was a consultant for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. MANDEL. That is taken from a letterhead dated May 21, 1948, in our possession.

Mr. MORRIS. You have not, however, have you, Mr. Mandel, checked with each individual to find out whether they were in fact a consultant?

Mr. MANDEL. No; it is impossible.

Senator FERGUSON. It merely shows that you did have the letterhead and that is what it indicated here?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. We have the source of reference.

Mr. MORRIS. The inadequacy of this report is, although it does serve a purpose, that it is conceivable that someone may have been listed in one of those organizations and never actually have been affiliated with it. That is one limitation of this list, but still I think it is a source of explanation.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it with that explanation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1334" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1334

Interlocking between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy

Name	Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy		Institute of Pacific Relations	
	Connection	Information source	Connection	Information source
Bidien, Charles.....	Consultant..	Letterhead, May 21, 1948.	Writer.....	Far Eastern Survey.
Bisson, T. A.....	-----do-----	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Member....	International Secretariat Bien Report 1944-46.
Bodde, Derk.....	Writer.....	Spotlight, Apr. 5, 1950.	Collabora- tor.	IPR book Chinese Ideas in the West, 1948 Far Eastern Survey, Nov. 16, 1949.
Brooke, Raymond D., pseudonym for Chen, Hanseng.	-----do-----	Spotlight, June 1949.	Writer.....	Pacific Affairs, June 1937.
Carlson, Evans F.....	Chairman...	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Member....	International Secretariat 1949.
Chapman, Abraham.....	Director....	Letterhead, Apr. 18, 1951.	Writer.....	Far Eastern Survey, 1941.
Cholmeley, Elsie Fairfax...	Editor.....	Spotlight, October 1949.	-----do-----	Pacific Affairs, June 1946.
Deane, Hugh.....	Consultant..	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Member....	International Secretariat 1935-41.
Epstein, Israel.....	-----do-----	-----do-----	-----do-----	Letter, Oct. 10, 1940.
Field, Frederick V.....	-----do-----	-----do-----	Writer.....	IPR book Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, 1948.
Forman, Harrison.....	Director....	-----do-----	Secretary...	American Council IPR, 1936-40.
Friedman, Julian.....	Consultant..	-----do-----	Author.....	Book promoted, IPR bulletin Mar.9, 1945.
Gayn, Mark.....	Writer.....	Spotlight, April 1947.	Member....	Ninth IPR conference 1945.
Gerlach, Talitha.....	Book pro- moted.	Spotlight, October 1950.	Author.....	Book promoted, Pacific Affairs, April 1944.
Goodrich, L. Carrington...	Member exe- cutive com- mittee.	-----do-----	Supporter...	Letters, Feb. 4 and 6, 1943.
Goshal, Kumar.....	Sponsor....	Dinner folder Apr. 3, 1946.	Trustee....	American Council 1946, 1951 (annual reports 1946, 1951).
Hersey, John.....	Consultant..	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Coauthor...	IPR pamphlet Twentieth Century China, 1944.
Jaffe, Philip.....	Reference...	Circular, 1946, quoting New Yorker, May 5, 1946.	Trustee....	American Council 1946, 1947, 1951, annual reports.
Keeney, Philip O.....	Consultant..	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Member....	Seventh IPR Conference 1939.
	Writer.....	Spotlight, July 1948, February 1950.	Speaker, writer.	Dec. 11, 1947. Far Eastern Survey Jan. 28, 1948.



*Interlocking between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy—Continued*

Name	Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy		Institute of Pacific Relations	
	Connection	Information source	Connection	Information source
Lang, Olga-----	Recom- mended reading.	Spotlight, January 1947 p. 7.	Writer-----	Pacific Affairs 1940, p. 110.
Lattimore, Eleanore Frances.	do-----	do-----	IPR staff--	May 1944-June 1947, W. L. Holland list.
Lindsay, Michael-----	Consultant--	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Writer-----	Far Eastern Survey April 1945; Septem- ber 1947.
Mandel, William-----	Writer-----	Spotlight, Apr. 5, 1950--	do-----	IPR book Soviet Far East and Central Asia, 1943.
McWilliams, Carey-----	Sponsor-----	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	do-----	IPR pamphlet: What About Our Japanese Americans? 1944.
Menefee, Selden-----	do-----	do-----	Member-----	Washington, D. C., 1946.
Melish, William H-----	do-----	do-----	Writer-----	Far Eastern Survey July 14, 1943.
Mitchell, Kate L-----	Consultant--	do-----	Staff writer, editor.	Pacific Council and International Secre- tariat, 1934-41 Far Eastern Survey 1936, 1937, 1945.
Rosinger, Lawrence-----	Recom- mended reading.	Spotlight, January 1947, p. 7.	-----	-----
Salisbury, L. E-----	Consultant--	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Editor-----	Far Eastern Survey 1944-45.
Seeman, Bernard-----	do-----	do-----	Writer-----	IPR pamphlet: Cross Currents in the Phil- ippines, 1946.
Smedley, Agnes-----	Writer-----	Spotlight, October 1950.	Member-----	Carter testimony, p. 73.
Snow, Edgar-----	Member Executive Commit- tee.	Spotlight, July 1948--	Writer, member.	Pacific Affairs 1937-38, Carter testimony, p. 73.
Snow, Mrs. Edgar-----	Director-----	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	do-----	Far Eastern Survey Aug. 28, 1946, Carter testimony, p. 73.
Stein, Guenther-----	Consultant--	do-----	do-----	Carter testimony, p. 73, Pacific Affairs, 1936- 37, 1939, 1941, 1943, 1946, 1948. Far East- ern Survey 1942 1943, 1947
Stewart, Maxwell-----	do-----	Letterhead Feb. 11, 1947.	do-----	Carter testimony, p. 73 IPR pamphlet War- time China, 1944.
Straus, Donald-----	Sponsor-----	do-----	Member-----	Board of Trustees, 1949 to 1951.
Strong, Anna L-----	Director-----	Spotlight June 1948--	Member writer.	Carter testimony p. 73 Pacific Affairs June 1941.
Sues, Ilona Ralf-----	Consultant--	Letterhead Feb. 11, 1947.	Author-----	Book promoted Far Eastern Survey Mar. 8, 1944.
Tewksbury, Donald-----	Writer-----	Spotlight October 1950--	do-----	IPR book, Source Ma- terials on Korean Politics and Ideol- ogies, 1950.
Van Kleeck, Mary-----	Director-----	Letterhead Apr. 18, 1951.	Member writer.	Carter testimony p. 73 Pacific Affairs Sep- tember 1936; June 1938.
Wallace, Henry A-----	Writer-----	Spotlight July 9, 1949--	Member-----	Board of Trustees, 1946.
Watts, Richard, Jr-----	Director-----	Letterhead Feb. 11, 1947.	Writer-----	Far Eastern Survey Oct. 10, 1945.
Weltfish, Gene-----	Sponsor-----	Letterhead Feb. 14, 1947.	do-----	Far Eastern Survey Aug. 28, 1945.

## NOTES

Spotlight refers to Far East Spotlight, published by Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy has been cited as subversive by Attorney General Tom Clark in a letter to the Loyalty Review Board, released April 27, 1949.  
Far Eastern Survey, published biweekly by the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.  
Pacific Affairs, published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, there are a couple of items I would like to ask you about. After the name of Mark Gayn you have the expression "book promoted." Will you explain that?

Mr. MANDEL. That simply means that his book was favorably reviewed or recommended for reading purposes.

Mr. MORRIS. After the name of John Hersey you have another reference. What is the explanation of that reference? You have the word "reference."

Mr. MANDEL. There were quotations from some of his writings which were set aside as references.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the only connection we have of John Hersey?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. After Olga Lang and Eleanor Lattimore you have "recommended reading." Will you explain that?

Mr. MANDEL. Spotlight on the Far East, the official organ of the Committee for a Far Eastern Democratic Policy, there is a feature in each issue with recommended reading, and the books of Olga Lang and Eleanor Lattimore were recommended to the readers of the Spotlight.

Mr. MORRIS. But everything else, Mr. Mandel, is listed here as a result of your research in connection with the publications of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, and the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. The name "Lattimore" came up here. Did you ever know Owen Lattimore?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, sir. I met Owen Lattimore on one occasion.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that occasion?

Mr. YERGAN. At a social gathering, a cocktail party in San Francisco, in the early 1940's. I think it was 1942 or 1943. It was at the home of Mrs. Chamberlain, whose daughter was at that time the wife of Frederick V. Field.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Field at the meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. He was not at the meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any known Communists were at that cocktail party?

Mr. MORRIS. Was Paul Robeson there?

Mr. YERGAN. Paul Robeson was there; a man by the name of Philip Lilienthal.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. YERGAN. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you of any known Communists.

Mr. YERGAN. I am sorry. I was answering the second question. I don't know of any known Communists who were there.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any people there who had worked with you as Communists?

Mr. YERGAN. Well, Robeson was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Field was not there, was he?

Mr. YERGAN. He was not there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Robeson was a Communist?

Mr. YERGAN. No; but I knew that there never was any expression of opposition from him to the Communist point of view.



Senator FERGUSON. Then, you knew him to be under the discipline of the Communists?

Mr. YERGAN. I don't know, sir, the use in which I have the word "discipline."

Senator FERGUSON. Were you under—

Mr. YERGAN. I was never under the discipline in the sense that I was bound by them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you actually comply with their directives?

Mr. YERGAN. Not always, and it is in that sense that I was not under their discipline.

Senator FERGUSON. You did have some freedom, then, of action, outside of the Communists; is that right?

Mr. YERGAN. I would like to say, sir, that I had complete freedom of action, so that it is for that reason that I take the responsibility for the mistakes that I made, because I did make a mistake in identifying myself with them, and I now have to take the responsibility for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, what was discussed at this meeting at which you were present and, according to your testimony, Paul Robeson, Mrs. Frederick V. Field, her mother, Philip Lilienthal, and Owen Lattimore, among others?

Mr. YERGAN. I would not say it was a discussion. It was a conversation. It was informal. The general question dealt with the issue in China: Why does America continue believing in Chiang Kai-shek? Why doesn't America see that the real exponents of democracy in China are the Communist forces? That was the tenor of the discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there general uniformity of agreement on this?

Mr. YERGAN. I don't recall any opposition.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall, for instance, Owen Lattimore objecting to any of those sentiments you have just described?

Mr. YERGAN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was unanimous opinion of that discussion?

Mr. YERGAN. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have we established that Mr. Lattimore was there and heard it?

Mr. YERGAN. I think that is established.

Senator FERGUSON. You are satisfied that that was true?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, when asked about this meeting, acknowledged that he was present, and that Paul Robeson was present, and that Dr. Max Yergan was present. He has not testified as to what the conversation was at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever meet Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. YERGAN. No, sir: I've never met her.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, would you look at that "American Friends of the Chinese People" there?

Mr. YERGAN (complies). Yes, I've looked at that. I see the names here of several people who were asked to sign and support Communist projects. I see a lot of names that I think that they were pretty fortunate in getting to lend dignity to the thing, but I don't have any question about it being an effort on the part of Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, you got to know Frederick V. Field quite well, did you not?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you able to observe the degree of monitoring or supervision that the Communists exercised over his activities, during his activity within the Communist scope of endeavor?

Mr. YERGAN. There was a Miss Bachrach—

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Miss Marion Bachrach?

Mr. YERGAN. Marion Bachrach, who seemed to function as a political expert in such meetings as I attended where they were present.

Now, there was a meeting of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and other meetings which discussed the colonial question in general, and she appeared as a sort of political expert there.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say within the Communist sphere of things, it appeared to you that Marion Bachrach was superior to Frederick V. Field?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes; I would say that.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Alexander Trachtenberg? Did he monitor the actions of Frederick V. Field?

Mr. YERGAN. Not at those meetings, but at the meetings of the board of Jefferson School—I was on that board also—Mr. Trachtenberg's voice was usually the authoritative voice.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever teach at that school, or lecture?

Mr. YERGAN. I've lectured there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that was a Communist-dominated organization?

Mr. YERGAN. I would say, sir, that it was.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt about it, do you?

Mr. YERGAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, did you know Mr. Lawrence Duggan?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes; I met him on one occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that occasion?

Mr. YERGAN. At a meeting held at 23 West Twenty-sixth Street, dealing with Latin-American questions. This was a meeting that Fields' organization on Latin America held, and Lawrence Duggan was there, under the invitation of Field. They constituted a sort of panel which received and answered questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Lawrence Duggan at that time was an official in the United States State Department, was he not?

Mr. YERGAN. I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. He appeared to you to be a political intimate of Frederick V. Field at that time, did he not?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes; he appeared to be a very close friend of Field.

Mr. MORRIS. And what year was that, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. I'm not sure about the year, but I think that was 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Frederick V. Field an important functionary as far as you could observe, of the Communist policy, with respect to far-eastern policy?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, yes; I would say that he was, on the basis of what he wrote, and the fact that he wrote almost exclusively on far-eastern questions. I would say that he was set up and regarded as an authority.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a few more exhibits. It will only take us 5 minutes if we can put them in the record at this time. These are things that have appeared in recent testimony, Senator,



and have been called for as a general supplement to the paper—what is that paper?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an advertisement in China Today of October 1935, advertising a meeting, dated October 9, and showing as speakers Frederick V. Field, Maxwell Stewart, Earl Browder, Hansu Chan, and others.

I offer that for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1335" and is as follows:)

[Source: China Today, October 1935]

*October 9th—Night Extraordinary*

#### EARL BROWDER

MAXWELL S. STEWART,  
*Editor, The Nation.*

WILLIAM GROPPER,  
*Famous Cartoonist and Nemesis of  
Emperor Hirohito.*

DR. HANSHU CHAN,  
*Chairman of Editorial Board of  
China Today.*

FREDERICK V. FIELD,  
*American Secretary of the Insti-  
tute of Pacific Relations.*

HARU MATSUI,  
*Well-known Japanese Woman  
Writer.*

J. W. PHILLIPS—Chairman,  
*Exec. Sec'y, American Friends of  
the Chinese People, Editorial  
Board of China Today.*

WILL GREET THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF CHINA TODAY AND CELEBRATE THE 24TH  
ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC AT THE

#### "CHINA TODAY" BANQUET

Wednesday, October 9th, at 6:30 P. M., at Manhattan Lyceum, 66 E. 4th St.,  
Bet. 2nd & 3rd Aves.

\$1.25 PER PLATE

Genuine Native Chinese Food.  
Native Chinese Instrument Program.  
Famous Filipino Dance Orchestra.

William Gropper will draw what he  
really thinks of Emperor Hirohito of  
Japan.

SEE LARGEST MAP OF CHINA EVER MADE

To be used by speakers of the evening

35¢ Tickets Sold at Door Only, Will Admit Holder to Hear Speakers, Entertain-  
ment & Dance. Program Begins at 8 P. M.

Tickets for Banquet Obtainable in Advance at China Today, 168 W. 23rd St., and  
Worker's Bookshop, 50 E. 13th St.

RESERVE WEDNESDAY EV'G, OCTOBER 9

Mr. MANDEL. I have compiled a list of contributors to China Today from their magazine, who are also associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I offer this list, giving the name of the contributors and the source of the information.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1336" and is as follows:)



## EXHIBIT No. 1336

## CHINA TODAY

Official Organ of the American Friends of the Chinese People

*Contributors associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations*

Name	China Today		Name	China Today	
	Date	Page		Date	Page
Alley, Rewi	1/40	4, 13	Mitchell, Kate	2/41	4, 5
Barnett, Patricia Glover	6/40	4, 9	Moore, Harriet	9/39	4, 10
Barnett, Robert	5/40	4, 5	Norton, Robert	9/39	4, 8
Bertram, James	2/39	3, 8	Price, Harry B.	9/39	4, 12
Bisson, T. A.	2/39	3, 5	Pruitt, Ida	10/39	4, 12
Carlson, Evans F.	1/40	4, 5	Rosinger, Lawrence K.	8/40	4, 12
Chi, Ch'ao-ting (Hansu Chan)	11/35	26	Roth, Andrew	1/41	4, 13
Deane, Hugh	2/41	4, 9	Schoyer, B. Preston	8/40	4, 12
Fabyan, Eleanor B.	11/39	4, 11	Snow, Edgar	4/41	4, 5
Field, Frederick V.	12/41	2, 4	Stewart, Maxwell S.	2/39	3
Goshal, Kumar	3/42	2, 6	Strong, Anna Louise	3/42	2, 6
Jaffe, Philip J.	2/39	3	Thompson, Virginia	11/40	4, 12
Lattimore, Owen	5/41	4, 5	Yakhontoff, Victor	8/39	4, 12

## NOTES

The American Friends of the Chinese People has been cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities in its Report, March 29, 1944, pages 40 and 147.

China Today has been cited as a magazine "published by the Communist front, Friends of the Chinese People, at 168 West Twenty-Third Street, New York City" by the California Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, in its Report, 1948, page 198.

China Today has been mentioned by the Massachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activities in its Report, 1938, page 281, as distributed by the Communists' Progressive Book Shop in Boston, Mass.

## TYPICAL QUOTATION FROM CHINA TODAY

"If the people of the United States know what is happening in China, if they know the glorious history of the Chinese Communists \* \* \* there will rise a storm of protest against American and European aid for Chiang Kai-shek \* \* \*. Thus is telling the story of China to our people, your magazine is helping to protect the future of the Soviet Union." (Waldo Frank in China Today, December 1934, page 43.)

Fred Brown, also known as Alpi, a Comintern operative, in an article in the COMMUNIST of March 1933, pages 261 and 262, has paid tribute to the work of the American Friends of the Chinese People as follows: "Credit is due to the good work of the American Friends of the Chinese People."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, on that point, let me ask Mr. Mandel a question:

Is it not true that what you have here is a list of persons whose names appear in China Today as contributors?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no knowledge as to whether, in fact, although it is presumptive, that they are, in fact, the respective authors of the articles that appeared therein?

Mr. MANDEL. That is the way they appeared in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. What is next?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State dated November 23, 1951, signed "W. K. Scott, Acting Deputy Under Secretary" addressed to Senator McCarran.

Mr. MORRIS. What does that letter say?

Mr. MANDEL. This deals with a document known as the Economy of Communist North China, 1947-49, and identifies the document.

Mr. MORRIS. Have these documents been introduced into our record?

Mr. MANDEL. They have been introduced in introducing the front sheet of each one.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that identified in the record as a physical document taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It was.



Mr. MORRIS. Does this show it was not taken from the files of the institute, but, in fact, taken from the files of the State Department, and you made a mistake in identifying it?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, is it a case of this letter showing that you made a mistake, or are you testifying that with this letter refreshing your memory, you know that you made a mistake.

Mr. MANDEL. The latter, that is, the documents were kept in a cabinet and were confused with IPR documents, and as a result of testimony, there seemed to be some disagreement so I checked on the matter and found that it was a document from the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1337" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 1337

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
Washington, November 23, 1951.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: In Mr. Humelsine's absence, I should like to answer your letter to him of November 13 in regard to the photostatic copy of *Economy of Communist North China, 1937-45* (No. 3024) which Mr. Humelsine sent you at your request, and also in regard to the summary appraisal of this study.

With reference to your questions concerning the summary appraisal quoted by Mr. Humelsine in his letter to you of November 6, this appraisal was prepared routinely at Mr. Humelsine's request after receiving your letter of October 3, and was quoted in full in his letter. Mr. Humelsine quoted this appraisal because he thought it might be helpful to you and your committee in evaluating the study. (Another copy of this appraisal is enclosed.)

The Department does not believe that individual(s) who drafted the appraisal should be identified. The disclosure of the authorship of internal memoranda by subordinate officers inevitably leads to inhibited and inconclusive writing and counsel on their part if they feel that they will be held accountable to unknown others in addition to their superiors. Similarly, the Department cannot release the name of the author of the study itself even though he left the Department in 1947.

In regard to the circulation of the document (*Economy of Communist North China, 1937-45*), a search of the Department's files has failed to reveal what circulation was made. Because the unsatisfactory nature of the study was clearly recognized at the time, however, it is probable that it was given a very limited circulation.

I regret that the Department is unable to furnish certain of the information requested.

Sincerely yours,

W. K. SCOTT,  
*Acting Deputy Under Secretary.*

Enclosure.

APPRAISAL OF OCL No. 3024, *ECONOMY OF NORTH CHINA, 1937-45*

The subject report, approximately 250 pages in length, was published in nine sections, the first describing the area of Chinese Communist control, the second summarizing Chinese Communist economic policies, and the remaining seven sections dealing with Chinese Communist policies in various fields such as agriculture, industry, labor, etc. According to the introduction, the series of reports was "to comprise a comprehensive analysis of economic conditions and policies in the Communist-held area of North China during the period of Japanese occupation. As thus defined, the studies will provide information on a stage of Communist economy which originally evolved in the course of the anti-Japanese struggle and now forms the basis for the new economic stage ushered in by the Japanese surrender" (3024.1, p. 1).



When this report was undertaken, available information on this important subject was extremely limited, consisting largely of materials from Communist sources (Chinese Communist pronouncements, directives, and doctrinal statements). As a research paper, it suffers basically from the fact that this material is used with little critical evaluation and without proper appreciation of Communist political tactics. In consequence, the report tends to overstate Communist administrative and productive achievements in North China, the degree of popular support they enjoyed in the area, and to assign a "democratic" character to Chinese Communist economic and political policies during the war. Chinese Communist statements regarding their endorsement of moderate policies in the postwar period are presented uncritically. The fact that the Chinese Communists are real Communists tends to become blurred.

At best this report may be viewed as a somewhat sloppy and inadequately unqualified presentation of Communist policies based on Communist statements.

The flavor of the report can adequately be obtained by reading Section two, Summary of Economic Policies (3024.2).

Mr. MORRIS. What is the next document?

Mr. MANDEL. The name of Ordway Southard has come up in testimony. This is a clipping from the Daily Worker of August 20, 1952, page 3, showing him as a candidate for Governor on the Communist Party ticket.

Mr. MORRIS. The chairman of the preceding meeting requested that that go in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1338" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT 1338

(Source: Daily Worker of August 20, 1942, p. 3)

#### THREE COMMUNISTS QUALIFY FOR ALABAMA ELECTION

(Special to the Daily Worker)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA., August 19.—Three candidates nominated by the Communist Party of Alabama have qualified to run in the general election No. 3, it was announced in the State capitol today.

The candidates are Mary Boggs Southard, for State Senator; Rob F. Hall, for Congress from the Ninth Congressional District; and Ordway Southard for Governor.

Mrs. Southard is district secretary of the Young Communist League. She was born in South Carolina 27 years ago and was reared in Birmingham. She graduated with highest honors from Phillips High School and Agnes Scott College.

Hall was born in Mississippi in 1906 and was reared in Mobile, Ala. Since 1935, he has been district secretary of the Communist Party.

Ordway Southard, 30, is a native of Cambridge, Mass., where his father, the late Dr. Ernest Southard held the chair of neuro-pathology in the Harvard School of Medicine. He is the grandson of former Governor Horace Austin of Minnesota one of the pioneer governors of that State. Southard has lived in Birmingham for the past 5 years and is District Daily Worker director.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the next one?

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter from the Chinese Embassy dealing with an organization known as Indusco, and the Chinese Embassy gives an analysis of the organization from their viewpoint.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you accept that into the record? I want to call your attention here to what it is.

The Indusco is an organization that was concerned with bringing relief to certain organizations in China, and the staff requested the Chinese for an analysis, that is, the official Chinese Government, of that. I was wondering whether you would receive that into the record for just what it is?



Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it for what it is. It is an explanation from the Chinese Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. It is over the signature of Wellington Koo to Senator McCarran.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1339" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1339

CHINESE EMBASSY,  
Washington, February 12, 1952.

Senator PAT McCARRAN,  
*United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: In reply to your letter of January 19, I am sending along a study prepared by one of my staff members on the subject. I hope that the materials contained therein answer your question adequately.

With sincere good wishes,

Sincerely,

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

INDUSCO

The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (Indusco, or C. I. C.) was organized in Hankow early in 1938, the second year of the Sino-Japanese War. Its founders were Rewi Alley, a New Zealander, and Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

The Indusco was nominally governed by a Board of Directors, with headquarters in Chungking. At its peak in 1940, there were 1,738 societies, with a total of 25,682 members.

The cooperative societies were financed by three main sources: (1) Chinese Government appropriations, (2) loans from the Farmers' Bank of China, and (3) private donations.

A considerable portion of private donations came from abroad, principally the United States. In 1939, an "International Committee for Chinese Industrial Cooperatives Production Relief Fund," usually known as the International Committee, was set up in Hong Kong, to receive funds donated from abroad and to send these funds to the different societies.

Donations from abroad during the war years, 1938-1945, totalled some CNC\$140,800,000, of which CNC\$118,200,000 came from the American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (Aminusco) in New York, CNC\$22,180,000 from the British United Aid to China Fund, and CNC\$400,000 from other miscellaneous sources. This compared with CNC\$84,000,000 appropriated by the Chinese Government, and CNC\$48,500,000 loaned by the Farmers' Bank of China. In other words, the finances of Indusco depended considerably from donations outside of China.

As originally conceived, Indusco was supposedly to operate in three broad regions of wartime China—the Northwest, the Southwest, and the Southeast. From the very beginning, however, attention was centered in the Northwest region, with Paochi, in Shensi Province as the key point of operation. Rewi Alley himself, for instance, was stationed there almost permanently. So was the Chinese secretary, Lu Kwang-mien (K. M. Lu).

The organizational pattern was that, at certain key points, a headquarters would be set up, which was surrounded by depots which served the cooperative workshops. As an example, Paochi was one of the headquarters, and Yen-an (the wartime Chinese Communist capital) was one of the depots.

One of the main problems connected with the Indusco was its propaganda activities both in China and abroad. Rewi Alley himself became some sort of a prophet for social democracy. A bronze statue was made of him in London. American magazines featured him in numerous articles under such titles as "Alley, the Man." Books were written about Indusco, such as that by George Hogg entitled "I See a New China." Hollywood made a film about it. Many visitors came to the Paochi headquarters, including Ida Pruitt, Nym Wales, General Evans F. Carlson, Henry Luce, Clare Boothe Luce, the British Parliamentary Mission to China, Lady Cripps, and many, many others.



The propaganda exaggerated and distorted the facts. For instance, while there were only some 25,600 members, the general figure in circulation was that there were 50,000.

One of the propaganda stunts, originated by Rewi Alley and widely circulated by General Carlson, was to coin the Chinese phrase "Gung Ho," which was translated into "Work together." This was done because the Industrial Cooperatives in the Chinese language was known as *Gung-yeh* (meaning industrial) *Ho-tso* (meaning cooperatives), and for abbreviation purposes, like the alphabetical names of Washington government agencies, it was known as *Gung Ho*, a term which, like SHAPE, carried no particular meaning in itself.

But both Alley and Carlson saw fit to exploit this abbreviated term to mean "Work Together," which was ridiculous. They carried the term further to do propaganda in favor of the *United Front* (between the Chinese Government and the Communists), which was the Comintern policy at the time. The Indusco thereupon became a Communist propaganda agency, symbolized by its operation both in Nationalist and Communist territories.

It will be recalled that in 1938, when the Indusco was first set up, the Communists had pledged allegiance to the Chinese Government for joint prosecution of the war against the Japanese aggression. It was the period of the *United Front*.

However, as the war dragged on, the position of the Communists became increasingly recalcitrant, and an open break between the Chinese Government and Communists took place in 1942 in the famous incident of the New Fourth Army. It was also at this time that a serious schism began between the Indusco headquarters in Chungking and the local office headed by Rewi Alley in Paochi, which resulted in the termination of the services of Alley by the Chinese Government on September 21, 1942.

From then on, the Indusco gradually declined, although the international propaganda mills were still grinding out the usual stunts on its behalf.

In short, the Indusco was conceived as a means to speed up production in wartime on a cooperative basis. Unfortunately, those who championed it were politically inclined, and it soon came under the direction of men who preferred to exploit it as a propaganda agency for the so-called *United Front*; i. e., the working together of the Nationalists and the Communists. This followed the Comintern line, and efforts to divert it from that channel into its original conception brought only schism within the organization itself. The Communists, naturally, were in favor of the Indusco because it served their propaganda purposes. This was true especially of such men as General Evans F. Carlson, whose championship of "Gung Ho" in the United States was tireless until his death. It was equally apparent that, when the so-called *United Front* was no longer real in China, the Indusco turned against the Chinese Government, and apologists for Indusco, such as General Carlson, outspokenly attacked the Chinese Government. (General Carlson, for instance, was one of the sponsors of the three-day conference, October 18-20, 1946, in San Francisco, "to call upon our government to withdraw all United States armed forces from China, to cease arming and financing the Kuomintang, and to allow the Chinese people to settle their internal affairs in their own way." Other sponsors included Harry Bridges, Bartley Crum, Joseph Curran, Hugh de Lacy, Paul Robeson, Vito Marcantonio, Maud Russell, Guenther Stein, Frederick V. Field, Harrison Forman, etc.)

It is an ironic commentary that, when the Communists came to power in China, no effort at all was made to revive the Indusco. The propaganda agency had served its purpose, and served it well.

Mr. MORRIS. What is next?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated July 30, 1951, from the Postmaster General, showing the interchange of subscribers between China Today and Amerasia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you if you will introduce that into the record.

It says here:

This will acknowledge your letter of July 19 concerning China Today and Amerasia.

These publications were formerly admitted to the second class of mail matter. In a letter dated March 19, 1942, the publishers informed the postmaster of New York that issuance of China Today had ceased and that "the subscribers to this publication will be informed that the unexpired portion of their subscriptions



will be covered by issues of Amerasia, which has assumed to responsibility for this list."

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received. Amerasia has been mentioned before.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1340" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1340

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,  
Washington 25, D. C., July 30, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,  
*United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This will acknowledge your letter of July 19 concerning China Today and Amerasia.

These publications were formerly admitted to the second class of mail matter. In a letter dated March 19, 1942, the publishers informed the postmaster of New York that issuance of China Today had ceased and that "the subscribers to this publication will be informed that the unexpired portion of their subscriptions will be covered by issues of Amerasia, which has assumed to responsibility for this list." The second-class mailing privilege of China Today was then revoked.

Our records indicate that the second-class mailing privilege accorded the publication Amerasia was canceled August 11, 1947, pursuant to a letter dated August 4, 1947, from the editor advising that that publication ceased publishing with the issue dated July 1947.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. DONALDSON, *Postmaster General.*

Mr. MORRIS. We have testimony that when Amerasia closed the Far Eastern Survey, which was a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, took over from them. This bears on the fact that when China Today closed its existence Amerasia took it over.

What is the next one?

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter dated July 13, 1951, addressed to Senator Pat McCarran from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, giving the civil-service records of persons who have been named in our hearings. I can read those names.

Mr. MORRIS. Will they be admitted into the record? It is routine, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1341" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1341

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,  
Washington 25, D. C., July 13, 1952.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of June 27, 1951, wherein you request information concerning thirteen persons who you state have been employed by the Civil Service Commission.

The specific questions asked in your letter concerning these individuals are as follows:

1. Are they still employed by the Civil Service Commission? If so, in what capacity?
2. Have they severed their employment with the Civil Service Commission? If any questions of loyalty were involved, would you please indicate? What were the circumstances of their severance?



The records of the Civil Service Commission show that although all of these individuals have been employed in the Federal service, none has been employed in any capacity at any time by the Civil Service Commission.

A full report showing the Federal service of each of the thirteen individuals you list is being furnished herewith for your information.

*Julian R. Friedman* was employed by the Department of State from September 2, 1943, until November 15, 1946, when his employment was terminated without prejudice. There is no record of subsequent Federal service by Mr. Friedman.

*Thomas Arthur Bisson* received an appointment as Principal Economic Analyst with the Board of Economic Warfare on January 22, 1942, in which position he served until July 10, 1943, when he resigned voluntarily. On October 4, 1945, Mr. Bisson was appointed to a position with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Department of War. His employment with that department was terminated on May 23, 1947, due to the completion of his contract. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Mr. Bisson.

*Esther Caulkin Brunauer* has been employed with the Department of State since March 8, 1944. In connection with her employment with that Department, Mrs. Brunauer was the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order 9835, as amended. As a result of this investigation, she has been suspended for security reasons.

*Emile Despres* was employed as a Senior Economist with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from September 5, 1939, until he resigned on October 5, 1941. On October 6, 1941, he received an appointment with the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which agency was later transferred to the Office of Strategic Services. He was separated from his position with the latter agency on September 30, 1945, for transfer to the Department of State. Mr. Despres resigned from the Department of State on January 2, 1946. Later, he received a W. A. E. appointment as a Consultant with the Economic Cooperation Administration. His employment with that agency was terminated on November 12, 1948, upon completion of his assignment. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Mr. Despres.

*Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson* was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved.

*Michael Greenberg* was appointed to a position with the Board of Economic Warfare on November 9, 1942. On July 7, 1944, he was transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration and on September 27, 1945, he was transferred to the Department of State. His employment was terminated due to reduction in force on June 15, 1946. In connection with his employment with the Foreign Economic Administration, an investigation of Mr. Greenberg was conducted by the Civil Service Commission to determine his general qualifications for Federal employment. As a result of this investigation, Mr. Greenberg was barred from competing in civil service examinations on March 7, 1947, because of questionable loyalty.

*John N. Hazard* was employed by the Office for Emergency Management from July 21, 1941, to July 7, 1944; with the Foreign Economic Administration from July 7, 1944, to December 12, 1945; and with the Department of State from December 12, 1945, to July 31, 1946, when he resigned to join the staff of Columbia University. He later received an appointment to the position of Attorney-Adviser with the Department of State on a W. A. E. basis. This employment was terminated on November 30, 1949, due to completion of assignment. In connection with this latter employment, an investigation of Mr. Hazard was initiated under the provisions of Executive Order 9835 but was discontinued when it was learned his employment with the Department of State had terminated. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mr. Hazard's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of his loyalty has been resolved.

*Jefferson Franklin Ray* was employed by the Office for Emergency Management from June 23, 1941 to February 1, 1944; by the Foreign Economic Administration from February 1, 1944 to September 7, 1945, when he resigned to accept a position with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. On March 31, 1948 he received an appointment with the De-



partment of State as a Foreign Affairs Specialist, in which position he served until March 18, 1949 when he resigned to accept a position in the foreign service with the Economic Cooperation Administration. Mr. Ray was employed with the latter agency until December 1, 1950 when he resigned. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Mr. Ray.

*Michael Lee* was employed from June 18, 1942 until August 5, 1943 with the Board of Economic Warfare; from August 5, 1943 to July 7, 1944 with the Office of Economic Warfare; from July 7, 1944 to December 1, 1944 with the Foreign Economic Administration; from December 1, 1944 to June 16, 1945 with the Office for Emergency Management; from June 16, 1945 to December 18, 1945 with the Foreign Economic Administration; and from December 18, 1945 until November 16, 1950 with the Department of Commerce. In connection with his employment with the Department of Commerce, Mr. Lee was the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. As a result of this investigation, Mr. Lee was suspended for an indefinite period on September 8, 1950 pending final decision on contemplated removal action under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. He resigned while under suspension. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mr. Lee's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of his loyalty has been resolved.

*Charles Flato* was employed with the Work Projects Administration from February 23, 1937 to July 13, 1937; with the Department of Agriculture from December 16, 1938, to March 15, 1939; with the National Labor Relations Board from March 16, 1939 to October 11, 1939; from October 12, 1939 to November 2, 1940 with the Department of Agriculture; with the Federal Security Agency from January 13, 1941 to January 31, 1941; with the Department of Commerce from February 1, 1941 to June 30, 1941; with the Federal Works Agency from June 30, 1941 to December 21, 1941; with the Office for Emergency Management from December 22, 1941 to October 6, 1942; with the Board of Economic Warfare from October 7, 1942 to September 25, 1943; with the Foreign Economic Administration from September 25, 1943 to March 17, 1945 and with the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion from March 17, 1945 to June 30, 1945. In connection with Mr. Flato's employment with the Office for Emergency Management, he was subject to an investigation by the Civil Service Commission to determine his general qualifications, including loyalty. As a result of this investigation, he was rated ineligible and on April 23, 1945, the Foreign Economic Administration was instructed to terminate his employment. That agency advised the Commission that Mr. Flato's employment had been terminated on March 16, 1945 by transfer to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. The latter agency was then advised of the facts in the case and Mr. Flato was removed from his position with the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion due to unsatisfactory investigative report.

*Olga Lang* was employed by the War Department from January 28, 1946, to January 8, 1949, when her services were terminated due to completion of employment agreement. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Miss Lang.

*Lawrence K. Rosinger* was employed by the Department of State as a Consultant (without compensation) from October 6 to 8, 1949. His employment was terminated due to completion of assignment. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Mr. Rosinger.

*Harold Glasser* was employed by the Department of Agriculture from May 1, 1936, to November 22, 1936; and with the Treasury Department from November 23, 1936, to December 31, 1947, when he resigned. In connection with his employment with the Treasury Department, Mr. Glasser was the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9835, but this investigation was discontinued when Mr. Glasser resigned. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mr. Glasser's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of his loyalty has been resolved.

You will note that in the reports given above on Julian R. Friedman, Thomas Arthur Bisson, Emile Despres, Jefferson Franklin Ray, Olga Lang, and Lawrence K. Rosinger, no reference is made of loyalty that may have been involved or the circumstances of their severance. The reason this information is not set forth is that the six individuals were either excepted employees or employees of the Economic Cooperation Administration, in which case the investigative reports were forwarded directly to the agency for consideration. All reports on persons



occupying excepted positions or given absolute appointments prior to October 1, 1947, the effective date of Executive Order No. 9835, were adjudicated by the particular agency under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9300. Such reports would not come into the possession of the Civil Service Commission.

All reports of investigations on employees of the Economic Cooperation Administration are referred directly to that agency by virtue of the statute creating the Economic Cooperation Administration and do not fall within the jurisdiction of Executive Order No. 9835. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission would have no knowledge of a question of loyalty that may have been involved in the circumstances surrounding a separation from the Economic Cooperation Administration.

However, if any of these six individuals reenter the Federal service in any department or agency, other than the Economic Cooperation Administration or the Atomic Energy Commission, they will fall within the jurisdiction of Executive Order No. 9835, as amended, and a determination as to their loyalty to the Government of the United States will be made.

If I can be of further assistance to you at any time, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT RAMSPECK, *Chairman.*

Mr. MANDEL. Finally, is a letter from the Treasury Department, signed by William W. Parsons, Administrative Assistant Secretary, dated August 31, 1951, giving the Treasury Department records of certain individuals who had been mentioned in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. One of the Senators requested that in part.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1342" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1342

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, August 31, 1951.

[SEAL. Administrative Assistant Secretary]

HON. PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Room 409 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary asked me to reply to your letter of August 27, 1951, requesting data for the use of the Internal Security Subcommittee regarding the title and status during the period 1942 to 1945 of four former employees of the Treasury Department. The information you requested is indicated below:



Name	Date	Title
Harry Dexter White	Jan. 1, 1942	He was serving as Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of Monetary Research, Grade P-8, \$9,000 per annum.
Do.....	Jan. 24, 1945	Appointed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury with compensation at the rate of \$9,000 per annum. This appointment was made by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Solomon Adler	Jan. 1, 1942	He was serving as Senior Economic Analyst, Grade P-5, \$4,600 per annum, in the Division of Monetary Research.
Do.....	June 9, 1942	Promoted to Principal Economic Analyst, Grade P-6, \$5,600 per annum. From the latter part of 1941 to February 19, 1943. Mr. Adler served as the Treasury Economic Adviser to the United States Member of the Chinese Stabilization Board.
Do.....	Feb. 19, 1943	His appointment in the Treasury was terminated as he was appointed by the Chinese Minister of Finance as the alternate American Member of the Chinese Stabilization Board.
Do.....	Mar. 1, 1944	He was reinstated in the Treasury as an Economic Analyst, Grade P-7, \$6,500 per annum in the Division of Monetary Research.
Do.....	May 1, 1945	Promoted to the position of Treasury Attache in China and Far East, Grade P-8, \$8,000 per annum.
V. Frank Coe	Jan. 1, 1942	He was serving as Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Grade P-7, \$7,000 per annum.
Do.....	Feb. 1, 1942	Transferred from the Treasury to the Board of Economic Warfare to serve as Assistant to the Executive Director. In November of 1943, he was appointed Assistant Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration.
Do.....	Feb. 16, 1945	Transferred back to the Treasury as Director of Monetary Research, Grade P-8, \$9,000 per annum.
Irving S. Friedman	Jan. 1, 1942	He was serving as Economic Analyst, Grade P-4, \$3,800 per annum, in the Division of Monetary Research.
Do.....	June 9, 1942	Promoted to Senior Economic Analyst, Grade P-5, \$4,600 per annum.
Do.....	Aug. 26, 1943	Promoted to Principal Economic Analyst, Grade P-6, \$5,600 per annum.
Do.....	May 1, 1945	Promoted to Economic Analyst, Grade P-7, \$6,500 per annum.

These employees are no longer with the Treasury Department.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM W. PARSONS.

*Administrative Assistant Secretary.*

Senator FERGUSON. I believe you have a short statement of two pages that you wanted to read or put in the record, Doctor?

Mr. YERGAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be quite satisfied to put it in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you ought to give it to the press. It is a résumé of what you think about communism?

Mr. YERGAN. That's right, and I would like, Mr. Chairman, the record to show that I came voluntarily here today.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. YERGAN. I came here voluntarily today because I am appreciative of the service that this committee is rendering our country.

This statement, which I will hand over to the press, is a reflection of my views, with regard to the relation of communism and Communist agents, to the issues confronting Negroes and colonial peoples today.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, I will receive it in evidence as part of our record, and it will be passed to the press officially.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1343" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1343

#### (STATEMENT BY DR. MAX YERGAN)

It is my considered opinion that Communism, its agents and its dupes constitute one of the deadliest dangers to freedom, democracy, and therefore our country, today. It is for this reason that I appear voluntarily before this committee which is rendering vital service to our country in routing out and



exposing the activities and influence of Communists in the most important aspects of our national life today. I testify with a sense of conscious pride in my American citizenship, my membership of the Negro race, and the fact that my three sons serve as officers in the United States Air Force.

My experience leads me to the strongest possible conviction that the Communist forces mean no good to Negroes in America, to the people of Africa, or to other hitherto underprivileged people who now seek and are on the threshold of a better life. I speak here out of an experience of nearly twenty years in Africa as an Executive of the Young Mens Christian Association, as a lecturer in Negro history at the College of the City of New York, and more recently as the founder of the Council on African Affairs, President of the National Negro Congress, and a less active member of a number of other organizations which by every test are quite accurately described as Communist fronts. I founded the Council on African Affairs, but to my everlasting shame I permitted the Communists to take control of it, and it is with a sense of shame also that I recall that I was among those duped by Communists and other organizations.

They look in vain who expect moral leadership or even wise political guidance from Communists for those who desire and work for an over-widening democracy.

I returned a few months ago from a visit to East Africa and India. In numerous conferences and public meetings I was glad to bear witness to two things: First, to my belief that American democracy is surely solving what many people a quarter of a century ago thought of as an insoluble national problem in America, and secondly, that the reactionary Communist force of today not only is unable to advance the cause of human progress but, because of the very nature of this vicious force, is the greatest stumbling block in the way of human progress.

Surely Negroes, other minorities, along with all American people, know that the Communists have nothing to contribute to the society and to the life which we are trying to build here. We are not perfect but we do have the opportunity to work continuously toward something better. I say without hesitation to Negroes in America, to my people in Africa, shun Communism and its agents as one shuns poison. This is a force that threatens the cherished institutions of our country and would destroy them as it would destroy our country. It is for this reason that I refer to it not only as a force of evil, of an unprincipled character, but a conspiracy against human freedom and the deadliest enemy of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. We want to thank you for appearing here voluntarily, and explaining your part, and what the Communists had to do in relation to activities here in the United States, how they subverted certain good causes for their own use and benefit, and under the guise of being humanitarians, they were attempting to take over in their own behalf, for Communists and for Russia.

You feel that they have done that?

Mr. YERGAN. I do. I agree fully with what you have said, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you, Doctor.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m. the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the chairman.)



# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF  
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SE-  
CURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:45 p. m., in room 424 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator Ferguson. The committee will come to order.

Will you raise your right hand and be sworn. You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF DAVID WEINTRAUB, DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Senator FERGUSON. State your full name and address.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. David Weintraub, 34 West Seventy-fourth Street, New York City.

Senator FERGUSON. You are an official of the United Nations Organization?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your official title?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Director of the Division of Economic Stability and Department of Economic Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever connected with the IPR in any way?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever attend any IPR meetings?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was informed by you that a meeting I had attended was called a study group of the IPR. I attended that meeting as an official of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record, Mr. Weintraub, I want to state that you were not informed by me nor by anyone else that any meeting you attended was called a study group of the IPR. You were

asked if you attended a discussion group on United Nations cooperation sponsored by the United Nations on March 15, and you said you did. The use of the words "study group" was your own, is that a fact?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record will speak, of course, of the executive session.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that that particular portion of the colloquy that took place in the executive session this morning be entered in this record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It will.

Mr. SOURWINE. As counsel will designate when it is transcribed.

Senator FERGUSON. And it will speak for itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chair will include that order to cover all of the answers and questions this morning with regard to that particular meeting we need not go further into that right now.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be made a part of the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1344A" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT 1344A

(The portion of executive session testimony of May 15, 1952, of David Weintraub referred to above appears as follows:)

Mr. SOURWINE. I have explained to the witness our procedure of holding an executive session first, and thereafter going into public session. I assured him we would try to do it all today so he could go back to New York.

Were you ever a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations in any way?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend any of its meetings?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend a discussion group on United Nations Cooperation under auspices of IPR on March 15, 1943?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any memory of it at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think I remember attending a meeting which was organized in OFRAR of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that word?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation of the State Department. But I was at the State Department at the time, and it was attended by a white-haired gentleman whose name slips me, who was with IPR, but I do not know that it was a study group of the IPR or what it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anyone else who attended it, sir?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. A lady Congressman, I remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. A lady Congresswoman, whose name I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Was she on the Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I could not say.

Senator WATKINS. Can you describe her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what State she was from?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Ohio comes to my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be Mrs. Bolton?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. From Cleveland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. She is on the Foreign Relations Committee of the House. I just assumed that is who it would be, because of her connection with the Foreign Relations Committee. She does come from Cleveland.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.



Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember any others who were at that meeting?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was a very small group, as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Dr. Frank Coe there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Could be; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Michael Greenberg?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Carter is the white-haired gentleman I had in mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. W. L. Holland, of the IPR?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. William Johnstone?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. L. B. Pearson, then Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It could be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Rifat Tirana, member of the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Pearson?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know him in those days?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I knew him in those days.

Mr. MORRIS. You know him now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Len DeCaux, was he there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I know the name, but I don't think I know him.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Mr. Chairman, I do not want it to appear in the record that I am in any way noncooperative.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course not.

Senator FERGUSON. Every witness has a right to state what he understood the testimony to be.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was just I don't recall having been aware of that meeting as being a study group of the IPR. It may well have been that. I attended it as I recall, and it is now 9 years ago, as a member of the staff of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation who was in charge of research work for that office. As I recall it, I was asked to attend it. I don't remember any more by whom, and I regarded it as part of my duty to attend it. I have no objection to its having been a study group of the IPR, it is just that my recollection is not quite so sharp and that is all I meant to indicate.

Senator FERGUSON. You attended it as an official of the United States Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And took part in it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I am assuming that you do not remember the facts, what you learned there.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. You are quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it might have been beneficial or detrimental to the United States.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I doubt very much that it was detrimental to the United States in view of the fact that Congresswoman Bolton was there.

Senator FERGUSON. I meant for your job as to whether or not it gave you any information.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It presumably helped me in my job. I just don't remember what transpired at that meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Irving Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he employed under you at the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his employment by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee about that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Sometime in 1947 Mr. Kaplan got in touch with me. We talked about his availability for employment. He indicated that he might become available sometime in the future for employment in the United Nations. I told him that when he was, to let me know. He let me know eventually and I sent him around to see several people and eventually he was employed by the United Nations.

Senator FERGUSON. What was he working at, at the time you had that conversation about the fact that he might be available?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If I recollect correctly he was working on something that had to do with wage legislation or annual wages or something like that.

Senator FERGUSON. For the United States Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall whether it was the United States Government. To the best of my recollection that was on some project that was headed by Mr. Murray Lattimer, but I don't know whether it was a governmental project or not. It probably was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know him as a Government employee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you known him as a Government employee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Since 1935.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a Government employee from 1935 up until about the time he went with the United Nations.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. So far as I know, I don't know his entire career but I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Weintraub, did you have anything to do with the appointment of Owen Lattimore as head of the United Nations mission to Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee the circumstances of Mr. Lattimore's selection and appointment to that post.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The United Nations received a request for technical assistance from the Government of Afghanistan.

Senator FERGUSON. That was economic assistance?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Technical assistance for economic development of Afghanistan. After discussing this request with my superior, Mr. David Owen, and with representatives of the Afghanistan Government it was decided by Mr. Owen that before any technical assistance could be extended, a further investigation on the spot in Afghanistan would be necessary and that a mission would be organized for that purpose, and we then cast about for a person qualified to head that kind of mission.

Senator FERGUSON. What is Mr. Owen's first name? You see, we have an Owen Lattimore and Mr. Owen, so we had better be careful to keep this record straight.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. David Owen.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he an American citizen?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he is a subject of the United Kingdom.

We then tried to think of properly qualified persons and Mr. Owen Lattimore's name was suggested by me as a possible qualified person for that post.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what bases did you make that suggestion, Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. On the bases of general knowledge of Mr. Lattimore's work as a political scientist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him at the time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I had never met him before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had never met Mr. Lattimore before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had anyone suggested to you that he would be suitable for the job or for a job of this kind or for employment by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect anyone having suggested that to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just chose his name yourself?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him as an expert in Afghanistan matters?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I knew of him only as an expert in general far-eastern affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whether he had written anything about Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whether he had been in Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider Afghanistan a far-eastern nation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Technically Afghanistan is classified as a middle-eastern country.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider Afghanistan to be a nation within the sphere of Mr. Lattimore's specialty or his expertness?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I thought so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Because I knew that Mr. Lattimore had spent considerable time in countries adjoining Afghanistan and I believed that the general condition, mode of living, were sufficiently similar to feel that Mr. Lattimore could handle that job.

Mr. SOURWINE. What countries adjoining Afghanistan had Mr. Lattimore been in, to your knowledge?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where does Mongolia join Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I will have to ask for a map to help me on that. I just don't have that clearly enough in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been in neither one?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had been in neither one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think Mongolia does adjoin Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am sorry; I would like to have a look at a map at this point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your impression at the time you picked Mr. Lattimore that Mongolia did adjoin Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was Mongolia, Tibet.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was Mr. Lattimore in Tibet?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Certain parts of India. I couldn't tell you when Mr. Lattimore was in Tibet.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if he was ever in Tibet?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know it for a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was he in India?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know Mr. Lattimore well enough to know about his travels.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the customs and mores of Mongolia are similar to those of Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would rather not answer that kind of question because—

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you have an opinion on that subject? If you don't, you need only to say so.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't have an opinion on the subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an opinion on the subject as to whether the customs, mores, of India are similar to those of Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is the same kind of question that I would rather not answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an opinion on the subject?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Sir, I have a general view that the economic condition and developments of many countries in that part of the world are rather primitive and in their primitiveness have many similarities.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you think that a political scientist, one that had to do with politics, would be the proper man to send in to determine what economic aid they ought to have and what should be done?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To my way of looking at it, a political scientist is aware of the relationships between economic, social, and political problems. And to my knowledge Mr. Lattimore is that kind of political scientist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying now that you selected Mr. Lattimore because he was an able political economist rather than because he was an expert in the area to which you were sending him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; because he was an expert in the general area to which we were sending him.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the general area of Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; that general area which includes those other countries that I have mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the general area which includes Mongolia, India, and Afghanistan and Tibet?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a pretty good-sized general area.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is a good-sized general area.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is an expert in that whole general area?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To my view he was sufficiently expert for me to make the suggestion to Mr. David Owen and I did not finally appoint him, it was not for me to appoint him. The judgments of four other people came into that after a discussion with Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you initiated it, you initiated the suggestion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without a prompting from anyone or suggestion from anyone?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Without any prompting or suggestion from anyone that I can recall.



Mr. SOURWINE. And solely on the basis of your feeling that Mr. Lattimore was an expert in this general area?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. My feeling that Mr. Lattimore was a sufficiently expert person in this general area to be looked——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know where he was employed at the time you suggested his name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I knew that he was with the Johns Hopkins University.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you know that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is a kind of fact that people pick up and know. One knows that Owen Lattimore is associated with Johns Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you read his book?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had read some parts of books that he had written. I remember looking into one dealing with China, if I remember correctly.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought that would qualify him if he knew about China?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I thought that he was a person whose qualification ought to be looked into by my boss and if he wanted, after that, to appoint him, that was up to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know which side, if any, he was on in the China problem? When did this happen? When did you suggest his name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Early in 1951, I believe it was. No; I think it must have been early in 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. 1950. Had you known at that time which side, if any, Owen Lattimore was on in the Chinese problem, the Chinese conflict.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you know he was broadcasting and issuing statements and so forth on one side or the other?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect, sir, that I knew at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it that caused you to name Lattimore for this job? What was there in the book or anywhere that his name came to you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is a very difficult question to answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact the State Department?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not have been one of the places to contact if there was an American that had knowledge of Afghanistan or that territory that they thought you might contact and see who would do it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It might have been one of the places; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact any other government as to whether or not they had a subject or a citizen that might have done that job?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Out of a clear sky, the name of Owen Lattimore came along?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know how names occur to one, sir. I only recollect that when the question arose, Mr. David Owen and I considered whom we might possibly consider for the job, that the name of Owen Lattimore occurred to me. I suggested that and it was felt

that it was sufficiently interesting to have a chat with him to find out what he thought of it, to find out whether he thought he might be able to do it. We then had a meeting with him. Mr. Owen requested that he come to a luncheon which was attended by Mr. Owen and myself, two other members of the staff of the United Nations, and over luncheon we discussed it and after that Mr. Owen came to the conclusion that Mr. Lattimore would do for that job.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact Lattimore?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I may have. If I did it was at Mr. Owen's request to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. You think you may have?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think I may have talked to him.

Senator FERGUSON. As a member of the United Nations staff, it wouldn't have made any difference to you which side of the dispute he was on in China between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Communist government, that would not have made any difference, would it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know that question ever arose actually.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I meant, you were not concerned really with the question of loyalty to any country or anything like that.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. We were concerned with Lattimore's technical ability to do the job.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, and not any question as to what he may have represented in his thinking.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think that would be a correct way of describing it, using him as a technician.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had thought of a man who was then back of the iron curtain, say a Russian, you would not have hesitated to suggest his name to go there as the head, because those problems are not involved in your work in the United Nations, are they?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They are not involved.

Senator FERGUSON. The question of whether a man is a Communist or not a Communist is not involved in your work in the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That explains the situation. You just selected the man that you thought could do it. Is that right?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, that is correct, we selected the man we thought could do the kind of job we had.

May I interject, Senator, just so there is no misunderstanding in the matter. The United Nations has since then dispatched many missions to many other countries, and I think it is rather rare that a chief of a mission, which is what Lattimore was supposed to be, is selected primarily for his abilities as an economist. The chiefs of missions of the United Nations are frequently lawyers, judges, sociologists. Their qualifications to a very considerable extent are judged in terms of their ability to deal with high government officials. And it is assumed that chiefs of missions have as their assistants technicians and specialists, and for that reason the mission that was headed by Mr. Lattimore was a mission of several people, including among them an engineer, an economist—

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get your staff? From what countries? America was represented by Lattimore. What others?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. An Englishman went along as the economist. I believe either an Australian or South African went along as an engineer. I forget exactly what his nationality was. I don't recollect offhand who the other members were.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you pick these men up from these countries? Do you do that through their foreign office or how do you get them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It varies. Rarely are people picked through foreign offices.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact you take an oath that you will not be subject to the dictation or the influence of any other country or any nation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, we take an oath that we are not subject to orders of any other nation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean of any nation, not of any other nation.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, of any single nation; that is correct. I don't remember the exact words of the oath but that is certainly the sense of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The substance of it is that you will take orders only from the Secretariat of the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk to Mr. Lattimore either in person or over the telephone before you made your suggestion to Mr. Owen?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not at any time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not before I have made the suggestion to Mr. Owen. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, after this luncheon at which it was discussed, did you tell Mr. Lattimore or indicate to him that he was going to be appointed to head that mission?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that I did but I may have. As I told you, my superior, Mr. Owen, was there. My recollection is that in one way or another Mr. Lattimore was left with the impression that he was certainly seriously being considered for that appointment and he was subsequently notified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who notified him, do you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect. He was probably notified by letter. He was possibly notified by telephone that the letter was coming and although I certainly do not recollect that I notified him it is possible that it was I.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you speak with him in person or over the telephone at any time after that luncheon?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about the occasion or occasions when you did so.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I recollect one occasion only at the moment. Mr. Lattimore came to Lake Success for the purpose of making arrangements for that mission, and he came to my office, and we spent a couple of hours talking about the mission, the organization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just the two of you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, no. Mr. Caustin was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had been at the luncheon also, had he not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is your deputy?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is my deputy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else was there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was a rather small group, I don't recall all of them, but Mr. Rosenborg was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you spell that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. R-o-s-e-n-b-o-r-g.

Mr. SOURWINE. From what country is he a national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is a Swede.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a deputy to Mr. Owen?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is, I believe, called a special assistant to Mr. Owen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else was there? This is the meeting at Lake Success after Mr. Lattimore had the designation to head the mission?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Mr. Kaplan there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, Mr. Kaplan was not there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did his work take him into this field at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It would not take him in there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, it would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Kaplan have anything to do with the selection or appointment of Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or briefing Mr. Lattimore on this matter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Kaplan ever met with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever meet with Mr. Lattimore in your presence?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember anyone besides Mr. Rosenborg who was at this meeting in Lake Success?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am trying to recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, other than Mr. Rosenborg and Mr. Caustin.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't swear to it, but I believe a Mr. Ed Henson was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he from?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is an American.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is on the United Nations staff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what capacity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I couldn't tell you exactly. He is now a member of the staff of the Technical Assistance Staff of the United Nations, but I couldn't really describe it.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time he was also a member of the same staff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. At that time he was a member of my staff. There was no Technical Assistance Administration in existence at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. How much was Lattimore paid for this mission?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I couldn't answer that exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. How did they pay him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I don't think I could answer it exactly, but it is likely to have been a specified amount per day.



Senator FERGUSON. About what did they average, those kind of jobs, per day?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Somewhere between \$40 and \$50 per day.

Senator FERGUSON. And expenses?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Plus any other expenses.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would include transportation and meals and, everything, traveling?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I wouldn't care to specify precisely what it includes. It includes what per diems normally include.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. And travel expenses.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, the \$40 per day is compensation, that is not per diem.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Salary.

Senator FERGUSON. Five- or six-day week, or seven?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am again afraid I couldn't answer that exactly. Normally one is paid when actually employed, but draws per diem on week ends. I couldn't tell you exactly what that arrangement was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know approximately how much Mr. Lattimore received for this mission?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I do not. One could try and estimate it roughly, but I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he explain how he could get away from his teaching to make a mission like this?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recall it, it was his problem rather than our problem.

Senator FERGUSON. But did he explain that he would have to get a leave of absence, was that understood?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I suppose it was understood that he would have to get permission from his university to leave unless he was free during that period anyhow, but I just couldn't answer that one exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all on that subject?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record may contain your background, sir, I would like to go over very briefly what we went over in the executive session this morning.

You were born February 14, 1904, in Kozlow, K-o-z-l-o-w?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Austria-Poland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does that mean, it was Austria then, Poland now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I suppose since you have it on your record, what it must mean when I was born it was Austria, when I left it was Austria. Subsequently after the First World War that part became Poland, and that is what I suppose your notation means.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Where did you receive your early education?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In Vienna, Austria, and in New York City high schools and universities.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In 1921.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were at that time 17 years old?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I must have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were naturalized a United States citizen in the eastern district of New York on July 3, 1928?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You attended eastern district high school in Brooklyn and the Washington Square school?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. CCNY?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Acquiring a B. S. degree from CCNY in 1928?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And attended at Columbia University, majoring in economics and receiving your M. A. in 1932 or 1933?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe it was 1932.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did get an M. A. degree from Columbia?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You started to work for the Government when?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think it was July or thereabouts of 1933.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that right after you graduated or did you do something else for a year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did something else for a year.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I worked for the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was that located?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Located in New York City. That is a private nonprofit research organization, and I was research assistant there.

Mr. SOURWINE. During that time did you ever work for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, just prior to coming to Washington I did a 1 or 2 weeks' special job for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, where, I might add, I was, so to speak, on loan from the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the only payment I received, if I remember, was reimbursement for expenses.

The incident came about because in the National Bureau of Economic Research Dr. Leo Wolman was my superior.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that Leo or Louie?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Leo, professor of economics at Columbia University, L-e-o Wolman, W-o-l-m-a-n. Professor Wolman was simultaneously the director of research for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers at that time, serving with the NRA in Washington. I was asked to assist Mr. Sidney Hillman in preparation of a brief for the NRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. To assist Mr. Sidney Hillman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was for a period of about 2 weeks?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Approximately.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was a longer period, however, was there not, when you physically worked in the quarters of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, because as an employee of the National Bureau of Economic Research I was required to work in close proximity to Dr. Wolman, who spent most of his time at the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and an office was assigned to me in the building of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.



Mr. SOURWINE. During that period of time, or most of it, were you in fact working on a project for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I was during that period working on a project for the Bureau of Economic Research.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had nothing to do with the Amalgated Clothing Workers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It had nothing to do with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Professor Wolman assist you to get into Government service?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recollect it, Professor Wolman called me from Washington one day and suggested that I come up to Washington. When I came he told me that Mr. Harry Hopkins was looking for an assistant, and would I go up and see Mr. Hopkins. I did, and I was subsequently asked to join the staff of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration for what was supposed to be a temporary period of 6 months, and I requested leave of absence from the National Bureau of Economic Research for that purpose, and that was the beginning of my governmental career.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a sign that once you get in temporarily you cannot get out, is that it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well——

Mr. SOURWINE. Bringing this up chronologically, sir.

I beg your pardon, I do not think the witness had a chance to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went from the United States Government in 1944 into the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not quite. From the Government I went to UNRRA in early 1944, I don't remember the exact date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Going back to 1930 to keep this chronological, were you ever an organizer for the Young Communist League?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hold any other job with the Young Communist League?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were a member of the Young Socialist League?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That had no connection with the Young Communist League?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And never was merged with it or associated with it as far as you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in 1933 an instructor in economics at CCNY?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1933 you were a statistician with the FERA in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. 1933 to 1941 you were Director of the National Research Project on Reemployment Opportunities and Recent Changes in Industrial Techniques of the Work Projects Administration?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where were you at that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In Philadelphia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now how long did that last?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Until I was asked to join the staff of the War Production Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which was in what year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Which was, I believe, September or October of 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend the Russian purges of 1936 and 1937?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever maintain that the Russian purges were necessary?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that you saw nothing wrong with the Russian purges of 1936 and 1937?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever study that problem?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not seriously.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you study it at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, I read about it in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. What conclusion did you come to?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, I don't know that I came to any special conclusions except that it was a very depressing affair, something like that. I don't recollect any more.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take the position that Stalin was fully justified in agreeing to such a pact?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you economic adviser for the Redistribution Division of the War Production Board, 1941 to 1943?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you Chief of the Division of Studies and Reports, Office of the Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, United States Department of State, in 1943?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was briefly for a period of months, was it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was from very early in 1943 until that staff was merged into UNNRA, which was at the beginning of 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1943 you were assigned as adviser to the Director General at the First Council Session of the United Nations Relief meeting in Atlantic City?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Director General at the time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Gov. Herbert H. Lehman, now Senator Lehman.



Mr. SOURWINE. You never returned to the State Department after that, did you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you went over to UNRRA on assignment first and then subsequently shifted over to the UNRRA payroll?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Morris Rosenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the same Rosenthal who was formerly in charge of the Director of Imports Office of the Foreign Economic Administration?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Vaguely I think he is in some import business, but I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is out of Government as far as you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. So far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever assist Mr. Rosenthal to secure employment or promotion in the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Murray Lattimer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the same Murray Lattimer who was employed in 1943 with the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again vaguely I understand he is in private business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Out of the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Out of the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Is his wife's name Eleanor, do you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Murray Lattimer is different from the other man we have been discussing. There was some confusion in our record at one time, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have a close association, social or business, with either Morris Rosenthal or Murray Lattimer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None with Morris Rosenthal.<sup>3</sup> With Murray Lattimer, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was employed by the Industrial Relations Counselors in New York some time I think the end of 1929, early 1930, as a research assistant, and Murray Lattimer was a member of that staff, and although I did not work for him there, I did meet him several times right there in the office.

The next association with Murray Lattimer was when I was director of this national research project that you mentioned, and one of the activities of that project involved some work which was to be done by the staff of the Railroad Retirement Board, and that was probably sometime in 1936 or 1937.

<sup>3</sup>Mr. Weintraub in a letter dated May 22, 1952, said: "I appear to have said, 'none with Morris Rosenthal.' I meant to say, 'not with Morris Rosenthal.' As my other testimony showed I did have some business association with Rosenthal."

The next association was in the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation in the State Department when Mr. Murray Lattimer became one of the assistants to Governor Lehman. We were both there as members of the staff of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, OFRRO, which was headed by Governor Lehman.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did your association with him cease?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think when he left OFRRO.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your association then was wholly in a business way?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now did you ever assist Mr. Lattimer to gain employment or promotion in the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I shouldn't think so; he was always in positions much superior to mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge did he ever assist you to gain promotions or positions in the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were Secretary of the Committee on Supplies of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in 1944?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That last group of questions was about Lattimer, L-a-t-t-i-m-e-r.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct. You were Chief of the Bureau of Supply of UNRRA from 1945 into 1946?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became Director of the Division of Economic Stability and Development, Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations in September 1946?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You still hold that position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you have been under consideration for promotion within the United Nations organization?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Very vaguely. I understood that I might possibly be promoted to a vacancy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in 1951 attend a United Nations conference in Chile?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you returned from that conference in April of 1951?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you return before the conference was concluded?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I believe I left hours after the conference was concluded.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hurry back, would you say?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I tried to hurry back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any particular reason why you were hurrying back?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I had a lot of work to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of that work involve in any way any persons who had been dismissed or separated from the United Nations or were about to be dismissed or separated from the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in 1951 or thereafter take an active part in protesting against the dismissals or separations of United Nations employees?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mary Jane Keany?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the person?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I saw the person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know her yourself?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take any part in protesting the dismissal or separation from the United Nations of Mary Jane Keany?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know she was going to be dismissed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was a matter of newspaper talk and general discussion; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all you knew about it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no information about it except from the newspapers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. There was some gossip in the corridors.

Mr. SOURWINE. Otherwise, you had no information?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you take sides?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever express yourself on it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Benedict Solomon Alper?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; again, simply as a name that was talked about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Alper was employed by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And was dismissed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take part in protesting his dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know John Picon, P-i-c-o-n?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, again, only as a name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Picon was employed by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that he was dismissed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take any action in any way with regard to his dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you protest it? Excuse me.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I certainly did not protest it. I have a vague recollection that Picon is a woman rather than a man, and that is the reason for my hesitation.

Mr. SOURWINE. The name as I have it is spelled J-e-a-n; that might be a woman, of course.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I merely wanted to explain my hesitation in replying.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know why they were dismissed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No. These names became cases before a board, and there were some papers circulated as to the hearing, and in those papers some of those names were stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the board?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. With the papers.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were the papers that were circulated? You mean official papers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not speaking of some kind of petition about the matter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; some releases about the action of the board.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never signed a petition with regard to these three persons?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there were petitions out to keep them from being discharged?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, during this entire incident, as I remember, I was not in New York; I was in Geneva.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take the position that the point 4 program should be administered by an international organization and not by the United States?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you care to expand on that? You might feel that in justice to yourself you should do so.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. The program in question is a program of technical assistance for the economic development of underdeveloped countries. That question had been under discussion in the United Nations for years—meaning, by that, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and various committee and commissions—and along with others I felt that that kind of activity is peculiarly suited for an international organization so as to put underdeveloped countries in a position of receiving economic assistance of that character from an organization of their own rather than receiving it on a bilateral basis from individual governments.

I agree with that position, and I am sure I must have said so to too many people at various times.

Senator FERGUSON. How much are you administering now under the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I personally?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I meant the United Nations.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The United Nations has a technical-assistance program which involved \$20,000,000, funds contributed by some 60 different countries for the period of middle 1950 to the end of 1951, and early in 1952 an additional approximately \$19,000,000 was pledged.

Senator FERGUSON. What is our percentage, the United States?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The United States percentage is roughly 60 percent of that contribution.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the entire \$39,000,000?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.



Mr. SOURWINE. Have we paid in our share?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I couldn't answer that. Normally the United States pays its share.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Have any of the other nations paid in their shares?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. The other 40 percent has been paid in?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I didn't say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much of it has been paid in?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I couldn't answer that; I would have to look at the records. My impression is that a good proportion of it has been paid.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the Soviet Union's share, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not a member of that; are they?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They did not contribute to it. I can't answer your question technically; that kind of question doesn't arise.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they supposed to contribute, and are they in default?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; the contributions to that particular fund are voluntary. That is why I can't answer your question, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there, sir, some 1,500 persons approximately under you in the "National research project" of the Work Projects Administration?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of those persons to your knowledge Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of them pro-Communists so far as you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any reason to believe that any of them were Communists or pro-Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever assist a person known to you to be a Communist or seek to assist such a person to secure employment in the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize your name to be used as a reference by any Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know of Harry Samuel Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he employed by the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist him to secure employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If he gave my name as reference, I probably gave him a good reference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist him actively in securing employment under you in the "national research project?"

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Under me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. He was employed under you, was he not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. You asked me did I assist him?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I must have hired him. He came to work for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to get at this point. Was he employed at a level which required you to hire him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; definitely not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you did hire him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was the responsible person, and I would therefore have to say yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you authorize him to use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall, but I well may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in fact give him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have you any reason to believe that Harry Samuel Magdoff is or was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I certainly do not have any reason to believe that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have you any reason to believe that Mr. Magdoff ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with the Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it surprise you to hear his name mentioned in that connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, because I had seen his name mentioned in the newspapers before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before when?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Before now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever seen his name mentioned in the newspapers before you hired him for the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything of the circumstances under which he ceased to be employed under the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As far as I can recollect, he left the "National research project" to go to another Government agency, probably the Department of Commerce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that it was in fact the Department of Commerce?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe it was the Department of Commerce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not recommend him to the Department of Commerce?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If I wrote a letter, it must have been to whatever agency it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is perfectly obvious that if you wrote a letter it was addressed to the person to whom it was addressed. I am asking you whether you wrote a letter.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's quite likely I wrote a letter, but I don't recall it as a matter of fact. I am not surprised if I did. If he went to the Department of Commerce, that is where the letter was addressed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that if he went to the Department of Commerce you wrote a letter to the Department of Commerce, or



are you saying that you do not recall writing a letter for him anywhere?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not recall writing a letter for him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you know Irving Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist in securing his employment there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, he worked in the FERA together with me before then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. We both went together to the "National research project," I went as director and he went as associate director.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend him for the post of associate director?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect the exact facts, but I well may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his selection as associate director?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not know that you did have?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am not trying to dodge your question; I am trying to be sure of the facts.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to be sure of the facts, too.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He worked with me, we worked well together. When the question arose as to how the project should be operated, I may well have and probably did say that I need someone to help me, Kaplan will be perfectly all right, and Kaplan went. That is the answer to your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, do you not know, sir, that initially when you were approached on the matter you were not simply told, "We will select an associate director for you," you were consulted about who you would have on the job?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's 17 years ago, and I think you are probably right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were asked the question whether or not you had any Communists or pro-Communists working under you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your answer to that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever known a pro-Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I probably did; I just don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot think of any? Did you ever know any Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; other than persons who probably are Communists who are in the United Nations, non-United States citizens.

Mr. SOURWINE. Shall we proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOUTHWINE. Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Excuse me, sir. Mr. Chairman, might I just state for the record that Mr. Sourwine is quite right. I must have made the suggestion within FERA that Mr. Kaplan should be an associate director. I can't imagine that it would have been done without that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you subsequently recommend Mr. Kaplan for any other Government employment or assist him to secure any other Government employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give him permission to use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is quite possible. I think he would have had a right to assume that he could use my name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever ask you for permission to do so?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't specifically recollect that, but that is quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Kaplan is or was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Kaplan ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with the Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or did you know Mr. Whittaker Chambers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not and did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Chambers employed by the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I wouldn't have known that he was, but I recollect that I saw somewhere in the newspapers that he stated he was employed by some part of the "National research project."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his employment in that capacity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so; I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize him to use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him to anyone for employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that Whittaker Chambers is or was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I read that in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. That he what?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That he stated he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know as a matter of general knowledge that Mr. Chambers has declared under oath that he was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I guess so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never read any of his testimony?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I never read his testimony except what I saw in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do know that he was at one time employed by the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only from the newspapers.



Mr. SOURWINE. Only from the newspapers. Did you ever give the right to use your name as a reference to Abraham George Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give the right to use your name as a reference to Solomon Adler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write a letter of recommendation for either Mr. Silverman or Mr. Adler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it surprise you to learn that both of those men had in fact given you as a reference in connection with an application for Government employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It would not surprise me with respect to Mr. Adler. I think it would surprise me with respect to Mr. Silverman because again his positions were superior to mine, and I don't think my reference would have done him much good, and he never worked for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. When a person is given as a reference in Government it is customary to check the reference, is it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether in fact any agency of the Government ever checked with you with regard to Mr. Silverman on the basis of a reference which he had given—that is, his listing of you as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so, I certainly don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many employees are there in your division at the present time in the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Approximately 125.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that any of those people are Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only to the extent that some of those employees are nationals of countries with Communist governments.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many of those employees are nationals of the Soviet Union?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I recollect at the moment only one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I may have the name not quite right, but I think it is something like Pavolov.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you spell it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I could spell it only phonetically, probably P-a-v-o-l-o-v, but I am not quite certain of that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he perhaps an employee in a rather subordinate or lesser capacity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Below the policy-making level?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there any employees in your division at or above the policy-making level? In other words, a line of demarcation of the policy-making level with respect to whom you have knowledge or believe or have reason to believe that they are Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The line of demarcation is a rather vague one, but one of my immediate assistants is a national of Poland.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, Mr. Michael Klecki?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. K-l-e-c-k-i?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is his position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Assistant director of the division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is Mr. Klecki now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is probably in Poland right now on leave.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now with regard to the two gentlemen you have named, are there any other employees in your division whom you know or have reason to believe are Communists or pro-Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I do not know of any such.

Mr. SOURWINE. Outside of those two whom you have named, Mr. Pavolov and Mr. Klecki, are there any other employees in your division whom you know or have reason to believe have ever knowingly cooperated or collaborated with the Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Harold E. Caustin?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a national of the United Kingdom?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is, and is my deputy in the division.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is your deputy?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is my deputy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he has ever knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the furtherance of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have an understanding that with regard to the list of people concerning whom I am about to ask you, when I ask the question, Communist connections I am referring to this whole phrase as I have used it repeatedly here, "Do you know or have any reason to believe that this person ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?"

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Phillis Chait, C-h-a-i-t?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know the person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not know the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Howard Daniel?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not now, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. How recently?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is employed by the Technical Assistance Administration?

Mr. SOURWINE. And was until recently employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Until about a year ago, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. When he left was it a promotion or an advancement?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I don't think it was either.



Mr. SOURWINE. Just a transfer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Just a transfer.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a national of Australia?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he have a Communist connection or affiliation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sarah L. Diska?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know of her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She is employed in my division.

Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Adolfo Dorfman, D-o-r-f-m-a-n?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know of Adolfo Dorfman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Argentina?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. A national of Argentina.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask there, do I understand from your answers previously in executive session that the question of a person's political belief is not a qualification for employment with the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That, so far as I know, is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. A person's political belief is not a question of employment in your particular branch?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if all of them were Communists that would be within the scope of the employment there, or if they were all capitalists, that would be within the scope, is that correct?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; it would be; that is correct, theoretically.

Senator FERGUSON. Or is there an endeavor to try to match the Communists and anti-Communists so that you have a ratio? Is there anything like that in the employment? In other words, there being so many Communist nations, their population so many, so many capitalist nations have so many, and so many Socialist nations? Do you try to do like they do in some places, try to distribute the positions according to the political thinking of the respective nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Sir, I am really not competent to speak to that question. I can say that the charter of the United Nations includes an article somewhere, and I could not recite it to you verbatim, which states that the secretariat of the United Nations should be selected on the basis of competence to do the job first, but insofar as possible the secretariat is to reflect the geographic distribution of the world and that is understood to mean that all nations that are members of the United Nations should be appropriately represented among the secretariat staff members.

Senator FERGUSON. But certainly one of the qualifications is not a matter of political thinking?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it would not make any difference to the United Nations that a person was a citizen of the United States and believed in communism and not capitalism as far as getting a job in the United Nations was concerned?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I wish, sir, you directed that question to the people who can answer you.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you to your knowledge.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To my knowledge that is not a factor.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right; that is not a factor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

One other question. When you take this oath of allegiance to the United Nations, have you ever found difficulty in your thinking that you also owe allegiance to the United States and owed allegiance to the United Nations? Has that been a conflict in your mind?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Never, my allegiance to the United States is an allegiance which I hold as a citizen of the United States, and that is in no way affected by the oath which I took to the United Nations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do you think that a Communist, your knowledge of a Communist, do you think that he can take an oath such as you took and be loyal to that oath?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. You are now asking my personal view of that?

Senator FERGUSON. Sure.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I should think not.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am trying to say I should think he would have difficulty.

Senator FERGUSON. He would have difficulty?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In paying allegiance to his oath that he took to the United Nations owing to the allegiance that he owes to communism, that is what you have in mind?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That he would have difficulty.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now as I understand it, you conferred with the counsel of the United Nations before you came down here?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been answering the questions believing that you are within the rule that he laid down for you to answer questions?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. May I say, sir, that he simply said to me that there was no objection on his part to my answering questions that the committee puts to me, and I am doing that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You volunteered that, did you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, were you not told that you might be asked questions about Mr. Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that if certain questions were asked about Mr. Kaplan the answer was to be thus and so?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.



Senator FERGUSON. What was the "thus and so"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That Mr. Kaplan has been terminated by the United Nations as of the 29th of May.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were warned that you might be asked why?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not quite, but I was told that the Secretary General gave no reasons for the termination.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were told to say that; were you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I was told to say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, is that the same thing as being told that they have no objection to answering all questions fully and freely?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was told both things.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Do you know Lottie Adler Fields?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. She is a national of the United States?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection, and by that I mean do you know or have any reason to believe that she has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anna Friefeld?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. A national of Canada?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sidney Glassman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Michael Klecki we have already discussed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a national of Poland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is presently in Poland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He has a Polish passport?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that not necessarily indicate that he is persona grata to the present Polish Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would suppose that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he ever knowingly or willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Since you ask me that question this morning, I thought about that one again, and the only thing I can say to you is that I recollect that sometime before he came to work with the United

Nations he spent several months in Poland assisting the Polish Government in elaborating their economic plan as an economist.

Mr. SOURWINE. What bearing do you think that has on the question I asked you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, you asked whether he in any way had assisted in the attainment of Communist aims.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer then necessarily is "Yes"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would suppose under those circumstances I would have to say "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Irving Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is employed by you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no knowledge or reason to believe that Mr. Kaplan has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of a Communist objective?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I have no knowledge or reason to believe that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now will you tell us what you know of the reasons for Mr. Kaplan's termination by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, as I told you, the Secretary General gave no reasons for his termination.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, does not the United Nations protect an employee against summary dismissal without any reason?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No. There is a regulation—which I cannot quote to you verbatim—which states that, with respect to employees who are not on a so-called permanent contract, the Secretary General has the right to dismiss them without stating any reason. I understand that the Secretary General has availed himself of that right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead. What do you personally know about the reasons for Mr. Kaplan's dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, as to the reasons, I am afraid my answer would have to stand that, so far as I know, the reasons were not given. Now, all I can tell you is something about a sequence of events. First I think I would have to say that the director of the personnel office more than a year ago told my superior, Mr. Owen, and me that he suggested the replacement of Mr. Kaplan by some other person who was more eminent in the field. That was over a year ago, and I perhaps ought to state that I had forgotten to mention that this morning; that just slipped my mind.

Second, that sometime early in April Mr. Kaplan was called before a grand jury, and a few days later I was called before a grand jury. In the course of the questioning before the grand jury—

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, you have talked to the grand jury, and they said there was nothing secret about what they were telling you or what you told them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They specifically told me that anything that transpired at that hearing I was free to discuss outside.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, you may proceed now.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They then told me that they had directed certain questions to Mr. Kaplan, and that he had refused to answer those questions, and they wished to know what I was going to do about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they tell you what the questions were?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. They did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were they?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They said——

Senator FERGUSON. First, did they think that he worked for you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They asked me that, and I told them that he did.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, go ahead and give us the questions.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They told me that they had asked him whether he was a member of a spy ring, and to the best of my recollection that is the substance of the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they use the word "spy" or "espionage"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the best of my recollection they used the word "spy."

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say for what country?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; and that he had refused to answer that question. The second question, as I recollect it, was that, when they asked him where his loyalties would lie in case of a war between the U. S. S. R. and the United States, he had refused to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked the same questions?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I was.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your answers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I said "No"; that I was not a member of a spy ring nor never was, and in case of a war between the U. S. S. R. and the United States my loyalties would definitely be with the United States of America. They then wished to know what I was going to do about that and whether I wasn't going to fire him. I told them that I certainly would wish to ask Mr. Kaplan some questions, and told them that I neither hired nor fired for the United Nations. They then wanted to know who did, and I told them it was Mr. Lie and Mr. Owen, my superiors. They wanted to know wasn't I going to tell them about this matter, and I said I probably would, and I in fact did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend Mr. Kaplan's dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That question did not arise when I reported the matter. I was told, having reported the matter, it was now out of my hands.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend Mr. Kaplan's dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not recommend against Mr. Kaplan's dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did not; that question did not come up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express any position with respect to his dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You simply recited what happened before the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you had no further function to perform?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in the light of all that recital, is it still your contention that you do not know and do not have any reason to believe that Mr. Kaplan is or was a Communist or pro-Communist or whether he has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with the Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, because before I came to that kind of conclusion I would certainly want to investigate a matter thoroughly, it being a serious conclusion to come to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, and he said to me he was not.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you discuss it with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. "Discuss" is perhaps too broad a word. When he reported to me about the grand-jury matter.

Senator FERGUSON. He reported to you about the grand-jury matter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you what questions they asked?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask him whether or not he was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He said to me he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me get this straight. Mr. Kaplan reported to you on his appearance before the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As soon as he had come from the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he told you nothing about any of the questions that were asked him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he told me that he had been asked a number of questions about the United Nations and its operations and that he had refused to answer those questions, and he wished to get instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you that he had been asked questions about his own possible membership in the Communist Party or his attitude toward the party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he simply reported to me the official matter that he, as a United Nations employee, had been questioned, and he asked what should he say. I sent him to my superior, Mr. Owen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you anything about communism in connection with his report of what had taken place in the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not at that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then why did you ask him if he was a Communist at that point?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did not ask him if he was a Communist at that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. After I had been to the grand jury.

Mr. SOURWINE. Oh. That is what we wanted to get. That does not sound quite like your earlier testimony, and perhaps we misunderstood you on that. You did not ask him until you had been to the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you asked him. Just what did you ask?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I told him that I had been informed about this and what were the facts in the matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. He told me that he was not a Communist; that he didn't answer these questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you what questions he did not answer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Some of these questions. I told him what the grand jury had told me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You only knew about two questions; is that right?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told him about those two questions?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did tell you he refused to answer them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you whether he was a member of a spy ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He said he was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you why he did not answer those questions at the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe as I recollect it that he said he had consulted counsel and that counsel had told him he did not have to answer these questions, and so he didn't answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you whether he would owe loyalty to the United States or Russia in the event of a war between those two countries?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did he tell you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He would owe it to the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he volunteer that he was not a Communist, or did you ask him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect exactly whether I asked him or he told me, but he certainly left me with the impression that he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he just leave you with the impression that he was not, or did he state voluntarily or in response to a question from you that he was not a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall that I asked him the specific question. What he said to me was that he had every confidence that he could disprove any specific accusation on all of these matters, both with respect to being a Communist, being a member of a spy ring, and matters relating to that, and I left it at that and reported that to my superiors.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now testifying that you never did ask him if he was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I said to him, "Are you?" and he said, "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what we wanted to get. Did you ask him that, or did you not ask him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think the best honest answer I can give you is that I believe I asked him and he said to me no, he was not. At any rate, that certainly was the impression I was left with.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you asked him it means that you did take the logical step and go through the question of what could be proved by him or anybody else and go to the ultimate fact of was he. If you did not ask him it means that you did not go to that ultimate fact.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I must say that I did not conduct an investigation. I meant to go to that ultimate fact. I did not keep a record, and I can't say that I specifically asked it in these words. That was my intention, and what I got satisfied me that he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would say that you satisfied yourself that he was not a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In terms of his answers, "Yes."

Senator FERGUSON. There, Mr. Weintraub, I am wondering why you inquired about that, it not being one of the qualifications or requirements in the job he held, whether he was or was not. What difference did it make? In other words, from what you told us?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only because the question arose in terms of this grand jury investigation, and it was in that context that I asked that. Perhaps I had no right to.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not as an employee of the United Nations; this was rather a personal matter, was it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It probably could be put that way; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you put it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I had by that time become personally involved in the thing, and I was interested to know.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you become personally involved?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In this sense, that I was asked, if I remember correctly by the grand jury, would I knowingly hire a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you tell them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Or recommend one; and I replied to the grand jury that I would not. It was for that reason that I wanted to satisfy myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was Mr. Kaplan's dismissal announced?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't believe it was announced, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn of it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The closing days of April.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew of it before the 1st of May?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so, I think it must have been the 28th of April.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was it that you appeared before the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In the early days of April; I don't remember the exact date.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was Mr. Kaplan notified of his dismissal, do you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. On the same day that I was told about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you the one that notified him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I was not. It was done through formal channels.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I return to the list of names?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Karol, K-a-r-o-l, Kraciewicz, K-r-a-c-z-i-e-w-i-c-z?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I presume my pronunciation is very bad?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is atrocious.

Mr. SOURWINE. The person in question is a national of Poland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so; I couldn't swear to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. A woman?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, a man.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he employed by you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he is not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has he been employed by you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has he been employed by your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is employed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If we are speaking of the same person, he is in the Personnel Bureau.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Of the United Nations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not. I really don't know the person except as an official.

Mr. SOURWINE. Leo Malania, L-e-o, M-a-l-a-n-i-a?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. A national of Canada?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he employed, if you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. At this time he is employed in the Secretary-General's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Of the United Nations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Susan Morris?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know of her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jacquelin Rosenberg?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is she employed, if you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. On the secretariat of the Technical Assistance Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she at one time in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; she never was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Margaret Rukovina, R-u-k-o-v-i-n-a?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know of her.

Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is she employed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In the Technical Assistance Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she ever in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you help her get her present job?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a promotion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect whether it was or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it carry a salary increase?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect; it is conceivable that it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend her transfer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I recommended her.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not because you wanted to get rid of her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, no. As a matter of fact, I wanted her to come and work for me very much.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Marcia Singer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. A United States national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Alfred James Van Tassel?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I know of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he employed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Now in the Technical Assistance Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Formerly in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Formerly in my division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist him to get his transfer or new position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a promotion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't say. He came to me one day, in fact, he came to me with a letter from Senator MacMahon, as I remember it, having worked here on the Hill, but I don't know whether he came directly from here or whether he had been somewhere in between.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you do not know whether he got a promotion when he left your division and went to the Technical Assistance Division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. When he left my division?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I doubt if he did; I think it was a straight transfer.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not trying to get rid of him when you recommended him to the other division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That whole Technical Assistance was moved away and organized into a separate department, and he moved along with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communist connection for Mr. Van Tassel?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know of any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Dimitry, D-i-m-i-t-r-y, Vladimar, V-l-a-d-i-m-a-r, Varley, V-a-r-l-e-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Employed in your division?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with hiring him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You hired most of these people, did you not, who are in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I hired most of the people you have named; yes, sir. I mean, hired is the wrong word to use. As I told you, I neither hire nor fire. There is a procedure for that. There is a Bureau of Personnel, there is a special department that handles that.

Senator FERGUSON. But you recommended?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I certainly recommended some of those names which you have mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know any Communist connection for Mr. Varley?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. David Zablodowsky, Z-a-b-l-o-d-o-w-s-k-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think he is in a section of the secretariat that deals with the printing of documents.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Weintraub, is this a fair statement, that you never inquired about any of these people when you were recommending them as to whether or not they were Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct. I might say that some of those names you mentioned, I know that David Zablodowsky I did not recommend. I don't want you to be under the impression that I admit to knowing more people than I recommended.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To answer your question, sir, we are not supposed to ask that kind of question.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not one of the requirements, is it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not ask a man whether he is a Communist or not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. If he is working in an espionage ring, how would that affect his job at the United Nations? He is sworn to allegiance there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I wouldn't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just asking you if you know. Would that make any difference as long as it was not against the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the extent—exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. You are quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as the rule is concerned that if the espionage, the spy ring, was not a spy ring against the United Nations it would not make any difference, would it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would suppose it would not make any difference.

Senator FERGUSON. I have taken that from your answers that when a man owes allegiance to the United Nations and he is not in a spy ring that involves the United Nations, disloyal to the United Nations,

the United Nations would not be involved in it as you have given these answers; is that right?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct. But I ought to state that I do not make personnel policies.

Senator FERGUSON. But that is your understanding there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. My understanding is that; yes, sir.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communist connection within the limits of the phrase that I constantly use here for David Zablodowsky?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Marjorie Zap?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you employ her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have anything to do with her employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She is working for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communist connection of hers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Herman Zap?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he related to Mary Zap?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is her husband.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he is not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he employed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In the Technical Assistance Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he formerly in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend him for his present position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know anything of a Communist connection for him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what kind of a spy ring the grand jury may have been investigating from what they say to you and said that you could report out?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They never told me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not from the questions put to you it was a spy ring against the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man named Field?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a Philip Morton Field?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize a Philip Morton Field to use your name as a recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

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<sup>4</sup> Mr. Weintraub in a letter to Senator Ferguson dated May 22, 1952, said: "I should have added, 'But I am sure that nobody in the United Nations would knowingly hire anyone who is in any kind of spy ring'."



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize a Philip Morton Field or anyone who was using that name to give your name as a recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give a letter of recommendation to a Philip Morton Field or to anyone under that name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think you might have?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so. I might simply say, sir, not necessarily in connection with that name, but as you have elicited here, I have had over the past 20 years several thousand people working for me and I must have written several hundred letters of recommendation in the normal routine process of people stating they worked for me, they are good people, technical people, and I certainly cannot remember all the names and letters that I have written.

Now I certainly do not recall having ever employed such a person or having written such a letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Just from the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know him personally?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man named Adler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Solomon Adler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Solomon Adler.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he the only Adler you ever knew?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the best of my recollection. I can't think of another Adler.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any close association with him on either social or business matters?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He worked for the same project.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, the research project?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The research project.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize him to use your name as a recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect it, but I may well have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's quite possible, but I don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Max Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did ever have any business contacts with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any social contacts with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Cocktail party kind of social contacts perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that he was anti-FBI?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had read a review of a book that he had written a couple of years ago, I think, somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever discuss that question with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there a rule to your knowledge in the United Nations that they will not hire any American that has ever worked for the FBI as an agent?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I have never heard of such a rule, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell the committee about your business contacts with Mr. Max Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recollect it, Mr. Max Lowenthal was in charge of a unit in the FEA, I guess the Foreign Economic Administration, during the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your first contact with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no contact with him back at the time when you had something to do with Sidney Hillman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so; I don't think I had ever met him before.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I said, he was head of a unit in the Foreign Economic Administration during the war, and both OFFERRO—that is, the Office for Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, I guess it was—in the State Department, and subsequently UNRRA had a great deal of business involving economic matters, and the Foreign Economic Administration was in fact one of the agencies through which the UNRRA dealt with the United States Government.

Consequently I had fairly frequent contact as a person in UNRRA dealing with supply questions with what might in a way be called my opposite number in the United States Government, which was Mr. Lowenthal, and many of his people. So I did have dealings with him, and that was the nature of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it terminate when he and you or he or you left your respective posts, the ones you have mentioned?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe it terminated when he left his post because I think he left his post before I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Whenever the organizational arrangements were changed, it must have been some time in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have had no business connections with him since then?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you seen him since?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so. I don't recollect having seen him since.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned the possibility of a cocktail party. You might have seen him at some cocktail party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's conceivable.

Mr. SOURWINE. Outside of a casual meeting at some function sponsored by a third party organization, would you say you had not seen him or had conferences with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not had any appointments with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Abraham Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us what you know about Mr. Silverman.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I first met Mr. Silverman when he was a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and I was a research assistant. That must have been some time in 1930.



I think I subsequently met him here in Washington sometime during 1933. After that when I was the director of this "National research project"—

Mr. SOURWINE. That was 10 years later, was it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, no. As I said, in 1933. I became director of the "National research project" I believe in 1935.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Did you know him during that intervening 2 years?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I said I met him here in Washington in business connections.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it business or social connections?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Both.

Mr. SOURWINE. During the period from 1931 to 1933?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I had any contact with him between 1931 and 1933.

Mr. SOURWINE. Between 1933 and 1935, both social and business?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead and pick it up at 1935.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In 1935 or 1936, thereabouts, this "National research project" of which I was director was carried out in conjunction with several agencies of the Government, one of which was the Railroad Retirement Board. Mr. Silverman on the Board conducted some of that work for the "National research project," and I had fairly frequent contacts with him there concerning that work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you help him in any way to get his position with that Board?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir; I certainly don't recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think that those are the only business contacts that I had with him except that when I came back to Washington in 1941 I did see him from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any contact with him between 1935 and 1936 and 1941?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, and throughout this project, which lasted from about 1935 to 1941, we had on this work that was being done at the Railroad Retirement Board, frequent contact.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean when you "came back to Washington"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I told you earlier, in 1941 I joined the War Production Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He being in Washington, I meant when I came back to Washington I saw him from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. But that was not a resumption of the association because the association had continued, had it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. I am trying to give you the story year by year as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right, it was a continuation except that the business end of the association ended with my leaving the "National research project," that is what I meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was what year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That was in 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. But having known him we continued the association on an occasional lunch basis kind of thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you met with him periodically at lunch?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, from time to time we would run across each other and have a drink together.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make luncheon appointments?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do that with some regularity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. As often as once a month?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Three times a year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Conceivably, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As often as four or five times a year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would say three is nearer to the number than five, something like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who used to make the appointments, you or he—that is, who initiated them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Both ways?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Quite possibly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sometimes you? Did you sometimes initiate luncheon appointments with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Quite possible, I am quite sure I must have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he sometimes initiate luncheon appointments with you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on other occasions you just ran across him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Continue.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen him since then?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I haven't seen him since I left Washington.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever had any dealings with Mr. Silverman other than social or governmental?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever leave a package with Mr. Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give or hand him a package at any time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize Mr. Silverman to use you as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever do anything to assist Mr. Silverman in getting a commission in the Air Force?

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<sup>5</sup> Mr. Weintraub in a letter to Senator Homer Ferguson, dated May 22, 1952, made the following statement:

"With respect to the last reply, I subsequently recollected that I saw Silverman again about half a dozen times in New York shortly after I joined the staff of the United Nations. As I recollect it, he was negotiating for a job in New York and looking for an apartment. He got in touch with me and since he indicated that he was having difficulty in getting a hotel room during his visits to New York I told him to feel free to stay over at our house whenever he wanted to. At that time we lived in a furnished 10-room apartment at 955 Park Avenue and had plenty of spare rooms since our normal requirements are about 5 rooms. Mr. Silverman availed himself of that invitation on several occasions. As near as I can recollect it, this was near the end of the year 1946, and I have not seen him since then."



Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my recollection. I didn't know he had a commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had applied for a commission in the Air Force.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever recommend Gregory Silvermaster for a commission in the Air Force?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Silvermaster?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could I finish with Silverman, Senator, before we get to the next person?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know that Mr. George Silverman had used your name and the names of Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie as references in an application for a commission in the Air Force?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever knew that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not the Air Force check with you about that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I certainly don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now if the Senator wants to pursue the question about Mr. Silvermaster?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I knew him.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Here in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. How well did you know him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Very casually, he was an employee of the FERA when I was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Superior?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. We didn't have anything to do with each other actually. He was working somewhere else, and I just knew that he was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you met him recently?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When is the last time you saw him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Probably when I left the FERA, which must have been in 1935.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Elizabeth Bentley?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I read her name in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could I ask about some other names, Mr Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know George Perazich, P-e-r-a-z-i-c-h-.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I pronounce that name properly?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us about your association with Mr. Perazich?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was an employee of this same project, the national research project.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you had anything to do with his employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so beyond having general responsibility.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead. What else do you know about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe that he also was subsequently an employee of OFRRO in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with securing that appointment for him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that I did, but had he given me as a reference I probably would have given him a good reference, but I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize him to use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not specifically, but again I think he would have had a right to feel that he could, having worked for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. What else do you know about Mr. Perazich?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He, subsequently, as I recall it, was also employed by UNRRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his employment there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so, but it is quite likely that he transferred over with the OFRRO staff to UNRRA. In any case he did not work for me either in OFRRO or in UNRRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, what more do you know about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. There is very little more I think that I can tell you. As I recall it, he was sent off on a mission to Yugoslavia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sent off by whom?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. By someone in UNRRA, not myself, but normally that would have been handled by a part of the shop which I think was called area studies—not area studies—Bureau of Areas, I think it was called.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the end of him?

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean "the end of him"?

Mr. SOURWINE. He says he does not know what happened to him, and he went on a mission to Yugoslavia.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am trying to recall now. Well, he came back, I know that, but I really couldn't tell you what happened to him after that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know where he is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any social or business contacts or dealings with him other than those you have told the committee about?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, he was a fellow with green fingers.

Senator FERGUSON. With what?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I owned a house here, and I had a garden. I had no time to do anything in the garden, and as I remember it, George loved to work with flowers, and for a time when his family wasn't here he used to come around on Sundays and just putter away,



and that is the only other contacts that I can recall, and I appreciated that very much.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have Mr. Perazich use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall that I authorized him to, but again I wish to say that he would have had the right to use my name as a reference, having worked for me before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Perazich was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of any organization of which Mr. Perazich was also a member?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of any organization of which Mr. Silverman was also a member?

Senator FERGUSON. Any group?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so short of, I am a member of the American Economic Association, and I would assume he is likely to be, it is that kind of technical association.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of any group or organization other than the technical kind that you have mentioned of which Nathan Gregory Silvermaster was a member?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that at the time Mr. Perazich was a member of the Bentley ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man named Harry Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize him to use your name as a recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I don't recollect the specific authorization, but he worked for me, and he would have had the right to use my name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is quite likely that I did, although I do not specifically recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any social association with Mr. Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, a casual sort. In Philadelphia when he worked on the project that I was director of, I remember he lived only a block or two away from me, and their babies and my babies were born about the same time, and we used to admire each other's babies in baby carriages and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not have a green thumb?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. At least I don't know of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. With him it was a mutual interest in babies and with Mr. Perazich it was a mutual interest in gardening?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If you care to put it that way. It wasn't mutual, I had no interest in the gardening.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just had the garden?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I just had the garden, and that lasted only for a brief period, but I didn't want to leave it out since you asked me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Anatoli Borisovitch Gromov?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Never head of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. A former first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall the name.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Gubichev when he was with the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Judith Coplon?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever in contact with Mr. Gromov?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so, although I must say I was in contact with the Soviet Embassy as an employee of UNRRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Throughout my employment with UNRRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been what period by years?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. 1944 to 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they make contributions to UNRRA, the Soviets?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the administrative fund of UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the administrative fund?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically were you in contact in December of 1944 with Mr. Gromov?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I certainly don't recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever go to the Soviet Embassy to see him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that, but it's possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever call him on the telephone?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is possible, but I don't recollect the name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever go to the Soviet Embassy at any time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. In what connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I recall several cocktail parties at the Soviet Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that on May Day?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. More likely on the anniversary of the Revolution, which is sometime in November.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever go to the Soviet Embassy other than to a social function, and by social function I mean an affair to which many were invited?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so, but I fairly frequently went to the Soviet Purchasing Mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Silverman and Perazich and Magdoff and Kaplan and Gromov, of whom we have been talking, all have been named by Elizabeth T. Bentley, who is a self-confessed former Soviet agent, as having been members of an underground group in Washington, the purpose of which was to gather and forward information to the Russian Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I knew of some of those names. I don't think I recall all of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which of those names did you remember?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Would you mind repeating them?

Mr. SOURWINE. Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I remember that was one.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn about him?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I was in Geneva at the time when the thing broke in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you learned about that at about the time that Miss Bentley testified?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perazich?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever heard about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I think that was another name that came to light at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. About the same time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You learned about that at the same time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Irving Kaplan.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Gromov?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Is that the same Kaplan as the man sitting here today?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you knew when Elizabeth Bentley testified about his so-called connection with the espionage ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That was exactly the question Mr. Sourwine asked me.

Senator FERGUSON. You seemed surprised that the grand jury would ask him a question like that.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I didn't say I was surprised.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the open testimony before the Senate connected him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you disbelieve Miss Bentley's testimony?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I didn't believe it.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't believe it?

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was shocked.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any basis of knowledge concerning the facts to which she testified?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. This much, that when I heard of the name Kaplan I think I heard that first through a memorandum which was received in Geneva when I was there. That memorandum was received by Mr. Owen, my superior, from a man who was then in charge of the department in New York, a Mr. Goldet, G-o-l-d-e-t, and as I recollect it, the memorandum stated that Mr. Kaplan had come to see him; that Mr. Kaplan had told him that this was a ridiculous charge; that it was not true; that he had every faith that on any opportunity to disprove it he could do so. That is the memorandum that was received in Geneva.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Kaplan's job at that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was the job that he has now. He was then working for the United Nations in my division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Kaplan was ever there-after given the opportunity to disprove the charge?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe Mr. Kaplan had stated, but I don't recollect it very exactly, that he had offered to come to the same committee before which Miss Bentley had made the charges and that I think he was never called.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he ever was called?

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever voluntarily appear before the committee and ask to be heard?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know that, but as I recollect it, he either told me or told Mr. Owen that he had offered to come.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he ever did in fact appear?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not think he ever in fact appeared, but I cannot say that I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make any effort to find out whether he had in fact appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I can't recollect it exactly, but I think I asked him, and he said to me no, he was never called.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand now that he had been working for the United Nations and nothing had been said about it although Bentley testified before a committee of the Senate and one of the House that he was in an espionage ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But when the grand jury tells you about it, you go back and tell the United Nations, and either by coincidence or something else he loses his job?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Those are the facts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Has there been a change in attitude on the part of the U. N.? I am talking of your personal knowledge.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't answer that.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean your personal knowledge.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To my knowledge I know of no changes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now with regard to Mr. Perazich, you said you did not know of Miss Bentley's charges concerning him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct; I don't recall having heard.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Magdoff; did you disbelieve her charges with regard to Mr. Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I was surprised.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a difference between surprise and disbelieving. Did you disbelieve?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believed that Magdoff could probably prove that it wasn't so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever talk to him about it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I never saw him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did disbelieve her charges then?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think it would be correct to say that I had confidence that he could probably disprove that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you believe it about anyone she had said that they were in the ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. There are many names that I never heard of.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean that you knew.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not. I felt the same way.

Senator FERGUSON. About all of them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. About all of them.



Senator FERGUSON. Did you question these people as to whether or not she was telling the truth?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. Most of these people I never saw since then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Whittaker Chambers had testified that these people were members of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I could say I knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had testified that any of them were members of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I never read the testimony of Whittaker Chambers.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not the question, did you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Consequently I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are saying that you did not know, for instance, that Mr. Whittaker Chambers had ever testified that Abraham George Silverman was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not recollect that I knew it as a testimony by Whittaker Chambers. Conceivably I saw it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that anybody had testified in support of Miss Bentley's charges in that regard?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I am afraid I cannot answer you as a matter of positive knowledge because I believe I was in Europe at the time and did not follow the thing closely and what I saw, I saw bits and snatches that appeared in the European press, and I never went back to the testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never got any information about Whittaker Chambers' testimony?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is not correct. I got information again through the newspapers, and as I recall it, it was primarily a matter of Alger Hiss, but I don't recall the names.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you know Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. How well did you know Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only casually, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever work in the State Department with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not with him, but I think I met him casually at that time, and I subsequently met him when he was president of the Carnegie Fund where he on several occasions came to the United Nations, and there was a meeting or two about some report that Carnegie Fund was writing about the United Nations. I met him then again.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him information on that report?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. About the United Nations?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I gave any information directly to him, but to some of his people. I think some of his people went to see quite a number of people in the United Nations about its structure and so forth, and I am sure I talked to one or more of his people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the Perlo group?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what the Perlo group is or was?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man named Perlo, P-e-r-l-o?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his first name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I can't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it Victor?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. When and where did you know him, and how long did the association continue?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect exactly, but some time somewhere in Washington in some official connection, I believe it was, in the War Production Board. I remember meeting a man named Perlo in some official capacity and that is about all I can remember of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have—

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever had any other contacts, social or otherwise.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of the Perlo group?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet with any other persons in a room with Perlo?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge, did your wife Sylvia ever attend any Communist meetings?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she present at a fraction meeting or fraction meetings of the Communist Party in the Philadelphia area?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she ever attend any Communist Party meetings in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the Coordinating Committee for Post-war Rehabilitation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who the members of that committee were at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I say, I don't remember the name of the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it refresh your recollection that the members of that committee might have been Murray Lattimer, Morris Rosenthal, and yourself?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. There never was such a committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. There never was a committee of which you, Murray Lattimer, and Morris Rosenthal were members?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. There never was any such committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, Mr. Lattimer, and Mr. Rosenthal ever meet together?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you ever recall any such meetings?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the occasion of any meeting of that nature?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I don't remember any such meetings, and when I say it's quite possible, it is simply because Murray Lattimer was Governor Lehman's deputy in OFRRO, I was a top-ranking employee in OFRRO at that time, Rosenthal was a top-ranking employee of the Foreign Economic Administration. We must have had common business, and it's quite conceivable that the three of us met sometime, but I just don't recollect it specifically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the three of you ever meet with Max Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That again is possible, but again I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have frequent meetings with Max Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Alone, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. The group.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or you and one of the other two?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You may have met with him, you say, on more than one occasion. Do you remember any such meeting?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. Again it is rather vague in my mind. I remember I once came to the offices of the FEA, there was a meeting of which Lowenthal was chairman. I represented either OFRRO or UNRRA, and we conducted some business, but I don't remember exactly what it was any more.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Murray Lattimer or you and Morris Rosenthal or you and both Mr. Lattimer and Mr. Rosenthal meet with Mr. Lowenthal outside Government offices?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect any such meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Parker McAllister?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Director of rehabilitation for the Balkan area.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss Mr. McAllister's appointment with anyone?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I said, I don't remember McAllister's name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you have discussed Mr. McAllister's appointment with Mr. Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I doubt it very much since I don't remember McAllister's name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss any appointments with Mr. Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Lowenthal ever to you or in your hearing question the appointment of any man not known to be a liberal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Norman Bursler, B-u-r-s-l-e-r?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's very vague in my mind. He seems to have been one of the employees of the National Research project in its very early days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only in my general capacity as the person responsible for the project.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there has been testimony under oath that he was a member of an underground group for the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Frank Coe?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I first met Mr. Coe in the summer of 1933 when he was working for an employers' group in the clothing industry in Chicago, as I recall it, when I assisted Mr. Sidney Hillman on the brief, and he did a technical job on the other side, and I never

Senator FERGUSON. Was that an economic brief or a legal brief?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was an economic brief. He more or less performed the same kind of function for the employers' group that I did on the union group.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there any attorneys associated in that matter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall that. I simply did a technical job on the brief, and he did a technical job on the other side, and I never had anything further to do with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all you ever had anything to do with Mr. Coe?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; that was the first time I ran into him. I don't think I ran into Coe again for years until I came back to Washington and was working in UNRRA. I think that Coe at that time occupied some position in the Foreign Economic Administration and that I again began to run into him there, but that was rather infrequent, and subsequently I believe I had again some contacts with him when he became secretary of the International Monetary Fund.

I had occasional lunch with him, and that is about all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you now informed the committee fully with regard to the extent of your association with Mr. Coe?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so. I have had, as I said, occasional contacts with him of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there had been sworn testimony that Mr. Frank Coe was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you learn that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I think when I was in Geneva. As I remember it, it appeared in the newspapers at the same time as Mr. Harry White's name was mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us the extent of your association with Mr. Currie?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's again a casual kind of association stretching over quite a number of years, probably going back to something like 1934 or thereabouts. I remember attending some meetings together with Mr. Currie involving discussions about some economic matters and problems.



Mr. SOURWINE. Were those meetings which you attended in your official capacity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. I remember meeting him from time to time in various places, and I would say that the contacts I had with Mr. Currie from the years 1934 to about 1947 or 1948 were probably no more than half a dozen to a dozen contacts over that whole stretch of years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that there had been sworn testimony that Mr. Currie was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you learn that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. About the same time as I heard about Harry White and Coe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a person named Bela, B-e-l-a, Gold?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear that name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a Sonia Gold?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear that name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that name either.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified about Abraham Silverman; have you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you told the committee fully concerning your knowledge and association with Mr. Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know William Taylor?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The name sounds familiar, but I don't recall now.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of a Mr. William Taylor?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I say, only as a familiar name, but I just couldn't place it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a person named William Ludwig?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever heard the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you testified fully with regard to your knowledge of and association with Victor Perlo?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know an Edward J. Fitzgerald?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee what you know about him and what your association with him was, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was one of the employees of the "National research project." As I recall it, he left the project to go to work for some Government agency, and I don't recollect exactly which it was. I don't believe I have had any contact with him since then; at least, I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there had been sworn testimony that Mr. Fitzgerald was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I heard that.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you hear it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember any more, but it appears to be associated in my mind with that same Bentley testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You read all of this in the newspapers; is that right?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, about Fitzgerald?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And about these other people that you said you learned at the same time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Harold Glasser, G-l-a-s-s-e-r?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us what you know about him and inform the committee concerning your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recall it, I first met Harold Glasser when I worked in the State Department in OFRRO just prior to the calling of the first UNRRA Council when we were preparing certain documents for the Council in collaboration with other departments of Government; and, as I remember it, Harold Glasser represented the United States Treasury in a series of meetings that we had about the financial plan for UNRRA.

Subsequently Glasser was one of the representatives of the United States Government in a series of meetings that lasted over years dealing with UNRRA, involving the United States contribution to UNRRA, and involving a committee of an intergovernmental committee of UNRRA which dealt with the ability of governments to pay for the relief supplies; and, since I was secretary of that committee, I met him at every meeting.

I think that is the total of my association with Glasser.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there has been sworn testimony that Mr. Glasser was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I don't recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Charles Kramer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Charles Krevitsky, K-r-e-v-i-t-s-k-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Solomon Leshinsky, L-e-s-h-i-n-s-k-y or L-e-c-h-i-n-s-k-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us what you know about him. First, do you know which spelling is correct?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know about him? What is your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Leshinsky was an employee of the "National research project" in Philadelphia, if I remember correctly, and subsequently was an employee of UNRRA. In both instances I was his superior; although not his immediate superior. That is about all I can tell you about Leshinsky.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with his employment; that is, employing him, securing employment for him, or recommending him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only in this general way. I don't remember specifically employing him or recommending him.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there has been sworn testimony that Mr. Leshinsky was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had heard that.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you hear it, and when?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As a matter of fact, now I recall Leshinsky dropped into the U. N. offices—it must be several years ago—and told me that himself, if I remember correctly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why he did that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he came in. I think, as I remember it, one day my secretary told me “Mr. Leshinsky is outside and wants to see you.” I think he just came in and said, “Well, I happened to be in New York and wanted to drop in and say hello.” He said he hoped I didn’t mind wasting my time on that, and I said I did not.

As I recall it now, he told me he had a farm and that, as he expressed it, he was being hounded by an accusation of this kind, and it was a lot of nonsense, but it certainly was taking up a lot of his energy and things like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you believe his denials?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you subsequently make any investigation with respect to the truth or falsity of the charges against him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you fully informed the committee with regard to your knowledge of and association with Harry Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Allan Rosenberg, A-l-l-a-n, R-o-s-e-n-b-e-r-g?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It sounds like the name of a man who was in the FEA, if I remember correctly. Could you refresh my memory? Was he in FEA with Lowenthal or something like that?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am unable to state. I am asking you for your recollection.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the best of my recollection, I seem to remember a man of that name in the FEA in that same group that Lowenthal was in as a person with whom I had dealings during UNRRA days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Allan Rosenberg has been cited in sworn testimony as a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Donald Niven Wheeler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don’t recall the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Harry Dexter White?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you informed the committee fully concerning what you know about Mr. White and your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe you didn’t ask me anything about Mr. White.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us, please?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The association with Mr. White was also a rather casual one stretching over quite a number of years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you first meet him in a business connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. When?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall exactly, but I think it must have been around 1934 or 1935, somewhere in the Federal Reserve Board or something like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not know him before that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I think what we will do at the present time is to suspend with the witness, and counsel has a few letters he wants to put in the record at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. First is an extract from the Far Eastern Survey dated June 30, 1943, and it is entitled "The Navy Needs Men for the Military Government Program."

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344B" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344B

THE NAVY NEEDS MEN, SPECIAL PROGRAM 108-43 (MILITARY GOVERNMENT)

The Navy needs exceptional men capable of accepting an over-all range of executive responsibilities to serve as administrative officers in the Military Government of occupied areas. A college degree is essential, preferably with a major and postgraduate work in international relations, law, trade, or finance; or the domestic fields of political science, economics, public administration, law, or finance. The age limits are from 28 to 45. Civilian experience must have included at least three years of executive-administrative work.

Government, business, and education are the three fields which can contribute most of these higher-caliber executives. Backgrounds of foreign service in any of these three fields, with a knowledge of languages and customs of individual foreign countries (preferably the South Pacific and Far East area), are particularly desirable, but not absolutely essential.

"Officers in Military Government will be expected to serve beyond the expiration of the war. This message is not intended for men engaged in essential war industries or employed by a federal agency. Candidates should apply at the nearest Office of Naval Procurement or write to the Secretary of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc."

—FAR EASTERN SURVEY, June 30, 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Raymond Dennett to Mr. Robert Morris, special counsel, dated February 7, 1952, asking that a certain change be made in the testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, this is a letter which was received by you here?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. And connected with it is a carbon copy of your reply. Do you desire that to go in also?

Mr. MORRIS. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be made a part of the record.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344C" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344C

RAYMOND DENNETT

21 LOWELL ST.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., February 7, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

*Special Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security,*

*Committee on the Judiciary,*

*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In reading over the printed record of my testimony before the subcommittee I have discovered minor errors to which I should direct your



attention. The first is clerical, and the second a misunderstanding on my part of the question you asked as we were rushing to adjourn.

On the third or fourth page of my testimony where I am describing the set-up of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the printed record states, in regard to the Washington office, that Mr. Lattimore was later associated with that office. It was Mrs. Lattimore and not her husband who was on our payroll.

The record also shows that the final question you asked me was whether Gunther Stein attended the Hot Springs conference as a member of the American delegation and that I answered that this statement was correct. I understood you to ask whether Gunther Stein attended the Hot Springs conference. Stein did attend, but, as *Security in the Pacific* shows, he attended as a member of the United Kingdom and not the United States delegation.

I thought these two corrections should be brought to your attention and, if you consider it desirable, entered in the record.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT.

RD :jw

FEBRUARY 12, 1952.

Mr. RAYMOND DENNETT,  
21 Lowell Street, Cambridge, Mass.:

DEAR MR. DENNETT: Thank you for your letter of February 7th. I shall ask the committee to insert your letter into the record with the two changes that appear therein.

Thank you for calling this to our attention.

Sincerely,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel*.

RM/al

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a request by Senator Pat McCarran addressed to the Honorable Henri Bonnet, Ambassador of France, and the reply from Mr. Bonnet to Senator McCarran, dated April 17, 1952, stating that Andrew Roth had been barred admission to Indochina.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344D," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344D

APRIL 8, 1952.

HON. HENRI BONNET,  
*Ambassador of France.*  
2535 Belmont Road, Washington, D. C.

My DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Would you kindly let us know, for the use of the Internal Security Subcommittee, whether or not in the 1940's, possibly about 1945, a writer named Andrew Roth was refused admission to Saigon on the order of the French High Commissioner. If so, I would like to have the reasons for such action.

Kindest regards and all best wishes.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman*.

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, AUX ETATS, UNIS,  
April 17, 1952.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*Chairman Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*United States Senate, Washington, D. C.,*

MY DEAR MR. SENATOR: With reference to your letter of April 8th concerning Andrew Roth, I have the honour to inform you that this journalist has been refused admission to Indochina since 1949 because of his extremely violent attacks in American, Chinese, and Indochinese newspapers against the French presence in that country.

Between 1946 and 1949, Andrew Roth had made several journeys to Indochina.

HENRI BONNET.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is an exchange of correspondence between Senator McCarran, who writes to the Honorable Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, dated January 19, 1952, and a reply to Senator McCarran signed by William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated January 29, 1952, in connection with the publication *The Making of Modern China*, being published in the *Infantry Journal* of the United States Forces.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344E," and is as follows:)

(The booklet, *The Making of Modern China*, by Eleanor and Owen Lattimore, was filed in committee files for reference.)

EXHIBIT No. 1344E

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, January 29, 1952.

Senator PAT McCARRAN,  
*United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: Inclosed are copies of a paper-backed edition on "The Making of Modern China" by Eleanor and Owen Lattimore, and Army Talk No. 66, published by the Army during the summer of 1945 on the subject of "Our Ally China," as requested in your letter of 19 January 1952.

You will note that the booklet "The Making of Modern China" was published by the *Infantry Journal* and not by the United States Armed Forces Institute. So far as the Armed Forces of the United States are concerned, both of these publications are obsolete and have been withdrawn from circulation. The entire stock of the book was declared obsolete and salvaged in December 1947 except a few file copies, from which I was able to obtain the inclosed copy. The Army Talk, "Our Ally China," was declared obsolete by Army Circular No. 346, dated 26 November 1946. Neither of these publications has been distributed or referred to in publications of the Armed Forces of the United States since the above dates.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM C. FOSTER,  
*Deputy Secretary of Defense.*

Inclosures—2.

JANUARY 19, 1952.

HON. ROBERT A. LOVETT,  
*Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: For purposes of the inquiry of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee into the affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations, we would like to obtain a copy of a paper-backed edition of "The Making of Modern China" by Eleanor and Owen Lattimore, published by the United States Armed Forces Institute at Madison, Wisconsin, and a copy of an Army fact sheet published for orientation work in the Armed Forces during the summer of 1945 dealing with China. A photostat of the latter would do.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*



[Restricted]

## ARMY TALK—ORIENTATION FACT SHEET 66

WAR DEPARTMENT—WASHINGTON 25, D. C.—7 APRIL 1945

*Note For This Week's Discussion*

There are three main points to develop in this week's discussion: (1) China, in spite of her extreme poverty and lack of sufficient numbers of well-trained, well-equipped troops, has waged a heroic war against Japan; (2) A united, progressive China can hasten the final defeat of the enemy; the present internal political tension within the country is a serious problem; (3) Only a strong, forward-looking, democratic China can give leadership to the people of the Far East and function as a leading member of the United Nations. (Suggested references: Fact Sheet Nos. 27 and 28; also *Changing China* by George E. Taylor, and *The Making of Modern China* by Owen Lattimore—both of these volumes were issued in the basic reference library for Information and Education officers.)

## OUR ALLY CHINA

There is no need to tell you that great numbers of American soldiers are fighting the Japanese in the Pacific. Many of them are fighting alongside our Chinese ally—on the soil of China. And many more—perhaps some of you—will eventually get there.

This is certainly not the first time you have talked about China—you have undoubtedly read articles about the Chinese people and their heroic struggle with the Japanese since as far back as 18 September 1931.

Today we will spend our hour in an attempt to get at several important points that we ought to know about China—there is a lot more to talk about but this will not be our only opportunity.

Newspaper stories, magazine articles, and books have been written about what is supposed to be going on within China. Sometimes authors tell conflicting stories. Often enough it is hard to tell whether the conflicting reports are the result of individual bias or inadequate information.

One hears a lot of phrases that seem to have special meaning: The Nationalist Government, the Chinese "Communists," guerrilla fighters, lack of unity, war lords, Japanese puppets, and so on. Later, we will try to get a clearer picture. Right now let us remember that China is big—China is poor—China has about 450 million people—people like yourself and myself—all of whom very likely want the same things that you and I do: peace, a chance to make a decent living, and a chance to have some fun out of life. There isn't a GI in our Army who doesn't want these things—and that is about the same for the Chinese GI.

China, like the United States—like any nation—has her problems. Some are internal, others are related to the War. We can't begin to consider all of them. But it is important for us to know how some of her major problems affect the United Nations war effort and how they will affect the peace to come.

We are vitally concerned in the affairs of our Chinese ally. We each need each other in the battle against Japan. And when the War has been won—we will still need each other. America and the world need a strong, forward-looking, democratic China ready to give leadership to the people of the Far East and prepared to function as a leading member of the United Nations.

*(The foregoing may be useful as a brief introduction to the topic for discussion.)*

## WHY IS CHINA BACKWARD?

*(Question: Why does China, by American standards, seem poverty-stricken and backward?)*

Many reasons might be given for China's poverty and economic backwardness. Here are a few of the most important.

1. *China has an enormous population.*—Even with all her dependencies, she is not a great deal larger than the United States, yet she has between three and four times as many people—about 450 million, as compared with the 130 million of the United States. Much of her land is either mountainous or so dry that it cannot support agriculture without artificial irrigation. As a result, most of her people are crowded upon a comparatively small part of the land. Forty-six



Chinese farm families have to get a living out of the land that *one* American farm family of the same size would have.

As things now stand, the overcrowding of land means poverty for most people. About 80 percent of China's population are farmers. And it also means that in the past, the existence of an almost limitless supply of cheap manpower as acted as a definite check upon such a development of labor-saving machinery as we have had in the West.

2. *China is an old country.*—Considerable parts of China have been under continuous and intensive cultivation for more than 3,000 years, yet they still produce large crops today. This is only possible because of the infinite and painstaking toil that has been put into the soil by generation after generation of Chinese farmers. In the United States we have had quite a different situation. But that would happen if we were as crowded as the Chinese, or if we had been forced to stay settled on the same land for two or three thousand years. Taking these factors into account, perhaps it will be easier for us to realize what the Chinese are up against.

3. *China is poor in natural resources.*—Coal is the only basic resource that is plentiful, except for large deposits of a few of the rarer metals, such as tungsten. But in iron her known reserves would last only nine years at the annual U. S. rate of consumption. Her situation as to oil is even worse. This helps to explain why the Chinese are so far behind us in industrialization. They do not have our almost limitless and easily accessible natural resources. The annual output of iron in China is only three pounds per capita (as compared with 550 pounds in the United States), and even in coal she annually produces only 100 pounds per capita (as compared with 10,000 pounds in the United States).

Much of China has never been properly surveyed for minerals, and future explorations, especially in China's little known western regions, will undoubtedly on the War, and in spite of certain other inequities in the distribution of wartime burdens, the harrowing fact remains that the average Chinese is living under conditions but one step removed from starvation. But in spite of all this, the Chinese are still fighting with us today, though the battle has not been going too well.

#### MILITARY SITUATION CRITICAL

(*Question: What is the present military situation?*)

At the start of 1945, the military situation in China looked worse than it has in all her seven years of war. The United Nations suffered a major defeat when the Japanese succeeded in joining together their forces in northern and southern China. Three major gains accrued to Japan from this move—she virtually established a continuous land corridor between her base in Manchuria and her conquests in Indo-China and the East Indies; she drove us from our principal air-bases in South China; she placed herself in a position to prevent the Chinese from coming to our aid should we attempt a landing on the China coast.

At present Japan is garrisoning the coast of China, in greater strength, to prepare for the threat of American landings. reveal many hitherto unknown resources. As things stand today, these figures point clearly to why China is a poor country.

4. *China has been fighting a war, on her own soil, for seven years.*—Actually China's war with Japan began in 1931 when the Japanese struck in Manchuria. However, after rapidly overrunning this province, the Japanese turned to the problem of exploiting its resources, and did not strike again until 1937. But between 1937 and 1939 the Chinese had lost to the enemy precisely those parts of their country which were richest and economically most developed. They were forced back into the deep interior regions that were the least modernized parts of the country. Before 1937 that part of China which is now not occupied by the Japanese possessed only about ten percent of the industrial plants, and 20 percent of the railroads; it mined only 22 percent of China's coal and milled less than three percent of her flour.

Millions of Chinese preferred to flee from Japanese rule into the interior of Free China, thus complicating the problem of food and support. The entry of America and Britain into the Far Eastern war and the resulting blockade against our shipping made China's economic position worse rather than better, because its immediate result was to cut off China almost entirely from the outside world. Is it any wonder, then, that there is a terrible scarcity of almost all kinds of goods in Free China today; a resulting inflation that has raised price levels to several hundred times what they were in 1937; and that



black markets and profiteering activities have sprung up on all sides? This blockade has reduced China's normal poverty to misery and suffering. Thousands of highly cultivated Chinese people who were accustomed to some of the normal comforts of living are gradually dropping below the minimum standard of health requirements. In spite of the profiteers who are fattening

These gains by the Japanese have been blamed on many things—insufficient supplies from us, corruption and bad management in the Chinese government, and poor leadership in the Chinese Army. We shall take a closer look at these complaints a little later.

#### IS GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATIC?

(Question: Why do some people find it difficult to call China a "democracy?")

Since 1912 China has been a republic. We Americans have been told many things about China's heroic struggle for human freedom. But there are certain things that may seem startling or even appalling—things that don't seem to fit into the usual pattern of what we think of as a republic. A one-party form of government, for example, controlled by the Kuomintang (Gwoh-min-dahng) or National People's Party; a president but no popular elections; and governmental control over the press and other institutions that are run as private enterprises in our own country. In other words we find in China that the terms "republic" and "democracy" do not always necessarily mean the same thing. Though China, by abolishing the monarchy, has become a republic, she hasn't yet fully worked out the democratic processes that we think should go with a republican form of government.

#### ONE-PARTY RULE

The control of the government by a single party, the Kuomintang, is the result of historical circumstances, for it was the Kuomintang that, under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, overthrew the monarchy in 1912. In China the men who created the revolution were a comparatively small group of ardent revolutionaries. They had to struggle against reactionary forces of all kinds. Thus the Kuomintang tends to look upon itself as a very special and select group, better qualified than others to lead China in her new path.

Sun Yat-sen and his followers believed that the introduction of representative government in China could only be done very slowly. Therefore they regarded the revolution as a gradual and continuing process that would include three different stages: The first, that of *military operations*, came to an end in 1929, after the Kuomintang armies, led by Chiang Kai-shek, had reunified China after the disorders that had followed the overthrow of the empire. The second stage that followed, that of *political tutelage*, was a period when China was being prepared, under the leadership of the Kuomintang, for full democratic government. In 1937 it was to have been followed by the third phase, that of full *constitutional government*, when the Kuomintang would give up its one-party rule and hand the government over to the entire Chinese people. But, unfortunately, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the same year made this last step impossible. Thus China still remains in the stage of political tutelage, and is still under the government of the Kuomintang.

During the last 100 years China has been politically weak—so weak that it has sometimes been referred to as "a loose sheet of sand." During the last 20 years the Kuomintang has done very much to change this situation, but in the process it has inevitably been led to the use of forceful and sometimes even repressive measures. Since 1937, too, its centralized control has been considerably increased. Whether China can make a smooth transition to constitutionalism at the end of the War, or whether reactionary forces win out is a question of vital importance.

#### ROLE OF THE "COMMUNISTS"

(Question: What is the difficulty between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists?")

One of the most serious bars against the realization of full representative government in China is the continuing tension between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists." When we speak of the Chinese "Communists," we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "communist." In the first place, unlike communists of the orthodox type, they



believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of China's farmers, many of whom own but little land themselves, and rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese "Communists" are not, like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of the Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of North China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against the Japanese.

The present situation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists" has a long and complex history behind it. The Chinese Communist Party got its real start when certain Soviet advisers were sent by the USSR to China in the early 1920's to help the Kuomintang in its work of uniting the country.

In 1927, shortly before this unification was completed, a split developed between the Kuomintang and "Communist" groups, and in the years following this split led to serious civil war, in the course of which the Kuomintang armies finally drove the "Communists" into the northwest part of China. Their capital is at Yen-an (Yen-ahn) in Shensi (Shen-see) province.

But late in 1936, when the threat from Japan was growing, the feeling became general that this costly internal conflict must end. This resulted in the creation of an armed truce.

During the first years of the War this truce operated very well. But as the years passed by, and China became almost completely isolated from the outside world with resulting inflation and economic suffering of incredible proportions, the old tensions and mutual suspicions reappeared. The "Communists" accused the Kuomintang of failing to send them necessary military supplies and withholding the cooperation needed for the common struggle against Japan. The Kuomintang, on the other hand, accused the "Communists" of failing to obey the orders of the Central (Kuomintang) Government, and of wanting to set up an independent state for themselves in the northwest.

The situation is so complex and has such an involved history, that it is very difficult for any outsider to say definitely who is right and who is wrong. Probably some degree of right and wrong attaches to both sides. The "Communists" say that they are trying to carry out certain economic and political reforms that the Kuomintang has up till now been unable or unwilling to make. Some American and other observers who have visited the "Communists" agree that their program is a moderate one, and that the things they have been doing in their areas are quite in accord with what we think of as a liberal democracy.

In the early autumn of 1944, Chinese press censorship was temporarily relaxed and American correspondents in China were able to give us a clearer picture of the Chinese situation in general, a situation which came as somewhat of a shock to the American public.

#### NEED UNDERSTANDING AND HELP

We Americans are accustomed to newspapers which freely express their views. We have a long heritage of political freedom. We have fought for the rights of trial by jury, habeas corpus, and freedom of speech. With us the idea of a secret police run by a government is so obnoxious that no government would dare try it. But we sometimes forget that part of the reason that we have and keep these liberties is that we also have enough to eat, and a certain security in our lives which is unknown in the Orient. The years of war against Japan, the terrible malnutrition of the people and the internal conflicts have produced, in China, conditions which require both economic and political improvement. We, on our part, must try to understand China's problems and help her in solving them. All who know this patient people, cheerful under unbelievable hardships, believe they have a chance of coming through.

Recently there have been indications that internal affairs in China have been improving. Negotiations and talks between Chungking and Yen-an have been continuing over the past nine months, with General Chou En-lai as the chief representative of the "Communists." Dr. T. V. Soong, whose attitude toward the "Communists" is considered moderate, has been made premier of the Central Government. Early in December 1944, the Generalissimo withdrew large numbers of troops from the armies that had been blockading the "Communists" for six years and rushed them south to Kweichow (Gway-joh) province where they have helped to repulse the Japanese. In March, Chiang announced a National Assembly to convene on 12 November 1945, to draw up a constitution. All par-



ties, including the "Communists," are to be invited and all are to have equal status.

#### OUR BASIC CONCERN

*(Question: How would you summarize the essential problem of China?)*

In brief, our basic concern with China's problems is related to the winning of the War and the peace that will follow. China needs supplies—China needs well-trained and well-equipped troops—but perhaps most of all China needs internal unity.

The issue in China is not so much the tension that exists between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese "Communists" as it is between those elements within each camp who place their personal prestige, ideas, and ambitions ahead of winning of the War. A strong, democratic, and united China will hasten the end of the war in the Pacific and make it possible for China to assume her important role in the Far East and among the United Nations.

#### *Who's Who in the Chinese Situation*

CHENNAULT, MAJOR GENERAL CLAIRE L., commanded the famous "Flying Tiger" volunteer force of American airmen who fought for China before the United States entered the War. He now commands the U. S. 14th Air Force operating against the Japanese from bases in China.

CHIANG-KAI-SHEK is China's Generalissimo and Head of State. A follower of Sun Yat-sen, he became the most powerful leader in the country after Sun's death.

CHOU EN-LAI, CHU TEH, and MAO TSE-TUNG are leading Chinese Communist figures. Chiang fought them before the War and drove their forces into northern China, but they later united with him in resisting the Japanese. Chou En-lai has been one of the principal negotiators with Nationalist representatives in trying to settle the differences between the two groups.

SOONG is the most important family name in modern China. T. V. Soong, one of the country's foremost financiers, was appointed Foreign Minister soon after Pearl Harbor. He succeeded H. H. Kung as acting President of the Executive Yuan recently. His three sisters all married leading Chinese figures. One is the widow of Sun Yat-sen, one is the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, and one is the wife of H. H. Kung.

SUN YAT-SEN, who died in 1925, was the great leader of modern China, and has been called "China's George Washington." His "Three Principles of the People"—nationalism, democracy, and livelihood—are the great guiding lights of the nation, to which most of its leaders subscribe in theory while sometimes quarreling about methods of achievement.

WEDEMEYER, LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C., was placed in command of U. S. Army Forces in China when the CBI theater was divided after General Stilwell's recall. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan was given the India-Burma part of the command.

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#### AIDS FOR DISCUSSION LEADERS

Following are some special guides for AAF, AGF, ASF, and Officer Group discussion leaders, also supplementary material for the background information of all group leaders. Importance of this material precludes printing this week of the usual Outline for Discussion.

#### SPECIAL GUIDES

##### *Army Air Forces*

Two phases of the Chinese situation will probably be of particular interest to Air Forces personnel: (a) the record made by the Air Transport Command in flying supplies across the Himalaya (Him-AHL-ah-yah) Mountains while the Burma Road was closed; (b) the activities of our combat airmen in China. Here are a few basic facts on each operation:

(a) "*Flying the Hump*."—After the Burma Road was closed by the Japanese in April 1942, the only way to supply China from India was by air. This involved flying cargo planes from fields in northeastern India over mountains as much as three miles high. At first the totals were small, but more planes, more



fields, and improved methods boosted the record. A War Department report in October 1944 stated that 23,000 tons were flown over the "Hump" in one recent unnamed month, adding: "Air freight from India to China long ago started flowing in greater volume than ever went via the Burma Road." This was more than twice the tonnage for December 1943. In January of this year, General Stilwell said that 35,000 tons a month were now being flown in. The supplies carried included gasoline, munitions, trucks, and jeeps.

One writer, discussing the old Burma Road, which supplied 20,000 tons a month, said: "Such a supply line could hardly maintain a single American Armored division in combat." It must be remembered, too, that supplies brought in had to be divided between General Stilwell's Chinese troops and General Chennault's air force. Also, part of the cargo had to be high octane gasoline for the Air Transport Command itself.

(b) *Combat air forces in China.*—The "Flying Tigers," the American Volunteer Group, had been fighting the Japanese for about five months before Pearl Harbor was attacked. Out of this organization ultimately grew the U. S. 14th Air Force. Starting almost entirely with fighter planes, this force eventually added medium and heavy bombers. It has not only fought for the defense of China; it has aided our Pacific operations, having destroyed about 275,000 tons of Japanese shipping off the China coast in a single year's time. Chinese pilots trained by Americans made up part of the personnel.

The story of this air force has emphasized again the importance of air-ground coordination. The force has worked closely to support Chinese ground troops, but the fact that China and the Allies have not been able to equip ground forces on a sufficient scale has resulted in the enemy driving us out of many forward air bases simply by ground action. This is well worth pointing out to Air Forces personnel—that final victory against the Japanese in China can only come through combined action.

#### *Army Ground Forces*

Many Ground Forces discussion leaders may want to emphasize particularly the point that the United Nations may ultimately engage the main body of the Japanese army in China. One question is most likely to be raised in this connection: If the Japanese do fight on in China, will large numbers of American troops be sent there?

Any attempt to answer this question would be speculative, of course, but it is possible to point out the factors that will be involved.

One factor would be the scale of Japanese resistance in China. China's Chief of Staff estimated in February that the Japanese have assigned up to 50 divisions—two-fifths of their army on the Chinese mainland—to prevent an American landing on the coast.

Another factor would be the extent to which China's military effort can be built up. China recently announced that 500,000 new men would be drafted by the end of March "to meet the demand for the all-out Chinese counter-offensive in conjunction with the coming landing of American forces on the China coast." The big need, however, will still be proper training and equipment for Chinese armies.

One other question of particular Ground Forces interest may rise: Would troops in China encounter a new set of conditions there?

In general, China's likely battle areas are not unusual fighting terrain. The country lies roughly in the same latitudes as the United States, with about the same range of climates. The outstanding terrain difficulties are mountain gorges in some sections and rivers which cause great floods from time to time. The enemy troops encountered are likely to be tough. China has been a great practical training ground for the Japanese, and many Japanese soldiers there have had years of experience in combat under the conditions our forces would meet there.

#### *Army Service Forces*

Emphasis upon supply is inevitable in any discussion of the Chinese war situation. For Service Forces groups, discussion leaders will have the opportunity to show in this particular theater more clearly than in most others just how vital supply activities are in relation to combat success. To an unprecedented degree, China's difficulties have been the result, not of lack of manpower, but of lack of the means to equip the millions of soldiers in its armies. It has necessarily been our task—a slow and painful one—to attack that problem.



The building of the Stilwell Road was an example of cooperative effort by ground and service troops. Some of the difficulties involved were described by Secretary of War Stimson in his press conference of 2 February 1945:

"The construction of the Ledo Road was a great engineering as well as military achievement. Part of the Ledo Road was built at a time when enemy attack and harassing raids were an ever-present possibility. Terrific rains, bottomless mud, mountains, jungles, and malaria had to be overcome. Much of the job was done working around the clock 24 hours a day using flood lights at night. During the last monsoon period a two-mile wooden causeway had to be built for maintenance purposes across a stretch of flooded jungle land inundated with four to six feet of water. This causeway, comprised of one million board feet of lumber, was cut by two G. I. lumber mills in the Hukawng Valley. Altogether 487 miles of road had to be built or improved from India to the China border. It is permanent all-weather supply highway."

The road was started in December 1942, so that it took slightly over two years to complete. Though it is a two-way highway for most of its length, in some places it had to be hacked along the sides of 4,000-foot mountains and is scarcely more than a jeep-track. To build each mile of the road, engineers moved an average of 750,000 tons of rock and earth and laid 1,000 feet of culvert. In many cases they worked after dark by the light of oil flares.

In Burma, the troops faced malaria, dysentery, and leeches, in addition to the ever-present mountains and jungles. There was also the monsoon season, beginning in May and lasting four or five months; during that period, the rainfall may be as high as 50 inches a month.

As is the case of "flying the Hump" (see Army Air Forces section), this road will not be a complete answer to China's supply problem. But as long as the Chinese knew that their allies were bending every effort to complete it, they had evidence of our good faith and the hope that ultimately more vital equipment would be on the way. They knew, too, that while the road was being built, trucks and stockpiles were being accumulated at its far end to be rushed to them as soon as possible.

The Chinese have had so little equipment to work with that a little more can mean a great deal to them. Service Forces troops will understand, for instance, how important a few trucks are to the Chinese Army when they are told that when the Burma Road was closed, it was estimated that there were perhaps 15,000 trucks operating on China's roads. Two years later, there were perhaps one-third that number which could operate regularly.

The vehicles in the first convoys coming in over the Stilwell Road will be left in China to ease this shortage. Drivers can be flown back over the Himalayas on return trips of the Air Transport Command.

Answers to the question—Will we need many supply troops in China?—are partly contained in the above information. It is clear that the scale on which Japanese troops fight in that theater will be the real determining factor. If there is major combat activity there over a long period, many Service Forces men must be kept busy. Some will be in port areas in India and Burma or at supply dumps at one end or the other of the Stilwell Road. Others will be driving vehicles. Still others will be doing service and supply jobs in China. If we make landings on the China coast, large numbers of service troops would inevitably be involved. The importance of China in the Far Eastern picture, at any rate, advances the possibility that Service Forces men of all branches face the possibility of serving in or near that country.

#### *Officer Discussions*

Where separate officer discussion groups are held, there is an excellent opportunity to drive home a point in which understanding by leaders is very important: the whole subject of relations between Americans and Chinese as individuals. It is vital to emphasize:

1. That the Chinese have fought the Japanese with very little outside help, have suffered more than 5 million casualties, and have lost most of the best industrial facilities of their country.

2. That in spite of this, they still fight on, and that they have earned the right to our respect as good allies.

3. That although their standard of living is very low by comparison with ours, they are working for a better life, and that the ways in which they are like us are more important than any superficial differences between Chinese and Americans.



4. That the Chinese are a living proof of the falsehood of the Japanese claim that this is "a white man's war."

5. That American soldiers in China by their actions and attitudes are contributing to the picture that the Chinese people form of all of us and of our country. Behavior based on mistaken notions that the Chinese are "inferior" not only betrays a lack of familiarity with the ordeals China has been through; it can also do incalculable harm during the War and in the peace that follows.

### *A Few Interesting Facts On China's Industrial Progress*

China's first railroad, a line ten miles long between Shanghai and Woosung, was built in 1876. Shortly afterward it was completely torn up, owing to the superstitious fears of people living along the right of way, who believed it brought bad luck. But at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Chinese owned over 7,500 miles of railroad, exclusive of over 3,700 miles in Manchuria lost to the Japanese in 1931.

China's first motor highway was built in 1912. By 1937 there were about 70,000 miles, of which 15,500 were surfaced.

In 1912 there were almost no modern factories. But by 1937 there were 3,849, among them many cotton textile mills, having a total of over five million spindles.

In Free China, the region that before 1937 was the most backward part of China, this progress has been continued since 1937, despite overwhelming difficulties. In some fields it has even been speeded up. Here is part of what has happened:

Railways: About 800 miles built up to December 1942.

Highways: About 3,720 miles built up to the summer of 1942, and 3,350 miles under construction or surveyed.

Coal production has been increased in Free China by 59 percent; iron by over 150 percent; oil by 1,194 percent.

Of the 3,489 factories in pre-war China, 452 have been moved to the interior. This involved the transport of over 120,000 tons of machinery and other equipment, much of which had to be taken apart and carried in small pieces for hundreds of miles on the backs of men.

Most of this progress in Free China has been made entirely by Chinese, without help from any outside source. Thus it is evident that the Chinese have both the ability and the determination to carry out the modernization of their country even under the most heartbreaking conditions. After the War it will undoubtedly continue at a much faster rate.

## SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

### BASES AND COOPERATION

"Even if we destroy the Japanese fleet, we still couldn't defeat them on the sea. We have to have bases in China to cut off their lines to Manchuria. \* \* \* I still feel that Japan will be defeated from bases in China."

—*Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, August 1944.*

"Following on the heels of the Cabinet reorganization, and closely related to it, came important changes in the Chinese system of military supply and far closer cooperation between the Chinese and American high commands. \* \* \*

"There is more likelihood that moderate elements in the Kuomintang will continue to gain power, adding to the chances of genuine cooperation between the National Government and the Communists. \* \* \* Such cooperation, if attainable, will be of historical importance both in speeding the progress of the war and in strengthening the bases of the peace."

—*Donald M. Nelson, in a special report to the President, early this year.*

### MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

Aside from its internal political problems, China's big problem has been supply. After Japan closed China's seaports and captured its best industrial areas in the early years of the War, both military and civilian demands grew harder to meet. Whole manufacturing plants were transported piece by piece and set up in the interior, but lack of modern methods and machinery has made the supply job tremendously difficult. Now, however, efforts we have made to aid the country are beginning to show results.

Even since April 1942, when the Japanese closed the Burma Road, China has been almost entirely cut off from outside help except for supplies—at present,



perhaps 35,000 tons monthly—being flown in over the Himalayas. In January the Japanese were finally driven from northern Burma so that engineers could complete a new road from Ledo through Myitkyina (MYIT-chi-nah) connecting with the old Burma Road near the Chinese border. The first convoys, carrying ammunition, ambulances, and medium and light artillery, have now passed over the route, which Chiang has named after General Stilwell, "in memory of his distinctive contribution and of the signal part which the Allied and Chinese forces under his direction played in the Burma campaign and in the building of the road." The world's longest oil pipeline, roughly paralleling the road, has also been constructed.

In another move to improve the Chinese supply situation, Donald M. Nelson, formerly chairman of our War Production Board, paid two visits to the country, the first in September 1944. As a result of that trip, Chiang agreed to the creation of a Chinese War Production Board. Nelson returned to this country in November for a talk with President Roosevelt, and then went back to China with a small group of production experts. The Americans worked with Chinese officials headed by the Minister of Economics, on a basic law granting wide powers to the new WPB. Arrangements were made for close liaison between it and U. S. Army Ordnance representatives in Chungking. Nelson also left behind him steel and alcohol experts to work with plant managers on output, quality, and cost. By the spring of this year, he estimated, China's total war production will double the November rate.

This program, of course, is mainly aimed at bettering China's war situation. It can be important for the future, too. As the Nelson report puts it: "The success of China's venture in planned war production, if properly followed up through American Government and business channels, will make for closer post-war economic relations between China and the United States. China has the capacity and the desire to develop herself industrially with American aid. If that aid is realistically planned, and if financial arrangements are put on a sound business basis, China should soon after the War begin to replace Japan as the leading industrial nation of the Orient. In that event, a market of enormous size should progressively open up for American export industries."

#### CHIANG STATES AIMS

"Internally we strive for the realization of local autonomy throughout the country, consolidation of national unity, establishment of government by law and consummation of the democratic rule. Externally we seek to cultivate closer relations with our friendly nations, to win the war against aggression, to collaborate with our allies in establishing permanent world peace after the war, to develop our rich natural resources, and carry out economic reconstruction and to enhance the well-being of mankind through self-exertion as well as international collaboration."

—Chiang Kai-shek, on the 32nd Anniversary of the Chinese Republic,  
10th October 1943.

#### CHINESE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS

"As a whole, Chinese people have incredible fortitude. I have rarely heard a Chinese complain about the miseries of wartime existence. China's remarkable spontaneous sense of humor, which makes it easy for Americans and Chinese to get on together, keeps the Chinese people sane and congenial during a period of bleakness and slowly accumulating disaster.

"These are some of the things for which the Chinese people are to be respected. But for our own self-respect we must be realistic about China's many shortcomings. Some of them are inevitable and cannot be remedied; some of them are due to the incompetence of a government that puts its political security ahead of the War against Japan. \* \* \*

—Brooks Atkinson, *N. Y. Times*, 21 November 1944.

#### CHINA AND THE FUTURE

"China's future policies toward Japan, toward Russia, and toward colonial Asia, like China's domestic development within the homeland of the 450,000,000 Chinese, will be of primary concern to all men living in the world today. The abolition of the unequal treaties by America and Britain has already symbolized the end of the hundred years of China's semicolonial subjection. China's part in the final victory will give significance to that symbolic act by Britain and



America ; it will mark the beginning of the end of the colonial system as a whole.

"No longer will the destinies of Asia be dictated by imperial powers. Nor, on the other hand, is an Asiatic counter-imperialism to be expected. Japan tried that and failed. The truth is that we no longer live in a world of 'the European question,' 'the Balkan question,' 'the Russian question,' 'the Far Eastern question.' That era is over. Henceforth we live in a world where there are only local aspects of the world question. Whether we make a success of that new world will depend on the interaction of two things: the success or failure that each nation makes of its own affairs, and the success or failure of all nations in dealing with each other as neighbors in a world order."

—Owen and Eleanor Lattimore in *The Making of Modern China*.

(Prepared by Army Orientation Branch, Information and Education Division, ASF [A. G. 353 (16 Jan. 44)]).

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Mr. Richard Wait, counsel for John K. Fairbank, to Robert Morris, dated April 25, 1952, together with a carbon copy of a letter sent by Robert Morris to Richard Wait dated April 23, 1952, asking that three articles purportedly written by his client be identified for the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 1344F" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344F

SH:FW

FAIRBANK WITNESS.

APRIL 23, 1952.

RICHARD WAIT, Esq.,

*Choate, Hall and Stewart, 30 State St.,  
Boston, Mass.*

MY DEAR MR. WAIT: The following three articles, purportedly written by Professor John K. Fairbank, are being introduced into our public record of the hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations:

"The Mechanics of Imperialism in China." (AMERASIA, September 1937, pp. 295-300).

"China's Prospects and U. S. Policy." (FAR EASTERN SURVEY, July 2, 1947, pp. 145-149)

"Communism in China and the New American Approach to Asia."

(NEXT STEP IN ASIA, Harvard University Press, 1949, pp. 1-24.)

Would you kindly have professor Fairbank send us a statement confirming the fact that he is the author of these specific writings?

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel*.

John L. Hall, Stuart C. Rand, Charles O. Pengra, Harvey H. Bundy, Claude R. Branch, James Garfield, Charles P. Curtis, Richard C. Curtis, Marcien Jenckes, Robert Proctor, Richard Wait, Simon P. Townsend, Brooks Potter, Samuel L. Gwin, Bailey Aldrich, Franklin Dexter, John M. Hall, Charles H. Stockton, Raymond W. Ellis, John Dane, Jr., Wm. Arthur Dupee, Jr., Franklin R. Johnson

CHARLES F. CHOATE, JR., 1899-1927. RALPH A. STEWART, 1904-1926

CHOATE, HALL & STEWART

30 STATE STREET

Telephone CAPITOL 7-5020

BOSTON 9, MASS., April 25, 1952.

ROBERT MORRIS, Esquire,

*Special Counsel, United States Senate,*

*Committee on the Judiciary,*

*Senate Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORRIS: I have your letter of April 23. My client, John K. Fairbank, confirms that he was the author of the three articles listed in your letter. You will recall that pages 13 and 14 of the digest of his writings touching upon communism, which was an exhibit to his statement submitted to the



Committee, contains excerpts from the article "Next Step in Asia" which is the third article referred to in your letter.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD WAIT.

RW:KV.

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### FAR EASTERN SURVEY

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Trends in China toward collectivism work against American efforts to foster a capitalist-American way of life in that country.

### CHINA'S PROSPECTS AND U. S. POLICY

(By JOHN K. FAIRBANK)<sup>1</sup>

*The American fear of communism, if we yield to it blindly, may inspire us to aggressive anti-communist policies in China of the most disastrous sort. Our defense against totalitarianism will be ineffective if it is blindly fearful, and we must therefore try to assess clearly the Chinese political tradition and China's trend toward some form of collectivism. What kind of Chinese state must we be prepared to get along with in the future?*

I assume that, as an alternative to understanding Asia's long-term prospects, we may embark on an emotional program of aid to anti-communist regimes which attempt to suppress popular movements in areas like Indonesia, Indochina, the Philippines, or China, in the belief that such aid will somehow defend American democracy. Far from helping us, such a program would be likely to help communist leadership of those popular movements become firmly established, since communists would be able to champion the people's cause and focus anti-foreign and anti-imperialist sentiment against the United States. Thus, after setting out to fight communism in Asia, the American people would be obliged in the end to fight the peoples of Asia, in the effort to make them develop liberal political and economic institutions which are outside their tradition and beyond their means.

This is the danger we face if we try to defend ourselves in Asia blindly and without regard for Asiatic tradition and institutions. *Aggressive anti-communism in Asia could easily reinforce a trend toward anti-communist authoritarianism at home. Such a trend will come only if we let our fear of communist totalitarianism stampede us into acquiescence in an American type of fascism, and this may seem unlikely.* But we must recognize that corruption of our democratic process may begin overseas, and that if we set ourselves to stamp out popular movements in Asia, we can only undermine, rather than fortify, American-style democracy at home. If we take China as the decisive theater, what political institutions are the Chinese people themselves now tending toward?

#### MAIN LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

In China's political reformation we can expect three main lines of development, in the economic, political, and cultural spheres, respectively. They add up to a new Chinese-style collectivism.

In the economic sphere the main determinant of China's future will be population increase, made possible by the continuation of the general process of industrialization and modernization, particularly in public health and medicine and in production and transportation of food. These developments will lower the infant mortality rate, increase the number of baby girls that grow up to produce children, and so raise that proportion of the population which is in the child-bearing age-group. The population increase after several decades will level off with an increase of possibly twenty percent or even more, at any rate an enormous net increase.

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Fairbank is Associate Professor of History and Associate Chairman, China Program, Committee on International and Regional Studies at Harvard University. His most recent periods in China were with the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information.



## KEY FACTOR FOOD SUPPLY

The key factor in this process will be the increase of food supply. Lack of food in China, as in India, appears to be the chief factor which has been deterring population growth. That is, the demographic picture is Malthusian. Food supply is likely to be increased, first, through government stimulation and organization of increased production. The current example is the Chinese Communists' production drives, which work through communist-led farmers' bodies and use political means to encourage farmer cooperation and initiative. Anti-communist campaigns oblige communist areas further to encourage this local production. Second, food supply will also be increased by scientific and technical improvements—plant- and stock-breeding and improved farm management and crop diversification—such as those developed particularly by agencies under the National Government, and also by Japanese during the occupation of North China. American technical aid, through official State Department channels or through academic and missionary channels as at the University of Nanking, should continue to help in this scientific aspect of rural reconstruction. The chief need is for a closer coordination of mass political organization and technological know-how. The present separation of political mass organization (as in the Communist areas) and imported technology (as in the Kuomintang areas) is disastrous for China. The key to agrarian reform lies in getting the Chinese farmer, by political means, to act differently in the economic sphere.

The same coordination of politics and technology is possible and may be expected sooner or later in the field of public health. Over a decade ago the Ting Hsien experiment, for example, made it plain that in traditional circumstances rural China can be remade efficiently only by combining technological improvements with political support of such improvements. The reason is that any program of change in the countryside, to be effective, must be on a mass scale. Anything on a mass scale in traditional China had to be under government purview, just as in the new China mass activity may also be under government inspiration.

Improvements in food supply and public health are only two of the factors in population increase, others being improved transportation channels, rural farm credit facilities, industrial production of cheap consumer goods in factory cities, increased foreign trade, and the like.

In the slowing down and leveling off of the population increase in China the key factor will be the general rise of the standard of living among the broad mass of the people. Industrialization, generally speaking, means both an increase of population and a rise of the standard of living, but the latter lags behind the former. Increased production of food in China, so to speak, will be used first as a basis for increased survival of people, after which the increase of material goods gradually will be used less for increasing the quantity of people and more for improving their quality of living. The slowly rising standard of living may be expected to cut down the birth rate, through the operation of many factors—not merely contraception but also a later age of marriage, some decline of fertility, and the like.

## SOCIAL WELFARE OR MONOPOLY

The crucial question is, will the standard of living in China rise soon enough and cut down the birth rate fast enough to permit the Chinese people individually to enjoy the fruits of industrialization? Or will industrialization and its attendant population increase merely multiply the present coolie poverty and mass misery? Will China use modern technology to support a greater volume of human life or a better quality of life? The outcome depends on whether or not the fruits of modern technology and production can be spread rapidly and broadly among the mass of the people. This rise in living standards in turn depends on whether the political and economic system aims at social welfare rather than upper class interest or monopoly.

In this context Chiang Kai-shek's archaic Confucian ideas, as expressed in *China's Destiny*, do not seem as hopeful as the ideas expressed by Chinese Communist leaders. Since the raising of mass living standards is the particular stock in trade of the Chinese Communists rather than of the anti-communists, American support of anti-communist regimes in China will be likely therefore to exacerbate the Chinese population problem. In general, we must be prepared for a trend toward political organization of the economy adequate to sustain a larger population but inadequate to raise its standard of living rapidly.

This key importance of government-for-social-welfare rather than for upper-class interest brings us from the economic to the political sphere, in which we must expect the growth in China of an authoritarian state system at variance



with traditional American ideals of individual freedom, particularly the ideal of economic free enterprise which now forms the ideological basis for our large-scale capitalism. This growth of authoritarianism has a solid basis in China's history and institutions.

There is for example the Chinese tradition of the unity of the empire, one sun in heaven and one ruler in the world, or as Kuomintang slogans put it, "one nation, one party, one leader." This deeply ingrained feeling that the whole of China must have one single top authority stands in the way of movements for federation of autonomous areas and reinforces extremist opponents of coalition government. It lies behind the mutual distrust of the Kuomintang and the Communists who each feel that the other must be aiming at monopoly of the government power. It impedes the growth of a two-party system, since the control of government has traditionally been vested in a single dynastic house, ruling monolithically through a single universal bureaucracy personally loyal to it. Traditionally the opposition to the government has found organized expression only through secret societies which defied the government's monopoly of political organization. All these traditions undoubtedly influence the present scene.

Let us analyze certain elements in this sociopolitical tradition. First, China has had a two-class or bifurcated society. The lower class or stratum has been the illiterate and custom-bound mass of the peasantry. The upper class or stratum has been that small proportion of the Chinese population who have in one way or another had enough leisure to become literate. Language has been used to preserve this class structure. Anyone learning the Chinese written language must be supported for several years by the labor of others. Consequently literacy has been a luxury mainly confined to the land-owning class, from which has been produced the scholar class, to which has been attached, under its wing, the merchant class. *This small literate ruling class of landowners, scholars, officials, and also merchants has been the bearers of China's culture and has had every reason to hang together in support of a bureaucratic authoritarian government.*

#### TRADITIONS OF TWO-CLASS SOCIETY

In the second place, the two-class society of China has naturally had a tradition of government as the responsibility of the bureaucracy, not of the people. To be sure, Confucius, Mencius, and others developed the idea that the ruler and his officials would be well advised to rule in the interests of the mass of the people, in order to retain their tacit acquiescence in the continuation of the regime, that is, the Mandate of Heaven. But this was rule for the people, not by the people.

This idea is now echoed in the present-day doctrine of party dictatorship and political tutelage. The Kuomintang, for example, still runs the national government of China on behalf of the Chinese people, who are considered to have surrendered their voice to it. The Chinese Communists have a similar party structure topped by a Party Congress and a Central Executive Committee, which is like the Kuomintang in form.

#### ROLE OF SCHOLAR

Third, modern China has inherited the tradition that the scholar class is the reservoir from which the officials of the bureaucracy are chosen, but that the scholar when out of office has no particular responsibility concerning public affairs. It is true that the memorials of courageous scholars were one chief expression of public opinion under the empire, but this was offset by the generally passive attitude of the nonactive members of the scholar-official class, who, as the saying goes, were Confucians when in office and Taoists when out of office. This tendency may be seen among Chinese scholars today, of the type who are inclined to deplore both communist ruthlessness and Kuomintang corruption and keep their skirts clean of both. (They have their counterpart among American liberals, and are similarly impotent and unhappy.) This irresponsibility of the liberal in China accounts for the relatively small number of technically trained personnel who have moved to join mass movements in the countryside.

Fourth, it has taken a long time for the Chinese intellectuals to begin to overstep the ancient class boundary and provide leadership for the modern mass revolution. The great Taiping Rebellion of the period 1851-64 was a peasant movement but it failed to enlist the leadership of the Confucian scholar class. The scholars were active in the Reform Movement of 1898 but failed to organize any sort of mass support. Even Sun Yat-sen in organizing the revolution of 1911, while he used the secret societies, failed to extend his organization into the



masses of the cities or the countryside. The Kuomintang did not finally achieve national leadership in the revolution of 1925-27 until it used Soviet tactics of mass organization.

In the long course of the Chinese revolutionary process, one great stumbling block has been this inability of the scholar and the coolie to get together and work together. This tends to leave the bureaucrat today in a strategic position between the two. As long as the official stratum of political organizers, military officers, and civil bureaucrats can replenish its ranks from a relatively small literate educated class, it can continue to dominate the illiterate agricultural masses. It is essential to the Kuomintang, for instance, that it continue to screen all candidates for technical training abroad and try to absorb them into government institutions on their return. By controlling the sluice gates of western technology, the ruling class in modern China is able to absorb the scholar back into itself and so perpetuate the two-class type of society. This two-class system necessarily implies authoritarian government of the lower farmer class by the upper official class.

*In this respect the Chinese Communists are truly secular and not merely cyclical revolutionists in their effort to draw an official class directly from the peasantry.* China's chief hope is to stimulate and permit the peasant to participate in politics and find representation, preferably in our democratic forms, and at least through the bureaucracy of a social-welfare government. If the Communists cannot quickly wipe out the ancient class barrier of illiteracy and shatter the old two-class system, their administration will more easily succumb to the traditional evils inherent in bureaucracy.

#### GOVERNMENT FROM THE TOP

The continuing tendency toward government from the top down, by a ruling bureaucracy which monopolizes the higher learning and technology as well as control of public utilities and large-scale enterprises of all kinds, is best seen among the conservative ranks of the Kuomintang as the party entrenched in power. *Kuomintang authoritarianism is buttressed by the use of the ancient Confucian virtue-ethic exemplified in Chiang Kai-shek's book;* also by the slogan of the Confucian reformers of the late nineteenth century—"Chinese learning for the fundamental structure and Western learning for practical use"—in other words, traditional Chinese values, like the two-class society, can be preserved, while modern technology is used in the service of such values. The prostitution of Western science in the service of outworn oriental despotism is nothing new in Asia. Continued American assistance in this prostitution, as in military missions, would not be new either.

If we lift our eyes from the Kuomintang, however, we find still a considerable prospect of authoritarian government under the Chinese Communists. Quite aside from the controversial question how far the Russian example might be followed in China, we must face the exigencies of the Chinese situation in itself. Supposing that the Chinese Communists avoid both the evils inherent in the Confucian political tradition, and also the political evils developed under the communist dictatorship in Russia, they will still be subject to two very powerful factors in China making for autocratic centralized control from the top down. One of these factors is the urgency of China's problems. So much must be done in so short a time, if any government is to avoid disaster. This urge toward police rule will be the greater among the Chinese Communists in proportion as they take responsibility for the government of urban areas and areas in which they have not had sufficient time to build up indoctrinated mass organizations, responsive to propaganda rather than to police control.

#### NEEDS AND RESOURCES

The second factor calling for central control, no matter what party or parties eventually unify China, will be the size of China's needs in proportion to her resources. Raw materials, capital resources, and trained personnel are all so scarce that only an autocratic top authority can undertake great tasks of reconstruction, can make great investments, and can organize great projects.

American policy will also influence this trend. *The Chinese Communists rely heavily on mass support, which cannot be entirely manipulated, and their declared policy is to proceed toward socialism through an inevitable intermediate stage of bourgeois-democratic small-scale capitalism, by which they hope to build up the productive powers of their society, and to develop democratic institutions.*



*But it is doubtful if the Chinese Communists will be allowed favorable circumstances in which they can follow out this gradual program.*

*On the contrary, American efforts to save China from totalitarian communism, by increasing the material obstacles in the way of the Chinese revolutionary movement, are likely to oblige the revolution to follow more ruthless, dictatorial, and totalitarian leadership than would otherwise be the case. For example, American acquiescence in the legally recognized Chinese government's blockade of the communist areas has already increased the doctrinaire ignorance and lack of technology which are the Communists' weakest points. American support of the anti-communist military effort, for another example, permits the unmilitary Chinese liberal movement to be liquidated, and the leadership both of liberalism and of communism to become concentrated in military communism. The attempt to suppress social change by the sword ensures that social change will come only by the sword. Liquidation of die-hards, secret police surveillance, an iron curtain against foreign influence, all may develop to preserve the gains of the communist revolution.*

*The pernicious results of our intervention policy are already apparent. American support of Kuomintang authoritarianism now allows the Kuomintang to destroy Chinese liberalism in its area. Consequently the extremist totalitarian elements among the Chinese Communists have less need to compete with the Kuomintang in order to win the support of Chinese liberals. They more easily inherit the liberal cause as a poor ally of the communist cause. By backing one extreme and supporting Chinese fascism we shall soon wipe out independent Chinese liberalism.*

*In the long run we may expect Chinese individualism and humanism, which are so ubiquitous in the conduct of personal relations in Chinese society, to reassert themselves in politics. But the fundamental fact is that in the poor countries of agrarian Asia food comes before civil liberties. The American type of political freedom, being as yet unknown there, will not be demanded until the standard of living has risen considerably. Thus the economic trend toward a greater population, at a low living standard, and the political trend toward an authoritarian government dominating the vast peasant mass through bureaucratic controls will reinforce each other. We must recognize that Asia is ready to modernize through mass organization rather than follow the nineteenth century example of the United States and modernize through individual enterprise.*

*This un-American type of political and economic development, which may be called forth in part by American stupidity, is likely to be further reinforced by Chinese cultural trends. In this sphere the main background factor is the ancient tradition of Chinese cultural superiority to the barbarians roundabout. As a culture island in East Asia, the early Chinese developed, instead of nationalism, a sort of culturism, judging the foreigner by his conformity or non-conformity to the Confucian way of life. In time of invasion and alien domination the Chinese scholar class took refuge in the demonstrable superiority of the art, literature, philosophy, and customs of Chinese life. This has formed the basis for a national pride which, as the world shrinks, can increasingly be used to nourish xenophobia, nationalism, and chauvinism, contempt for the foreigner, and aggressiveness, when circumstances allow, in foreign relations,*

#### DEMOCRATIZATION OF CLASSICAL TRADITION

One factor which may facilitate this modern superpatriotism is the democratization of the Chinese classical tradition. The spread of literacy to the masses, presumably through some form of phonetic script, cannot be delayed forever. Like the spread of political organization and political consciousness which accompanies it, the spread of literacy and enlightenment is a constant possibility in the Chinese countryside today and offers to those who spread it the opportunity to assume the leadership of the awakened masses and thereby gain great power and accomplish great changes. It is this potentiality of mass awakening which gives the Chinese revolutionist a long-term advantage which is not possessed by the die-hard conservative.

#### USE OF EDUCATING MEDIA

Within the context of authoritarian government, this means that the media of mass enlightenment which accompany industrialization—radio, press, publishing, schools, and screen—can be used for the political purposes of a ruling



bureaucracy. Techniques of thought control and of propaganda are to be expected and are already being used by both parties as far as present circumstances allow. The diffusion of a highly selfconscious interpretation of Chinese history and cultural traditions among the vast ocean of the common people can contribute to a new and vital popular culture, such as the new folk drama and simple pictorial art of North China, or the modern theater of the cities. All this cultural development can be stimulated, guided, and used to support a new order of society. The point to note is that the new mass culture is developing pari passu with mass political organization and controls, not ahead of them as happened in Western countries.

*Finally we must not forget the distinction between the fascist-conservative and the communist-progressive forms of totalitarianism. Whatever may be the case elsewhere, there is no doubt whatever that the Chinese communist movement, as the party out of power, is strongly motivated to show a broad concern for the masses of the people, since it is from mass support that it derives its strength. This cannot be said of the Kuomintang regime in power, as now constituted. Since the long future belongs to those who prove that they act for the welfare of the Chinese people, our support of anticommunism in China will be a losing battle as long as the Chinese communist movement retains popular support. This it will be helped to do as long as we attack it and thereby confirm communism as the defender of the Chinese masses.*

In summary, a much larger but still economically poor and insecure population will call for a more efficient but still necessarily authoritarian government, which will reinforce its position through the use of a new and democratized but still essentially Chinese and nationalistic mass culture. Given China's size and poverty, she has no other road to follow. In order not to remain poor, ignorant, individualistic and disorganized she will become less poor, more educated, and collectivized. It follows that efforts to foster in China an illusory, capitalist-American way of life, which China cannot afford, will only delay the process of creating China's new way of life and if persisted in will eventually range China against us.

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[Amerasia, September 1937]

## THE MECHANICS OF IMPERIALISM IN CHINA

(By John K. Fairbank)

Several features of the present Japanese expansion in northeastern Asia are reminiscent of the process by which England opened China to Western trade a century ago. Puppet régimes, smuggling wars, the narcotic trade, opportune "outrages," "insults" and "incidents" are in China an old story. In greater or less degree they were characteristic of the British commercial conquest in the 1840s and '50s just as they are typical of the present Japanese aggression, which is the lineal though brooding descendant of its British forerunner.

Imperialism in China, like most other importations, soon becomes Chinese. Granted that Japan seeks territorial control where Britain sought only peaceful trade, and that the evil concomitants of the present conquest are intensified many fold by modern improvements in warfare, finance, and propaganda, still there are certain recurrent phenomena which seem to distinguish a foreign invasion in modern China from its counterpart elsewhere. One of these is the fact that the invader can attain his ends only with the help of a certain type of opportunist, the so-called "Chinese traitor" (*han chien*) so roundly denounced in Chinese documents of the last century. Another persistent phenomenon has been the opium trade, with which is allied the business of smuggling dutiable goods past the customs. Also, because of the numerical weakness of the invaders, the maintenance of their prestige has always been a peculiarly important consideration. In these and other respects the early British experience forms a parallel which provides instructive comment on current Nipponese activities.

It took the British four campaigns and many minor skirmishes to effect the opening of China in the years between 1840 and 1860. Their first war led to treaties in 1842-43 which opened to trade five seaports on the southeast coast. But the trade soon outgrew these coastal ports. British merchants clamored for access to the interior, into which the foreign trade was already making its way. The second war and the treaties of 1858-60 completed this seemingly irresistible process, and foreign merchants and missionaries, pro-



tected by gunboats and extraterritoriality, were soon bargaining for the goods and souls of the natives all over the country. Of course, we believe that the result improved China, since it made her more like ourselves. The fact remains that China was opened, without her consent, by a subtle process of temptation and intimidation.

What are the chances of the same thing happening again today, on a vaster scale? To what extent are the circumstances that helped the British likely to help the Japanese?

As in most cases of imperialism, the dynamic element in the British advance was the man on the spot. Her Majesty's Consuls, pen in hand, played then the role which Doihara and his colleagues now bustle through in military trappings. It was the Consuls in the treaty ports whose ambitious minds saw problems crying out for regulation, insults that demanded immediate redress, opportunities ripe for the taking. Moreover Her Majesty's servants had their careers to make, and they were hand-picked for self-reliance and fidelity to the interests of British trade. After the first war, for example, the Government in London was adverse for a time to the acquisition of even an island base in China, such as the merchants had desired for generations. Sir Henry Pottinger, who negotiated the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, finally obtained the cession of Hongkong on his own responsibility, in excess of his instructions. This was typical of British expansion. The men on the spot were often several jumps ahead of their superiors in London. When the dynamic Harry Parkes, who was the Chinese *bête noire*, the Doihara of the period, precipitated the second war in 1856, the first impulse of people in England was to disavow him; and they might have done so had they not been convinced that Britain's honor, meaning at Canton Britain's face, was at stake. Loss of face would entail loss of trade. Again, when Consul Alcock installed foreigners in the Chinese custom house at Shanghai and so laid the foundations of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, the greatest boom the China trade has ever had, his superiors at home washed their hands of the experiment almost at once and two years later actually ordered the whole thing abolished. Not being on the spot even in imagination, at a time when the telegraph to China stopped in Italy and most people traveled to the Orient only to make money or to fight, or perhaps both, the officials of the Foreign Office were seldom interested in expansion in China. It was only under a man with Palmerston's imagination or under the pressure of the commercial associations in England that the Consuls in China were energetically supported.

It goes without saying that the British merchants of the 1850s, like the great financial houses of modern Japan, were actively interested in expansion. Their enthusiasm was that of pioneers. They saw before them virgin territory awaiting exploitation. In many respects the early treaty ports were frontiers, such as Manchuria seems to be today. It is often forgotten that for two hundred years the East India Company had been confined to Canton while its contemporaries, the Massachusetts Bay and Virginia Companies, and their successors had been conquering the American continent. The barriers of an alien civilization had been more formidable than those of nature, and after two centuries of contact the Western merchants in China still lived perched on the rim of a vast hinterland into which they seldom ventured beyond the treaty limits of a day's journey. The missionaries who traveled and even dwelt in the interior in defiance of treaty law (before 1858) were hardy voyageurs, trail breakers for their itinerating descendants.

The treaty port frontier was a place for young men and for money making. In their middle thirties the older residents often went back to Scotland with a fortune. Fortunes were made in buying teas and silks and selling opium, but the idea of four hundred million Chinese each adding an inch to his cotton shirt-tail was soon conceived and began to haunt the thoughts of Lancashire and the Board of Trade. Vast potentialities for Western manufacturers were seen in the Chinese market. For England, wrote Consul Alcock, "to whom the necessity of commercial expansion is a law of existence and national power . . . China alone remains a virgin soil, with a population numbering probably more than a third of the whole human race, with facilities of trade which no empire of similar extent has ever enjoyed, and with ready formed capabilities of consumption which time can scarcely exhaust." No Japanese paean over Manchuria could exceed the optimism of the early treaty ports. Hongkong was to become "a second Carthage, with a population equal to that of ancient Rome."

And yet the Chinese demand for Western manufactures grew with disappointing slowness. A second war was fought and new ports were opened, but British



goods found few customers. The plain fact was that China was not only conservative but, for all its size, a poor country, as others have since discovered, and what ready capital there was became involved first in the tea and opium trades.

In the opium trade the British had a wonderful solvent for the hard shell of China's exclusiveness. The importation of opium from India had only begun about 1800—opium smoking is a modern vice in China—and until 1858 the trade had to make its own way in the face of Chinese official opposition and British official nonsupport. Actually, of course, the Chinese local authorities of the day generally connived at it, and the British for want of a better solution quietly let Hongkong become the great distributing center for the rest of the China coast. Opium certainly was not forced upon China. It was merely supplied to her, although it must be noted that the opportunity to supply it was got and maintained chiefly through force. The distinction is significant because it indicates the importance, in the trade, of the Chinese opium importer and distributor without whom the drug could never have reached its consumer. This unchronicled class of opportunists, trafficking in their neighbor's weakness, were an essential link in the process of supply, not as lovely to contemplate as the stately British and American opium clippers and undoubtedly more dangerous to China. Through them the drug spread over the interior, where poppy growing was well begun by 1850. With the opium trade went official corruption and demoralization, since the trade was still illegal by Chinese law and yet too lucrative for the average mandarin to ignore. The British officials of the time reasoned simply that if China wanted opium someone would supply it, and British India, which needed the revenue, could do it more regularly and respectably than anyone else. To this argument there was no practical answer so long as the opium receiving-ships had only to wait for the Chinese smuggler to come out and take delivery of what he wanted.

By way of contrast the present situation in North China, where Japan is reputably unable to prevent the pumping of narcotics into the country, seems more iniquitous in proportion as it is more intensive. Now, instead of chests of crude opium it is heroin and similar derivatives, which can kill in months instead of years, and delivery is made not *f. o. b.* the opium store-ship but direct to the consumer's divan. The poppy fields of Jehol and Manchuria are closer than those of India once were, and the agents of the trade are now reported to be chiefly Koreans, who are protected by Japanese extraterritorial rights, rather than purely Chinese as in the old days.

The early Chinese opium merchants were members of that great class of "Chinese traitors" who dealt with the foreign devil. This is a feature of British expansion in China which has been generally overlooked—the fact that it was conducted in large part by the Cantonese, such as those of Sun Yat-sen's native district, Heung Shan, near Macao. The merchants and boat people of Kwangtung Province had been longest in contact with the barbarian and had early learned to work with him through the medium of pidgin English. As compradores, linguists, bearers, and body servants, these "brisk and handy natives of the south" were an indispensable element in the foreign penetration. Through them the resident of old Canton had done much of his business. When the first new ports were opened, at Amoy and Foochow in Fukien and Ningpo and Shanghai farther north, the arrival of the Westerner at those places meant the arrival also of his staff of Cantonese servants, tough fellows who spoke a different dialect and often ganged together to prey upon the natives. It is a question whether these compradores and their hangers on, coming from another province, were not more detested than the handful of foreign devils who brought them. They started riots and assaulted the local women, and on at least one or two occasions the local populace rose to massacre them. In such instances they sought the protection of their British employers, until the Consul at Foochow at one time forbade any more Cantonese servants being brought into port. To the people of Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu these Cantonese could not have seemed more alien, and certainly were more to be feared, than the Korean and Formosan adventurers who now carry on their activities under Japanese protection in the North and South, respectively.

Aided and abetted by such fellows, it is small wonder that the foreign merchant of a century ago broke the laws of China and often flouted the oburgations of his Consul. The lawlessness of the Canton River was imitated elsewhere. An export trade in coolies and copper cash and rice, all of them forbidden by Chinese law to leave the country, might be carried in foreign vessels, but it was Chinese crimps and smugglers who supplied the cargo. Evasion of



the customs duties flourished by arrangements between the merchant and the customs collector, neither of whom was averse to "taking it out of the Emperor." Thus the sharpest elements of the Chinese population flocked to the treaty ports, like the ex-hong-merchant of Canton, Samqua (Wu Chin-chang), who rose by purchase to be the leading official at Shanghai in the early 1850s. He prided himself on his knowledge of English, which was actually little better than pidgin, and cultivated the affable American merchants of Russell and Co. in order to learn the weaknesses of the British. In the end his study of English undid him when he allowed his custom house to take promises from the foreign vessels in port that *each* one of them would pay *half* the regular duties if *all* the others paid *full* duties.

If Chinese officials would not coöperate with the barbarian, they could sometimes be used anyway, as when the Governor of Kwangtung, Po Kuei, was captured by the British in 1858 and installed as head of the Provisional Government of Canton with a guard of British bluejackets to keep an eye on him and Harry Parkes to give him orders. For about two years Canton was under a puppet régime, necessitated by the fact that the British had conquered the place but could not rule it. A mixed British and Chinese police force kept order and it was six months before the unfortunate Governor was denounced to the Emperor for having written all his cheering reports at the dictation of his captors. The foreign occupation was described in terms applicable to other times and places; it was reported to Peking that the invaders had built barracks and blockhouses, printed a newspaper, and collected the local taxes. "Every day they measure the streets and make maps. They look upon Kwangtung Province as their own \* \* \* they have ruined the Confucian Temple, seized the Treasury \* \* \* and torn down the houses of the populace." Chinese meeting barbarians in the street were required to take off their hats, and it was forbidden to say the two words "foreign devil" (*fam kuei*). In all this the barbarians were being aided by more than a hundred hired Chinese, who acted as advisers, secretaries and spies.

This example of puppet government at Canton was not carried further because the British were not territorially ambitious, but it illustrates the procedure which Japan has since followed.

Just as the administrative difficulties of an invader are complicated by the size of the Chinese population, so, consciously or unconsciously, his fears are aroused. When to this is added a consciousness of the importance of preserving face, the alien intruder not infrequently becomes pathologically sensitive. It is not surprising that the first foreign residents of the treaty ports—barely a thousand males in 1850 surrounded by millions of Chinese—felt actively on the defensive and rejoiced at the sight of a gunboat. When rebels of a native secret society in 1853 seized the citadel of Amoy and the walled city of Shanghai adjoining the foreign settlements, the British and American merchants had good cause to think of their lives and their warehouses. In such circumstances their prestige was their chief protection. When it was lowered, so were their chances of safety. As in India, "lowering the flag" was a cardinal social sin. In particular no Consul could afford to do it. And so the very thinness of the British spearpoint served to make it sharper.

It was soon found that the Chinese authorities yielded to pressure firmly applied, yielded at least as long as the pressure *was* applied. When three Englishmen, for instance were stoned near Shanghai in 1848, the British Consul ordered his one gunboat to blockade the river when several hundred grain junks with thousands of truculent seamen were about to carry valuable tribute grain to the capital. The blockade, really a gamble, actually worked. The local authorities wanted as always to avoid trouble, the grain fleet could not be delayed, culprits were found and punished, and the Consul became the hero of the treaty ports. Foreign prestige could not always be maintained so easily, however, because in the last analysis it was merely an idea in the minds of the Chinese. At Canton British troops twice routed the defenders of the city but each time withdrew for diplomatic reasons. As a result a third campaign and the final capture of the place were necessary in order to establish British supremacy.

Such a situation breeds incidents. Any successful manifestation of disrespect, or even a good joke if it destroys the opponent's face, may be an insult—before their second war the British published a Blue Book on "Insults in China"—or as the more quaint Japanese phraseology goes, such actions may demonstrate Chinese "insincerity." Faced with insults or insincerity, as the case may be, the invader cannot stand still. He must either advance and retaliate, or retreat.



And if he retreats at all he might as well go home. Hence the British learned early in the game never to make a threat or a demand which they were not prepared at once to back up with force. Following this policy they were led steadily forward in a vicious spiral. Once they had demanded freedom for Western trade, there seemed to be no alternative but to open the whole of China or abandon the project entirely. Of course the steady expansion of trade gave them the impetus to go forward. But if at some point the trade had become stabilized, even then it seems most unlikely that they could have stopped, short of a minister at Peking and the opening of the interior, and still maintained their supremacy. Motives of prestige as well as of gain drove the British irrevocably forward, just as they appear to be driving the Japanese today.

When the British commercial conquest of the mid-nineteenth century, picturesque but relatively mild-mannered, is compared with Japan's present activities, the contrast is enormous. But it may be questioned whether the difference is not one of degree only, rather than of kind. Modern methods are more intensive and the Japanese program is more far-reaching. Instead of the inevitable and beneficent triumph of Free Trade, now we are to be shown the splendor of the Great Asia Principle. The light-draft paddle-wheel gunboat has given way to the bomber, and the artery between North China and the Yangtze is the railway rather than the Grand Canal, which the British blockaded at Chinkiang. But the fact remains that the Japanese cannot gain their objectives as the British gained theirs unless, like the British, they get the cooperation of a certain type of Chinese. Unfortunately the "Chinese traitor" is still to be found, and when Yin Ju-keng, head of the puppet government east of Peiping, proves no longer useful, his secretary perhaps can be promoted in his place. Economic necessity still operates and job seekers have flocked to Manchoukuo just as Chinese merchants swarmed into Hongkong and the Shanghai settlement a century ago. But behind the pressure of population that makes a full rice bowl palatable whatever its provenance, there lies certainly another factor, call it a lack of nationalism or a rational individualism—a quality which in different contexts has been recognized as one of the great Chinese virtues. The experience of many centuries seems to have endowed the realistic Chinese individual with the conviction that he gains very little by dying and that if everyone takes care of himself everyone will be taken care of. It was this sophisticated and really far too civilized atomic point of view which facilitated the humbling of the Manchu dynasty by a few thousand British troops. How far it has been extirpated by the rapid development of nationalist China remains to be seen. In 1840 the British attacked Canton with the aid of a Chinese coolie corps, but now in 1937 Cantonese stevedores are reported to have refused to load Japanese ships.

Judging by the British experience, it is an obvious conclusion that China's present crises will differ from that of 1840-58 insofar as the new forces of nationalism are found to have gained power within the country, power sufficient to repress those atavistic elements willing to give aid and comfort to the enemy.

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NEXT STEP IN ASIA

*John K. Fairbank*

COMMUNISM IN CHINA AND THE NEW AMERICAN APPROACH TO ASIA

*Our Problem of Understanding.*—The danger of a Communist victory in China has been foreseen for a good many years by China specialists both inside and outside the government. Formulation of American policy to forestall such a victory, however, has depended upon conditions in the United States as well as in China.

The first prerequisite when dealing with a revolutionary situation in a foreign land is surely to study and understand it. But the American people have generally lacked either formal education or first-hand experience concerning the Chinese revolution. The second prerequisite, when dealing with 450,000,000 people, is surely to take account of the realities of their immediate situation. But Americans of the postwar period have generally been so aware of the obvious undesirability of Communist revolution in this and other countries of the West that they could not imagine it being welcomed by anyone worth mentioning in China. Thus our China policy became involved in the disastrous duality advocated, for example, in the famous Wedemeyer report; we urged that reform was



the only way to forestall Communism yet at the same time we kept on giving aid to anti-Communists like Chiang who felt they did not have to reform because they were getting our aid. These alternatives were by nature mutually incompatible, but we became involved in trying both at once. This was because our policy makers in the various branches of the government represented a variety of views, while the country as a whole had no one over-all view.

Now at last the past advocates and opponents of American military aid to Chiang Kai-shek are at one in facing the fact of Chinese Communist military ascendancy. As indicated in the State Department's eloquent White Paper on China of August 1949, it is time for stock-taking and appraisal, as a basis for new and more effective action, not only in China but in all of Asia. As a sign of the times, it is worth noting that one staunch advocate of military aid against Communism in Asia, General Claire Chennault, has finally acknowledged (in *Life* for July 11) that areas of anti-Communist resistance "must be sufficiently progressive and enlightened both politically and economically that the people of China and of all Asia can have living proof that democracy can meet their material, political, and spiritual aspirations better than can communism. We must insist that the necessary policies and reforms are carried out to make certain that this will be true." Presumably if this condition is not fulfilled, any resistance program, by Chennault's own argument, would not be effective. There are thus essential political, economic, and spiritual ingredients which must accompany any military program against Asiatic Communism. Lacking these ingredients, a military effort is likely to fail, leaving us in an even worse position than before.

Our situation is even more difficult than General Chennault realizes, because the political, economic, spiritual, and military ingredients with which to oppose Communism are at present inadequate within China and cannot be supplied by us from the outside. This pessimistic judgment is not defeatism but realism, the only basis on which we can build a new policy toward Asia free from dangerous wishful thinking.

*Three Realities.*—There are three points we must accept if we want to be realistic: first, the Chinese Communists have achieved military domination over the Nationalists and there is no firm evidence of any Nationalist capability to prevent the Communist consolidation of power over the whole of China. Once this Chinese Communist power is established, it is not likely to wither overnight.

Second, the Chinese Communist leaders are genuine Communists, as far as ideas can make them; they are not "mere agrarian reformers," but hope to apply to China many of the methods developed in Soviet Russia.

Third, from the point of view of the Chinese common people, the Chinese Communist regime, judging it in Chinese terms by its record to date, now offers promise of being the best government which China has had in modern times. (Note that this is a relative statement.)

Before we look at the record in China, we must recognize the problem of understanding created for us by these last two points: Chinese Communism is real Communism, but it seems, thus far, to be a relatively good thing for the Chinese masses. It is easy to accept either one of these points, but not both of them together. For instance, there have been some people who have liked to think that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists but merely do-gooders in the countryside—on this basis, Chinese "Communism" might very well be a good thing for the peasant since it seemed to lack the evil aspects of Russian Communism. On the other hand, there have been some observers who assumed that Chinese Communism, being Communism, could not possibly represent anything but evil, even if the peasant was temporarily persuaded into thinking so.

Americans who accepted either one of these positions have heretofore had a way out of our present dilemma: either it wasn't real Communism in China, or else it wasn't a good thing for the masses and they might eventually find it out and turn against it.

The proposition that Chinese Communism is genuine Communism and is also, thus far, a relatively good thing from the point of view of the Chinese common people, is not only more realistic according to the evidence available; it also makes our problem in China many times more difficult than we formerly realized it to be. Compared with the easy denunciations of the extreme right wing, who say, "It is Communism and so to hell with it, let us exterminate it," our predicament is much more serious. We are really up against a movement



which is winning and organizing the support of the Chinese people and yet is fundamentally opposed to our political order.

The key to this paradox lies, of course, in the backwardness of the old Chinese system of government and in the fact that modern China has been going through a social revolution on which the Chinese Communists have capitalized and of which they have taken the leadership. This paradox of Chinese Communism can be understood only in Chinese terms, not in American terms. We have to forget temporarily that we as Americans have no use for Communist and totalitarian methods in this country, and put ourselves in the position of the Chinese peasant.

*Chinese Communism as a New Dynasty.*—The first thing that strikes one in the Chinese scene is the incredible poverty of the peasant masses, who are so crowded upon the land that their standard of living is as low as any in the world. This poverty is easy to describe in statistical terms but hard to realize—food without meat, shoes without leather, houses without iron, illiteracy and ignorance, disease and famine, an average life expectancy of twenty-five or thirty years, and all of this accepted as a matter of course, forming part of an ancient way of life. The important point which has too often been overlooked is that China's political standard of living cannot rise far above her economic standard of living. To put it another way, the level of politics is held down by the low level of economic life. Depotism thrives on poverty, and since poverty has been an institution in China, so has despotism. The two actually seem to reinforce each other, forming a society entirely different from our own. This can be understood if we look at the Chinese Communists within the context of the Chinese political tradition.

The dynastic political system which developed in China over a period of almost thirty-seven hundred years without serious interruption came to an end only thirty-seven years ago. Behind the Chinese Communists' success thus far may be discerned the traditional features of a new dynasty's rise to power. Not all of the twenty-five dynasties chronicled in the official Chinese histories went through the same life cycle, but in a good many cases the new regime came to power by leading and organizing a peasant rebellion, helping the impoverished countryside to rise against the economic domination of the towns and cities. Redistributing the land or otherwise lessening the peasants' burden, at which Mao Tse-tung has thus far outdone Chiang Kai-shek, has been a common denominator in these rebellions, no matter what their ideology.

*Use of the Peasantry.*—In the traditional style, the new contestant for the Mandate of Heaven was usually a competitor among other regional war lords, but he won out because he excelled them in his concern for the common people—the lao-pai-hsing of the farming villages. His troops usually treated the people less violently, his area was less disordered and therefore more productive, his conduct more exemplary. "Winning the hearts of the people" (te jen hsin) was an operation that had to be performed in the countryside, not among the city proletariat. The dynastic founder therefore developed his military power on the basis of peasant cooperation, which gave him troops and the food to feed them. Peasant enthusiasm and mass participation in the new regime were not expected; tacit popular acquiescence constituted the Mandate of Heaven. The winner might be helped by his fanatical following (sometimes religious and mystical), military ferocity, and organizing ability, and by demoralization of the old regime and the war-weariness of the people. Having come to power to the accompaniment of agrarian reform, the new dynasty had the chance to consolidate its rule by preserving peace and order, levying the land tax efficiently, and maintaining the public works—canals and postroads for transportation, irrigation systems for agriculture, dikes against flood, and granaries against famine. It also kept up the official examinations to provide competent bureaucrats, and the official ritual observances to sustain the imperial prestige. For these public works the regime conscripted China's manpower.

In this Chinese political order there was little room for the political rights of the individual under a legal system. Government was a paternalism guided by the Confucian ethic, which was superior to written law. So long as the people prospered sufficiently not to rebel, the ruler retained Heaven's Mandate. The ruler's despotism was sanctioned by the people's maintaining a livelihood. It is no accident that Chiang Kai-shek, in his book *Chinese Economic Theory*, in the effort to build a strong modern state should consider it the government's duty "to satisfy the people's wants on the one hand and to restrict them on the other . . . to support the people—the people's livelihood—on the one hand, and to protect the people—national defense—on the other." Each farming



unit, he urges, should be a military unit—production and defense combined on the land.

Against such antediluvian political competition, Communist success in China has been a foregone conclusion. One need not be an Anglo-Saxon democrat to be more democratic than Chiang and the Confucian sages. "Democratic centralism," with its single-candidate "elections", is below the Western European-American political level, but above that of traditional China. As long as the masses are successfully fed and clothed, Chinese Communism can be despotic in our view and remain "democratic" in the eyes of the lao-pai-hsing. This is hard for us to remember, but important. When the Chinese Communists ask the peasant villager to participate in political meetings they are breaking the precedent of centuries, even though they are not catching up with the Anglo-Saxon practice. In Chinese terms, the Communist-organized village councils and elections are more "democratic" than anything in the past. We can understand the success of Communist "democracy" in China only by comparing it with China's past, not with our own.

*Heaven's Mandate.*—China's political tradition may also help us to understand the amazing speed of the Communist success during the past year. In Chinese terms, the Mandate of Heaven has passed from the Nationalists to the Communists, which means that the Communists are acknowledged to be the winners of power, much as an American presidential candidate is acknowledged to be the winner on the day after an election. By long training in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, Americans will unanimously acknowledge an election winner, even though an actual majority of the American voters may have voted against him. We abide by the rules of the game and proceed with our government. By an even longer training in the Chinese tradition, the Chinese public assume that one of the contestants in any civil war will emerge as the ruler of all China. When one contestant has demonstrated that he is superior in getting the peasant masses to fight for him and feed his army, any traditional Chinese observer knows that he has "won the hearts of the people" and so won the entire country. Resistance thenceforth is useless, and everyone, including the defeated army, proceeds to join the bandwagon.

*Use of the Literati.*—After its military rise to power, each new dynasty has faced the problem of organizing civil government to collect the surplus product from the land in taxes and maintain the public works. For this purpose the dynastic founder, once he had conquered by the sword, had to woo the scholar class. The great Manchu rulers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made themselves Confucian scholars and patrons of the literati. The Taiping rebels of the mid-nineteenth century failed to found a new dynasty because their strange pseudo-Christianity was too fanatically anti-Confucian to win over the Confucian scholar class. The Communists today have been making a great play for the support of modern intellectuals and trained professional personnel, who are almost too scarce in China to provide effective administration even if they all cooperate. Communist efforts to enlist the collaboration of these non-Communist groups illustrate the perennial need of victorious organizers of the peasant masses to get the help of the literate few after the fighting stops.

Among the student class in Communist China today there is widespread and intense enthusiasm. Thousands of boys and girls have joined up in new training centers, inspired by the prospect of peace and the challenge of building a new China, modernizing antiquated ways, and bringing a new life to the great masses of the peasantry. This passionate idealism is a relief and a reaction from the long and hopeless years of Japanese invasion and civil war. Although it is guided by the Communist regime, there can be no doubt that this idealism genuinely inspires the heart and mind of young China. The accession of a new regime to power is always a time of hope and enthusiasm, when everything is still possible, when the cause of reform has overcome its enemies and has not yet been defeated by circumstance. To many Chinese this seems like one of the great periods of hope in China's history. This hope does not spring merely from the fact that a new broom is sweeping out the old corruption and self-seeking in politics; it springs mainly from the fact that the Chinese Communists are leading a real social revolution. Indeed, this is the secret of their rise to power.

This view, that China's Communist revolution is also a social revolution and not merely a seizure of political power or change of one dynasty for another, is still denied by some American social or political scientists, who as scholars ought to recognize a revolution when they see one but who prefer to deny that a great social upheaval is occurring in China under Communist leadership. Here again a refusal to admit reality would lead us into the pitfall of underestimating what we are up against.



*Chinese Communism as a Social Revolution.*—The social system which still exists in noncommunized parts of China was one of the great human achievements of ancient times. Its persistence down to our own day after a century of Chinese contact with the West is proof of its original solidity. It has also been one cause of China's persistent backwardness.

This system has been based, first, upon the family as the social unit instead of the individual; and secondly, upon a distinction between the literate upper classes who participated in government and the illiterate peasant masses who did not. In this traditional society of old China, the Son of Heaven relied upon the Confucian literati as his flesh and bone. They were the link between the ruler who headed the bureaucracy and the landlord gentry who dominated the countryside. To understand this connection, we must recall the composite nature of China's literate upper strata. They included the landlords whose takings from their tenants' production allowed them to live in the towns and cities, the scholars whose landlord families supported them from this agrarian surplus while they mastered the time-consuming written language and the classics, the officials who were chosen by examination from among these scholars, and the merchants and other hangers-on who depended upon official patronage. All these people, possessing literacy and access to official power through personal contact, formed a mobile upper class in the towns and cities. The illiterate peasantry, who constituted four-fifths of the Chinese population, formed a static lower class in the villages. The landlord-gentry families stressed the obligations of family relationships, while the Confucian classics bred filial piety toward the patriarch and loyalty toward the Emperor. Confucianism held father and ruler, family and dynasty, gentry, and bureaucracy all together in one ideological apparatus, the most stable ever devised. The peasant masses touched this ruling stratum through the landlord gentry but were themselves inert in politics. They suffered the paternalism of the Emperor and his officials, of the literati and the landlords, all of whom participated in the higher life and culture of old China. There was no caste system, families rose and fell, and there was a good deal of social mobility. But the peasant did not participate in the imperial government, any more than did peasants under the ancient empires in the Near East or the West.

*The New Class Structure.*—Today for the first time this old-class structure has been widely broken down. The social significance of Chinese Communism is that it is consciously committed to destroying the landlord-gentry class. The mechanism for this is the Party, which now takes the place both of the dynasty and of the gentry. The Party uses the nation and the leader as foci of loyalty, instead of the family and the Emperor. By breaking up familism as one would smash atoms, the Party releases enormous human energy. Young people become party workers, and "Liberation" moves like a chain reaction through the households in the towns and villages. The Party and its government now bypass the local landlords and reach down all the way directly to the peasant (and his wife and family) to organize them for production and defense. This is a political activation of the peasantry such as China has never seen before. The old gentry-scholar-official superstructure is brushed aside and the Party steps in.

This profound social change was inherent in the Nationalist Revolution in which Sun Yat-sen and the Comintern collaborated in the early twenties. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang after 1927 could not escape the pattern, though they wanted to delay the process. The Nanking Government, in its efforts to control and reform, had to reach down into the villages. It inculcated loyalty to Nation, Party, and Leader. It enlisted a Youth Corps and did everything but face the problem of the political activation of the peasantry, which could only come at the expense of liquidating the gentry.

Today the local gentry and big landlords in backward regions like Szechwan realize that Communist infiltration can mobilize the peasantry against them. They are quite ready to cooperate, no doubt, with General Chennault or anyone else who will fight their battle for survival, while the Communists are supremely confident that the old landlordism is doomed, whether or not the United States supports it. It does little good for American economists to prove that agricultural production is limited in China less by landlordism than by the actual insufficiency of land. The Communists are championing the peasant's cause against his age-old adversary, and have developed a well-tried method for getting and organizing peasant support.

One of their devices for the mobilization of social change is the organized emancipation of women, a movement which has been supported by missionaries



and by Madame Chiang Kai-shek and others for years past, but which the Communists have now put on a paying basis. Domination of the male over the female has been part of the traditional family and village society. Communism brings the village women into a woman's association. The school girl is enlisted in party work. A tremendous source of social energy is unlocked.

Another appeal which Communism makes to the unlettered peasant is the opportunity it offers him to become literate and rise in social prestige and status. The literacy movement, begun by western missionaries and carried forward by the Nanking Government, is still another worthy cause which the Communists have harnessed to their chariot.

This would suggest that the special status of the modern Chinese literati will disappear in proportion as the New Democracy spreads literacy among the villages. The new Party and government bureaucracy can be recruited directly from the masses by a system of schools and party cells, instead of through gentry families. Trained personnel, technicians and administrators, are more necessary than ever. But the scholar's monopoly of literacy is doomed and with it the special position of the scholar class. The returned students from the West, who have played such a part under the Nanking Government and represent such an achievement in Sino-western cultural cooperation, are eventually replaceable.

In the long run, because the Communists must get more efficient production on the land, they will have to educate the Chinese peasant. Just as the Han and subsequent dynasties found that private property in land was a necessary incentive for intensive irrigated agriculture, so any increase of agrarian production today will require a literate farmer who can learn to apply modern technology to the land. But this rural technician, whether or not collectivized, will not be an Anglo-Saxon type of liberal.

What I have been saying about the constructive efforts of Chinese Communism could be amplified from the testimony of unimpeachable neutral sources, the eye-witness observations of non-Communist western medical workers and relief administrators, the first-hand impressions of reliable journalists and travelers in the Communist area. All this evidence shows a revolutionary movement dedicated to rebuilding China "for the common people", trying in a backward country to achieve the degree of literacy which the United States had a century ago, the social status for women which American women have had for a generation, the amount of public health and medical service which we had, say, in 1880, a standard of production which most Americans would think still too low for survival. With most of this Chinese revolution the American people have always been in sympathy, since in fact American missionaries helped to start it. Here again, we strike a problem of understanding; how does it happen that this necessary and desirable modernization of Chinese life can be led constructively by the ideology of Communism?

*Communism as a Chinese Ideology.*—If we try to look at Communism in Chinese terms as an ideology of the state, it is at once apparent that it seeks to supplant the Confucianism of the traditional dynasties and the famous Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen and the early Republican, and perform the age-old function of giving the new regime an ethical and philosophical sanction.

In traditional China a military victor found Confucianism ready at hand to form the sanction for his rule, providing only that he qualified by his conduct for the role of the Confucian monarch. This was not hard to do, since every schoolboy had memorized the deeds of model Emperors: it was the function of the Chinese ruler both to set an example of proper conduct as a person and to perform the ritual function of his office. This was, briefly, to take responsibility for the maintenance of the moral and material order of mankind. Here was the meaning of Heaven's Mandate: the actions of men must harmonize with the processes of nature, and the Son of Heaven was the great Harmonizer. Hence he set the calendar so that the crops would be planted on time, he ordered public works so as to maintain the people's livelihood, he rewarded virtue and punished crime, performed sacrifices and issued penitential edicts, and gave the final answer on all matters. This tradition of personal administration by the monarch, so different from the Japanese tradition, has lingered on in modern China. The extent to which Chiang Kai-shek was a modern Son of Heaven may be judged by his administrative habits and personal masterminding of war tactics, as well as by the speed with which his regime broke up once he left it. The apotheosis of a party leader, be it Sun, Chiang, or Mao, may therefore be viewed as a Chinese tradition quite as much as a Russian importation.



*Personal leadership is still unusually important in Chinese politics.*—But what has taken the place of Confucianism as the leader's ideological base? Sun's late acceptance of Comintern help in 1923, after he had himself failed to lead the Republic out of warlordism, was a confession that his own ideology, of mixed Chinese and western principles, was insufficient. Chiang's reversion in recent years to a revived Confucianism has been a further confession that Sun Yat-senism, which the Nanking Government tried so hard to propagate throughout the thirties, was not quite adequate to China's needs. Mao accepts Sun's ideas in their pro-Communist version of 1924, as a convenient first approach to China's long process of revolution and reconstruction. It now remains to be seen whether Mao's version of Marxism, in the way that he translates it into the Chinese language and applies it to Chinese situations, will prove adequate to his needs. In approaching this imponderable subject, we can remember that the Taiping rebels' failure in the 1850's, after they had conquered the greater part of China, was essentially a failure of intellectual leadership; and that neither Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek was able to present an interpretation of the world and China's place in it which could inspire the modern intellectuals of China. Can Marxism with its oversimplifications and nineteenth-century blindspots do much better?

*The Marxist Appeal.*—Superficially, the utility of Marxism to a modern dynastic founder in China seems hard to beat. The Chinese peasant has seen his two chief enemies as grasping landlords and foreign invaders. To call them Feudalism and Imperialism, respectively, is no very difficult propaganda feat. Communist propaganda can picture concretely the way in which native Feudalism and foreign Imperialism are supposed to reinforce each other in the persons of Wang Ching-wei and Tojo, or Chiang Kai-shek and General Marshall. This is easy when foreign arms are being used on Chinese soil against the peasants who are being indoctrinated. To youth and intellectuals, meanwhile, Chinese Communism has offered the great valid ideal of twentieth-century Asia, the liberation of the peasant masses from ignorance, poverty, disease, and exploitation. This is expressed in a real cult of the *lao-pai-hsing*, for whom the Communist labor hero labors, the student studies, and the soldier fights. Chinese youth are no doubt more receptive to this ideal because of the century of humanitarian effort invested in China by western missionaries of all sorts. But unfortunately the western evangelism, which has done so much for China, came hand in hand with western commercial exploitation and political domination, which international Communism claims to eschew. Marxism has had its chance in China thus far without the incubus of contemporary Russian expansionist pressure on that country (except for the unexplained rape of Manchuria in 1945, concerning which the Chinese Communists have had very little to say).

Marxism's claims to universality may also help it in China. Confucianism was a system of allegedly universal validity which took no account of color or origin so long as one behaved in the Confucian way. Any barbarian could become Chinese by acting Chinese, whereas Christianity, Anglo-Saxon liberalism, and fascism all reached China in circumstances which suggested a specific overseas origin among so-called advanced western peoples. They each had an aroma of foreign cultural superiority which made them less palatable to the Middle Kingdom. Perhaps the same odor will attach to Marxism as Marxism ripens in China. But in the past two decades of Russian passivity there, relatively speaking, the Marxist creed has achieved a local footing reminiscent (in this one respect) of the early days of Buddhism when the monks of the fifth century visited India and returned to make coverts of their disordered homeland. Chinese Communism is accepted in China as a genuinely Chinese movement. Mao Tse-tung proudly announces that his movement has "found the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, which holds good everywhere."

A wise Russian policy will certainly avoid pressures on Chinese Communism which might destroy the cosmopolitan and yet patriotic appeal of Mao's doctrines. Under Maoism young Chinese patriots can feel themselves participating in a practical world-wide movement in which China is an esteemed and self-reliant colleague, not an appendage. This is a good feeling after a century of humiliation.

*Communism and Nationalism.*—Part of the Communist ideological success against the Kuomintang has come from their capture of the sentiment of nationalism. It is a strutting paradox that Communists, so closely allied to China's inveterate continental enemy, Russia, should have been able to turn the force of patriotism against Chiang Kai-shek, who came to power as its symbol.



Chiang's chief ideological sanction was the theme of national unity, strength, and independence, toward which he at one time provided historic leadership. Yet the Communist propaganda claims that it has succeeded in mobilizing patriotic sentiment against Chiang as a "running dog of American imperialism," a traitor who sold his country to foreigners in order to stay in power. Few American administrators of aid to China will agree that Chiang was a subservient ally; he would take our aid more easily than our advice. How fundamentally, then, has Chinese Communism actually been able to use the sentiment of nationalism against him? This subject awaits study, but I suggest that Chiang's real failure was on the domestic front, not the international. It was his reliance on civil war instead of reform, as his means of competing with the Communists to solve China's manifold ills, that made him seem finally to be an enemy of the people. He lost public support not because he accepted American help but because he did not use it for the popular welfare and reform. The American policy of military aid to help an unpopular government suppress a social revolution played into Communist hands, as serious students predicted. It is noteworthy that the Communist hold upon Chinese patriotic sentiment has been achieved at a time when the United States was open to the charge of putting its own strategic interest ahead of the interest of the Chinese people. This self-seeking American policy gave Communist propaganda its chance to focus public indignation on Chiang's American-made and supplied bombing planes while picturing Russia as a friendly neutral.

Now that Chinese Communism has come to power, it is rapidly cementing its ideological base by a widespread indoctrination of the Chinese people in the Communist interpretation of China and the world scene. The study of Marxist texts today is reminiscent of the traditional study of the Confucian classics. But Communist methods today include the study-group, the individual's criticism of himself and of his colleagues, and public confession of errors-psychological techniques in which Communism bids fair to outshine its rival, the Church of Rome. By these methods the Communists hope to reduce the inveterate individualism of the old China, the personal jealousies and frictions which have undermined the cohesion and effectiveness of Chinese group activity of the past.

*Bases of a Chinese Totalitarianism.*—In summary, if we survey these political, social, and ideological aspects of Chinese Communism, we can hardly deny that it has its roots deep in the Chinese scene. After almost thirty years of trial and error and adaptation to Chinese circumstances, the Chinese Communist movement might indeed be expected to have firm roots, not superficial and not easily dislodged. The fact that Marxism is a two-edged sword which may be used first to liberate the populace but later to enslave it is not out of keeping with the Chinese political tradition. The Marxist emphasis on a monopoly of power by the state machine is compatible with the old Confucian theory of benevolent despotism. Modern Chinese who have seen the impossibility of reforming their ancient crowded country by unorganized individual efforts are more ready to accept the need of disciplined organization and central direction. China still consists of the illiterate peasant masses and a small literate elite, and both these groups in Chinese society will accept the idea that the Party must lead and the masses must follow, an idea which neither Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek could dispense with. The crowning point in the Chinese Communist success story, finally, is the fact that western missionaries and educators and western-trained liberal reformers in modern China have had their chance to remake and modernize this ancient society but have failed to do so because they failed to secure and use political power to carry through revolutionary changes. Fundamental reform, according to the Communist arguments, is impossible without military and political power behind it, just as the ancient rulers could not be benevolent until they had become despots.

Thus the same political, social, and ideological conditions in Chinese society which have permitted and facilitated the rise of Chinese Communism to power now provide a sanction for the use of that power in the totalitarian pattern. This includes the control of all political association, the activation and guidance of all social movements, the indoctrination of the people, manufacture of information and control of the press, manipulation of education and of mass movements, suppression of dissent and of civil liberties as we think of them. All these things are potentially a part of the new Communist order, including the systematic inculcation of the bogey of "capitalist imperialism" and denunciation of American "spies" and "sabotage" against the "peoples democracy" which the Chinese Communist Party has created.



Toward this new, complex, revolutionary China we are now making the effort to formulate and develop a new American policy. We must recognize that many excellent popular reforms are being carried forward by doctrinaire Chinese Communist leaders who are imbued with a dogmatic and provocative hostility to the United States.

*Bases of a New American Policy.*—In this effort to set up a new policy we can expect little or no help either from the left or from the right. Any credit that we give the Chinese Communists will be accepted by them as a matter of course, and any criticism denounced as capitalist American lies. Conversely, the emotional anti-Communist in the United States will assume that all criticism of Chinese Communism is obvious, and any praise is pro-Communist propaganda. One may therefore expect to be called both a stooge of the Kremlin and a lackey of American capitalism.

Mao Tse-tung has proclaimed that his movement looks to Moscow for leadership, that the world is divided into two camps, that there is no middle ground and everyone must be for him or against him. With a curious similarity, the extreme right represented by the religious dogmatism of the Roman Catholic Church, sees itself locked in mortal combat against Communism for the soul of mankind and proclaims that there can be no neutral ground. Chiang Kai-shek says we must support him or fight a third world war. So does Chennault. Apparently both right and left are implacably determined that we must fight—Mao because he assumes as a Marxist that our capitalism must be imperialistic and that the revolution must come by violence. Chiang Kai-shek because he considers Communism insatiable and also probably hopes that war between Russia and the United States will save his political fortunes.

We must recognize that this kind of extremist thinking does not provide us with a policy short of war. The cold war in which we find ourselves with Russia calls for armament as a deterrent of warfare, but also for constructive policies to build the peace. Yet in seeking constructive policies toward Asia we cannot profit greatly from our experience in western Europe, where we have followed a dual policy: Marshall-plan aid to revive the prewar industrial economy and a defensive military alliance, the Atlantic Pact, to maintain political stability. In eastern Asia (excepting Japan) there is little prewar industrial economy left to revive, industry has still to be built up, and meanwhile the degree of social and political instability makes a defensive alliance less possible than in western Europe. For an Asiatic program we have to strike out on new ground.

A few years ago we might have fallen back on the principle of the self-determination of all peoples and relied on an appeal to Asiatic nationalism. This principle that peoples should be left free to work out their own political systems is as old as our republic. It has been applied in Asia in our program for Philippine independence and in our doctrine of the territorial and administrative integrity of China. In the process of maintaining an open door for our trade and cultural contact, we have stood against the domination of China by any outside power.

Yet the application of this doctrine today is peculiarly obfuscated by the fact that the Chinese Communists are Chinese and, in spite of their professed ideological tie to a foreign power, have won a greater degree of popular support than their opponents could muster even with general American economic and military assistance. We cannot claim that the Russian interventionist activity in China since V-J Day has been greater than our aid, much as we may deplore the former and approve the latter. The chief of the American military aid mission which tried unavailingly to help Chiang Kai-shek has testified that no battles were lost by the Nationalists for lack of American arms; what the Nationalist troops lacked was something worth fighting for as an alternative to Chinese Communism. On balance, I am afraid we must put the Communist victory in China down as a case of self-determination, not of outside aggression. An American military effort to save the Chinese people now from their dangerous ideological tie to Russia would find the vast majority of patriotic Chinese lined up against us. Thus, the simple formula of backing Asiatic nationalism against Communism in the name of self-determination is not enough.

The implication of this very unpleasant fact is that we cannot expect to have an opportunity to develop toward China the beneficent programs of economic and social assistance of which we might be capable. The Chinese Communists have no intention of letting us compete with them in areas they control. More-



over, since our access to Indo-China is limited to the narrow confines within which the French are unsuccessfully trying to avoid the fate of the Chinese Nationalists, we must also expect little opportunity there. Thus we are already limited to south Asia and the islands on Asia's periphery; Japan, part of Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, as well as India, Siam, and states which have been or are under British control.

*The Lesson of Our Old China Policy.*—The American public are slow to realize that for some time to come we must be content with a very minor role in Chinese affairs. We can no longer expect to play the important part in China's national life that we have played during and since the war. Our major activity in Asia must shift to other areas. Yet if we seek to follow there the pattern which we followed in China, we shall meet similar disasters. The most trenchant conclusion to draw from our China failure is that material means (food and goods, arms, ships, and planes) are inadequate to defeat a social revolution which operates in the realm of the spirit and of national sentiment and psychology as much as on the economic and military levels. In this context it is a nice question whether our arms to Chiang Kai-shek did not actually help the Communists more than it hindered them.

We may expect our position in the rest of Asia to worsen steadily until we respond to its dangers in a more than military manner. It is therefore high time to apply to the rest of Asia the lesson which we should learn from our disaster in China.

This lesson may be stated in a series of points: First, Asia's peasant masses are now ripe for social revolution and political activation. The Asiatic farmer is ready to become a participant in politics. Whoever can lead and organize him in his own self-interest can use him as a basis for political power. But the Asiatic peasant is astute, like any farmer, and not easily led into new paths. The revolutionary leadership, as Mao Tse-tung tells his followers, must get close to the common people and stay close to them, experience their problems, live their life and think their thoughts, much as an American Congressman must retain close contact with his electorate. The revolution must be "for the common people."

Second, the political leadership of Asia's rural masses can come only from their own countrymen, not from foreigners. The Chinese Communist leaders are native Chinese, even though a number have been trained in Russia.

Third, the creation of a native non-Communist leadership for the modernization of Asia and the liberation of its peoples from poverty, disease, and ignorance can be achieved only in response to a revolutionary idealism which is ruthlessly dedicated to the people's welfare. If we are really interested in the fate of Asia's peasant masses, and not just in our own security and comfort, now is the time for us to show it. Communism derives its power originally from its ideal of helping the common people; so strong is this ideal that it partially sanctions the evils of the Communist police state even after it has begun to coerce the common people. To put it another way, Communism is winning in Asia because it combines genuine idealism with a ruthless urge to power; it cannot be combated by power alone. Nothing we can offer in arms and material goods can buy the support of Asia; such support as we seek and need must be inspired by ideals and visions of a better life. This is a great test for western Christendom—having begun by inspiring the modernization and liberation of Asia in modern times, can we now continue the job?

Fourth, the ideas and ideals with which to inspire a native revolutionary leadership in Asia are not lacking in the American background; our Declaration of Independence, for instance, is impressed in the minds of many Asiatic patriots; our concern for the individual, our humanitarianism, our technology, and our cultural values are known and admired. Yet the spirit to make these things come alive in our approach to Asia since the war has been lacking, because we plainly put ourselves first and Asia second in our policies. Take for example our distrust of socialism abroad: a great many Americans oppose the growth of federal government power and activity in the United States as a trend toward a dangerous and unnecessary totalitarianism or statism; on this ground some of us denounce all American efforts to help regimes abroad which are developing socialist types of government ownership and operation; yet it will be difficult if not impossible to find in Asia a creative leadership which is not fundamentally socialist in its thinking. This is because the backward peasant societies of Asia generally have a ruling or official class but lack an entrepreneurial middle



class: capital is not in private hands, and private enterprise on the American model cannot be their primary means of development. The Asiatic states must lead the way in many aspects of their own modernization and industrialization. If we would consult the needs of these Asiatic peoples, instead of our own fears or predilections, we could give them more inspiration. The Tennessee Valley Authority is still one of the most inspiring examples that we have set before Asia's leaders, because in the TVA government capital has done a job in the interest of the local common people which their own local private capital could not do.

Here, then, is the challenge. The American people have the skills and technology, the cultural values and ideals, to make us the guide and friend of revolutionary Asia. Thus far we lack the will and vision to use them.

What we could do, if we would, can be vividly imagined: we could help to bring literacy and education, medicine and public health, production and welfare to a third or a half of mankind, and bind them to us as cooperating partners in a new world. We cannot do this, however, by purely material means—by the mere shipment of cargoes, least of all by the supply of arms alone. The job requires, first, study and understanding, a grasp of the problems; second, trained personnel who are inspired by a sense of dedication as real as that of the American missionaries who spread over the world in the nineteenth century. American technicians, administrators, and advisers sincerely dedicated to the development of Asia will have at hand the most powerful tools and methods that man has ever devised for the remaking of his own society. The things that America produces, supplies and equipment of all kinds, are only a first element among our resources; economic aid is only the first step, and may not be the main one. We also have available the media of mass communication and of individual education—books, periodicals, pictures, radio, motion pictures; the methods by which science is applied to the age-old problems of agriculture and husbandry; the techniques, both scientific and social, by which science can be used to meet human problems anywhere; the ideal of individual and community initiative as the key to prosperity and welfare.

Our first problem of all, in such a program, would be to relate it constructively to our own domestic economy. The development of Asia must be an integral part of American business, education, and administration. Obviously, it cannot depend solely on the profit motive for its inspiration; as the American business community is the first to declare, the profit motive alone and unaided cannot save either Asia or ourselves from the menace of totalitarianism.

In summary, the lesson of our defeat in China is that we have let our policy become more anti-Russian than pro-Chinese. In our endeavor to thwart Russian expansion we have let ourselves become aligned against genuine Chinese popular sentiment. The ill-advised zeal of the Eightieth Congress, when it further increased our arms aid to Chiang Kai-shek, played into Communist hands; for the Chinese Communists not only got the arms in the end but have been able to turn popular feeling against us, in spite of all the help that we have given the Chinese people in the past. The fact that Moscow and Chinese Communism have loudly exploited our error against us must not obscure the fact that we consciously put our own strategic interest, which is to check the spread of Russian influence, ahead of the Chinese popular welfare, which was served by our economic aid but not by our military aid. The defeat of our policy will have been a small price to pay if we can learn from our experience in China how to harmonize our strategic interest with the popular welfare of the rest of Asia.

It is not by any means too late to relate ourselves constructively to the revolutionary process at work in China and the rest of Asia, providing we accept these principles: (1) The containment of an all-encompassing revolution such as now convulses China cannot be achieved merely by setting up static military defense lines nor by arms shipments from abroad but only by competition from rival groups within the country which make an equally valid use of the sources of revolutionary power. (2) Such competition in agrarian Asia must stress the remaking of peasant life and its political activation, and must therefore parallel those elements in the Chinese Communist "Liberation" movement, like the emancipation of women and the use of medicine and technology, which are desirable things in themselves. (3) The American role in all of Asia must therefore be to help and inspire an Asiatic leadership which seeks constructive and rapid change in all aspects of society, a genuine social revolution in the people's interest. (4) This policy of working with and not



against the Asian revolutionary process requires intensive study of Asiatic conditions, needs, and sentiments and an immediate vigorous development of the President's Point Four program. It calls for an intellectual effort greater than in wartime, the use of American resources and idealism to forestall a world-wide defeat from which arms alone cannot save us.

*Practical Steps.*—The details of a new and more active American program toward Asia must be worked out by administrators who face the concrete problems, but a general outline may be suggested. In China it is too late for military or other interventionist adventures, which could only strengthen the Communist position against us. We must strive to maintain contact with the Chinese people as best we can, preserving educational and cultural activities whenever possible, cooperating with United Nations agencies, developing whatever commercial and cultural exchange the new Chinese regime will permit and we ourselves consider desirable. In our propaganda we should try to keep the record straight and provide an example of freedom of opinion and criticism. We have more to lose than to gain by any further support of Chiang Kai-shek, or by the use of American force to keep Formosa out of Chinese Communist hands. Similarly, we probably have more to gain than to lose by according a new Chinese central government some sort of *de facto* recognition if they seek it, and by not responding too violently to any provocative acts against us. We must remember that our hostility is essential to Chinese Communism, to preserve the Communist myth of world history and keep popular sentiment mobilized against "capitalist imperialism." The development of a discriminating trade with China, on a selective basis to eliminate strategic materials, should be a cardinal point in our policy. China is not now in the Russian orbit economically, and we will gain nothing by pushing her into it. In spite of Mao Tse-tung's vigorous adherence to Moscow, China's foreign trade is still oriented toward the West. We should try to keep it so. All this, however, can add up to little more than a holding action in our relations with China.

Our more active policy should center on non-Communist Asia. Here the essential step, fundamental to all others, is a mobilization and allocation of American manpower to provide the specialized personnel who can develop direct and intimate contact with Asiatic realities. American shipments are less necessary than Americans on the spot in Asia, ready and able to study local problems and assist local leaders. This personal firsthand understanding of Asiatic needs is the only way of safeguarding an American program of development, for all programs will fail which are not geared to the life of the common people so as to help them effect great social changes. Revolution or rapid change is inevitable in all aspects of Asiatic life. Revolution in the people's interest is part of the American heritage. We must revive the pioneer revolutionary spirit in our approach to Asia. This will come if public-spirited Americans are given a closer view of Asia's problems and potentialities. Training programs, research institutes, field stations, and cultural exchange at all levels are therefore in order, with a movement of students and specialists of all sorts in both directions between the United States and Asia. The cost is relatively little. All these things can be done once we realize that American security and Asiatic welfare are indivisible.

It is time, therefore, to reactivate our approach to Asia through private American agencies—missions, the YMCA and student movement, universities and foundations, our great business corporations. Our free society must respond to Asia's challenge through private as well as governmental channels, through a new recruitment of talent, on all the many levels of which we are capable.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is an excerpt from the Vandenberg Diary received from Mrs. Helen Reid of the New York Herald-Tribune and the reference to the Vandenberg Diary was made in a photostat.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, on this point I should like to request that this extract from the diary be printed. It is in photostatic form and is presented in reduced size as a plate, and I ask that the text also be printed because the reduction will make the text practically unreadable and yet it is desired that the position of the note on the text be shown on the plate.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be done in that way.



(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344G" and is as follows:)

## MEMORANDUM

Saturday, February 5, 1949.

4 February

This meeting proved to be about China where the Nationalist Government (which we support) has all but collapsed and is now trying to negotiate peace terms with the Chinese Communists. Under ECA we granted \$125,000,000 of American military aid to Chang Kai Shek. About half has been delivered this past year. The other half (about 60 millions) is now in process of delivery - some on ships ready to sail/ \* \* \* The President met us in the Cabinet room. He was very serious. He said that his National Security Council and his military advisors had recommended this week that he suspend all export licenses on all further shipments to the Nationalists because of their imminent collapse and, therefore, that these supplies probably would simply fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists (or, in the event of Chang's fall, be sold by the Chinese in the black market). He asked our view. Two or three of the gentlemen immediately fell in with the idea of stopping all export licenses forthwith. I kept silent until the President asked for my view. This is substantially what I said. \* \* \* "Chang and his Nationalist government may well be on their last legs. They probably will collapse in the near future. Our shipments to them, therefore, might well fall into the hands of the Northern Chinese Communists (as has been the case with American equipment furnished to eight American-trained Nationalist Divisions which surrendered without firing a shot). But there is something here vastly more important than what happens to \$60,000,000 worth of supplies. The American Government already is charged with a large share of responsibility for Chang's Government's fate because of our previous policies and our failure to give it adequate military supplies. (This charge is only partially justified up-to-date). But if, at the very moment when Chang's Nationalists are desperately trying to negotiate some kind of a peace with the Communists, we suspend all military shipments to the Nationalists, we certainly shall make any hope of a negotiated peace impossible. We shall thus virtually notify the Communists that they can consider the war ended and themselves as victors. We virtually withdraw our recognition of the Nationalist Government. We seal China's doom. Regardless of the justification of previous charges that our American policy has been largely responsible for China's fate, if we take this step at this fateful moment, we shall never be able to shake off the charge that WE are the ones who gave poor China the final push into disaster. Millions of our own people will be shocked; and we shall seriously lose prestige throughout the world. I decline any part of any such responsibility. I beg of you, at the very least, to postpone any such decision for a few more weeks until the China question is settled by China and in China and not by the American government in Washington. This blood must not be on our hands. My point is further emphasized by the fact that the title to almost all of this 60 millions in supplies has already passed to the Nationalist Government which is waiting for these export licenses. Therefore your order will be much more than a withholding of American supplies in American hands. It will be a ban on the Nationalist Government - and that will be "the last straw". I make it plain that I have little or no hope for stopping the immediate Communist conquest. That is beside the point. I decline to be responsible for the last push which makes it possible." \* \* \* After a moment of silence, the President said that, of course, I had posed the real question. Then he asked the Vice President for his view. Barkley said he agreed with me. \* \* \* That ended the conference. I doubt whether the President will issue any "orders" for a while to come.

Miss Barrows, Matt Connelly's office, 'phoned to ask the Senator to be at a meeting with the President tomorrow at 11 o'clock; it's a very much off the record meeting. Connally, Eaton, Bloom, the V.P., and Acheson will be present. East Entrance, White House.

S

R.S.V.P.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is an exchange of correspondence from Senator McCarran to the Honorable Dean Acheson. Senator McCarran's letter is dated April 1, 1952, and the reply from Mr. Carlisle Humelsine to Senator McCarran is dated April 11, 1952, and this bears on the significance of the Japanese-Soviet Pact which took place in 1941 with a characterization thereof by Secretary Hull.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.



(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344H" is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344H

BM: MW

APRIL 1, 1952.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,  
*Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you kindly send us, for the use of the Internal Security Subcommittee, a copy of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull's statement characterizing the Russo-Japanese Treaty. This statement was released after April 13, 1941.

I would appreciate having this as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
*Washington, April 11, 1952.*

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: With reference to your letter to the Secretary of April 1, there is attached a copy of the statement you requested.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Enclosure: Copy of press statement by Department of State, No. 180, April 14, 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
*April 14, 1941  
No. 180*

For the press.

In reply to inquiries at his press conference today, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"The significance of the pact between the Soviet Union and Japan relating to neutrality, as reported in the press today, could be overestimated. The agreement would seem to be descriptive of a situation which has in effect existed between the two countries for some time past. It therefore comes as no surprise, although there has existed doubt whether the two Governments would or would not agree to say it in writing. The policy of this Government, of course, remains unchanged."

Mr. MORRIS. Next is a letter from Carlisle Humelsine dated July 16, 1951, addressed to Senator McCarran bearing on the employment of seven people whose names have been referred to as having been employed in the Department of State.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344I," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344I

JULY 16, 1951.

In reply refer to SY.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I refer to your letter of June 27, 1951, in which you request information with regard to certain individuals who may have been employed at one time or another by the Department of State.

Although it would appear that I am precluded by Presidential directive from discussing whether the investigative facts of a particular case raise a question of loyalty, I am pleased to inform you that the records of the Department contain the following information with regard to the status of the persons concerned:

Julian R. Friedman is not an employee of the Department at this time. He was previously employed, receiving a War Service Indefinite appointment on September 2, 1943, as a Divisional Assistant. He transferred to the Foreign Service Auxiliary on October 10, 1945, and was assigned to the American Consulate General at Shanghai as a Junior Economic Analyst. Mr. Friedman was terminated from this position on November 12, 1946, due to the liquidation of the Foreign Service Auxiliary.

Emile Despres is not employed by the Department at the present time. He was appointed to the Department on September 30, 1945, by transfer from Office of Strategic Services under the provisions of Executive Order 9621. Mr. Despres resigned from the Department on January 2, 1946.

Michael Greenberg is not now an employee of the Department. He entered the Department on September 27, 1945, by transfer from the Foreign Economic Administration under the provisions of Executive Order 9630. He was separated from the Department by reduction in force on June 15, 1946.

John N. Hazard is not employed by the Department of State. He is a former employee who entered the Department on December 12, 1945, by transfer from the Foreign Economic Administration. He resigned from the Department on July 31, 1946. He was again appointed to the Department on November 15, 1949, for a period not to exceed thirty days. Mr. Hazard was terminated from this position on November 30, 1949.

Jefferson Franklin Ray is not an employee of the Department. He was previously employed, having been given a temporary appointment on March 31, 1948. He resigned from this position on March 18, 1949.

Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer's suspension by the Department from her job as Policy Liaison Officer, GS-14, was announced April 10, 1951, and resulted from the suspension of Mr. Brunauer by the Department of the Navy. Consideration of Mrs. Brunauer's case is pending in accordance with established loyalty and security procedures.

Mr. John S. Service, whose case is also pending, is a Foreign Service Officer, Class 2, on detail in the Department to the Division of Central Services.

Thomas Arthur Bisson is not now, and has not been, an employee of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,  
Deputy Under Secretary  
(For the Secretary of State).

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter dated December 12, 1951 from Argyle R. Mackey, Commissioner of Immigration, to Senator McCarran bearing on the deportation of one Charles Bidien, who has written for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344J," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344J

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Washington 25, D. C.

Please address reply to: and refer to this file No. A-2987117—Inv.

DECEMBER 12, 1951.

Honorable PAT McCARRAN,

*United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: This is in response to your letter of December 1, 1951, requesting full information regarding the deportation proceedings of Charles Bidien.

Your inquiry appears to relate to the Charles Bidien who is the subject of immigration file A-2987117. He was born at Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia, on



July 18, 1904, and is an Indonesian citizen of the Malayan race. His name in his native land was Sheh Bidien Ben Aroon.

A warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings was issued against him on September 16, 1948, charging him with: (1) membership in an organization advocating the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States; (2) membership in an organization that circulates, or distributes printed matter advocating such overthrow; (3) being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigration visa at time of entry; and (4) being an alien ineligible to citizenship and not entitled to enter the United States under any exception.

He was accorded a hearing under this warrant of arrest on November 1, 1949, at the New York Office of this Service. Charges (3) and (4), above, were found sustained by the evidence. Charges (1) and (2), above, were not sustained as no evidence was adduced bearing upon these charges. Admissible evidence to sustain these latter two charges was not available for production at the hearing.

According to the record, Bidien last arrived in the United States February 8, 1930, at Boston, Massachusetts, as a seaman aboard the S. S. *City of Rangoon*, and deserted the vessel at the port of Philadelphia. He was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

On December 21, 1949, an order of deportation was entered. The warrant of deportation was issued on the same date. His deportation was effected on the S. S. *Batory*, which sailed foreign from the port of New York, January 20, 1950.

I hope that the foregoing satisfactorily answers your inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ARGYLE R. MACKEY,  
Commissioner.

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Senator FERGUSON. We will recess at this time until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, May 16, 1952.)





# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL  
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in room 424 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. The subcommittee will come to order. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Weintraub, when we suspended your examination yesterday, we had concluded a question about Mr. Harry Dexter White.

Do you or did you know Michael Greenberg?

**TESTIMONY OF DAVID WEINTRAUB, DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, N. Y.—Resumed**

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Joseph Gregg?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that name either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Maurice Halperin?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir, I don't recollect that name either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know J. Julius Joseph?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. The same answer. I just don't recollect those names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Duncan Chaplin Lee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Robert T. Miller?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know William Z. Park?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Bernard Redmont?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. What is the name again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Bernard Redmont, R-e-d-m-o-n-t.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Helen Tenney, T-e-n-n-e-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have, I think, answered a question as to whether you know William Remington.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe you asked me the question yesterday. I know who he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't know him personally?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Harold Ware?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know John J. A-b-t?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us of your acquaintanceship with Mr. Abt, your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Mr. Abt, I believe, was a member of the general counsel staff in FERA some time during the time that I was there, and I knew him as such.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the full extent of your knowledge of him and association with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir. I kept seeing him on and off; I had some business with him from time to time related to the FERA, but that is about all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen him in recent years?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect running into him in recent years at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you maintain your acquaintanceship?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Abt had been named in sworn testimony as a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I read that in a newspaper once.

Senator FERGUSON. When you read in the paper about these people, the fact that Chambers and Bentley had testified, as I understand it you discounted all that testimony and did not believe it.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, that is only partly correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get your idea. I did not want to put words in your mouth. But from what you said yesterday, I drew that conclusion. That may be your testimony.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, some of those names I knew only as names, and I don't know that I had any particular reaction, other than that it was odd, or interesting, or something like that. With respect to some of the other names, of people with whom I had a working relationship, many of those people, those of them that had worked for me, I knew as competent technicians, with whom I had had associations, with respect to whom I never had any reason to believe that they would do anything of that sort. I was shocked, and I suppose I assumed that when put to the test those people would probably be able to show that that was not true. It is in that sense that I disbelieved it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that a man who is a Communist can be an economist and really be objective in his thinking in America?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know that I could answer that question, not having been a Communist myself. All I can say is that since I knew these people had done good objective work that stood up in public, I therefore felt that these people probably would be able to show that they were not Communists.



Senator FERGUSON. Well, you have not made much of a study of this question of communism, have you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I have not. My specialties are in another field.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how can you be a economist and not know that philosophy?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In a general way I do know the philosophy. But I certainly have not made any intensive study of it. I have been busy doing other things.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an economist now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your work?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is my work. And I am essentially an administrator of economic research.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me take our own point 4 program. Do you think that a Communist who claims to be an economist could properly appraise and evaluate and recommend projects for point 4?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, I think when we talked yesterday about some of the people who worked for me, I answered a question to the effect that Mr. Michael Kaletsky, for example, who is a Polish national, is on my staff in a senior capacity. He is an economist.

Senator FERGUSON. I was not thinking of the United Nations. I did not want to put that in, because I understand that the United Nations has to deal with this problem on a Communist and Socialist and capitalist basis. And would you even include anarchy, believing in no government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I wouldn't say.

Senator FERGUSON. At least the others are all combined in the United Nations, and you have to deal with it on that basis, and you cannot eliminate any one of those thinkings—out of the solution of your problem in the United Nations. Is that not correct?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But here in the United States, do we not have a different philosophy? We were talking about your work when you were with the State Department and the various other agencies. Do you think that Communists should be permitted to be economic advisers to our officials?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, to answer your question—

Senator FERGUSON. And not known to be Communists? That is what I am getting at.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is partly for that reason that I answered the question as I did yesterday. These people worked for me. So far as I knew, they did objective work that stood up. And for that reason I had to answer the question that as far as I knew, to my knowledge, I had no reason to believe that they were Communists and were doing work along those lines. I suppose that answers your question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you never saw any evidence of communism or socialistic thinking in any of the economists or political scientists that you worked with in Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. None at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I can recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you would not say, from the evidence that has been presented in court, that Hiss was a menace? You would not say that he was not a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, there was a court, a jury, an appeal. That is a fact, and I accept that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Nathan Witt, W-i-t-t?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Lee Pressman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us of your knowledge of him and your acquaintance and association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was essentially the same as that of Mr. Abt. He, too, was a member of the Council, the staff of the FERA, with whom I had dealings.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the extent of your association with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Alger Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The extent of your knowledge of him you have fully explained to this committee already?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Donald Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the extent of your knowledge and acquaintance with him you have already explained to the committee, have you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I don't believe you asked me about him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you do that now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is the most casual—I think I simply ran into him once or twice sometime. I believe it must have been in the State Department, but that is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he related to Alger Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I thought he was his brother.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Henry H. Collins?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The name sounds familiar, but I don't recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Charles Kramer or Krevitsky?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I think you asked me about that yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have already been asked about Victor Perlo; have you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did know him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Weintraub, I have asked you about the names of the 10 persons who, according to the Bentley testimony and other sworn testimony, made up the Silvermaster group. You knew 6 of the 10. I asked you about the 10 names that made up the Perlo group. You knew 8 of the 10. I asked you about the nine names that made up the Ware-Abt-Witt group, and according to such testimony you knew six of the nine and were doubtful about a seventh. I asked you about the names of 10 persons who, according to this testimony, were Communists but unattached with any of those three groups. You went



right down the list of 10 and didn't know any of them. Is that entirely coincidence, sir?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know, sir. I don't remember, as a matter of fact, which of those were in one or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no knowledge as to which were in which category at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Certainly not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Anne Triano?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Wilder Foote, F-o-o-t-e?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about him, what you know and the extent of your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Wilder Foote, I believe I must have met for the first time sometime during UNRRA days, but I couldn't fix any date, as a member of the State Department staff, probably related to public relations. Wilder Foote has, for several years now, been a member of the staff of the United Nations, and during those years I have known him quite extensively, see him frequently, as a man in the public relations field. That is about the extent of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he is a Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the furtherance or obtainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we, on the rest of this list, let the phrase "Communist connection" stand for that whole last question?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If you wish, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Benedict S. Alper?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Isn't that the name you mentioned yesterday as a member of the U. N. staff?

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe it is.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I just know the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know the person?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Do you know Max Beer, B-e-e-r?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Ursula Wasserman, W-a-s-s-e-r-m-a-n?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she a member of the United Nations staff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She was a member of the United Nations staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. She is not now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not so far as I know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did she work? In what division or branch?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If I remember correctly, she worked in the Trusteeship Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with securing her employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she resign, or was she dropped? Do you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did she leave?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know that either, but it is some time ago, at least over a year ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where she is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe she is—well, the last time I saw her, as a matter of fact, was in Paris. I have a vague recollection that she had something to do with some newspaper agency, but that is all I could tell you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Marie Ginsberg?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. I don't recollect the name at all.

Could that stand for most of those things that you ask me? When I say I don't know, I simply don't recollect the names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Jeanne Goodsteinsinger?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir, I don't recollect the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harold Porter McKeever we have already discussed; have we not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir; never heard the name before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Helen Smerling?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Marshall D. Schulman, S-c-h-u-l-m-a-n?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. J. Donald Kingsley, K-i-n-g-s-l-e-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The name, Kingsley, is familiar, but I don't associate that with those initials. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir Arthur Rucker?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir. That probably makes it the same as Kingsley. Both Mr. Kingsley and Sir Arthur Rucker are names to me. I have met Mr. Kingsley, I think once, but I don't remember ever meeting Sir Arthur Rucker. They are associated with the International Refugee Organization, if I remember correctly.

Mr. SOURWINE. John C. Ross?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Millard Lampell, L-a-m-p-e-l-l?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Norman Lewis Corwin?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. What is the name again? Corwin?

Mr. SOURWINE. Norman L. Corwin, C-o-r-w-i-n.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harry Byard Price, P-r-i-c-e?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jan Galewicz, G-a-l-e-w-i-c-z?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jeri, J-e-r-i Stary?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Steiger?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Allen Atkinson?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked about Michael Endelman; were you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember being asked about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Connors asked you about him.



Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, yes; that is correct.

No, sir, I don't know the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Grad?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Red?

Mr. SOURWINE. G-r-a-d, Grad.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Grazdanzef?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Victor Yahkontoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir. The name is simply familiar to me as someone who is doing translation work, I think, in the United Nations, who wrote some books, if I remember correctly, books on Siberia or Russia or something like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know the man?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jefferson Franklin Ray, Jr.?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, you will recall your testimony that Harry Magdoff was employed under the research project.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he have a top-rank position there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I suppose you would call it that. He came in at a fairly low level, and by the time he left he was doing some very important work in the sense that his work finally could be published.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a writer; isn't he?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was a statistician.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't he also write?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, he wrote up the results of his statistical research which were published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't he write speeches?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not that I knew of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you know that Harry Magdoff ever wrote speeches for anybody?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not for me. No, sir, I didn't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make speeches?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. I don't know that he ever wrote speeches.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know that he ever wrote speeches for anybody?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He might have. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you keep up connections with Mr. Magdoff after you and he had severed connections with that research project?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he ever wrote any speeches for Henry Wallace?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir; I do not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Lewis Corey?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us what you know about Lewis Corey?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I met Mr. Corey sometime when I worked for the national bureau of economic research at the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, where he used to visit from time to time, and I met him there.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recall it, he wrote some things for the Amalgamated from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all you know about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Subsequently, he lived about a block away from where I lived.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In Sunnyside, Queens.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall his address?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. And I used to see him from time to time there socially. That is essentially all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what he is doing?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Louis C. Freina, F-r-e-i-n-a?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Corey's name had at one time been Freina?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never knew that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Corey had ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I had heard something of that sort, possibly from him directly, but I don't remember any more.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember any details?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whether he had broken with the party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is what I meant. As you put it, he had been and was no longer at the time that I knew him.

Senator FERGUSON. You had heard that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever discussed it with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, if you didn't discuss it with him, how is it possible that you could have heard it from him directly, sir?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, to that extent. This is a matter of some 20 years ago. To the best of my recollection, now that you have mentioned it, I seem to remember that he had been and was not at the time. Now, I think he must have told me. If he didn't tell me, someone else must have told me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Esther Corey?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She is his wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only as his wife?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As his wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was not your friend?



Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I told you we lived a block away from each other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this a family friendship?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, we dropped in there. They dropped into our house now and then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mrs. Corey a particular friend of Mrs. Weintraub?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the same extent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mrs. Weintraub know whether Mr. and/or Mrs. Corey had ever been members of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I imagine to the same extent that I knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all you knew about it, just that you imagined?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. We must have talked about it, and I would say that my wife knew the same thing I knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell her or did she tell you, or did the four of you talk as a group, or how did it come about that the knowledge was the same?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, as I say, I don't know whether I knew it directly from him. If I knew it directly from Corey, it was quite possibly the result of possibly a four-cornered conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not exact enough to be able to say that it was that.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you and Mrs. Weintraub knew the Coreys well enough that it could have been a four-cornered conversation among you discussing their prior Communist connections?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your wife ever a Government employee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What department?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She was an employee in the National Bureau of Standards during the war.

Senator FERGUSON. How many years did she work there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. From approximately 1941 or 1942, until we left Washington in 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. Is she employed now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had she worked for United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was her line of work with the Bureau of Standards?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She was a chemist.

Senator FERGUSON. Is she a chemist by profession?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your wife, to your knowledge, ever discuss with Mrs. Esther Corey the question of who was who in the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were never present when there was any such discussion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, when you left UNRRA, did you do so of your own choice?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us the circumstances under which you left UNRRA?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. At the time I left UNRRA, Mr. Fiorello LaGuardia was Director General, and he asked me to resign.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why, if you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He never told me why.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, sir, didn't it involve a question of instructions which you had sent concerning an accusation that Russia was selling machinery for export, selling UNRRA material for export?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, that was a—that is a fact. Now, whether that prompted him to ask me for the resignation or not, I do not, as a matter of fact, know.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what was said by you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir. As I recollect it, I was then Deputy Director General of UNRRA in charge of supply, and therefore in charge of the shipping of all kinds of goods to countries receiving relief supplies.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Russia was not in UNRRA, not furnishing any money for UNRRA?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The U. S. S. R. was paying part of the administrative expenses of UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. Just part of the administrative expenses?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not the operating.

Senator FERGUSON. Not the operation or the matériel?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct. And to be exact, the question involved was the shipment of tractors to the Ukraine, which, incidentally, was a member of UNRRA in its own name in addition to the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. As an independent state?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was an individual member of UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. It at least got that listing?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right. And the question involved the shipment of tractors to the Ukraine from the United States. Those tractors were obtainable only through the allocation machinery then in effect in the United States. I received a call one day from the State Department, which in substance was to the effect that there were some rumors that tractors were being shipped out of the U. S. S. R. to Argentina. And if that were a fact, the shipment of tractors to the Ukraine could not go forward, unless I could state to the State Department, and through them to the allocating authorities, that that was not so, that tractors were not being shipped out of the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was not fair for UNRRA, principally out of American funds, to ship tractors out to Russia and at the same time have Russia selling tractors to the Argentine or any other country.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That was the view. I thereupon dispatched a cable to the UNRRA chief of Mission in the Ukraine repeating the statement that had been made to me and asking some questions concerning it, namely, "Are they or are they not shipping? And if they are, whither are they shipping it, and how much are they shipping?"

I did that for the purpose of getting at the facts so that I could present them to the State Department.



Senator FERGUSON. You sent it to the Ukraine, now, instead of to Russia?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I sent it to the UNRRA chief of mission, who was our man in the Ukraine.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recall it, I received a reply saying no tractors were being shipped, that it was ridiculous to say so, or something of that sort. I conveyed that information to the State Department. And, as I recall it, the tractors went forward.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you think that was a sufficient examination of the facts?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. May I—

Senator FERGUSON. Let me ask you that question. Did you think that that was a sufficient examination of the facts?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I thought that that was sufficient information. That was the only information I had to convey to the State Department who, in the final analysis, were the people who had the judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question at all.

My question was: Did you think that that was a sufficient examination of the facts?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not recall what I thought then.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think so now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. And I do not know precisely how the man went about obtaining the information.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question either.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Sir, I simply am trying to reply to the question in these terms. The chief of mission was a responsible individual in whom a certain amount of faith resided.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not ascertain from other sources whether Russia was shipping tractors to the Argentine or any other country?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Because I followed the established channel.

Our way of getting information at that time was through our man who was stationed there. And I therefore went through that channel.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that LaGuardia discharged you for doing it in that way?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Now, that is why I asked you to please let me complete my story, and I think perhaps it will come out.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Apparently a newspaper correspondent, who was at that time in the Ukraine, met either the chief of mission or one of his people in the Ukraine and asked him some questions about how things were going and received a reply to the effect that the people in Washington in the central organization were crazy, in that they asked such ridiculous questions as to whether the U. S. S. R. was exporting tractors, when it was perfectly obvious to everybody around there that they didn't have any tractors. That story appeared in the newspapers, or something to that effect. That is the story that Mr. LaGuardia saw.

Mr. LaGuardia then said, "Whoever sent such a crazy cable?" or some words to that effect; and apparently seemed to feel that I shouldn't have sent that cable.

Now, what else he felt, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say? He usually spoke out, did he not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, yes. He asked me why I sent the cable, why I sent such a ridiculous cable. He seemed to agree with our people in the Ukraine, that that was a nonsensical question to ask.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, as a matter of fact, sir, didn't Mr. LaGuardia feel and express to you his feeling that your instructions with regard to that matter had not been tough enough?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is incorrect?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is incorrect.

Senator FERGUSON. He would not have made any inquiry at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. My impression was that he felt that I should not have made the inquiry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell Mr. LaGuardia that you had received this communication from the allocation authorities stating that no more tractors would be made available to UNRRA unless you gave them assurances?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did, except that it was not the allocation authorities; but the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department; but it originated with the allocation people, wouldn't you say?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you get from Mr. LaGuardia any expression as to how he thought it should have been handled?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that. Mr. LaGuardia spoke mainly about: why didn't I clear the cable with him before I sent it. I perhaps ought to say that my recollection then was, and I told him so, that I had shown him the cable, but he claimed he had never seen it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, wasn't it a situation in which the cable in Mr. LaGuardia's opinion was not designed to produce a real investigation of the facts or disclosure of the situation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He didn't indicate that at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. In fact, it was rather the other way around. It was that this was such a ridiculous rumor that I had no business taking it seriously and starting inquiries of that sort. That certainly was the impression that I got.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you gather that Mr. LaGuardia would have had you ignore the State Department's communication, or that he would have had you send a denial without checking the facts?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't say that. My impression perhaps was that Mr. LaGuardia would have gotten on the telephone and burned up some wires telling people that he wasn't going to chase around every rumor that appears in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the sole complaint against you so far as you know, so far as Mr. LaGuardia told you, was that you had sent the cable?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And because of that Mr. LaGuardia requested your resignation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, as I said before, Mr. LaGuardia never told me. Moreover, we had had several other run-ins before.



Mr. SOURWINE. About what?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I remember Mr. LaGuardia once coming into the office and telling me that he had met somebody over the week end and had bought some thousands of cases of liver paste.

I said to Mr. LaGuardia that he couldn't do that. That upset him very much. He thought he could do anything. I then pointed out to him that we were not in the business of buying directly, that we had to buy through the Department of Agriculture. He then wanted to know why I had three hundred-odd people working for me if we weren't doing the buying.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a pretty good question, was it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, it certainly sounded good.

I also told him that even if we did, I would not have bought liver paste, because I wanted bread, and there was no use having liver paste if you didn't have bread to put it on, and we didn't have any money to spend on liver paste. We had quite a "go" on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long before the tractor incident was the incident of the liver paste?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. A couple of months, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. How soon after the tractor incident were you fired?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Perhaps a couple of weeks.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was the liver paste or the tractors that had the most to do with it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think it was an accumulation of things. As I said, that was one incident. There were other incidents.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have other things besides the liver paste and the tractors, bring them out. Let's hear it.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, we had another incident that had to do with grain allocations, if I remember correctly. There was some meeting of a committee of one of the allocating bodies. I forget the details now, but that allocating body didn't want to allocate as much grain to UNRRA to ship as we wanted, as we thought we were entitled to. It was an off the record kind of meeting. There were papers floating around there, with all sorts of figures on them, about what the allocations might be, should be, could be, and so on.

Mr. LaGuardia, at that meeting, became terribly excited and finally stalked out of the room and said he wasn't going to stand for this any more and asked all of his staff to come along with him, and as he went along he picked up a sheet of paper from the table and put it in his pocket; which was a confidential piece of paper, and the chairman protested it and asked him to return the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the chairman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect any more who the chairman was. Vaguely I recall he was a Canadian.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you come into that picture?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was in charge of supply, and I was the man who dealt with requests for allocations, and so on. As we left the place and got back to the office, I told Mr. LaGuardia that he ought to return that piece of paper.

We had a little argument about that, or rather quite an argument about that.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wondering whether LaGuardia ever had a "little" argument.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right. It was quite an argument. And as I recall, he eventually returned the piece of paper, but he was quite angry.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was on the paper?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I remember, some confidential figures of some sort. And I had said to him that he had no right to take it.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position at that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He wanted more food for UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. But what was his position at that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was the Director General for UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. And what happened?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I complained that he should return it, and he at first said he thought he didn't have it, and I said, "Look in your pocket," and he put his hand in his pocket, and he had it, and he eventually returned it. It was a very unpleasant affair.

I remember another incident. I don't know why—well, you want to know. I will tell you. I recall another incident shortly before the firing, as a matter of fact. UNRRA had bought a lot of meat, as I recall it, through the Department of Agriculture, against my advice, and I kept insisting that we ought to cancel those meat orders, because we didn't have any funds, and we ought instead to use those funds to buy grain. Apparently Mr. LaGuardia had, through the Secretary of Agriculture, previously done a lot of work to obtain the allocation of this meat from the Department of Agriculture.

And what I was asking Mr. LaGuardia to do was to go back on that and cancel that and instead spend the money for bread.

It took several weeks, as I recall it, of arguments about that, until finally Mr. LaGuardia was convinced that he ought to do that.

He went up to see the Secretary of Agriculture, and I went along with him. We had a brief talk with the Secretary. He did all the talking. The Secretary was quite glad to accept the cancellation and merely asked Mr. LaGuardia to write him a letter about that, so that he would have it on the record.

Mr. LaGuardia and I left the Secretary's office, got into his car, and on the way back to our office I said to Mr. LaGuardia, just before we were to leave the car, that I would be glad to draft his letter to the Secretary; which netted me perhaps some of the worst abuse I ever received from anybody, to the effect that did I think that he didn't know how to draft a letter, or something of that sort. It was a most unpleasant affair. I don't remember any more what I said to him and what he said to me. It was one of those things I would rather forget, as a matter of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there any other instances which come to your mind which you feel may have been part of the background for your dismissal from UNRRA?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Perhaps I also ought to state for the record, sir, so that you don't get the wrong impression; in between those incidents, we got along extremely well sometimes. I was asked to submit my resignation not directly by Mr. LaGuardia but by General Rooks, who was then his deputy; and 2 days after the resignation, I received a telephone call from Mr. Rooks asking me whether I would join the UNRRA staff again, on some assignment in Europe, as I remember it; and as I recall, I said there wasn't room enough for both Mr. LaGuardia and me in the organization. Perhaps that rounds



out the general picture. It was one of these flare-ups-and-downs kind of affair.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Arthur Stein?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a former president of the UFW, United Federal Workers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever have anything to do with that organization?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think he held some kind of office with that organization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he ever dismissed from Government employment, to your knowledge?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he ever employed by the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was employed in the NRA, if I remember correctly, at first. Later on he worked in the FERA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with securing his employment, helping him to get a Government job at any time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is quite possible. He is my brother-in-law. I don't think I had anything to do with his first employment, but it is quite possible, since he later worked in the FERA, that I did have something to do with it, although I don't recollect it specifically.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you help many people to get in Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, I think the answer would have to be "Yes," in the sense that people used my name as a recommendation, and in some instances I proposed them.

Senator FERGUSON. And have you helped many to get into the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I think the same answer would be true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember we discussed your acquaintance with and knowledge of Mr. Abraham George Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you state that you had no knowledge or reason to believe that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or a pro-Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or that he had ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the furtherance of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you know that when he was testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1950—and let me ask: Did you know he had testified there in 1950?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think I read that in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that when he was testifying before that committee he had been asked:

What was the nature of your association and relationship with Mr. David Weintraub?

And that he had replied:

\* \* \* on the advice of counsel, I refused to answer that, decline to answer that, in the exercise of my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment, since what I would say might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That he was then asked: "Do you know where he is now?"

And he replied: "I decline to answer on the same grounds."

And that he was asked:

What positions did he hold with the United States Government, to your knowledge, other than that of economic adviser of the War Production Board?

And Mr. Silverman conferred with his counsel and then replied:

I decline to answer in the exercise of my constitutional privilege, under the fifth amendment, since what I would say might tend to incriminate me.

Did you know that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give this committee any possible explanation for why Mr. Silverman took that position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you never heard that before?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever at any time engage with Mr. Silverman in any discussions, activities, joint ventures, or any other type of activity which, if known, would incriminate him criminally?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you not even curious when it appeared in the paper that he had been before the Un-American Activities Committee? Was any of this ever printed in the newspaper?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect having read that in the newspaper.

I remember vaguely that I read somewhere that he had refused to answer questions. I don't remember the date of this.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that he refused to answer questions in relation to you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Nobody ever called that to your attention?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard it before?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I never heard it before.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you surprised at it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Rather; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just "rather?"

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir; I am surprised at it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you do not show much surprise on these questions of communism, here, or your investigation of them. Were you curious about all this testimony going in about your friends down here in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In a general way; yes, sir.

Mr. FERGUSON. Just generally curious?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You could not quite fathom why these people would be taken before the Un-American Activities Committee, and



refused to answer on the ground that it would tend to incriminate them? That did not even incite your curiosity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, it incited my curiosity, but obviously not sufficiently for me to make any serious investigations of it to go into the testimony and the records.

May I say, sir: I don't remember the date of this particular thing, but you might possibly help me on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will try to help you.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was August 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. As late as August 1950.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, in August 1950, I was in Europe. I read about this thing very briefly in the European press. I was busy with other things. By the time I returned, I was tied up in other things, and I didn't make any special investigation of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that Silverman also refused to answer a question in relation to Irving Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was a friend of yours?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Irving Kaplan was a friend of yours?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He certainly was associated with me for many years.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman, for this witness.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. May I, Mr. Chairman, before I am excused, make one or two small points?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. One, I would like to make a correction of something I said yesterday. I believe I gave the name of one of the employees working under me who is a national of the U. S. S. R. as Pavlov, indicating that I wasn't sure of his name. I subsequently recollected that the name is really Ivanov, I-v-a-n-o-v.

As a second point, I believe either you, sir, or the counsel asked me yesterday about some kind of coordination committee that existed some time in the forties having to do with postwar reconstruction, of which Mr. Lattimer, myself, and either Lowenthal or Rosenthal were members, and I think I indicated yesterday that I have no recollection of such a committee. If I have made a positive statement that no such committee ever existed, I had no right to say that.

There were many interdepartmental committees at the time, and if some kind of committee existed having to do with postwar reconstruction, I may well have had something to do with it, but I simply would like the record to show that I have no recollection of any such committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did in connection with that prior testimony to which you have now referred testified that you and Mr. Murray Lattimer, or you and Mr. Rosenthal, had never met with Mr. Lowenthal in connection with such a committee or its activities or prospective activities. Is that substantially correct?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If I said we have never met, I would like to say that if any such committee existed, I may have, but I have absolutely no recollection of any such committee or of ever having met with these people about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have testified earlier here yesterday that you and Mr. Lattimer—L-a-t-t-i-m-e-r—and Mr. Rosenthal had met on several occasions with Mr. Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Would you mind repeating that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Do you think that you might have testified on yesterday that you and Mr. Murray Lattimer and Mr. Rosenthal might have met on several occasions with Mr. Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I may have testified to that effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. That could have been true?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It could have been true.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of your having thought it over, overnight, and coming in here to make your correction, you still say that could have been true?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, it could have been true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection of whether it was or not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I have no recollection of its being true.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. Do you have anything else to say in relation to adding to or amending your testimony?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, one more point, as far as I am concerned.

You made a statement earlier about certain groups of people, of whom apparently I knew a major proportion, and another group of people of whom I knew a similar number, and another group of which I knew none, and you seemed to draw some kind of conclusion from that, as if this were something that—

Senator FERGUSON. An unusual coincidence?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Something of that sort.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if it were a fact, but I am sure I stated no conclusion for the record, sir.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, I merely would want to say that in my almost 20 years of professional work I have known probably literally thousands of people. Some of those names you mentioned whom I knew were individuals who I am sure thousands of people in Washington knew. They were in positions which made it almost necessary for other people in related fields to run into and deal with them all the time. I simply would like the record to show that in my activities as a Government official I was one of the thousands, I am sure, with whom they dealt and with whom I dealt. And that is all, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, just on that point, you remember you stated you did not know Mr. Michael Greenberg.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was with the Board of Economic Warfare and with the Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated you didn't know Joseph Gregg.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Research Division.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I never had anything to do with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated that you didn't know Maurice Halperin.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect the name.



Mr. SOURWINE. He was head of the Latin American Division in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, and head of the Latin American Research and Analysis Division of the State Department.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again, I had nothing to do with Latin America at the time, but I did have to do with Europe.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated you did, or did not, know Robert T. Miller?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that name, either.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was head of Political Research for the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, a member of the Information Service Committee, Near Eastern Affairs, the State Department, and Assistant Chief, Division of Research and Publications of the State Department.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't attempt to draw any conclusions from these, but we had here four groups of persons, all of whom had been cited in sworn testimony as members of the Communist underground. Three of them were in groups, the Silvermaster group. That was Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Solomon Adler, Norman Bursler, Frank Coe, Lauchlin Currie, Bela Gold, Mrs. Bela Gould—Sonia Gold—Abraham George Silverman, William Taylor, and William Ludwig Ullmann.

Your testimony was that you knew 6 of those 10 persons.

The Perlo group was Victor Perlo, Edward J. Fitzgerald, Harold L. Glasser, Charles Kramer, or Krevitsky, Solomon Leshinsky, Harry Magdoff, Allan Rosenberg, and Donald Niven Wheeler; and you knew 8 of the 10.

The Ware-Abt-Witt group was Harold Ware, John Abt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Alger Hiss, Donald Hiss, Henry H. Collins, Charles Kramer, and Victor Perlo. You knew six of those and were doubtful about the seventh.

And then there were 10 unattached individuals. That is, they were employed in the Government. It was testified by Miss Bentley that they had cooperated in obtaining information from the files of the Government for the use of Russian agents. And those 10 names you didn't know any of. I simply ask if there was any coincidence, if you had any explanation with regard to it.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I can only say that it must have been coincidence, that those others were names of people who were apparently prominent and moved around a great deal, and consequently I knew them. If those others didn't move around, and I had no direct business relations with them, I didn't know them. It appears to be coincidence. That is all I can say, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next witness is Mr. Kaplan.

Will you raise your right hand, sir?

You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your full name, and your address?

**TESTIMONY OF IRVING KAPLAN, NEW YORK, N. Y. (ACCOMPANIED  
BY HIS COUNSEL, MILTON FRIEDMAN, NEW YORK, N. Y.)**

Mr. KAPLAN. Irving Kaplan, 130 West Seventy-eighth Street.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you speak louder?

Mr. KAPLAN. I have a voice that doesn't carry very well. I will try to.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a lawyer with you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your counsel's name?

Mr. KAPLAN. Mr. Milton Friedman.

Senator FERGUSON. And what is your address, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. 522 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your office address?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you stated your address for the record?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you acquainted with David Weintraub, the gentleman who has just testified here, and who is Director of the Division of Economic Stability and Development of the United Nations?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What has been your association with him?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am employed in the United Nations in the division of which he is director.

Senator FERGUSON. The division of what?

Mr. KAPLAN. The division of which he is director. With respect to any other associations outside of the U. N., I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me or degrade me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait. You merely say now that you will answer that one question, that you work under him, and that as to any other question you offer voluntarily the answer, "I refuse to answer any of the other questions on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me"?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That isn't what you said, is it?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, that is not what I said.

The question that I was answering was a very general one as to what were my associations with him.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. Any other questions about your association with him you refuse to answer?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer as to any associations prior to my employment at the United Nations or any personal associations with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that the witness means to say, Mr. Chairman, that he did have other associations with Mr. Weintraub outside the United Nations, but that in that area he will respectfully decline to answer questions on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him.

Mr. KAPLAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You heard Mr. Weintraub's testimony, did you not?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes. I heard most of it. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. You heard most of his public testimony?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You could hear what he was saying?



Mr. KAPLAN. Not always, but I think I heard the better part of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Your answer indicates, as far as he is concerned, that you leave the inference, as to him, that there must have been something wrong with his negotiations with you.

Mr. KAPLAN. I intend no inferences whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. But you refuse to answer on the ground that it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know that Mr. Weintraub testified to associations with you other than the association which you have testified to, do you not?

Mr. KAPLAN. I heard him so testify; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did he testify to anything which, so far as you know, was false?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that any relationship that you had with the previous witness, outside of the United Nations, your actual job, you refuse to answer? That you refuse to answer as to those relations or activities or relationships or friendships, on the ground that it would tend to incriminate you? Is that right?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That leaves it that you may not get much information on that line.

Mr. SOURWINE. We may get a good deal, Mr. Chairman.

Did you participate in any way in the assignment of Owen Lattimore to Afghanistan?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had been assigned to head a mission to Afghanistan for the United Nations?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that, at or about the time he was so assigned?

Mr. KAPLAN. I knew it at or about the time he was so assigned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that with any of your superiors in the United Nations?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never did discuss it with Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Weintraub participated in the assignment of Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. KAPLAN. I heard him testify that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, so far as you know, did he testify truthfully in that regard?

Mr. KAPLAN. As far as I know, he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have testified your name is Irving Kaplan?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever known as Isador?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the name you were given at birth?

Mr. KAPLAN. I was given a name in Jewish at birth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; the equivalent of either Isador or Irving.

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right. The equivalent of Israel, Isadore, or Irving.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify as to where you were born, sir?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And where was it?

Mr. KAPLAN. Poland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the place?

Mr. KAPLAN. I can spell it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you do that? I couldn't pronounce it, either, sir.

Mr. KAPLAN. Z-d-z-i-e-n-c-i-o-l.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was in what might be termed the Province of Nowagrodek?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. KAPLAN. September 23, 1900.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that your school and college records indicate that you were born December 12, 1900?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think some records did.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is incorrect?

Mr. KAPLAN. Those were incorrect, those that did; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your parents were Morris Kaplan and Jenni Kaplan?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were both born in Grodno, Russia?

Mr. KAPLAN. Well, I couldn't be sure, but they were born in that same vicinity.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your father was a naturalized citizen of the United States?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you acquired your citizenship by derivation from him?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you born in Russia, or Poland?

Mr. KAPLAN. Well, it has been listed as Poland. I think it is an area that has shifted around in the post-World War I period and subsequently.

Senator FERGUSON. You were classed as Polish, though, rather than Russian?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that your father's naturalization papers show that you were born September 1, 1901 in Russia?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am not aware that they show any date.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you remember testifying in executive session that you came to the United States about 1904?

Mr. KAPLAN. About 1904 or 1905, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know that your parents entered the United States on March 17, 1902, at New York City?

Mr. KAPLAN. I say it must have been my father who entered at that time, and I entered a year or two later.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your father was, on December 18, 1911, admitted to citizenship?

Mr. KAPLAN. Approximately. That must be right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has your American citizenship ever been questioned, Mr. Kaplan?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. You attended elementary school and high school in the public schools of the Bronx, N. Y.?

Mr. KAPLAN. And Manhattan.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Manhattan.

The City College of New York, 1919, 1920; Columbia University, 1920, with an A. B. degree June 6, 1923?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You attended Fordham Law School from September through April 1929?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is approximately correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you a lawyer?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not receive a law degree?

Mr. KAPLAN. I had a year and a fraction of law in night school.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an economist?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were employed in New York City and later in San Francisco, Calif., in various positions as statistical clerk, research analyst, and statistician, between July 1918 and July 1935; is that right?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you work in any other cities during that period except New York City and San Francisco?

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In July 1935, you secured employment as a principal statistician with the Government in Washington?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the early 1930's, were you employed by the Pacific Gas & Electric Co. in San Francisco?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a fellow worker named Frederick J. McConnell?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Frederick J. McConnell took an active part in Communist demonstrations in San Francisco?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he was regarded as an active Communist among his fellow workers?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend any Communist Party meetings with Mr. McConnell?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Senator FERGUSON. Has he ever been prosecuted in any way in connection with communism?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been made a party to any litigation, criminal activities, in relation to communism?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were employed by the national research project of the WPA in Philadelphia in November of 1935?

Mr. KAPLAN. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And remained in that employment until August of 1938?

Mr. KAPLAN. Till when?

Mr. SOURWINE. August of 1938.

Mr. KAPLAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were associate director of that research project, working under Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have previously refused to testify on the grounds that it would tend to incriminate you about any association with Mr. Weintraub other than the United Nations.

You are now testifying about an association with Mr. Weintraub other than the United Nations.

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not intend to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did do so, didn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. It was in error.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did so testify right here, didn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I wish to withdraw that testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can't withdraw it. It is true, isn't it?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it would tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You refuse to answer whether the testimony you just gave here was true?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this witness be directed to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I do direct the witness to answer.

Mr. KAPLAN. It is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were then employed as associate director under Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Weintraub assist you to get that position?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you consulted with counsel with regard to your refusal to answer on that, after you have opened it up with regard to the association?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had better consult him again.

Mr. KAPLAN. All right.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I adhere to my position.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the witness be directed to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the question?

(The question referred to was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think I will require him to answer that, if he refuses on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him. They are not directly connected with the fact that he worked under him, and the fact as to whether or not he helped him get the job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communists or former Communists who were employed by the national research project of the Works Projects Administration?



Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that McConnell was a Communist, this person you have been asked about?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you basing your answer on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate or degrade you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am basing my answers on the constitutional privilege.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said it might incriminate or degrade you. Do you think you have any right to refuse to answer a question before this committee on the grounds that it might degrade you or tend to degrade you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am resting on the incrimination.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not contend that you have any right to refuse to answer on the grounds that it might degrade you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not contending that you do? You are not claiming any such right?

Mr. KAPLAN. I said I am not claiming that.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. You have said that several times, and I wanted for your sake to have your position clear.

The questions you have refused to answer, then, have been refused on the grounds that they might tend to incriminate you if you answered them truthfully; is that correct?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Harry Samuel Magdoff?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the grounds it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Irving Kaplan?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am Irving Kaplan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Whittaker Chambers?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Mr. Magdoff and Mr. Chambers were employed by the Research Project while you were there?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you employed as a special assistant to the Attorney General in the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, from 1938 to 1940?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who helped you to get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was your immediate superior?

Mr. KAPLAN. I guess Thurman Arnold.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Arnold employ you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Senator FERGUSON. You refuse to answer the question that was asked as to whether Thurman Arnold employed you, on the ground it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know, as a matter of fact, offhand, what the employment procedure is. I imagine I was employed by the Attorney General.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you withdraw that claim that it would tend to incriminate you, on the question of whether he did hire you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I withdraw that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consult with Mr. Thurman Arnold before you were employed by the Department of Justice?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did talk with him?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Over the telephone, or in person?

Mr. KAPLAN. In person.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you make your appointment?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Kaplan, you can't open up a line like this and then refuse to go further with it.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I speak?

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think he has opened up that line, sir. He has answered questions which do not have a tendency to incriminate, and when you then ask a question which he thinks tends to incriminate him he reserves his privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have to rule that he may refuse to answer that. A Communist, you see, may have made the connection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell Mr. Arnold who had sent you to him?

Mr. KAPLAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and he discuss the question of your references?

Mr. KAPLAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not?

Mr. KAPLAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and he discuss the question of your qualifications?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Kaplan, do you think that a Communist could be a proper employee to help a man in the Antitrust Division of the Attorney General's office of the United States?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a research analyst, Federal Works Agency, Washington, D. C., from February 1940 to February 1942?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think those are the right dates, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee how you acquired that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Kaplan, do you know whether Communists were aiding people to get into the various agencies of the United States Government?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.



Senator FERGUSON. Was there a ring in Washington, where Communists were active, to get other Communists into the United States Government?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you head program progress analyst for the War Production Board, February 1942 to September 1944?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in charge of Reconstruction and Foreign Economic Development in the Foreign Economic Administration from September 1944 to July 1945?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever employed by the Treasury Department?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doing what?

Mr. KAPLAN. I was employed first on an assignment to Germany with the military government.

Senator FERGUSON. The military government?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. KAPLAN. I didn't know him personally; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Harry Dexter White?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he help to get you the job in the Treasury?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were employed in Germany from July 1945 to December 1945?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think those are the correct dates.

Mr. SOURWINE. And while you were there, you served as economic adviser, Foreign Funds Control Section, assigned to the United States Group Control Council in Germany?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And in that capacity you traveled to Europe to assist in carrying on the liberated areas program of the Treasury Department?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What year was that?

Mr. KAPLAN. 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether they inquired as to whether or not you were a Communist at that time, before you got that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any other Communists—or any Communists; I will put it that way—were with you on that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were transferred from economic adviser, Division of Monetary Research to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, as an economist, on May 19, 1946?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You retained that position until the discontinuance of the agency, January 31, 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever call upon you for any information?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't understand that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever call upon you for any information?

Mr. KAPLAN. You mean while I was working in the Treasury Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Either while you were working, or otherwise.

Mr. KAPLAN. Why, certainly. I had assignments, or I couldn't work there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever call on you for any personal information, information about you, yourself?

Mr. KAPLAN. I filed an application.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever call upon you for any personal information, about you?

Mr. KAPLAN. After that, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir, I don't recall that they ever did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give any people's names, that they could get information about you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Presumably. That is required by the application form.

Senator FERGUSON. So the applications would show those?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am pretty sure they would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who did recommend you to the Treasury? Who did you give as reference?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever ask you whether you were a Communist? Or about Communist affiliations, or about any charges that you had such affiliations?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir, I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. They never asked you about that?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recall that they did.

Mr. SOURWINE. They didn't seem to be interested in that?

Mr. KAPLAN. There was no occasion for it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department ever call on you for any information?



Mr. KAPLAN. I never worked for the State Department. I was on an interdepartmental committee for a short time while I was with the FEA, and if you mean by my participation in that committee as being called upon to provide information, then the answer is "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department security officials ever ask you for any personal information?

Mr. KAPLAN. State Department security officials?

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot hear you.

Mr. KAPLAN. I am just trying to get the significance of that question. I don't recall that there ever could have been any occasion for that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you employed as economic affairs officer, Economic Development Section, United Nations, in January of 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not?

Mr. KAPLAN. Not in January 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you hold a job of that nature?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were you employed?

Mr. KAPLAN. In 1948.

Mr. SOURWINE. January of 1948?

Mr. KAPLAN. Beginning in February, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. February 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you testify when you left the United States Government employment?

Mr. KAPLAN. No. Some time in 1947, about the summertime.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a Government job after the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was discontinued in January 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not?

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the Government employment that you left some time in the summer of 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think the termination of that project took place actually, with respect to me, at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the summer of 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. About June or July. I don't remember how long.

Mr. SOURWINE. The agency didn't exist after January 31, 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think there was a technicality. There was a formal discontinuance. The work of completing the report continued until March or April. And my pay with the annual leave involved in it continued into the summer.

Mr. SOURWINE. You entered on duties at the United Nations February 9, 1948?

Mr. KAPLAN. February 2, I think. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many employees are there in the Economic Stability and Development Division of the United Nations?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know. I heard Mr. Weintraub say there were about 125.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that about right?

Mr. KAPLAN. It sounds to me about right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know William Remington?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Alger Hiss?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many of the employees in the Economic Stability and Development Section of the United Nations are Communists?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many of them have Communist sympathies?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether or not the United Nations inquires into a man's political beliefs, as to whether or not he is a Communist or a Capitalist or even an anarchist?

Mr. KAPLAN. It is my understanding it does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Dean Acheson?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Solomon Adler?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Larry Adler?

Mr. KAPLAN. I know he is a harmonica player.

Senator FERGUSON. A what?

Mr. KAPLAN. I know he is a harmonica player, and I have heard him perform.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know him?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Ferri, F-e-r-r-i Asakian, A-s-a-k-i-a-n?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recall ever having heard that name before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Alben Barkley?

Mr. KAPLAN. I know he is Vice President of the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Veet Bassie, B-a-s-s-i-e?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know V. Frank Coe?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know you are being pretty selective about which ones you will answer and which ones you won't answer, don't you? What is the reason for that?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Henry Hill Collins?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Henry Hill Collins, Jr.?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know of any such person.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know of any such person as Henry Hill Collins, Jr.?

Mr. KAPLAN. What was the previous name you read?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about this name now. Do you or did you know Henry Hill Collins, Jr.?

Mr. KAPLAN. Oh. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.



Mr. SOURWINE. You just said you didn't know any such person, didn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I didn't have any idea who you meant. I thought it must be a different person from the one you read before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you do know a Henry Hill Collins?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You see, you did testify you didn't know any such person as Henry Hill Collins, Jr., didn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I answered to that question, and it seemed to me it must be a different person from the other, and the "Junior" made me think it must be an infant that I don't know anything about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, didn't you testify that you don't know any such person as Henry Hill Collins, Jr.?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that true?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know of any child by the name of Henry Hill Collins.

Mr. SOURWINE. I didn't ask you about a child. I asked you if you knew Henry Hill Collins, Jr., and you said you didn't know any such person, and I am asking you now: Was your testimony true when you said that?

Mr. KAPLAN. My answer meant at the time that I didn't know what I was thinking of as that name, as distinguished from a name that had been given me before.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were you thinking of?

Mr. KAPLAN. I told you I was thinking of a child.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you now not what you meant, but I am asking you now whether your testimony was true when you said you didn't know any such person as Henry Hill Collins, Jr.

Mr. KAPLAN. If you mean the same person as Henry Hill Collins, I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the answer your counsel just told you to make, isn't it?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right. That is the answer I am giving you on advice of counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. He leaned over and asked you to say that, without your asking him anything.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That isn't a fair statement. We have been conferring for the last 3 minutes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked the witness a question, and I ask counsel to please remain quiet.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I ask the Senator's permission to make a comment, since that does reflect on me.

Senator FERGUSON. The question is now: Did he confer with you, Counsel?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He did confer with me several times in the last few minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. And do I understand that you are just giving him legal advice, rather than advice on the facts?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Most definitely, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I have the witness who is under oath answer the question that I asked him?

Didn't your counsel lean over and tell you what to say in answer to that question, without your asking him?

MR. KAPLAN. Sir, I consulted counsel at the very beginning, saying that I couldn't see what kind of person this might be, if it is distinguishable from the first one, and whether I shouldn't say I don't know of any such person.

MR. SOURWINE. Will you answer the question?

Senator FERGUSON. He is answering it.

MR. KAPLAN. My consultations continued after that. They were never interrupted. And my counsel advised me at the end as to how to give the explanation, which I think is exactly the same explanation I have been giving over and over again.

MR. SOURWINE. Answer the question categorically.

Didn't your counsel lean over and tell you what to say in answer to that question without your having asked him?

MR. KAPLAN. I think you will have to drop the "without your having asked him."

MR. SOURWINE. You didn't turn to him and say, "What shall I say?", did you?

MR. KAPLAN. This was a continuing consultation.

MR. SOURWINE. That is right. He had been leaning over and telling you what to say in answer to any question, hadn't he?

MR. FRIEDMAN. I don't think that is fair, either.

Certainly, it is an improper paraphrase.

MR. KAPLAN. I have indicated that I consulted with counsel on this question from the start, because it seemed to me to be a tricky question. There were parts of the name that were in common, and then there was something else. And my consultations were continuing, as I see it, and the fact that it became a three cornered conversation I don't think changed the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. But your actual testimony is now that you do not know this person? Or you refuse to answer? Which is it?

MR. KAPLAN. My actual testimony is that if by this person is meant someone who is a junior, an offspring, of any Henry Hill Collins, then my answer is, "I don't know."

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know the junior? If it is the other fellow you know him?

MR. KAPLAN. If it is the same person, I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

MR. SOURWINE. Your answer is that if the person I asked about, to wit, Henry Hill Collins, Jr., is a junior and offspring of a Henry Hill Collins, you don't know any such person? Is that your answer?

MR. KAPLAN. That is right. I don't know any such person.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know a Tom Collins?

MR. KAPLAN. You mean a drink?

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know a person named Tom Collins?

MR. KAPLAN. I don't think so. It may be a very common name.

MR. SOURWINE. You don't think I am making that name up, do you?

MR. KAPLAN. I am sure there are lots of Tom Collinses. I don't recall knowing any.

MR. SOURWINE. For your information, there is a Tom Collins on the professional staff of this committee.

MR. KAPLAN. I don't know him, sir.



Mr. SOURWINE. You have been asked if you know Mr. Laughlin Currie.

Mr. KAPLAN. I have been asked that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Laughlin Currie ever recommend you for a position with the Government?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Pauline Friedland?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she ever live at 9 Greenwood Court, Queens, N. Y.?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know the address.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she related to you in any way?

Mr. KAPLAN. She is my sister-in-law.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your sister-in-law?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your wife's sister?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she ever live in Queens?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am not sure, but she very well may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you know whether your sister-in-law ever lived in Queens?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know for certain. I know that she once worked out in Long Island, and presumably lived somewhere around there, but I wouldn't know whether it is Queens.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the Pauline Friendland of your acquaintance was ever associated in any way with the Communist Party?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know that she ever was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether she ever was.

Didn't she ask you in 1936 to sign a Communist Party nominating petition for State and city elections?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a person could have asked you to sign a Communist nominating petition if they were not a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize that a refusal to answer—

I will rephrase that. I don't want to presume to be giving legal advice. I suggest you ask your counsel whether refusal to answer on those grounds will be any protection to you against perjury committed here.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, I realize that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have said, have you not, that you did not know whether Pauline Friedland was a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she was in any way associated with communism or with Communist Party objectives?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Edward J. Fitzgerald?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Barry Fitzgerald?

Mr. KAPLAN. The name seems familiar to me, but my counsel tells me it is a movie actor's name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your counsel tells you it is a movie actor. Do you know him?

Mr. KAPLAN. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Patrick F. X. Fitzpatrick?

Mr. KAPLAN. That sounds like a familiar name, but the only reaction I have is that the components of the name are familiar ones. I don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't recognize that as a Communist name, do you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recognize it as the name of any person at the present time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't recognize the name of Patrick F. X. Fitzpatrick as a Communist name?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recognize it as a name, I say, of any person that I have knowledge of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Isaac Folkoff, F-o-l-k-o-f-f?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Isaac Folkoff was a charter member of the Communist Party in 1918?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Folkoff was a man who Whittaker Chambers testified he contacted in 1935 in San Francisco at a time when he, Chambers, had a money belt that was to be delivered to someone whose identity he did not know?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understand I am only asking you if you knew about Whittaker Chambers' testimony.

Mr. KAPLAN. I understand.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you refuse to answer?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or did you not know Jacob Golos?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Charles Kramer?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Ferdinand Kransky—K-r-a-n-s-k-y or K-r-a-n-s-k-i?

Mr. KAPLAN. I know of no one by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Solomon Lischinsky?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Harry Samuel Magdoff?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know David Neyhaus—N-e-y-h-a-u-s or N-e-i-h-a-u-s?

Mr. KAPLAN. The name is unfamiliar to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know David Niles?

Mr. KAPLAN. I recognize the name as a former executive assistant to the President. I don't believe I ever met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to seem out of order. It is my opinion, without hearing the conversation, that counsel is advising the witness what to answer on every question.

If the Chair desires that that continue, I will have no more protest. If the Chair wants to ask counsel to sit one seat apart from the witness, so that if the witness wants to confer he will have to do so voluntarily—

Senator FERGUSON. I think this ought to appear on the record. When you want to confer with counsel, ask whether you may confer with counsel.

Mr. KAPLAN. Ask on the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I take it that I am not required to comment on counsel's statement that I have been giving answers?

Senator FERGUSON. No. In the future, you will ask whether you may confer with counsel. Then there will be no misunderstanding on the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Isadore Gibby Needleman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I should like to confer with counsel.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. The question, as I recall it, is: Do I know Isadore Gibby Needleman? The answer is "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that he is a former attorney for the Amtorg Trading Corp.?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well do you know him?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any business dealings with him?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Chair desire to require the witness to answer those questions?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I believe not. Maybe in his mind he thinks that would tend to incriminate him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know George N. Perazich.

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Victor Perlo?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Lee Pressman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Helen Witte Silvermaster?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recognize that as a name of a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have answered one question here with regard to whether you recognized a name as that of a Communist, haven't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you didn't recognize it as the name of anybody, didn't you?

I gave you the name Patrick Fitzpatrick, and you said you didn't recognize it.

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. On fact, or on law?

Mr. KAPLAN. On law.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You may confer with him.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. What is the question I am supposed to answer?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recognize the name of Helen Witte Silvermaster as the name of a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then I asked you the question as to whether you had not answered such a question with regard to Henry Patrick Fitzpatrick.

Mr. KAPLAN. I answered that I don't know of any such person.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Well, if you didn't know of such a person as Helen Witte Silvermaster, you could answer the question the same way, couldn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. If I didn't know of the existence of any such person?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel on that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Harold Ware?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Harry Dexter White?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your wife, Dorothy, ever a member of that organization?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties had been designated as Communist by the Attorney General?



Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a woman named Bentley?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Miss Bentley in testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee had testified with regard to you:

He was employed in the WPB. He was in a very peculiar position, because he was paying his dues to the Perlo group and giving his information to the Silvermaster group. Somehow the two groups got a little scrambled at that point.

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan consults with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew she had so testified?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was her testimony truthful?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Alger Hiss?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Charles Kramer?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Charles Kramer, when testifying under oath, and asked, "Do you know Irving Kaplan?" stated, "I must decline to answer that question, on the grounds it may tend to incriminate me"?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I didn't know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not a case of your doing him now the same courtesy he did you then?

Mr. KAPLAN. You expect me to answer that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Abraham George Silverman, testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and asked, "Do you know Irving Kaplan?" had stated, "On advice of counsel, I refuse to answer that question, in the exercise of my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment"?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I didn't know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hold any meetings at your apartment that were attended by any of these persons: Veet Bassie, Harry Magdoff, Edward J. Fitzgerald?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend meetings at the apartment of Abraham George Silverman which were attended by those persons, or any of them?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. You used to play ball with Harry Victor White?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had testified under oath that you used to play ball together?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think so. I think I saw a press account.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he testify truthfully?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you may.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Bela Gold had testified that he knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Sonia Gold has testified that she knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Frank Coe had testified that he knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I am not certain, but I have some vague recollection that I knew Frank Coe had testified, and testified with respect to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he testify truthfully when he said he knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Whittaker Chambers had testified that he knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Chambers had testified that he asked George Silverman to get him a job in the Government, that J. Peters agreed to that separately, that Silverman referred him to Irving Kaplan, at that time co-head of something called the Federal Research Project, or the National Research Project; that Mr. Kaplan was then living in Philadelphia, that he, Chambers, went to Philadelphia, and spent an evening with Mr. Kaplan and discussed the problem? Did you know he had testified substantially to that effect?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I can't say I knew that whole sequence as read there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Whittaker Chambers come to see you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate me.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Whittaker Chambers testified that he had known you before and that you knew his real name?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel on that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in fact know Mr. Whittaker Chambers' real name?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel on that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or do you know Marion Bachrach?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that in testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee, Marion Bachrach, being asked, "Do you know Irving Kaplan?" replied, "I refuse to answer," claiming her privilege under the Constitution?

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your wife ever a member of the Washington League of Women Shoppers?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know the Washington League of Women Shoppers had been cited as a Communist-front organization?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel about that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of the United American Spanish Aid Committee?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make any donations to that committee?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know you were on the mailing list of that committee?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that committee had been designated as Communist by the Attorney General?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever belong to the Southern Conference for Human Welfare?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Bella Rodman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recall any such name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Bella Rodman was associated with the Southern Conference for Human Welfare?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Bella Rodman was a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your wife know Bella Rodman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Henry Fowler?

Mr. KAPLAN. You are talking about the man who is now head of the National Production Authority?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about the man who was chairman of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare in 1946.

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the man who was chairman of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare in 1946 the same Henry Fowler who has just been named to replace Manly Fleischmann?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, surely.

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the Henry Fowler who has just been named to replace Manly Fleischmann?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think I have met Henry Fowler on some occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you contact him in July of 1946 or at any other time for the purpose of making arrangements for your wife, Dorothy, to furnish assistance to the Southern Conference for Human Welfare?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you still say you don't know whether this is the same Henry Fowler who was with the Southern Conference for Human Welfare?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the Southern Conference for Human Welfare had been cited as a Communist-front organization?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Jay David Whittaker Chambers at Columbia University in the early 1920's?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at that time in frequent association with Socialists?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Abraham George Silverman was employed by or collaborating with the Communist Party or a Communist group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Mr. Silverman any information to be passed on to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Nathan Gregory Silvermaster?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he was the head of a Communist group in Washington?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give data to the Silvermaster group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever belong to the Silvermaster group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay dues to the Silvermaster group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you belong to the Perlo group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay dues to the Perlo group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the Bentley group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you belong to the Bentley group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whether Elizabeth Terrill Bentley ever was a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you know, as a matter of fact, that she is a self-confessed Soviet espionage agent?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am aware of reports that she has confessed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you know about a lot of her testimony. On various occasions you have shown familiarity with her testimony. You must know she has testified that she was a Soviet espionage agent, don't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Was that your original question?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just asking you now: Do you know that she was a Soviet espionage agent?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Mr. SOURWINE. Sure.

Mr. KAPLAN. I know that she said so. I don't know whether she was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know Earl Browder?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay Communist dues to Earl Browder?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever furnish Government information to any unauthorized persons?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, on May 29, 1949, decline to even discuss an allegation that you had furnished Government information to an unauthorized person?

Mr. KAPLAN. Will you read that question again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you on May 29, 1949, decline to even discuss any allegation that you had furnished Government information to any unauthorized persons?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you state that any such charge was ridiculous?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now state that any such charge is ridiculous?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever furnish unauthorized Government information to Abraham George Silverman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you on May 29, 1947, deny that you had furnished unauthorized Government information to Abraham George Silverman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the provisions of the Alien Registration Act?

Mr. KAPLAN. Not especially.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the provisions of Section 20 (a) of the Internal Security Act?

Mr. KAPLAN. Not especially.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it ever been suggested to you that you might be required to register under the terms of that act?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever registered as a representative or agent of a foreign government?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay dues to the Communist Party?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now a Communist Party member?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a Soviet espionage agent?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you a Soviet espionage agent now?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever conspire to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now engaged in an active conspiracy to overthrow the United States Government by force and violence?



Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

We will recess without a particular day.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are excused from the subpoena, Mr. Kaplan, and we will fix up your travel papers.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., Friday, May 16, 1952, the hearing was recessed, the committee to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)





# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
ACT AND OTHER SECURITY LAWS OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a. m., in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senators O'Connor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

As has been the custom, General, we swear all witnesses in this particular hearing. You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT, ACCOMPANIED BY  
THOMAS CORCORAN, ESQ., WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, will you give your full name and your present occupation to the reporter.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Claire Lee Chennault, major general, United States Army, retired. I am presently employed as an executive in Civil Air Transport, an airline operating in non-Communist areas of the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you operating that airline now in the non-Communist areas of the Far East?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in China during World War II?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes; I was in China from May 31, 1937, until I departed August 8, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were there continually during that period?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Except for two or three trips outside of China for conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, General Chennault has been called here today to be asked questions under oath concerning statements that appeared in his book that have been relevant to this inquiry. It is for that limited purpose that General Chennault has been brought here today.

General Chennault, were you in China when General Marshall in late 1945 went to China with his orders in order to bring about a coalition government between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I came to the United States in 1945, after the Japanese war, and returned to China, I believe on January 4, 1946. I did remain in China thereafter while General Marshall was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that General Marshall, as you say in your book, applied pressure in the Stilwell manner by shutting off the flow of all military aid to China including war surplus bought and paid for by the Chinese? You have made that statement in your book, General. Is that a fact?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes; that is correct according to the best of my information and knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that? Will you tell us precisely how you know that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I know it because I was informed by the Chinese Government officials that they had ceased to receive war equipment manufactured by the United States. When I inquired why, they said that General Marshall had forbidden its shipment from American-held islands and from the United States. That embargo did not last the entire time that General Marshall was in China, but was imposed some time in the spring of 1946 or early summer and did continue thereafter for the entire period that General Marshall was there.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of this embargo?

Mr. CHENNAULT. War materials of any kind could not be shipped from the United States territory or territory held by the United States at that time, including the islands of the Pacific, to China.

Senator FERGUSON. That was military material?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it could have been used for military purposes in China if it had been shipped?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was in effect held from the Nationalist government which was really the only government at that time in China?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say the embargo extended not only to the aid that we were giving the Chinese but what they themselves could buy on the free and open market?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I was told that the Chinese had actually purchased considerable quantities of what we designated surplus war materials on the former Japanese islands in the Western Pacific, particularly Okinawa, Guam, and other islands, and that this embargo applied to material purchased by the Chinese as war surplus.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in what authority at that time, that you were told this, General?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Strictly as a friend and wartime companion at arms of the Chinese officials. I was not in any official position in China at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time you were not a general in the United States Army?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I was retired. I had no official position with the Chinese Government at that time.



Senator FERGUSON. Had you any reason to doubt that that order was in existence?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, sir; I had no reason to doubt it. On the other hand there were other indications that these reports were true.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it true because the material was not coming in?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right. I lived in Shanghai, which is the port of entry for all of this stuff, and it simply was not coming in.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were in Shanghai, a port of entry, and there were no shipments coming through that port?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And you say that is the principal port where they would have brought it through?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is the principal port where this stuff would have come through.

Mr. MORRIS. You say General Marshall extracted a promise from the Generalissimo not to use the Chinese force already in China on the ground that this would constitute an offensive action? How do you know that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Throughout the so-called trust period, the Chinese Air Force was restrained from attacking the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Again I was told by responsible Chinese officials. The chief of the Chinese Air Force had been a close companion of mine throughout the war. I worked with him on very intimate terms and he informed me.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you have known, because of your position at that time, of any extensive Chinese air offensives against the Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. I had other sources of information through other Chinese Air Force officers with whom I was well acquainted.

Mr. MORRIS. But because of your experience as an air fighter in China would you have known of such an offensive if one had been undertaken?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. I might explain to you that for a period of more than 2 years I was appointed, with the consent of our President, as Chief of Staff of the Chinese Air Force. For that reason I was intimately acquainted with all of the top ranking and many of the lower ranking Chinese Air officers.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, are you acquainted with the various truces and the general truce that General Marshall tried to impose on the Chinese Government at the time they were fighting the Chinese Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. That was common knowledge in China. General Marshall proposed a truce, with a cease fire, and with each side to occupy the positions held at that time. The truce was accepted and the truce came, within a point, to consist of one Nationalist officer, one Chinese officer, and one American officer. They were dispatched to all of the principal points held by both Nationalist and Communist troops to enforce the cease fire. That cease fire lasted for almost a year, according to my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. How would a truce team operate, General?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I described the composition of the team already. They went to the principal points held by the Nationalist and Com-

munist troops and remained in observation of troop activities so there would be a cease fire.

Mr. MORRIS. You say in your book here that very often the Chinese Government would have a Communist military force defeated when a truce would be imposed on them. What do you know about that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. There were several instances where that occurred. I think the first instance occurred down on East River, east of Canton and north of Hong Kong. The East River Communists had a line by the Nationalist forces, and with the cease fire they were induced to cease attacking them. Those troops were moved out by sea, in vessels furnished by the United States, according to my recollection, and moved up to Shantung Province by water. That is the first instance I recall where Communist troops were saved by the intervention of Americans.

The next instance I recall, I believe was with the Communist force pinned up in the mountains north of Hankow, in the northern Hunan Province. They were almost entirely surrounded by Nationalist troops, and again American officials headed by General Marshall intervened and persuaded the Nationalists to let them off, and marched them off into Shantung. The third instance that I recall was Kalgan Pass.

Mr. MORRIS. That was one of the most important.

Mr. CHENNAULT. The Nationalists had taken Kalgan Pass by force of arms, and as long as they held the Communist troops to the south and southwest were unable to move to the northeast. The Nationalists were persuaded to pull out of the pass and open the highway through there so the Communists could move northeast. They did that and they moved into Manchuria where they received arms from sources we will name later.

Mr. MORRIS. How did they receive those arms that you refer to later on?

Mr. CHENNAULT. My information was that they were given arms by the Russians who had occupied Manchuria previously and who continued to occupy Manchuria after this Japanese surrender.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the source of your information on that point?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Chinese officials. No American was in that area at that time. I didn't get in there, therefore I could not have first-hand knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you know, General Chennault, was the Chinese Government at that time a one-party government?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No; the Chinese Government was a government of several parties. The Kuomintang was merely the strongest party. I recall two other parties to mind, the Youths Party and the Social Democratic Party. There were other parties also, but I can't remember the names now.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say there were other parties in the Government, did they have seats in a national assembly?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. Under the agreement or terms which were agreed to before the election of the National Assembly, each party was allotted a certain number of seats, regardless of whether the candidates of that party won in the election or not. The Kuomintang Party was by far the strongest, and, as a matter of fact, the Kuomintang Party did give up seats that their candidates had won in the



election in order to have more parties represented in the Assembly.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Generalissimo assign any seats to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, the Communists were assigned a definite number of seats, but the number was calculated to be in fair proportion to the number of Communists as compared to the number of party members of the other parties.

Mr. MORRIS. In the excerpts of the book, General, that we have introduced into our record you make the statement that:

At the time of the Marshall mission the Chinese Communists terms for entering the Chinese National Government were one-third of the Cabinet members including the War Minister, retention of a Communist army of 48 divisions, and the governorships of all provinces where the Communist troops then claimed occupation of a majority of the area.

Is that a true statement, General Chennault?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Those are the conditions that were published in the press at that time, or approximately the same conditions that were published. I can't recall whether they are exactly the same in every condition or not. But those were substantially the conditions published in the press and accepted as being the actual terms of agreement with the Communists; I mean, proposed by the Communists. They never did accept it.

Mr. MORRIS. What else do you know about the Communist demands at that time, General Chennault?

Mr. CHENNAULT. In my recollection, each time the Communist demands were met, either wholly or partly, the Communists would bring up fresh demands and thereby go into further negotiations and delays.

Senator FERGUSON. Somewhat like we are going through today in Korea, is that it?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, a great deal of the general tactics, to make demands today and have fresh demands tomorrow, or changes in demands that made them a little more territory.

Senator FERGUSON. We discovered during those periods, at the time General Marshall was there, that you couldn't negotiate a real truce or peace with Communists, did we not?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I was convinced of that. I don't know whether everyone was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. It was demonstrated rather clearly.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Clearly demonstrated. The record was there.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, the Communists and many people writing of military activities in China have stated that the Chinese Communist guerrillas did extensive fighting of the Japanese. Could you give us any testimony along those lines?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I heard those reports and I disagreed with them. I don't believe, after 1941, that the Communists did any extensive fighting with the Japanese except in a few areas, just a few areas held strongly by the Communists where the Japanese had to clear them up in order to open the lines of communication, and the Communists did fight until driven out of those areas. But afterward, the Communist fighting, according to my information, and I was on the ground at the time and had intelligence officers all over the country, was limited to sporadic raids on small Japanese garrisons, of taking food and ammunition, arms.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you said there was no extensive fighting of the Japanese by the Communists, except in a few places. Do you mean to imply that there was extensive fighting of the Japanese by the Communists at any point?

Mr. CHENNAULT. At a few places, where the Communists were in great strength and held the place for some time and when the Japanese desired to clear a railroad through there, there was hot fighting in that area.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was not any extended fighting.

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, sir; it was not in accord with any general plan or order of fighting, simply sporadic and occurred in isolated areas where the Communists had been entrenched for several years.

Mr. SOURWINE. By extensive in that regard you don't mean over a wide area or with large numbers of troops involved, do you?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't, then, a planned campaign by the Communists against the Japanese.

Mr. CHENNAULT. There was no evidence of such campaign.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, were you in China when General Stilwell was in command of American forces in China and when he had on his staff as political advisers John Davies, Paul Ludden, and John K. Emmerson and John S. Service?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you able to observe the political activities of those four advisers to General Stilwell?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Some of them I did. I didn't have opportunity to observe Ludden, for instance.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you able to observe the activities of John P. Davies?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. Not under my immediate observation, but I had first-hand reports of his activities. I would like to explain that my headquarters were in Kunming, where General Stilwell was in Chungking 420 miles by air and much farther by ground. So I didn't have direct observation.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, in your book you said:

I do not think that Stilwell had any political motives in encouraging his Chungking staff to function as a public relations bureau for the Yen-an Communists. It was of a piece with his earlier dalliance with the Kuomintang reactionaries. He was simply unconcerned with anything but his immediate objectives. The Yen-an Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him command their armies.

At the end you said:

Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking Government, it was a common joke that Stilwell's headquarters were definitely opening a private foreign policy with John Davies as Secretary of State.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That was a common report.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what you know about that, General?

Mr. CHENNAULT. The staff at Chungking gave dinners at which prominent Chinese officials were invited and also attended by prominent Americans. They repeatedly told the glowing stories of the Communist fighting. They finally permitted an evacuation plan to leak out. According to the evacuation plan, all Americans in Chung-



king were assigned definite positions in vehicles and the line of retreat or evacuation of Chungking was to be over the Old Tea Road, that is up through Lanjo, out through Tsinan Province, one of the old tea roads. All of that not only tended to reduce national morale, but actually did reduce it. They got the jitters because the Americans were fully prepared to evacuate. That was one evidence of the bewilderment of the National Government by the Chungking staff. When I use the words "leak out," you know, of course, that an evacuation plan is supposed to be secret and should not become public information.

Mr. MORRIS. You mention in your book, General Chennault, that General Stilwell wanted to take an army after the battle of Okinawa, wanted to take an army and land on the north China coast and commence operations against the Japanese.

Mr. CHENNAULT. In late July of 1945 our ambassador at Chungking, who was then Mr. Hurley, received a message from Washington with instructions to transmit it to the Chinese Government. The substance of that message was that General Stilwell commanded the Tenth Army on Okinawa, and proposed to move part or all of his Tenth Army to the coast north of Shanghai, north of Shensi River, and on an approach to Yungso, there he would arm some two hundred or three hundred thousand Communists and turn south to take Shanghai. Had that been done, of course, the Communists would have occupied the mouth of the Yangtze River, which is the vital artery of all central China, and had been in possession of Shanghai and the Shanghai River Valley. It would have been impossible for the Nationalists to come out of Shanghai after the war was over. This plan, of course, met with great disfavor from the officials of the Chinese Nationalist Government and was dropped. That was in late July, just before the Japanese surrender.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, did you have any indication of learning what the official position was with respect to aiding the Chinese Nationalists in the period 1946 to 1949?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I have already told the story of the embargo on shipment of war materials during 1946 and part of 1947. After the embargo was removed some war materials purchased by the Chinese did come into China. It was not until December—let me ask you, When was Shanghai taken? Was it in 1948 or 1949?

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault's question was, When was Shanghai taken, 1948 or 1949. I think it was 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. What month would it be in?

Mr. CHENNAULT. May of 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. It was May of 1949.

Mr. CHENNAULT. I should remember, but I have forgotten. It was not until December the year before the fall of Shanghai—

Mr. MORRIS. December of 1948.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That the first shipload of materials arrived from the United States. The ship was diverted from Shanghai to Formosa, on orders of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. But you see, they started to move over into Formosa in the early fall or summer of 1949. They were driven out.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, that ship was diverted from Shanghai to Formosa and was held in a harbor for a period of about two weeks.

This came to my personal attention because Chinese officers came to me and asked me to use my best efforts to have the ship sent back to Shanghai. The fighting was then close to the Yangtze Valley. The fighting was just north of Nanking at that time. So war materials given to the Nationalists after 1947, after the removal of the embargo, did not reach the Nationalist Army in the field.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have an opportunity to observe the attitude of any United States officials in China at that time, with respect to the assistance given to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Observe activities—

Mr. MORRIS. Of American officials in China at that time.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. Just as a matter of common knowledge, I was in Nanking and Shanghai most of the time. I saw our counsult general in Shanghai often. I saw the Ambassador rather frequently. So I did have a chance to observe them.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were some of the officials that you spoke with at that time? Did you ever speak to Mr. Philip Jessup?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, I don't remember speaking to Mr. Jessup in China at that time. I talked to our Ambassador, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you speak to Jessup at any time about these matters?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, I did, in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. On what occasion was that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I had two or three talks with Mr. Jessup here in Washington. During those talks, I urged immediate aid to the Nationalists in order to prevent the Communists from continued conquest of China. At the last talk I had with him, I was told that a white paper was going to be issued in a few days, telling the whole story of Sino-American relations. My opinion was asked as to whether it should be issued, and I replied—I urged that it not be issued—

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him a reason?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, I said it would certainly destroy what morale remained in the Nationalists and on the other hand would raise the morale of the Communists to a considerable extent if we issued any such paper.

Mr. MORRIS. And did he express opposition to the Nationalist Government at that time? Did he express opposition to aiding the Nationalist Government?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, but the paper was issued in a few days.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say why they were issuing it at that particular time?

Mr. CHENNAULT. To explain Sino-American relations.

Senator FERGUSON. That was his only explanation, to explain the relations?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right, and he never explained to me why it was issued, over my protests.

Senator FERGUSON. After you saw it, what do you have to say now about issuing it at that time? Did it do what you said it would do?

Mr. CHENNAULT. It did. It destroyed moral in China to a great extent, Nationalist China, and increased the morale of the Communists a great deal.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chenault, based on your knowledge of the situation in China at that time, was it clearly understood by you that



if the Nationalist Government did go down to defeat that the only force remaining would be the Communist force in China?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you comment on that, General Chennault?

Mr. CHENNAULT. It was my feeling all along.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it more than a feeling on your part?

Senator FERGUSON. Were you convinced of that from the facts that you knew?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. When I use the word feeling, I mean that it was my inmost sentiment, my strongest belief.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any other force in China that could possibly take over if the Nationalist Government was defeated?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Absolutely not, and that proved to be true.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean other than the Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Other than the Communists. I mean, a third force.

Senator FERGUSON. It was well organized by that time, was it not?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Very well organized.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any doubt at any time that the Communists of China were tied directly to Moscow?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And part of the international Communists.

Mr. CHENNAULT. I had no doubt whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. And that came from the facts that you learned while you were there in China?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, were you acquainted with the ultimatum that was delivered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek by General Stilwell in late 1944? Have you any knowledge of that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Not first-hand knowledge. I was not present. I was in Kunming at that time, and this took place in Chungking. I did have reports from people who were present at the time. My most recent report was from General Stilwell's confidential aid, who is a brigadier general in the Chinese army.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name, General? Was it General Ferris?

Mr. CHENNAULT. John Lee, a brigadier general. In fact, the whole time Stilwell was in China he was with him, and the most trusted adviser and Chinese interpretive aid. John Lee told me the whole story, because he did interpret it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what happened from that source of information?

Mr. CHENNAULT. John Lee told me that during this series of conferences in October of 1944 General Stilwell kept insisting on command of the Chinese armies, and the Generalissimo finally agreed to let him have command of the army in China. Then at one of the last conferences General Stilwell mentioned that he would like to arm the Chinese Communist armies and employ them. They had offered him command of the armies previously and still offered it to him. The Generalissimo replied that he didn't trust the Chinese Communists and would oppose it. After thinking it over a day or two, the Generalissimo sent for General Stilwell, and at that time General Stilwell had delivered his final message that had been reported by numerous witnesses here before, General Wedemeyer among others, I believe, in which a cable from the President insisted that Stilwell be made com-

mander of the Chinese armies. The Generalissimo then withdrew his agreement to appoint Stilwell as commander of the Chinese Army and refused to do so. He then cabled Washington and asked for Stilwell's release. That is the report John Lee gave me.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time, did the Generalissimo oppose General Stilwell?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. I don't think he opposed him, but after the Burma debacle in the early summer of 1942 the Generalissimo lost confidence in General Stilwell as a field commander. You remember, the Chinese armies put under Stilwell's command were lost with all of their equipment.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know when the Generalissimo first asked that General Stilwell be relieved of his command?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No; I don't know when that was.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that in June 1944 Vice President Wallace recommended that Stilwell be replaced by General Wedemeyer?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes; I have information to that effect, information which I consider reliable.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what you know about that episode, General?

Mr. CHENNAULT. When Vice President Wallace visited China he soon learned that there was a lack of harmony between the Generalissimo and Stilwell. He took pains to question numerous officers regarding that rift, and finally in my opinion it became his opinion that the release of General Stilwell was necessary in order to restore the best relations possible between China and the United States. I believe that Vice President Wallace did recommend his relief at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time General Stilwell was advocating arming the Chinese Communists; was he not?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long had he been doing that; do you know?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I don't know, except as a matter of recollection he had advocated using the Chinese Communists all the time he had been theater commander. I will go back further. If you remember, the war with Japan really began in August 1937, and the Chinese Communist armies operated under the over-all command of the Generalissimo until about the winter of 1941, when they refused to obey his orders about crossing to the south of the Yangtze River. After that instance, it was that the Nationalist armies destroyed Communist units south of the Yangtze River, that the Communists broke off from their close cooperation with the Nationalists. But General Stilwell continued to advocate the use of the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, could you tell us something about the extent to which the political advisers of General Stilwell reflected his good disposition toward the Chinese Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes; they did that. One illustration of that fact is the military mission first at Yen-an. General Stilwell obtained permission from the Generalissimo to establish a mission at Yen-an, primarily, according to his statement to the Generalissimo, to collect intelligence in the areas controlled by the Communists in the north. Later, that mission was expanded to include meteorological observation parties, and to include American diplomatic or consular officials, or both. I have forgotten just how they were assigned. They remained in Yen-an until after Stilwell was relieved of his command in



China, and until Wedemeyer ordered them back, and the mission at Yen-an was closed down by Wedemeyer's orders. A very interesting incident occurred in relation to that mission which has not been published.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. CHENNAULT. In February 1945 both Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer returned to the United States on orders for conferences. Before departing from the China theater General Wedemeyer issued an order and required every officer under his command in China, every American officer, to sign this order as evidence that he had read it, and returned it to his headquarters in Chungking for file. This order said substantially, "You are directed to execute American policy in China and not to make it."

The situation had become so bad that General Wedemeyer considered it necessary to issue a very unusual order and require all officers to sign it and return a signed copy to his headquarters for file.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, there was feeling that some people in China, Americans, were making the policy?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right; influencing it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, General Wedemeyer issued the order, and required them to sign that they had read it.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That the duty of Americans was to carry out and execute policy that had already been made in America.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right, and not to make it in China.

Senator FERGUSON. And not to make it in China or to influence it in China, is that right?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right. May I continue the story of this incident? After the departure of General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley, I became the senior officer in the China theater. Therefore, I was acting commander of the theater. I was busy fighting the Japanese at the time, and I remained at my headquarters in Kunning, rather than go to Chungking, the theater headquarters. The chief of staff of the Chungking headquarters was approached by a member of the diplomatic corps, who requested the use of a C-47 airplane to go to Yen-an. General Wedemeyer had closed Yen-an and ordered all personnel to stay away. The chief of staff loaned the airplane to this official and he flew it to Yen-an for the party. My first knowledge of the C-47 party at Yen-an came when the chief of staff showed up in my headquarters one morning, he flew from Chungking, and showed me a long cable from Washington demanding to know his reasons for permitting a C-47 with a party of Americans aboard to go to Yen-an. He, of course, didn't have any good reasons. I was acting theater commander so I advised him to sit down at my desk and to write out a reply. The reply, in substance, was that it had been customary for the military to loan airplanes to civil authorities, diplomatic officials particularly, on request, and that he had not thought anything of it, but had loaned the airplane almost automatically. His reply went to Washington and he was then ordered to have the party removed from Yen-an as fast as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that party?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Mr. Service was included in the party. I don't know who the other members were.

Mr. MORRIS. That is John S. Service?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I believe so. There were two Services in China at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. He was connected with the State Department.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, you stated that General Wedemeyer found it necessary to give a directive that State Department subordinates of the Ambassador and theater commander in China would have to follow United States policy and not set policy.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Wait a minute, you are mistaken there. Wedemeyer issued it only to the military officers.

Senator FERGUSON. And they signed that they had read it?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir. Hurley was in charge of the Embassy at that time. Wedemeyer was theater commander for the military.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, as a matter of fact, what the United States policy was with respect to China during that period?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I can't quote it, but substantially it was to aid the Nationalists in fighting the Japanese.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there people in China who were creating a different policy?

Mr. CHENNAULT. There were.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the other policy that was being formulated by people?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Those people continued to advocate arming and aiding the Communists, presumably to fight the Japanese, too.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think we should use the information on the lend-lease program until we can get clearance from the Department. I cannot see any reason for marking it "secret, security information," back in 1941 to 1945. It seems absurd to mark what we shipped. That has been known and published everywhere. We get it now and it is marked "secret, security information." But I wish that a space in the record would be held at this place so that we can get clearance from the Department to put it in.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Smith, we have here the figures on what assistance was actually given to the Chinese Government during the period 1941 to 1945, then a period early 1945, and then subsequent to June 30, 1946. We have those figures here, but the figures appear in a document that is marked "secret." That is the issue that we have here.

Senator FERGUSON. I think we better get clearance.

Senator SMITH. Could the record show that that was presented but it was not put into the record until it was cleared? Would that not be the way to do it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Let us do it that way.

(The information to be supplied appears as exhibit No. 1395 in pt. 14.)

Mr. MORRIS. We have covered the points that General Chennault has written in his book. The purpose of this hearing, Senator Smith, was to put into our record as sworn testimony General Chennault's knowledge of those points in his book. I have now covered those points, and I wondered whether we might ask him generally whether there are any other evidences or experiences that he has that should go into our record at this time.



Mr. CHENNAULT. Before replying to that question I would like to preface all of my remarks with a statement.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the statement?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That I have appeared here in response to a subpoena by this committee; that I did not seek this opportunity to testify, but I am testifying because of that subpoena.

Mr. MORRIS. I think our record shows that. At the commencement of this hearing it will show that, that you were called here today principally to give the testimony concerning the items that you mentioned in the book, which parts of the book are already in our record.

Mr. CHENNAULT. And I did not invite or seek this opportunity to testify.

Senator SMITH (presiding). In other words, you are replying here to a subpoena and the duty placed upon you to come in and answer these questions.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Senator.

Senator SMITH. You were not trying to do like we are trying to do in certain parts of the world, butt into everybody's affairs.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Senator SMITH. General, is there anything else that you would like to add?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Only a general statement. The events which I reported in that book and the predictions I made on the probable course of events are all a matter of record, and the predictions I made have been fulfilled almost to the last one, 100 percent. I have tried to report the events that occurred under my observation of first-hand knowledge, and I think it constitutes the record of why we lost China, and how we did.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Anything else, General? We would be glad to hear anything you have to say.

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much.

All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this meeting today is to put onto the record various facts and various experiences that the witnesses who are here today, because of their peculiar experiences, are in a position to testify to. We have Admiral Hillenkoetter, we have Whittaker Chambers, and Miss Bentley. Admiral Hillenkoetter has not been sworn before this committee, so I wonder if you might do that. Both Mr. Chambers and Miss Bentley have.

Senator SMITH. Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. I do.

#### TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH BENTLEY, WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, AND ROSCOE H. HILLENKOETTER

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Hillenkoetter was director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

One of the things that we would like to establish as a matter of record here today, Senator, is the difficulty of establishing the rela-

tionship of an agent. When we talk about the agent in that sense, Senator, we mean somebody who is acting as an agent for the CIA, somebody acting as an agent for the FBI, or somebody acting as an agent for the Communists. We want to get some testimony on the nature of that agency and the difficulty of proof in establishing such agency, if it is difficult to establish it.

I wonder, Admiral Hillenkoetter, if you could tell use from your own experience in the Central Intelligence Agency of the difficulty of establishing proof of agency.

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. The difficulty is that if the agent is any good at all he will not have any identification, he can't possibly have. It is only childish if he does carry identification concerning himself. He must have the identification and live the part of the agent that he is playing. If he is an agent, say, acting as an insurance man, he must know insurance, he must have all of the credentials of insurance. If he fails to have that, he is no good as an agent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, would you make any comment on those lines?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't know what I can add to what Admiral Hillenkoetter has said, beyond the fact that it is all but impossible to penetrate the Communist apparatus, with which I am familiar, except by means of deserters from the apparatus of the Communist Party. I might be asked now if I suppose there are any Communists still in the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I was going to say, Mr. Chambers, how could a committee such as ours at this time determine whether or not there are any agents, Communist agents, high in the United States Government.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I was coming to that, if I may finish. I would have to answer to my direct knowledge there are no Communist agents in the American Government.

Mr. MORRIS. That is to your direct knowledge.

Mr. CHAMBERS. To my direct knowledge. But it would be childish to suppose that there are none. It would be childish for any security agent, say, to go on that assumption. Anyone with any knowledge of the recent past at least would have to presume that attempts are constantly being made to penetrate the Government and that there are in fact agents within the Government, agents of one kind, stature, or another.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, Mr. Chambers, when you left the Communist organization there were then still in existence a considerable number of Communist agents; were there not?

Mr. CHAMBERS. When I broke with the Communist Party there were still within the Government a number of Communist agents.

Mr. MORRIS. Do Communist agents by nature bring other Communists into the Government?

Mr. CHAMBERS. They tend to; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that point, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think by now everybody is familiar with past testimony of Miss Bentley and mine and others, about the way the Communist apparatus recruited the other agents into the Government, by securing jobs for them and by advancing them within the Government once they are in.



Senator SMITH. In other words, Mr. Chambers, the more astute the agent is, the better job he will do for the Communist Party, and likewise the more difficult it would be for a person not Communist to detect his activities.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is quite true.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, is there in existence within the general Communist framework really two organizations, one the regular Communist Party and other people operating outside the Communist Party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The Communist Party is normally divided into an open Communist Party and an underground Communist Party. The underground Communist Party takes many organizational forms. There are also people who are extremely important to the Communist Party who are not in fact members of the Communist Party, organizationally, but who assist the Communist Party and go to great lengths to assist them.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chambers.

Would a person who was a member of the Communist underground be answering truthfully if he is asked by a Senate committee whether or not he has ever been in the past a member of the Communist Party, if he denies that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That, of course, depends on the facts. If he has assisted the Communist Party in espionage activities, let us say, and has not been organizationally a member of the party, and is asked if he was a member of the party and says "No," he is telling the truth.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, do you have any comment to add on that particular point?

Miss BENTLEY. No; except with regard to—

Mr. MORRIS. When you were in the organization, you first were a member of the Communist Party.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I first joined what I called the semiopen party.

Mr. MORRIS. And then after that when you left the party you worked for the Soviet military police directly?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. During my days, they tended to take the undercover espionage activities away from the Communist Party and run them directly through the Embassy because of a question of safety.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were working in the espionage activities, you actually had to stay away from the Communist Party, did you not?

Miss BENTLEY. I was told to stay away as much as possible; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you add anything to the points that have been made so far, Miss Bentley, on the points that we have covered now?

Miss BENTLEY. First, on the point as to whether or not there are Communists still in the Government, I agree with Mr. Chambers on that.

Mr. MORRIS. In what respect?

Miss BENTLEY. I agree with him that quite obviously there still are Communists in the Government, partially because it is an obvious thing and partially because I was told by one of my Soviet contacts about the existence of other groups in the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you knew there were other espionage rings other than your own in the Government and you know they haven't been exposed.

Miss BENTLEY. I know they haven't been exposed. I was not told who they are, but since they were not exposed, obviously they are still operating.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew of two individual rings working under you?

Miss BENTLEY. Two individual rings plus a collection of individuals I dealt with individually.

Mr. MORRIS. One was the Silvermaster ring?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And the other?

Miss BENTLEY. We called it the Perlo group.

Mr. MORRIS. You had some indirect knowledge that Alger Hiss was operating in the Communist framework, did you not?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. One of the members of the Perlo group had at one time been taken out of that group by Mr. Hiss and turned over to the Russians, and I discovered that during the course of my talking to one member of the group.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, there was still a third group that you knew of that existed at that time.

Miss BENTLEY. There was a third group that I knew of because of Mr. Hiss, and there was another group that was mentioned to me by my Soviet contact without identifying it further.

Mr. MORRIS. That is still a fourth group.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know, as a matter of fact, that neither one of those two groups, as far as you know, have been exposed as of this date?

Miss BENTLEY. As far as I know, they haven't been exposed.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you comment in any way, Miss Bentley, on the difficulty that a committee such as ours would have in determining who are members of some of these espionage groups?

Miss BENTLEY. Obviously, you would have a great difficulty because any espionage agent, and particularly your Soviet espionage agent, they have had years of training and experience, and would be very difficult to detect, because they were told to take the local coloration. For example, often they were told to pose as right-wing Republicans or Fascists, or whatever might be a handy cover for what they might be doing.

Senator SMITH. In other words, they were told not to tell the truth when asked if they were espionage agents.

Senator O'CONOR. When you appeared before our committee several years ago and, as a result of your disclosures, the Remington case was developed. Do you recall it was a direct result of your testimony? And with what has happened since, do you feel it has borne out the representations that you made at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; definitely.

Senator O'CONOR. At that time you described the method of operation of the one group that you were most familiar with.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. In reference now, to the other group, the nature of which you learned from your contacts, was there any explanation given as to whether they operated in the same manner or were there any details given of the way in which they operated?

Miss BENTLEY. No, there were no details given. Actually, their method of operation was rather flexible. It adjusts itself. If it is



easier for them to act a bit openly they can do it. If they have to go further undercover they can do it. They have the whole thing set up so they can shift from one basis to another almost overnight.

SENATOR O'CONNOR. What I was leading up to was whether or not there was any indication as to whether it reached high in the Government or in any of the executive departments.

MISS BENTLEY. There was no indication where it was or how high it went, but I imagine it must have gone fairly high because they certainly wouldn't have been too interested in mere clerks who had access to nothing.

MR. MORRIS. In fact, some of the people that you did deal with, one of them was an Under Secretary and the other was an executive assistant to the President, were they not?

MISS BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

MR. MORRIS. Possibly Mr. Chambers might give us some information along these lines, or Miss Bentley. Some of the people who appeared in our hearings would frequently, from time to time, confer with Soviet officials, members of the Soviet foreign office, members of Tass, and members of the embassies here in Washington. I wonder if you could comment on the significance of that, Mr. Chambers?

I don't mean to ask you about Mr. Lattimore in any way, but from time to time Mr. Lattimore would have occasion to confer with Mr. Oumansky or various other Soviet officials. One man named Dolbin was here in the Soviet office, and they had a conference down in Lattimore's home. Again, without asking you to comment in any way on the question of Mr. Lattimore, I was just wondering if you could tell us some thing about the significance?

MR. CHAMBERS. Speaking purely as a layman, I would say that if embassy or diplomatic officials of the Soviet Government visited anyone I knew, on almost any occasion, I should find it of extraordinary interest, at least. I actually have no experience of this kind, but I believe Miss Bentley has experience.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, could you comment on that?

MISS BENTLEY. It was my understanding from what I was told that Soviet officials do not confer with Americans, especially in their homes, which happened in one instance with some of the people that I dealt with, and Mr. Bromoff, who was then first secretary of the Embassy, unless there was something very important afoot. They are not encouraged to deal with Americans at all, here in this country.

MR. MORRIS. And you think a conference of several hours' duration would have considerable significance?

MISS BENTLEY. I would think so. I would look into it.

MR. MORRIS. Would it make any difference if such a conversation took place, say, during the Hitler-Stalin pact? Would that have any significance at all to you, Miss Bentley?

MISS BENTLEY. I wouldn't think it would make any difference; no.

MR. MORRIS. Would it make any difference to you?

MR. CHAMBERS. I wouldn't understand what difference it might make. It would make a historical difference, I assume, but I could only speculate.

MR. MORRIS. During the Hitler-Stalin pact the foreign policy of the United States and Soviet Union were conflicting. During a period of cooperation, there at least would be a framework within which somebody having the interests of the United States could

confer with an official of the Soviet Union. Do you think that might cause a difference?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think it is a reasonable distinction, but I should think that any such traffic as you have described would be of a fact that would interest the security agencies.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, we have to consider the question here in dealing with people who are Communist writers, people who have been shown to have Communists in the past have done considerable writing on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In all cases the writing has been political in content. Is it conceivable from your experience in the Communist organization that a person could be a Communist and not write in such way as to reflect his Communist nature?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should have to answer that it is in general possible, but it would be extremely difficult for any man, any Communist, to write without, in some degree, reflecting his political opinions. He might very consciously try to angle his opinions in such a way as to cover his real intentions. We know that there are people very skillful at that line. But I think that a careful study of any such writings would nearly always reveal a line in the writing at least a point of view which would be rather inescapable.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comments on that, Miss Bentley.

Miss BENTLEY. No, except that I agree with Chambers. Except to those who are rather skilled in tracking that down, it might be unperceptible, but nevertheless somewhere in that writing would be the traces of the political line.

Mr. MORRIS. If we establish in our record that somebody was, as a matter of fact, say 2 years ago or 3 years ago, a member of the Communist Party, what kind of a conclusion can we draw from that, as to his present party membership. Can you tell us anything about that, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am afraid I am going to have to ask you to repeat that question.

Mr. MORRIS. If we have established in our record that an individual, as of 2, 3, or 5 years ago, was, as a matter of fact, a member of the Communist Party, to what extent can we conclude from that that he is recently a member of the Communist Party? How good is the presumption that if a man is shown to have been working in the Communist organization, that that relationship continues.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should think that would depend a great deal on what you knew of the individual's activities and expression during the period between the last time you knew of his membership in the Communist Party and your current interest in him.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose that his associates remained the same, suppose that he continues to work with the same people as he worked with prior to the time of a point where we could establish he was a Communist.

Mr. CHAMBERS. The presumption would then be very strong that he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. When a man changes from being a Communist to a non-Communist, are there any actions discernible on his part that would help us to evaluate whether or not he is presently a member of the Communist Party?



Mr. CHAMBERS. There are actions discernible on his part and on the part of his former associates, namely that he leaves the circles in which he formerly moved, usually with a great deal of strong feeling on his part and also on the part of his former associates who tend to leave him.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, if we can establish that a man is at some time in the past a Communist and that from that time on his associations remain the same, his general political expressions continued pretty much along the same lines, we are warranted in drawing some kind of a conclusion about the continuation of his membership.

Senator WATKINS. Would it be difficult for a man to disengage himself from a party, having been with it for a number of years?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think it would depend on what area of the party he was active in.

Senator WATKINS. What do you mean by area? You don't mean geographical area, do you?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No; I mean organizational area. If he was active in the open Communist Party, he might fall away from it without very much stress on the inside, particularly if he has not been very active. If he was active in any underground organization, there would, of course, be precautions taken by the Communist Party or the apparatus which is a branch of the party, and he himself, if he broke violently with the underground, might take precautions for his own safety.

Senator WATKINS. What I was trying to get at is maybe a man would not make a violent break or keep away from them for a time, even though he might have made up his mind that he was not going to be a Communist any longer.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is quite possible.

Senator WATKINS. That is why I was asking in connection with what you just answered to Mr. Morris.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't see what the line of the question is. I don't understand it.

Senator WATKINS. Well, if it is a difficult matter to break with the party, to get out of the party, a man might go along for a time, although he, in his own mind had broken with them.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is quite possible; yes. That is entirely possible. I think most cases of deserters from the Communist Party would probably show that that is a general pattern, that the intellectual break precedes to one degree or another the actual organizational break. Some momentous step is scarcely taken later.

Senator WATKINS. In your own case you had difficulty, did you not?

Mr. CHAMBERS. It is perfectly true in my own case.

Senator O'CONNOR (presiding). I just wanted to ask Mr. Chambers a question or two in regard to any of the procedures with respect to appointment in the U. N., as to whether there is anything he can give to the committee which might be of interest. I have for instance, in mind, a case such as the Irving Kaplan case.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Of course, Irving Kaplan's employment by the U. N. comes long after my last direct knowledge of Kaplan. I am entirely unfamiliar with how Communists are able to penetrate the U. N. assuming that they are, and I do so assume.

Senator O'CONNOR. Have you reason to believe that that is true, that there is that penetration, that the Communists are in the U. N.?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I can think of one or two names, Kaplan being one of them, and I have no reason to suppose that Kaplan has broken with the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he is an example. If he has been keeping the same associations during the past 5 or 6 years that he kept prior to that time or possibly for periods longer than that, you yourself would draw the conclusion that he has kept his allegiance to the Communist organization which you knew about personally.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think there is a further step in here that we have not touched on, namely, that the Communist who leaves the party leaves the party because he believes that it is no good, has come to believe that from actual experience. Therefore, he tends to seek quite different and new associations. Perhaps some of them he had in the past and has repudiated. He goes back to them. So that a Communist who has actually broken is generally seen in the context quite hostile to the Communist Party as a rule, even though he himself may have decided not to take any direct actions against the party if he can avoid it, for personal reasons. Does that answer your question at all?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Herbert Philbrick has just arrived, and I wonder if you will swear him.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you swear that the testimony you shall give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I do.

#### TESTIMONY OF HERBERT A. PHILBRICK

Senator O'CONOR. For the record, will you give your full name.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Herbert A. Philbrick.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chambers, I think I interrupted you, really when you were giving some detailed explanation of the procedures, or of anything that you had to say in regard to employment by the U. N.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am afraid that I won't be able to help you in that respect, Senator. I really don't know anything about it.

Senator O'CONOR. The reason I was asking you is that it did seem to me that there might very well be some dereliction on the part of some of the United States officials in regard, for example, to the Irving Kaplan case in the light of the revelations that have been made in the past. I was wondering whether there was any further information that you could give us in that regard.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I know of no such dereliction, I have no such information.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, one of the difficulties that we have encountered is to find sources of evidence on people whose membership in the Communist organization is current. We have found that principally the only way of arriving at such conclusions would be from somebody who participated in the organization, somebody who was an ex-Communist, or somebody who had the experience such as Mr. Philbrick, who was an agent for the FBI. At the same time we have found that there have been three witnesses that I know of, three potential witnesses, who have broken with the Communist Party, in



my opinion, having dealt with them and conversed with them at length, within the last 2 or 3 years. But it seems to me that they have not brought themselves around to the position where they will testify. One man who knows a great deal about the subject that we have been covering here says that if we call him he will refuse to answer on the grounds his answers will incriminate him. At the same time, he does know a great deal about it and is generally cooperative. It seems to be a phenomenon that we encounter continually, namely, that it takes quite a period of time for a man, once he has left the Communist Party, to comport himself in such a way as he will discuss the thing freely before the Senate committee.

I would like to get some testimony on that point because I think it goes to the difficulty that we have in establishing proof of these various things.

Senator O'CONOR. It undoubtedly would be very pertinent and I think very timely to have that testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. I think some of our witnesses before this committee have said it took them 5 or 6 years, really, to make a break from the Communist organization. I would like to have some testimony on that score.

Mr. CHAMBERS has another appointment, Senator. That is why I have been directing most of my questions to him, so he can get away early.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Will you ask me specific questions?

Mr. MORRIS. How long did it take you to really break away completely from the Communist Party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I would think the better part of a year. I am speaking of the organizational break.

Mr. MORRIS. It took a year to break away?

Mr. CHAMBERS. But you must bear in mind, it is extremely difficult to establish the point at which the break actually began, and that if any ex-Communist were able to go far enough back into the past, he would probably find small tell-tale traces of an incipient break of which, at the time, he was not conscious or barely conscious, and which he then put out of his mind if he was still active. So it is extremely difficult to state any definite period for that.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, at the end of that year, Mr. Chambers—you say it took you about a year—

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is purely an arbitrary figure, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, would you, if you can really look back to that period with a clear eye, would you then have testified before a Senate committee such as ours, about your associations in the Communist Party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. After I broke?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. And within that period of time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, at that period, at the end of 1 year.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am speaking of the period prior to my break. I think there is confusion here. I think you are speaking of the period after I broke. I was speaking of the period before I broke. After I broke with the Communist Party, as you know, it took me from April of 1938 to September 1939 to go to Mr. Adolph Berle, which is, I think, the answer to your question.

Senator WATKINS. Was one of the reasons why it takes a long time to make that break any fear of reprisal from the Communists because you are making the break?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I don't think fear of reprisal from the Communists enters in at all. An adjustment, very grave adjustment, was taking place.

Senator WATKINS. From your knowledge of the way the Communists work in this country, is there any great fear of physical reprisal upon the person of the former Communist, when he breaks away?

Mr. CHAMBERS. If the former Communist has broken from a Soviet apparatus, I think he is fully justified in fearing reprisals of the violent kind, depending of course on his function in that apparatus. But, in fact, for the ex-Communist to state his story openly, to tell his story openly, lessens the danger of reprisals.

One of the things that the party would like to prevent is the ex-Communist telling what he knows. Once he has told it, it scarcely becomes worth while to remove him.

Senator WATKINS. During your experience as a Communist, do you know of anyone who was the subject or object of reprisals, a physical reprisal by the party, who had broken from the party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I had reason to suppose that Julian Steward Points did, a former member of the central committee.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have any evidence to support that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I have no direct evidence.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever hear it discussed in Communist circles?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I never heard it discussed in Communist circles. It took place not too long before my own break, I think. I have forgotten the break.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have a conversation with General Krivitsky?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any evidence that he was done away with by the Soviet organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have no direct evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think that is a possibility?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe that he was murdered.

Mr. MORRIS. When you had your talk with General Krivitsky, Mr. Chambers, did you discuss with him espionage apparatus in the United States?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Probably, I don't remember in detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anything about the conversation with General Krivitsky at that time that you can tell us for our record, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, in the first place, General Krivitsky and I had a number of conversations. You may have in mind the initial conversation which I described at some length before. In that conversation the thing that stands out in my mind is Krivitsky saying that in our time, informing is a duty. Krivitsky was, I believe, at that time or shortly thereafter cooperating with the British Government.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back to this other point, Mr. Chambers, about the long delay.



As I said, Mr. Chairman, we have three people who have apparently clearly broken with the Communist Party but they are very, very much afraid of being put in the position where they have to be a witness. However, I would like to develop that for the record to show that in the first place it takes time for someone who is in the Communist Party to break away from the Communist Party, and then apparently there seems to be a long period where a person expresses an extremely great reluctance to give any testimony, and then the reluctance continues even after that. I think, Mr. Chairman, that having dealt with the witnesses from time to time, almost every witness who has been called here has been most reluctant to testify. I think that is a fact that should go into our record somewhere, that there is a strong reluctance to testify. One witness I remember, Mr. Kornfetter, stated that in his opinion it was a period of 4 to 5 years before he could ever bring himself around to the position where he would have given testimony before a Senate committee such as ours after he broke with the Communist Party. It is something along those lines, Mr. Chambers, that we would like to have possible further explanation.

Senator O'CONNOR. From your experience, would you be able to say that that is a correct statement of the situation?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think in general it is. You have to remember that a very strong human factor enters into these matters, I mean the fact of human relations. It is a personally destructive experience for the man who must testify, to testify against people with whom he has been close friends or has close associations. There are very few people who willingly do such a thing. As a rule, only some very powerful pressure, such as the pressure of history at various times, can bring them to do that. It seems to me that that is readily understandable. There are very few of us who would testify against any group of people with whom we have been closely associated, good people or bad people.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you develop that point at all for us, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I agree with Mr. Chambers that actually it is a bit difficult to say exactly when you did start the break. There were little things that first you rationalized, and it is a long process. In my case I think it was well over a year before I could bring myself to break and go to the FBI. It is not pleasant testifying. Every time you do it, you feel the same feeling all over again, whether these people are still Communists, and dangerous, that they were once friends of yours, and you worked with them, and you cannot get rid of that feeling. I think it is very understandable that the ex-Communist does not like to testify.

Senator WATKINS. Is it because of a fear that they may have some personal vengeance brought upon them?

Miss BENTLEY. No; particularly when you work in Soviet intelligence. You have about reached the stage where you realize that for all you know you may be living on borrowed time. You accept that fact when you have done intelligence work and you don't worry about that. You know that there might be that chance, although probably what has become public, that is minimized. You know there is a chance of a great deal of mud being slung at you, but you accept

that. That is a personal risk. But what you cannot accept is the fact of hurting someone else.

Senator WATKINS. In your own case you did not have any fear, then, of any reprisals being brought upon you by the Communists?

Miss BENTLEY. I did until these things became public; yes. You see, I worked under cover for the FBI for a period.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, when you left the Communist organization and came over to our side of the fence, or left that particular world and came over to our world, did you have a feeling that you were deserting the winning side and coming over to the losing side?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that for us, please?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, from what I had been able to see, the Communists were the strong ones. The forces of history seemed to be headed that direction. Whether I liked it or not, that seemed to be the kind of world that was coming into being, but I did not like that kind of a world. I decided that even though I was going to be on the losing side, I still was going to go back, and to the people that I thought were important. I might as well die fighting.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have such an experience as that, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; I had almost an identical experience. As you know, I have already said that I thought I was deserting the winning side for the losing side. As I look around me at this moment of history, I am not greatly heartened.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that based upon the fact, I will ask this to Miss Bentley, that some of the people you were dealing with were people who were high in power, and that they seemed to be going ahead and moving the Communist organization to even greater heights here in the United States.

Miss BENTLEY. Not completely. Yes; I did see the ease with which they could move in circles here, but it also tied in with the international picture. Those of us who worked for the Soviet underground had to keep track of international developments, and I could see that tying in very closely with a sweeping tide from abroad, and it began to look as though the first estimate the Communists had made about it being quite some time before communism could come in were entirely wrong, that it was coming in faster.

Mr. MORRIS. When you first broke with the Communist Party, you say for a while you worked with the FBI, Miss Bentley.

Miss BENTLEY. That is right; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And then did you tell the story of your experience to the Federal grand jury?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. That was a little better than 2 years after.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have the attitude that you were disturbed that nothing was being done about the revelations that you had made?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, I did. The jury seemed to drag on for about a year and nothing seemed to be happening.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you attach any significance to the fact that Mr. Hiss, whom you knew and worked with for many years, and concerning whom you gave testimony early in 1949, that he continued to go up in Government, did you consider that as evidence of a condition in the United States Government at that time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I can't answer that question in just those terms, for the reason that I didn't know how high Alger Hiss had gone in



the Government at the time. But in general, as nothing was done about the information I had given Mr. Burley, I must say I developed very strong feelings about it.

Senator WATKINS. What were those feelings?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The feeling that there was no particular desire to rout out Communists, in fact, if anything, that there was a desire to act against those who might testify against Communists.

Senator WATKINS. Well, you did not think that Mr. Burley was guilty of that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I understood that Mr. Burley was an anti-Communist and a very serious one. I have never had any reason to change my mind.

Senator SMITH. Did that feeling on your part continue, Mr. Chambers, as you just described in answer to Senator Watkins' question, that there appeared not to be a desire to route out the subversives in the Government?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; it did.

Senator SMITH. Over an extended period of time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. We have had considerable testimony before this committee, Mr. Chambers, that Frederick V. Field, who was the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1934 to 1940, and who remained active in the Institute of Pacific Relations and served on the board of trustees until 1947, we have had considerable testimony from people interested in the Institute of Pacific Relations that while Mr. Field may have been a Communist during that period of time, he comported himself in such a way as never to inject Communist Party activities into the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Based on your experience, do you think such a fact is possible, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't believe that it is possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify on that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I would have to assume that one of the reasons Mr. Frederick Field was in the Institute of Pacific Relations was to use his position there for whatever purpose the party saw fit.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, if he were a full-fledged Communist, he would be there in order to do Communist work.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I would expect that, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Particularly if he devoted the major portion of his time to that project?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Especially in that case.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you comment on that, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say the same thing, that it would be quite impossible for somebody to be in that position and not be doing Communist Party work.

Senator SMITH. Would it be logical to assume that when the individual is not only giving a substantial portion of his time but also sizable financial support?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. If you are talking about Mr. Field, the added fact that he was a link between Earl Browder and the Communist Party cell of the far eastern field would certainly add to that conclusion. I happen to know that was correct.

Senator WATKINS. Is there not a period of time, however, before the conquered Communist really finds out the conspiracy? Couldn't there be a period when he did not know that the Communists had in mind the overthrow of this Government, for instance, by force and violence?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he could. It would depend entirely on whether he behaved rather actively as a Communist, if he was in, say, the semi-open party, that sort of thing. But in the case of Mr. Field, who was in pretty deep, I don't think you can draw that.

Senator WATKINS. Was he not a part of the open party?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, and no. He had one foot underground and—he had one foot underground and one foot over the ground, so to speak. But he, I understand, had been a Communist for a good many years.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, he was even aiding the pickets, wasn't he, before the White House on one occasion?

Miss BENTLEY. He might have been, I don't know. But any one who was that close to Earl Browder, and had that assignment, certainly knew what was going on.

Senator WATKINS. You were not a member of the open party, were you?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I joined the open party originally.

Senator WATKINS. How long was it before you became a part of the underground?

Miss BENTLEY. Roughly about two and a half years.

Senator WATKINS. During that period before you became a part of the underground, did you know at that time of the objectives of the Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. I didn't. But the situation for me was entirely different. I was a member of a unit which is the lowest group of the party.

Senator WATKINS. A member of what?

Miss BENTLEY. A member of a unit which is the lowest group in the party?

Senator WATKINS. A lawless group?

Miss BENTLEY. No, the lowest group, the lowest in the party, mainly around Columbia University. In that case, there was no particular reason why I should have found out the inner secrets of the party. But a person who is around Communist Party headquarters associates with Earl Browder, and acts as his emissary, certainly he is in a position to find out the facts, and if he didn't then I would say that he is not quite bright.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, he wouldn't be very intelligent if he could not find out if he was a close associate of Earl Browder.

Miss BENTLEY. I would say so, definitely.

Senator WATKINS. I have happened to have known people in my own State, for instance, who thought they were Communists, and I doubt very much that they knew anything about the conspiracy that is being carried on by the Communists to bring about the overthrow of this Government.

Miss BENTLEY. I imagine today there are probably minor members of the Communist Party in the units who can still be fooled by the fact that they do not believe the Communist Party really believes in violence. They may rationalize and say, "Oh, yes; it would happen in Russia but it couldn't happen here." That could very well happen.



But they would have to be minor members of the party in groups which had no connection with the higher-ups in the party, very definitely.

Senator WATKINS. You do not consider Mr. Field a minor member of the party?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely not.

Senator WATKINS. From his conduct, would you still believe that he is a Communist at the present time?

Miss BENTLEY. As far as I have been able to determine, it sounds to me as though he is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sourwine has a few questions that I think he probably wants to put to Mr. Chambers now inasmuch as Mr. Chambers is going to leave soon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is one subject that I think we would like to have the opinion of all of these witnesses on, and more than their opinion we would like to have their statement of what they know as fact bearing on the situation. The situation I refer to is the position in which an undercover agent, an espionage agent, an underground agent, is and must remain with respect to any documentary evidence of his underground activity. I think I can phrase a question which I should like to have each one of the witnesses answer and then we can get a little more general on it.

Mr. Chambers, during the time that you were an underground agent, was there, to your knowledge, in existence documentary evidence of the fact that you were an underground agent?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, it was part of your job to see that there was no such evidence, was it not?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know enough of the procedures of the operation of the underground to be able to say whether there would be any likelihood of ever finding evidence of the underground activity of an underground agent while he or she continues to be such an agent?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think as phrased the answer would have to be "Yes." But I believe that you mean whether there would be documentary evidence. I think it very improbable that there would be any documentary evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you expand on that a little bit, please?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't know that I can add any more to it, except to say that there are no formal articles of convention. So far as I know, no one signs any recruitment blanks. All underground agents of the kind we are talking about would automatically deny that they were underground agents or even members of the Communist Party. That is a part of the operation in any such operation, regardless of whether it is for the Communist Party, or specifically for the Soviet Government or Albanian Government or the Norwegian Government. It is part of the organizational pattern of intelligence work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Bentley, while you were such an underground agent, was there in existence documentary evidence of the fact that you were such an agent?

Miss BENTLEY. No, except possibly in Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you feel that it was your business to make sure that there was no such documentary evidence?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely. I took every possible precaution.

MISS SOURWINE. Can you expand at all on the subject of whether there would be any likelihood of being able to get documentary evidence of the fact that an active underground agent is in fact such an agent?

MISS BENTLEY. You mean documentary evidence in the form of written evidence? I doubt it.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Philbrick, while you were operating as an underground agent was there in existence, so far as you know, documentary evidence of that fact?

MR. PHILBRICK. I don't believe there was any at all, sir. Of course, I operated in a dual capacity, underground agent for the Bureau, FBI, and supposedly for the Communist Party, too. So far as the Communist Party was concerned, in 1947, when I was ordered by the party to go into the real underground section of the party, I was also at the same time ordered to destroy any and all documentary evidence. I was ordered, for example, to destroy a party card if I held one and never to carry one again.

SENATOR SMITH. Was there any documentary evidence besides that that you were specifically ordered to destroy?

MR. PHILBRICK. I forget what I had. There was some material around the house which the party knew I had, and they said get rid of it. Well, there were many factors that entered into it, too. One was, for example, that I was working for Communist Party headquarters in district 1, in Boston, doing some work for them, and I was still to continue to do some work for them. In order not to have any documentary evidence that Philbrick was a party member, I was given a party name, the name of Arthur Trowbridge, and if I ever had to send anything in the form of a document to the headquarters, it would go under the name of Arthur Trowbridge so there would be no evidence of Philbrick being identified with the party. I, along with the other members of that group were told, for example, never to go near the State headquarters of the party from that time on, and never to telephone the State headquarters even from the pay stations. There was a tremendous amount of this type of instruction, and all of it was specifically given to guarantee there would be absolutely no evidence that any counter-espionage agent could find.

MR. SOURWINE. Was the same true with regard to your connection with the FBI? Was equal care taken to avoid the existence of any evidence that you were in fact working for the Bureau?

MR. PHILBRICK. I would say so; yes.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address a question to Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Sir, from what you can speak of your knowledge of underground activities, what can you tell us of the likelihood that an active undercover agent could be proven to be such by documentary evidence?

MR. HILLENKOETTER. Well, the only way you could ever prove he was an agent by documentary evidence is that he would be very stupid. He would certainly not be worthwhile having if he had any documentary evidence. The first thing would be to do away with all of the documentary evidence.

MR. SOURWINE. I don't want to ask you to disclose any confidential information with regard to the activities of any Government agency, but I think perhaps you can tell the committee without any such disclosure, generally speaking, whether the CIA does or does not take



care to avoid the very existence of documentary evidence with regard to underground agents and their identities.

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. I can't answer for that now, I am no longer there. But they certainly did when I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was no documentation?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, it is common practice in connection with all underground organizations to seek to avoid documentation, is it not?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. It very definitely is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Names are used, pseudonyms are used, they are changed with some frequency. Sometimes procedures become quite devious, solely for the purpose of avoiding any documentation of the existence or the identity of agents, is that right?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, that is the point I wanted to inquire about particularly.

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). Any further questions?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to ask Mr. Chambers a question of the existence of the documents that were used in the case of the trial of Mr. Hiss. Was that an extraordinary development, that such documents and therefore something that could be used as evidence at the trial were in existence at that time.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it an extraordinary event, was it out of the ordinary course of things that you should have had those documents and that therefore those documents could have been evidence of a trial, in this case in the trial of Mr. Hiss?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Under proper organizational circumstances the documents would have been destroyed.

Mr. MORRIS. Would have been destroyed?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. So in the ordinary course of things, the prosecution cannot look for the existence of such evidence in order to prove the relationship of someone's being a Communist agent?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The prosecution should always try to look for such evidence, I think, but it is very unlikely that they will find it.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, your having those so-called pumpkin papers was an extraordinary development.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Certainly, it was part of a special history.

Mr. MORRIS. When you left the Communist organization, did you take any documents with you, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. No, like Mr. Chambers, I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there any documents in existence that you know of that could have been used to establish the fact that you were a Communist while you were a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Not that I know of. In the normal course of events, everything that I took in was automatically handed over to the Soviet superior within a matter of 24 to 48 hours. Nothing was left behind.

Mr. MORRIS. Some of the members of your espionage gave you reports that you turned over to Soviet officials, is that right?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How many copies of those reports would be made?

Miss BENTLEY. You mean when I retyped some of them?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, without going into any names, if you have a man who is high in government, let us say, who gave you a report on certain information that the Communist organization wanted, what would you do with that report?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, that depended entirely—most of the documents went right straight through to the Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say most of the documents, what form did they take?

Miss BENTLEY. I mean documents, I mean microfilms. I mean anything that was a carbon copy of the documents or the original documents.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you yourself make copies to keep on file?

Miss BENTLEY. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a regulation covering that particular point?

Miss BENTLEY. Very definitely. I was supposed to have no material left around whatsoever. It was supposed to go right straight through.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, when you turned a copy of something over to the Soviet authorities, there was no other trace of that letter or document or paper or whatever it was in your organization?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. And they were so very fussy about this whole matter that when they sent me a typewritten sheet of instructions I had to read it and burn it in front of the person who gave it to me, because they didn't want me found with that in my handbag in case I got careless.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, can you think of any other such precautions taken by the organization that you worked for to destroy any evidence or any vestige of whatever evidence there was that could possibly be used by the opposition?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, with all the precautions we took—but it is all the sort of thing that any intelligent outfit, if it is any good, does engage in.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Philbrick, while you were in the Communist organization for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on what level were you able to observe the scope of Communist activities?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I don't quite understand the question, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you operated in Boston, did you not, Mr. Philbrick?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it possible for you to know all the Communists who operated in Boston?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Oh, no.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the scope of your being in a position to know who Communists were in your particular area?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Well, it varied from time to time, and the policy of the party was with me the same as with others who were recruited and brought into the party, so that we were started out on a low level. And I guess Miss Bentley has already mentioned that comrades in some of these initial cells would have very little information concerning the real picture of the Communist Party. That is very deliberately kept away from them. Only by slow degrees is the new comrade introduced to any real secrets of the Communist Party, and then it is done very cautiously. The Communist Party instructors and leaders make very sure or try to make very sure that the new comrade



is completely dependable; that is, that he has absorbed everything up to a certain level—before he is advanced to the next level.

That means that over the period of years the picture changes, you see, and at various stages you are able to get glimpses of some section of the Communist Party organization.

But all of the time, the party tries to narrow the scope of your information to prevent any party members, any Communist Party members, since they don't trust each other, from knowing too much about the Communist Party as a whole.

Mr. MORRIS. And by the same token, of course, there were no documents around listing all the members of the Communist Party in Boston available to you?

Mr. PHILBRICK. So far as the rank and file Communist Party members, that is, open Communist Party members, were concerned, there would be card files and lists of names, lists of party names, usually at party headquarters, or sometimes at a secret headquarters of the Communist Party. Any names of any real importance, however, of Communist Party members connected with espionage or sabotage—those names would never appear at Communist Party headquarters.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Admiral Hillenkoetter, could you add anything to the point that was just developed by Mr. Philbrick in connection with your central intelligence experience?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. I think the effort would be to compartmentalize people as much as possible and to have them deal with as few as possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a question along that line?

Admiral, during the time that you were head of the CIA, would you have been able personally to identify all of your agents?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to an agent whom you did know, and did know to be an agent, would you have been able to prove that he was an agent, other than by your own testimony?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. By no means; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In normal course, would you say it was possible for a CIA agent to take instructions over a period of months from a superior who was actually his superior and yet be unable to show or to testify that he ever saw any evidence that the man was, in fact, an employee and his superior?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. It would be very easy; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, that would be the natural course, wouldn't it?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. The normal thing to do; yes, indeed.

Mr. SOURWINE. These people are introduced one to another, and they accept the authority or take the instructions or perform the duties on the basis of the oral introductions; do they not?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. They don't show credentials?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or wear stripes on their sleeves or badges pinned to their vests?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. No.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Philbrick, you mentioned a minute ago that in Boston, while there may have been some records in respect to the open members, there was no documentation with respect to those en-

gaged in espionage and sabotage. Might I ask whether those individuals who were so engaged, or were to engage if possible in sabotage and espionage, were known to the general membership of the party?

Mr. PHILBRICK. No; these members, who were mostly the professional group members, were not known to the general membership as Communist Party members.

In 1947, I myself was ordered to disassociate myself from the rank-and-file membership of the party.

Senator O'CONOR. For what purpose?

Mr. PHILBRICK. For the purpose of joining the Prof. 4 cell. And I was never to attend a cell meeting again of any of my former comrades, and I was not to associate in any way with them.

I remember that on the day that I got the instructions, it so happened that I had a cell meeting scheduled for that very evening, and in fact I was supposed to conduct the educational discussion in the cell meeting that evening.

So I told my friend, explained to him, that I should attend this final meeting, because it was too late to get a substitute to take over that night.

I remember I said, "Well, I will tell them tonight that I am dropping out." And my instructions were to not do anything like that at all, not to say anything to them but just to drop out.

That meant that so far as my former comrades were concerned, they had no idea as to what happened to Comrade Philbrick. He, for some reason which they were not at liberty to know, was simply not there any more.

And, of course, one thing a comrade learns very soon is not to ask questions. It is none of their business to know. Perhaps he has been found out to be a traitor or something. At any rate, it is just understood that he wasn't there, and that is all there was to it.

That meant that so far as the rank-and-file members, they had no idea as to the actual identity of the top-ranking members of the party.

Senator O'CONOR. So we are to understand that where there were extra precautions taken, the identity of the ones in that special group were not even known or to be known to those who even professed membership and were loyal members of the party?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Admiral Hillenkoetter, if you were the head of an intelligence organization, and you walked into the office of one of your principal assistants and found him in close conversation with a man whom you had never seen before, discussing a subject which was highly restricted, what assumptions would you feel at liberty to make about that stranger?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. That he was working for us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you would immediately conclude?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would any other possibility occur to you?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. You could not get any other possibility.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to develop from the witnesses here today the probative value of a communication between a



senior in an organization directed to a junior, whether the organization would be the Communist organization or an organization operated by the United States Government.

We have had testimony that General Berzin, for instance, communicated to one of his assistants in Soviet military intelligence, the assistant being himself a person with the rank of a general. He passed on to him evidence about the identity of several people who were, according to General Berzin, members of their organization.

I wonder if I could ask you, Mr. Chambers: What probative value can we give to such a communication as that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I would say, if General Berzin said so, it was true.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean if General Berzin told an assistant of his who himself was a general, you think we can attach great probative value to such a statement, if the statement was true, of course?

Mr. CHAMBERS. If I had been the assistant and General Berzin had made the statement to me, I would assume on the face of it that it was true.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, isn't that very statement on the part of a superior general to a lower general, the real essence of the agency that we are trying to establish?

Mr. CHAMBERS. You mean that method of communication?

Mr. MORRIS. Communication. Namely, if General Berzin considers somebody to be his agent, isn't that almost the essence of the agency that we are talking about?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am not quite sure I follow that.

Senator O'CONOR. Will you, Mr. Morris, rephrase the question?

Mr. MORRIS. The relationship that an individual bears to the Soviet organization is a state of mind that that person has toward the organization as exemplified by the superior in the organization, in this case, General Berzin. And if the individual is loyal to, in this case, General Berzin, and if General Berzin considers him loyal, isn't that really the essence of the relationship that exists between the individual and the Soviet organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. If I follow, all Communists are under party discipline, and that discipline has been accepted by the individual party member at the time he joined the Communist Party, and has been intensified and has become more experienced and more conscious as his experience has deepened. Insofar as that is true, I think your statement is probably true.

There is also the question of decentralization, or, to put it another way, the personal relationship, rather than organizational relationship, the system in the apparatuses. That is, the chain of command comes from one individual to a lower individual to a still lower individual, until you get to the end of the chain.

Is that along the lines of what you are asking?

Senator O'CONOR. Will you just suspend for one second? I want to ask Miss Bentley if in that same situation, or out of her experience, there is anything that she could add.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, I would say that was correct in the Soviet espionage, as I saw it. In other words, there were no credentials. There was nothing that you could actually put your hands on to prove it. But if a superior officer considered his inferior to be a member of the apparatus, and under discipline, and that person accepted the orders and carried them out, then very definitely that would be true.

Also, if, for example, Mr. A. has Mr. B. working under him, and Mr. B. should be shifted to another superior, it is done entirely on a personal basis, which is that either Mr. A. would introduce Mr. B. to the new contact or else would make arrangements whereby he would meet his new contact at a prearranged place.

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't it true that the only process by which anybody could arrive at the relationships vis-à-vis those three people would be admission on the part of the person who was supposed to be an agent, or testimony on the part of some of the others as to what they told him?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct, testimony either by the agent himself or testimony by the superior officer.

Mr. MORRIS. And who was your superior in the Soviet organization, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I had several of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was your immediate superior?

Miss BENTLEY. My immediate superior, the last one I had, was Anatol Gromov, who was first secretary of the Soviet Embassy at that point.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, if Anatol Gromov told you in the course of your official duties in a serious way about a subject that was important to the Communist organization, that a particular agent was a Communist agent, what probative value would you give to that statement?

Miss BENTLEY. I would accept his statement completely.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, that would be the highest proof you could possibly arrive at that such a person was a Communist agent; isn't that so?

Miss BENTLEY. For example, with the previous man, whom I knew as "Jack," who was my superior before Mr. Gromov, the question of who Mr. Hiss was came up. And I had spoken to Jack about Mr. Hiss, "Who was he?" and Jack came back and said, "That is all right. He is one of ours. Forget about it." I accepted that statement completely. That meant exactly what it said.

Mr. MORRIS. And in your own mind you know as a matter of fact that Hiss was a Communist agent?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely. And I had been told by my superior office, "He is one of ours—lay off" or words to that effect, and I accepted that.

Mr. MORRIS. And at the same time you were not called to testify at the Hiss trial, were you?

Miss BENTLEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you not called to testify at the Hiss trial?

Miss BENTLEY. I haven't the least idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it because the testimony at that time would have been technically considered hearsay evidence?

Miss BENTLEY. I am not a lawyer, Mr. Morris, but that might have been what you call second-hand or hearsay evidence. I don't know.

Senator O'CONNOR. Miss Bentley, had you communicated to the FBI and other officers of this Government that information?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I had already told that to the FBI. I presume it was, as Mr. Morris says, hearsay evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply would like to ask this question. Mr. Chambers, in your opinion, which would be the most convincing statement with respect to the espionage activities of "X": "X's" statement



that he was a Soviet agent, or the statement of the local head of the Soviet organization that "X" was one of his agents?

Mr. CHAMBERS. If those statements were made while both were Communists? It that your question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. CHAMBERS. The statement of the superior would have greater probative force.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, suppose that you have the testimony of one, "B," known to have been a direct subordinate of the Communist chief, that his chief told him "X" was a Communist. Would that, in your mind, weight more than "X's" statement that he was in fact a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am afraid I will have to ask you to say that again. I am a little slow.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't know what your answer is going to be. I am not driving to a preconceived conclusion here.

Assuming that you have "X" and "X" says he is a Communist; assume also that "B" whom you know to be a principal subordinate of the head of the Communist Party, says that the head of the Communist Party told him "X" was a Communist: Which is the most convincing statement, "X's" own statement, or the statement made by the head of the party to his subordinate, "B"?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I should say that I would be inclined to believe both of them if they both said so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Suppose they were in conflict on that point?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think I would have to give greater credence to the superior, the ranking superior in the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Miss Bentley, I would like to ask you the same question.

Miss BENTLEY. Could you repeat it again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Assume we have, on the one hand, the testimony of a man, "X," that he is a Communist.

We have, on the other hand, the testimony of one, "B," who is a principal subordinate of the chief Communist, who says that his superior told him that "X" was a Communist.

Which is the more convincing testimony, if you would weigh them in your mind?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, in general, I agree with Mr. Chambers that the testimony of the superior would be the more believable, probably.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was a conflict, you would believe what the chief said, even as against the man himself?

Miss BENTLEY. I would tend to, but I think you would have to go into the situation a great deal deeper than that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Philbrick, what would you say on that?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I would say in that instance the hearsay evidence would, in my mind, be stronger or nearer the fact than the direct statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Admiral Hillenkoetter, would you express an opinion on that, sir?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. I think the same thing. You would believe the superior, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, what you people are all saying is this, is it not: That a man himself might for any number of reasons

lie about whether he was or was not a Communist, but the head of an espionage agency would not lie about such a matter to one of his principal subordinates? Is that what you have in mind? Is that the basis of your reasoning?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Philbrick?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Admiral?

Admiral HILLENKOETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the maintenance and the formation of an espionage organization, is the question of making a contact or making an introduction an important thing? Could you answer that question, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes. Inevitably.

Mr. MORRIS. The mere contact, the mere introduction, of somebody to somebody else under the proper auspices: That is an important function?

Mr. CHAMBERS. It is bound to be.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you develop that for us, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, clearly, when you have an underground organization, that is to say, a secret organization, any new person put in touch with that apparatus raises a new problem. And they always constitute a danger. There is no reason to believe in most cases presumably that there is any danger. The fact that the introduction is being made implies that very careful consideration has been given to it in advance. In the nature of underground work, a good deal of secrecy usually surrounds such an introduction, for security reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Hede Massing, who is one of our witnesses, has just arrived, and I would like, because of the testimony she has previously given this committee—she has been sworn—to ask the same question of her.

Based on your experience, that is. What was your experience in the Communist organization, Mrs. Massing?

#### FURTHER TESTIMONY OF MRS. HEDE MASSING

Mrs. MASSING. Well, I was an agent. I was an Apparatschik. I belonged to a Russian Apparatus. I was originally a German party member. In fact, I have spent most of my life, until 1937, in the Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. About how long was that? Fifteen or twenty years?

Mrs. MASSING. Oh, more than that. I joined it when I was 17, and I actually did not join by taking out party membership, but as you probably know I worked under Gerhart Eisler, and then belonged to the movement by being his wife.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, during this period of time, what period of time was spent actually in the open Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. You see, I spent my life in the Communist Party without ever having been a party member. By mere coincidence, I took out party membership when I came back the first time from Russia, where I had lived for 2 years, not knowing that I was not to



do that, not having been sort of briefed in time not to take out party membership.

Mr. MORRIS. So your party membership actually was a mistake.

Mrs. MASSING. Oh, completely. And I had to drop it right away, and it was very complicated.

Mr. MORRIS. So if anyone such as the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate had asked you if for any particular time except for the 2 weeks you were a member of the Communist Party, "Were you are have you ever been a Communist Party member," could you have given the answer that you were not?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; I could. Of course I could.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, the point that we are developing at this particular juncture, Mrs. Massing, is the importance of a contact within the Communist Party organization. We have had extensive testimony about the nature of agency, a Communist agency or an agency for the United States Government.

We would like to know within the general framework of an agency the importance of a mere contact.

As I understood your testimony previously, you were essentially someone who made contacts for the Communist Party, were you not?

Mrs. MASSING. Exactly. Well, of course, there are various kinds of contacts one makes, and various intensities at which one works on such a contact. I do not quite know which one you want to elaborate.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, what did you do, for instance? What was your assignment?

Mrs. MASSING. Well, first of all I would come here and report on possible prospects to my Russian superior. I then would be ordered, advised, to work on such prospects. And then I would, after intensive working on such prospects, hand them over to a Russian, that I generally didn't know.

Senator O'CONOR. Mrs. Massing, may I ask you at that point: Were you under instruction to obtain any given number, or as many as possible, of prospects?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course, everything I did was under instruction. And I had no decision on the number. I would give a report, and I would be told, "There is the man to focus or concentrate on." It wasn't a question of getting a number. It was a question of getting important and useful people, even if they would not be of immediate use, if they would be of future use.

Senator O'CONOR. That is the very point I was coming to, whether or not you were given any specific instructions as to the kind of individuals or as to the position or their influential posts or anything of that nature.

Mrs. MASSING. Well, sir, you see, they had so many levels. Of course, first you go and sort of look it all over, and once when I explained to my superior that I could not possibly meet a stenographer in his office, I said, "Of course, that is not important," and he said: "Don't say that. It might be very important at a difficult time to have a stenographer at the right place." But, of course, my occupation was to concentrate on State Department officials, and in fact I concentrated on two State Department officials mostly.

Mr. MORRIS. How much time did you spend on those two people?

Mrs. MASSING. Many months.

Mr. MORRIS. On each one, or on both, combined?

Mrs. MASSING. Many months on Noel Field and a few months on Lawrence Duggan, who had been obviously previously very well prepared, not for working with me but in the Communist doctrine.

Senator O'CONOR. Mrs. Massing, so that we can keep clear the references, will you state who the two were on whom you were to concentrate?

Mrs. MASSING. Noel Field, who then was in the western section of the State Department, and who is now kidnaped with his whole family behind the iron curtain, and Lawrence Duggan.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. And was there anyone else? That is what I wanted to get at.

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; there were others I tried to get, but they were not liked by the Russians, or it didn't work out, and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing was not here, Mr. Chairman, when you asked the question about the significance of meeting with a Soviet official, particularly a Soviet official attached to a foreign office.

Would you attribute any significance to an American meeting with such an official, particularly if the Russian came to the individual's home, in connection with security scrutinies?

Mrs. MASSING. Well, in my personal experience, no Russian official would have ever gone to any American official's home. That would have been completely taboo. Such meetings were done in great secrecy and with great preparation.

As Whittaker Chambers has beautifully described, we all had misgivings, for example, to represent our Russians, all of whom we didn't like, to our American sources; and we all found, and I think Betty Bentley found the same thing, that we did not need to worry. The Americans had already been prepared. And they were very pleased to be faced with a representative of this great country, Russia, the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Philbrick, did you have any comment to make?

Senator O'CONOR. You indicated there was something.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes, on this very peculiar business of being in the Communist Party for many years and not being a party member, that is quite a gimmick.

And as Mrs. Massing told about it, I recall that when I was shifted from the subrosa section, semiunderground section, of the party, into the underground, the very words that were used were, "You are to drop out of the party."

And yet I was becoming more of a party member than I had ever been before.

But what it means is that the Russian bosses and the Communist Party realize that they have not only an underground organization but an illegal operation, and therefore they use this, it seems to me, to make it impossible or try to make it impossible to legally prove that any of these people are party members. They all carry no cards and they operate as though they are not legally party members, when actually of course, they are.

Senator O'CONOR. Miss Bentley, might I just, in order that we can understand the method of operation, ask this: Recalling as I do the testimony you gave us when you first came before the Senate committee in respect to William Remington, which I think was in 1947, you described the method of operation and the steps you took to obtain from Remington certain information and Government records.



Do you recall?

Miss BENTLEY. Not offhand, no.

Senator O'CONOR. You do recall some of the contacts you had with Remington?

Miss BENTLEY. Oh, yes.

Senator O'CONOR. And it was that information that you gave us then. My point was whether or not, at the time you were having the contacts with Remington, you were then a member of the underground, or whether you were in the open party.

Miss BENTLEY. No; I was definitely a member of the underground and had been since 1938. That was 4 years before that.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Hillenkoetter, I would like to ask you the question, If you continued now to be the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and you had agents within the Communist Party, would you be allowed to make them available to a Senate committee for testifying about the organization that they had infiltrated on your behalf?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. Normally, no. We wouldn't make them available, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Mr. Chairman, the point here is that if a Senate committee addresses itself to this problem, there are really only two sources of evidence, if we have established the fact that there are no documents available.

Then we have to get the testimony of someone who was there in the conspiracy, namely, somebody who had been a participant in the conspiracy, either genuinely or acting, say, on behalf of the United States Government.

Now, I would like to ask a few questions of Admiral Hillenkoetter about the availability of such an agent.

The CIA, if it had a man well placed in the Communist organization—purely supposition—would not readily have that agent available for testimony before the committee?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. If they had such an agent, and he testified before the committee, he would be no good. He is gone then.

So certainly if he were doing good work and if there were an infiltration like that, you wouldn't want him to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Philbrick, can you give any testimony on that point? You did ultimately testify, did you not?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances surrounding your testimony?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Well, in 1949 the Justice Department or somebody—I don't know who—decided that I should be pulled out of my work for the Government inside the Communist Party to testify in the trial of the 11 comrades in 1949. And that, of course, meant that so far as the FBI was concerned my value was destroyed. I was no longer of any use to them. I could no longer get hold of any of the evidence that was available to me before.

Mr. MORRIS. So the fact of your exposure was something to offset the value of your testimony at the trial?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And as far as you know, some superior of yours made the decision, and you did not participate in it in any way?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to take a little testimony on the possibility of a Communist being an objective scholar.

I wonder if you could give us any testimony along those lines, Miss Bentley; the possibility of someone who is a Communist being an objective scholar within an organization such as the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Miss BENTLEY. I don't see how it is possible for a Communist to be objective anyway, whether he is a scholar or anything else.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that?

Miss BENTLEY. I mean that a Communist or someone who is under Communist discipline does not do his own thinking. He must accept the party line. He does not make up his own mind. And therefore I fail to see how he could be objective even if he had the kind of mind which otherwise could do objective thinking.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think a Communist could be an objective scholar, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason for that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. It is scarcely possible to accept a doctrine such as the Marxist theory and apply it and be objective in the ordinary acceptance of the word.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Hillenkoetter, can you give us any opinion on that score?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. Mine would be mostly hearsay, but if you are under strict discipline of a certain line of thinking, you can't be objective and follow that line of thinking.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Philbrick, could you answer that question?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I would say it would be impossible for a Communist Party member to be objective. I saw so many examples of it, such as—oh, I think it was in 1948, when in the party we were studying material concerning Tito. And we were studying booklets and pamphlets published by the Communist Party which built Tito up to a great hero. And then overnight, suddenly, Tito was a bum. Things had changed, according to Joe Stalin. And overnight here, in our own party cells, the peculiar minds of the comrades shifted immediately, and they all decided unanimously that Tito was no good any more.

There were many such instances which were amazing to watch, and it convinced me it was simply impossible for these people to be objective about almost anything.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, can you contribute anything to that particular point?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course he cannot be objective if he is a party member. If he is a good actor, and these are his orders, he will certainly make every effort to appear objective and make the point of being objective, but he will not be.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you think it is advisable, I would like to put the following possibility to the witnesses here today and ask them to comment on the probative value of a situation such as the following:

If we have a man concerning whom several witnesses have given testimony that that particular person has been within the scope of their direct knowledge a member of the Communist Party, and we



call such a person in, a man who was stated to have been a member of the Communist Party, and we ask him if he is or has been in the past a member of the Communist Party or at least ask him if he hasn't been in the past a member of the Communist Party, and then he refuses to answer, and then he indicates that he is going to refuse to answer any question concerning his membership in the Communist Party on the grounds that any answer he would give would tend to incriminate him. At the same time there is considerable evidence that the general tenor of his writing remains the same. His general list of associations remains the same. That is, from the time that he was identified to have been active in the Communist Party, right down to date.

What probative value do you think we can give to that testimony concerning his present membership in the Communist Party, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should find it very difficult to suppose that he was not still in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I would think so, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Philbrick?

Mr. PHILBRICK. What was the question again, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Philbrick, the question is that we have a situation where a man has been identified by several witnesses to have been in the past sometime within the scope of their knowledge a member of the Communist Party. After that, we call the man in and ask him if he, in fact, had been, according to the testimony of the three people, a member of the Communist Party. And he refuses to answer whether or not he had been, on the grounds that his answer might incriminate him. By his subsequent course of deportment in response to questions, he refuses to answer any question that borders on his own association with the Communist Party.

At the same time there is considerable evidence that such a person keeps the same associations, the general tenor of his writing remains the same, and there is no interruption of his general line of thought.

To what extent do you think we can conclude that such a man is still a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I think you could definitely conclude that he is still a member of the Communist Party. He might even go so far as to answer one question, and that would be to say that he is not now a member of the Communist Party.

And I base that statement upon instructions which we were given in 1948 in our cell by a courier by the name of "Pete," who was a security man inside of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all you know about him, that he is "Pete"?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is all. And Pete instructed us at that time—now, the situation may have changed since—that we were to say, we were permitted to say and some party members were instructed to say, that we were not now members of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he could have resigned the day before he came down to testify, could he not?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Well, he wouldn't have to resign; no. But he was to testify to that effect.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, do you think that course of conduct would be prompted by the fact that perhaps the inquiring agency had evidence of past membership but they had no evidence of present membership?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And therefore advice of that nature would be considered to be good advice under the circumstances?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is true, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Hillenkoetter?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. I think you must believe the man is still a member.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you give a reason for that other than the reasons that have been given, Admiral Hillenkoetter?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. No; I think the reasons that have been given have been very adequate.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing?

Mrs. MASSING. I agree with everything that has been said so far. You are instructed by a Communist Party member that if it is advisable to say that you are not now a member of the party you will say so, and if it is assumed that you don't know enough about the man you deny it completely.

You could never prove, for example, that I was a party member. And I was a party member. And if I had been asked when I was a Communist if I was a party member, I would have said "No; I wasn't."

Mr. MORRIS. You see, at that point, Mr. Chairman, we point out that there is no further source of evidence for all practical purposes about this man's present membership. It takes some period of time before an ex-Communist becomes an ex-Communist. He doesn't become one in a single day and then give testimony the same day about the agency of this particular person.

The only other possible source would be to have somebody in the intelligence agency acting on behalf of somebody in the Government who knows about his identity in the Communist organization.

So if those two things are unavailable, as I think the discussion showed today, we have to draw some kind of inferences as reasonable men about the continuation of a status once established, and we have to assume that such an agency is presumed to continue.

I have no more questions of these particular witnesses, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. Any further questions, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I wanted to put some exhibits into the record and wanted to make some comment about the difficulty of serving certain people in connection with our hearing. I don't think the whole thing will take more than 10 minutes.

Senator O'CONOR. There was a matter that I had to communicate with the floor on, so I thought we would be in recess for about 10 minutes, and then we will resume with what we have, if that is agreeable to you.

The committee will now be in recess until a quarter of 12.  
(Short recess.)

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please be in order.

Mr. Morris, you indicated a desire to offer for the record certain documents or other data, and also to make some explanatory statement.



Will you proceed?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There were quite a few witnesses that we have made an effort to have testify before this committee, and I think, if it is your wish, that the effort made by the staff to bring these witnesses here should properly be made part of the record; the difficulties that we encountered, the inaccessibility of these witnesses, are factors that should be taken into consideration if this committee is going to make a report on the series of hearings.

Now, we tried several times to reach Solomon Adler.

We consulted Mr. William Holland in the Institute of Pacific Relations. We checked with the Department of Justice. And we in addition having tried to subpoena him. The best information apparently is that Mr. Solomon Adler is in England; he is at Cambridge University, and that seems to be the best evidence I can produce at this time as to his availability.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, Mr. Morris, it occurs to me that we might be able to follow better, and the record might be a little more intelligible, if you were to announce the name of the individual about whom the explanatory statement will be made and then proceed to give any detailed information.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Ellen Atkinson. Now, Ellen Atkinson we had an address for in Arlington, Va., and we made an effort to reach her, and we discovered that she was working in the United Nations in Rome. That is the extent of the effort we have made to reach Ellen Atkinson.

Senator O'CONOR. The next individual?

Mr. MORRIS. Charles Bidien. He was a writer for the institute. We endeavored to subpoena him, and we discovered that he had been deported by the United States authorities out of the country, and he is now somewhere outside the continental limits of the United States, and we have a letter which has been introduced into the record giving his immigration status, namely, one of somebody who has been barred from the country.

In connection with Abraham Chapman, who has been a writer for the Institute of Pacific Relations, we have made extensive efforts to reach him. We have asked the Justice Department to assist us in finding him. We have had four different addresses. We have had several subpoenas out, and all of them have been unavailing, and nobody apparently knows where Abraham Chapman is now. It may be that a public announcement would turn him up, but the Department of Justice—and I presume they got in touch with the FBI—were not able to find where Chapman is at the present time.

Senator WATKINS. I understand the committee still wants him here to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't think so, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. What good is it if it becomes public and we find out where he is now, then, if you do not want him to testify?

Mr. MORRIS. I am just saying that the best efforts on the part of all the staff to find Mr. Chapman have been unavailing, and I want to say that we have tried to reach him through the Department of Justice and several times through the United States marshal's office.

Senator WATKINS. Well, I wondered, if you could get him, whether you would not still want him to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. There comes a point, Senator, where you feel that you can give up trying to reach him.

Senator WATKINS. Suppose he gets the word and turns up immediately? Would you want him then?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know. We would have to consult with the chairman.

Senator WATKINS. I would think the committee would want to hear him.

If you had this search out for him now, and had not been able to get him, and he should show up immediately, I think he ought to be heard.

Mr. MORRIS. The next is Mr. Ch'ao Ting Chi. We have discovered that he is an official in the Chinese Communist Government, and we last heard that he was actively associated in an important position in the Chinese Communist Government, and we assumed that he would not be available as a witness, from that fact. And that, I might say, is true of Mr. Y. Y. Hsu, who was on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and it is also true of Mr. Chen Han-seng.

These three are now in Communist China and therefore are unavailable so far as this committee is concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, just so there can be no misunderstanding of the record and the colloquy between Mr. Morris and Senator Watkins, I would like to ask Mr. Morris:

The purpose of putting this list in the record is not to serve notice on these people that they can come out of hiding, if they are in hiding, that the committee is not to look for them any more; is it?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. It is not an effort to reach them. It is a report on the efforts we have made to reach them.

Mr. SOURWINE. But nothing said here is to be taken as an indication that the committee has lost interest in these folks. If we can find them, the committee will certainly consider bringing them in here for testimony. Isn't that true?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That is all I had in mind. I thought from what you said about making this public that that might help to turn him up.

Mr. SOURWINE. It could.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is, by all our sources of information, including Mr. Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations, presently the wife of Israel Epstein. We had information 2 months ago that both Mr. Epstein and his wife were being feted in Red China. So the last information we had on these two people was that they were in Red China. Again, we have had subpoenas out. The marshal tried to find them. Early in the proceedings we discovered that they left the United States while an investigation was under way, and the immigration inspector has stated that all immigration stations in the country are on the lookout to avoid their entry into the country again. So I think we therefore can discontinue our efforts to get Epstein and his wife, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley. The last reports were that they were in Communist China and were being feted for some of the efforts they had made toward the conquest of China by the Communists.



Talitha Gerlach was reported out of the country, as was Michael Greenberg, for whom the last address we have is Trinity College, Cambridge, England, and we also heard from Mr. Holland that he was now working in Switzerland.

Mr. Chew Hong, or Chew Tong—he is known by both names—was called for a corollary purpose, to establish the identity of the New China Daily News, which figured in the testimony of Mr. Lattimore and some of the other witnesses. Now, we tried to reach him, and apparently he has left the country. The marshal reported that he cannot be found anywhere.

And again, on all of these, we have asked the Department of Justice to help us.

Again, Chew Hong, from the best information we have, is also in Red China.

Now, Anthony Jenkinson we had an address for at 133 West Forty-fourth Street, New York. We got some information that he might be found through the Allied Labor News at 401 Broadway. A subpoena was issued at both of those places, and the marshal reported that he could not be found. We do know that he is an Englishman, and then we have every reason to believe that he has left the United States and is now in England.

Hans Mueller, who was known as Asiaticus, to the best of our knowledge, has died. All of the Institute of Pacific Relations people, and Holland and Carter, have stated that their best information is that he was killed during the last war. We have made no other efforts to try to reach him. He is not an American citizen.

Fred Poland is a Canadian, and we made no effort to reach him, because he is a Canadian official.

Now, we tried to reach Hilda Austern Rae, and we subpoenaed her on March 11, 1952, and we got a report from the marshal's office that she was in Geneva, Switzerland, at that time.

Ludwig Rajchman, whose name appeared in our testimony, is now associated with the Polish Communist delegation to the United Nations and presumably would not be a witness before this Committee.

Andrew Roth, according to our evidence, according to information received from Mr. Holland, was last discovered to be in London. We have further evidence that the French Government has banned Mr. Roth from turning up in Indochina, because of his hostility to the French Government, I suppose vis-à-vis their difficulty with the Communists in Indochina.

Agnes Smedley is deceased. According to all reports, she is dead.

Andrew Steiger, who has appeared in our hearings particularly in connection with having written a book for Mr. Wallace—we had an address for him at 49 Claremont Avenue, in New York City. William Holland gave us the same information. We had a subpoena out quite some time trying to reach Mr. Steiger, and it was all unavailing.

The last we heard from Guenther Stein was that he was believed to be a correspondent for the Hindustani Times in Geneva. Mr. Holland confirmed this fact. Several times in the course of the hearings we had testimony to the effect that he had been deported from France for espionage activities, but he has not been found by the committee, and we are not going to call him.

Anna Louise Strong we tried to subpoena. We had an address for her in Connecticut, and after we tried to subpoena her we discovered

she was traveling somewhere in the State of Washington and could not be reached.

Mary Van Kleeck we sent a subpoena out for on May 4, 1952. The subpoena was not served. The marshal told us that she was reported to be somewhere in California.

Nym Wales was formerly Mrs. Edgar Snow, and was subpoenaed by the committee on two or three occasions by telephone. She pleaded illness, and she was unavailable to come before the committee.

Rose Yardumian, who was the secretary of the Washington branch of the IPR for a long while, apparently is married to an Englishman, Peter Townsend, and is living in London. We did have a report that within the last year she was in Communist China, and our evidence in the record does show that she was on the staff of a publication put out in Communist China, and that there is some doubt as to whether actually she is in England or in Red China, but the fact is that she is unavailable to the committee.

We have one more, Ella Winter. We had a subpoena out for Miss Winter on February 4, 1952. The marshal was not able to serve it. And the report was that she was vacationing somewhere in Europe.

I think that is properly a report on the people that we have not been able to reach. And I think that all should be part of the official record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. Now, is there anything further?

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1345" and was read in full by Mr. Morris.)

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we have some more documents we would like to put into the record, Mr. Chairman. It will take only about 10 minutes.

Senator O'CONOR. Proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. First, there was correspondence in regard to Government contracts for IPR publications. We have here correspondence with the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Frank Pace, and the replies, correspondence with the Secretary of the Navy, the Comptroller General of the United States, the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Comptroller General again. All these deal with the question of contracts.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, contracts, Mr. Mandel, between the Institute of Pacific Relations and these various Government agencies for the publication and the acquisition of IPR pamphlets and material by the Government?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may these be received into the public record?

Senator O'CONOR. They will be. And they will be marked as official exhibits.

(The correspondence referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1346 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, and O" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1346-A

SEPTEMBER 26, 1951.

HON. FRANK PACE, Jr.,

*Secretary of the Army, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations being conducted by the Internal Security Subcommittee, it is noted that Contract No. W28021 QM 14783 was made with Jersey City Quartermaster Depot for an indefinite number of pamphlets at a 20-percent discount.



Would you kindly give me the titles of the publications ordered in connection with the above contract with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346-B

OCTOBER 4, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: The Secretary has requested me to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated September 26, 1951, in which you ask for the titles of the publications ordered in connection with Contract No. W28021QM 14785, between the Jersey City Quartermaster Depot and the Institute of Public Relations.

I find that this contract is a 1-year "open end" contract dated June 30, 1944, and that all the records concerning this contract are located elsewhere than in Washington.

These old records are now being searched, and I will write you further concerning this matter, as soon as that search is completed.

Sincerely yours,

F. SHACKELFORD, *Department Counselor.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346-C

OCTOBER 13, 1951.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of 26 September 1951 in which you ask for the titles of the publications ordered in connection with Contract No. W28021 QM 14783 between the Jersey City Quartermaster Depot and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

We have made a search of the available Army records concerning this contract which, as I informed you in my letter of October 4, 1951, was a 1 year "open end" contract dated 30 June 1944. Examination of the accounts of the disbursing officer servicing the finance office at which vouchers under the contract were paid reveals that during the period July 1944 to June 1945 the following publications were ordered under this contract:

Month of purchase and name of publication:

	<i>Quantity</i>
January 1945:	
Japan Since 1931-----	1
Japan Emerges as a Modern State-----	1
• Basis for Peace in the Far East-----	1
An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics-----	1
Our Far Eastern Record-----	1
Changing China-----	1
Wartime China-----	1
Modern Japan-----	1
Korea Looks Ahead-----	1
Our Job in the Pacific-----	1
March 1945: America's Far Eastern Policy-----	1
May 1945:	
Modern Japan-----	1
Alaska Comes of Age-----	1
Speaking of India-----	1
Pacific Islands in War and Peace-----	1
China in Peace and Freedom-----	1
Korea for the Koreans-----	1
Asia's Captive Colonies-----	1
Our Far Eastern Record-----	1

## Month of purchase and name of publication—Continued

May 1945—Continued	Quantity
Knowing the Soviet Union.....	1
Filipinos and Their Country.....	1
Wartime China.....	1
Land of the Soviets.....	1
Changing China.....	1
Our Job in the Pacific.....	1
Gateway to Asia: SINKIANG.....	1
June 1945:	
Land of the Soviets.....	62
Modern Japan.....	62
Peoples of the China Seas.....	62
Lands Down Under.....	62
Our Far Eastern Record.....	62
Security in the Pacific.....	1

If you desire any further information in this connection, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

F. SHACKELFORD, *Department Counselor.*

## EXHIBIT No. 1346-D

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,  
Washington, October 17, 1951.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,  
*United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I have your letter of September 26, 1951, wherein you requested certain information relative to purchase contracts placed by the Navy Department for publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The publications purchased from the Institute of Pacific Relations are listed below with the applicable contract numbers and titles:

N140 s—28522 A, dated 23 February 1944.....	Speaking of India.
N140 s—46000 A, dated 19 May 1944.....	Wartime China.
Requisition dated 25 April 1945:	
Purchase order 69197 A, dated 7 May 1945.....	Know your Enemy Japan.
	Wartime China.
	Our Job in the Pacific.
	Speaking of India.
	Asia's Captive Colonies.
	Pacific Islands in War and Peace.
N140 s—72028 A, dated 20 June 1945.....	Spotlight on the Far East War on Japan.
N140 s—99790, dated 24 Mar. 1942.....	Know Your Enemy Japan.

Sincerely yours,

H. R. ASKINS,  
*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

## EXHIBIT No. 1346-E

SEPTEMBER 26, 1951.

HON. DAN A. KIMBALL,  
*Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations being conducted by the Internal Security Subcommittee, it is noted that the following contracts were made by the Navy with the Institute: N140 s 28522 A: With Educational Services Section of Navy for 10,000 pamphlets at a total cost of \$1,000. Feb. 23, 1944.

N140 s 46000 A: With Naval Training, 10,000 pamphlets at a total cost of \$1,000. May 19, 1944.

Pur. Ord. 69197 A: With Naval Training for shipment all around the world, 180,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about \$15,400. April 25, 1945.



N140 s 72028 A: With Naval Training, 30,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about \$3,100. June 20, 1945.

N140 s 99790: With Navy for 100,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about \$1,750. March 24, 1942.

Would you kindly give me the titles of the publications ordered in connection with the above contracts with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Secretary.*

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EXHIBIT No. 1346-F

SEPTEMBER 27, 1951.

HON. LINDSAY C. WARREN,

*Comptroller General of the United States,  
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: In connection with an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations being conducted by the Internal Security Subcommittee, it is noted that the following government contracts were made with the Institute:

W28021 QM 14783: With Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, for indefinite number of pamphlets at a 20% discount.

N140 s 28522 A: With Educational Services Section of Navy for 10,000 pamphlets at a total cost of \$1,000. Feb. 23, 1944.

N140 s 46000 A: With Naval Training, 10,000 pamphlets at a total cost of \$1,000. May 19, 1944.

Pur. Ord. 69197 A: With Naval Training for shipment all around the world, 180,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about \$15,400. April 25, 1945.

N140 s 72028 A: With Naval Training, 30,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about \$3,100. June 20, 1945.

N140 s 99790: With Navy for 100,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about \$1,750. March 24, 1942.

Would you kindly give me the titles of the publications ordered in connection with the above contracts with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

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EXHIBIT No. 1346-G

SEPTEMBER 28, 1951.

HON. LINDSAY C. WARREN,

*Comptroller General of the United States,  
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: Would you kindly consult your files for any record between 1940 and 1945, inclusive, showing a contract for government purchase of copies of two magazines:

1. CHINA TODAY, published monthly at 168 W. 23rd St., New York, N. Y.

2. AMERASIA, a fortnightly of America and Asia, published fortnightly by AMERASIA, 225 Fifth Ave., New York 10, N. Y.

The contracts for the purchase of these publications by the government may have been made through the Liberal Press, 80 Fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.

We should like to have all data pertaining to these contracts.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Secretary.*

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EXHIBIT No. 1346-H

SEPTEMBER 28, 1951.

HON. LINDSAY C. WARREN,

*Comptroller General of the United States,  
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: Further in connection with the investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations being conducted by the Internal

Security Subcommittee, it is noted that the following Government contracts were made with the Institute:

NOM-41776: 1/7/44, book

N-14055-15198A: 2/13/43, books on Alaska, Asia, Japan, China, etc.

W-1445 QM-2230: 7/29/43

Would you kindly give us the titles of the publications ordered in connection with the above contracts with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and also all data pertaining to these contracts?

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

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EXHIBIT No. 1346-I

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, October 2, 1951.

Hon. PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate*

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your letter dated September 28, 1951, requesting all data pertaining to a contract for Government purchase of two magazines, China Today and Amerasia, between 1940 and 1945. The matter will be given prompt consideration and I shall be pleased to advise you relative thereto at a later date.

Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN,  
*Comptroller General of the United States.*

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EXHIBIT No. 1346-J

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, October 2, 1951.

Honorable PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate.*

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your communications dated September 27 and 28, 1951, requesting titles of publications ordered and all data pertaining to various contracts with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The matter will be given prompt consideration and I shall be pleased to advise you relative thereto at a later date.

Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN,  
*Comptroller General of the United States.*

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EXHIBIT No. 1346-K

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, October 24, 1951.

Honorable PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate.*

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Further reference is made to your letter dated September 28, 1951, acknowledged October 2, 1951, requesting all data pertaining to contracts of record in this office for the period 1940 to 1945, inclusive, for Government purchase of copies of two magazines, China Today and Amerasia, which you state may have been made through the Liberal Press, 80 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y.



In accordance with your request, you are informed that a careful check of the records of this office does not reveal any contracts entered into for the purchase of such magazines through the Liberal Press or from any other source, for the period 1940 to 1945, inclusive.

Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN,  
*Comptroller General of the United States.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346-L

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, November 26, 1951.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.*

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Further reference is made to your letters dated September 27 and 28, 1951, acknowledged October 2, 1951, furnishing a list of Government contracts entered into with the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations and requesting the titles of the publications and the number thereof ordered under said contracts.

In accordance with your request there is submitted herewith a report compiled from the records of this Office showing the number of copies ordered under said contracts, with the exception of contract No. W-28-021-QM-14783, and the titles of the publications, which are identified with the specific contract involved. With respect to contract No. W-28-021-QM-14783, I have to advise that said contract covered not only the publications ordered by the Department of the Army, but, also, provided that the contract "may be utilized by any Government bureau, instrumentality or agency desiring to participate in same," and this Office has no centralized record of the titles of the publications and the number thereof ordered under the contract.

I trust that the otherwise available information contained in the enclosure will serve the purpose of your inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK H. WEITZEL,  
*Acting Comptroller General of the United States.*

Enclosure.

Contract number	Number of copies	Title of publication
N140s-99790.....	100,000	KNOW YOUR ENEMY: JAPAN.
W-1445-QM-2230.....	118	FAR EASTERN RECORD.
	118	KNOW YOUR ENEMY.
	118	CHINA AMERICA'S ALLY.
	118	MEET THE ANZAS.
	118	ASIA'S CAPTIVE COLONIES.
N140s-15198A.....	1,000	ALASKA COMES OF AGE.
	500	CHANGING CHINA.
	500	LAND OF THE SOVIETS.
	500	PEOPLES OF THE CHINA SEAS.
	500	MODERN JAPAN.
N0m-41776.....	1	BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PACIFIC AREA MAPS.
N140s-28522A.....	10,000	SPEAKING OF INDIA.
N140s-46000A.....	10,000	WARTIME CHINA.
N140s-69197A.....	40,000	KNOW YOUR ENEMY: JAPAN.
	40,000	WARTIME CHINA.
	40,000	OUR JOB IN THE PACIFIC.
	20,000	SPEAKING OF INDIA.
	20,000	ASIA'S CAPTIVE COLONIES.
	19,955	PACIFIC ISLANDS IN WAR & PEACE.
N140s-72028A.....	30,000	WAR ON JAPAN.

## EXHIBIT No. 1346-M

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, November 30, 1951.

Hon. PAT McCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Supplementing Office letter of November 26, 1951, furnishing, in response to your letters of September 27 and 28, 1951, the titles of publications and the number thereof ordered under certain Government contracts made with the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, there is submitted herewith another list showing the titles of the publications and the number of copies ordered and paid for by the Department of the Army only, under contract No. W-28-021-QM-14783, for the period July 1, 1944, through August 31, 1945.

Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN,  
*Comptroller General of the United States.*

Enclosure.

Contract number	Number of copies	Title of publication
W-28-021-QM-14783-----	1	AMERICA'S FAR EASTERN POLICY.
	1	SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC.
	1	GATEWAY TO ASIA.
	63	LAND OF THE SOVIETS.
	65	MODERN JAPAN.
	62	PEOPLES OF THE CHINA SEAS.
	62	LANDS DOWN UNDER.
	64	OUR FAR EASTERN RECORD.
	1	ALASKA COMES OF AGE.
	1	SPEAKING OF INDIA.
	1	PACIFIC ISLANDS IN WAR & PEACE.
	1	CHINA IN PEACE & FREEDOM.
	1	KOREA FOR THE KOREANS.
	2	ASIA'S CAPTIVE COLONIES.
	1	KNOWING THE SOVIET UNION.
	1	FILIPINOS AND THEIR COUNTRY.
	2	WARTIME CHINA.
	3	CHANGING CHINA.
	2	OUR JOB IN THE PACIFIC.
	1	JAPAN SINCE 1931.
	1	JAPAN EMERGENCE AS A MODERN STATE.
	1	BASIS FOR PEACE IN THE FAR EAST.
	2	KOREA LOOKS AHEAD.
	1	AN ATLAS OF FAR EASTERN POLITICS.
	1	THE FAR EAST: A SYLLABUS.
	1	MEET THE ANZACS.
	1	KNOW YOUR ENEMY: JAPAN.
	1	TWENTIETH CENTURY INDIA.
	1	SMALL INDUSTRIES OF JAPAN.

## EXHIBIT No. 1346-N

APRIL 8, 1952.

Hon. ROBERT A. LOVETT,  
*Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I understand that some time about 1945 Andrew Roth, an American writer, was refused clearance for a visit to Japan by General MacArthur's intelligence officers. Would you please let me have the official record on this, with the reasons for lack of clearance?

Kindest personal regards and all best wishes,

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*



## EXHIBIT No. 1346-O

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR,  
Washington, 13 May 1952.

Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: As the Secretary of Defense advised you, your letter of April 8th concerning the denial of clearance for Andrew Roth to visit Japan was forwarded to the Army for reply.

I am pleased to be able to give you the information that actually Mr. Roth was denied clearance to Japan in 1949, rather than 1945 as reported in your letter. This denial was made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who was responsible for the security of the area under his authority, and within whose jurisdiction the decision lay. You will understand, I am sure, that under established national policy it is not possible for the Department of the Army to release the sources or the nature of the information on which General MacArthur's decision was based.

I hope that if there is any further help I can give you, you will not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

F. SHACKELFORD, *Department Counselor.*

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, dated May 14, 1952, relative to money paid to Owen Lattimore for services.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Ferguson requested that information be made part of our record, and it is now available.

Senator O'CONOR. All right. It may be included.

(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1347," and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1347

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, May 14, 1952.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee for Department of State,*  
*Committee on Appropriations,*  
*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: Your letter of May 3, 1952, to the Secretary of the Treasury requesting to be advised of the amount of money that was paid to Owen Lattimore by the United States Government in 1945 has been referred to this Department for further reply, as stated in that Department's acknowledgment of May 7 to you.

The records available to this Department indicate that Owen Lattimore was paid the sum of \$4,063.13 for services rendered to the United States Government during the calendar year 1945. This covers his service with the Office of War Information, and with the Japanese Reparations Mission, which was appointed by the President.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,  
*Deputy Under Secretary.*

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a letter from Senator Cain, submitting a translation of a review of Owen Lattimore's book, the Situation in Asia, the translation being taken from a Soviet publication, Novy Mir, for November 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.



(The correspondence and enclosure referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1348," and are as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1348

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
May 19, 1952.

Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR: I am writing to you with reference to the hearings of the Internal Security Subcommittee on the Institute of Pacific Relations, with special reference to Owen Lattimore.

Because of the important role that Lattimore and his writings have played in the pro-Communist orientation of the Far Eastern policy of the State Department, and the official attitude of the Soviet government toward his utterances, I believe they represent an important criterion for evaluating his adherence to the Communist Party line.

In making a study of American Far Eastern policy, I discovered a significant article on Owen Lattimore in the Soviet publication *Novy Mir* (the New World) of November 1950. The article discusses Lattimore's book, *The Situation in Asia*, and shows very clearly how valuable to the Soviet Union was the published philosophy of Owen Lattimore.

I am sending you this article because I believe it to be an integral part of your hearings and reports on the Institute of Pacific Relations, and you may find it desirable to make it a part of your record.

With best personal regards, I am

Most cordially,

HARRY P. CAIN.

HPC/dmb.  
Enclosure.

# THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND THE PLANS OF THE IMPERIALISTS

REVIEW OF OWEN LATTIMORE'S BOOK, *THE SITUATION IN ASIA*

(By B. Leontiev)

As a result of World War II there has been a fundamental change in the relation of the forces of the camp of socialism and democracy, on the one hand, and the camp of imperialism and reaction, on the other. The decisive role of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army in the smashing of Hitlerite Germany and militaristic Japan, and in the liberation of mankind from the threat of fascist enslavement, ensured the victory of the progressive forces in a number of European countries and evoked a new great upsurge of the national liberation movement in Asia. The events of the postwar period and, above all, the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, and also the successes of the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, prove that the undivided domination of the imperialist powers in Asia has passed out of existence and never again will be revived.

The attitude towards this unalterable fact of historical development varies among different circles of the imperialist bourgeoisie. One group—and to it belong the more influential, the more aggressive elements in the ruling circles of the U. S. A.—has built and is building its policies on the desire to turn back the wheel of history at all costs. By adopting force, economic expansion, and direct armed intervention, the American imperialists, during the entire postwar period, have been trying to suppress the invincible movement of the peoples of Asia for freedom and national independence and to foist on them the old regime of colonial enslavement.

The other, less influential part of the bourgeoisie, is inclined to take into consideration more soberly and realistically the lessons of history and to draw practical conclusions from them. To it belong some persons from the ranks of the ruling classes of the U. S. A., who are cognisant of the harmfulness of a policy based upon an implacable, zoological hatred towards progressive movements.



True, these more sober-minded people from the ranks of the American bourgeoisie are not at all inclined to acknowledge the capitalism is doomed. It seems to them capitalism still may offer the peoples of Asia, who are liberating themselves, a means for raising the living level of the popular masses. They insist upon an "acknowledgement" of changes which have taken place and on the inevitability of the existence of self-governing states in Asia. In their opinion, the governments of the U. S. A. and other powers must "adapt themselves" to the new situation and attempt to come to an understanding with the people's regime in China and other countries.

To this, undoubtedly more sober but extremely small number of persons, belongs Owen Lattimore, who at one time occupied the post of political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, and who is considered an outstanding specialist on questions of the Far East by the U. S. State Department. In 1949 he published a book, *Situation in Asia*, in which are summed up his comments and his views on the past, present, and future policies of the imperialist powers in Asia. Both the factual material gathered in the book and the critique of the present policies of the ruling circles of the U. S. A. which are contained in it offer considerable interest.

"Asia is out of control," writes Lattimore. "From the Arab countries to China, the old forms of ascendancy, protectorate or rule cannot be reasserted by military action. \* \* \* An attempt to stun the peoples of Asia by atomic warfare is out of the question, except for madmen. \* \* \* We must negotiate; and we can only negotiate successfully if people in Asia are as well-satisfied with what they get out of negotiated agreements as we are with what we get out of them."

Lattimore refers to all the well-known facts of the forcible actions of the western powers in their former colonies. The attempts to suppress the national liberation movement are proving extremely costly but are not giving results. "Crack troops of the British army" are holding Malaya, notes the author. "The Dutch are keeping approximately a 125,000-man army in Indonesia, and the French more than a 100,000-man army in Indo-China." Having cost, in the words of Lattimore, from 2 to 4 billion dollars (and as a matter of fact considerably more) "the attempts of America to create a government in China satisfactory to it have suffered complete defeat."

Stating the hopelessness of reestablishing "an empire" as he expresses it, Lattimore tries to analyse those reasons which have led to the mighty upsurge of the national liberation movement in Asia, and to the failure of all attempts to suppress it. He gives its due to the growth of national self-awareness of the Asiatic peoples, to the increasing hatred of the popular masses towards the alliance of the imperialists and the feudal landlords in China, India, and other countries, and to the importance of the liberation struggle against the Japanese occupiers. However, the author puts in first place the great revolutionising influence of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia.

Lattimore's reasoning advantageously distinguishes itself from the wild, rav-ing howls of American reactionaries concerning the "Bolshevist menace" and the "hand of Moscow." Not Bolshevik propaganda, he says, but Soviet reality itself, the attainments of the socialist revolution in Russia—this is what has roused and inspired the peoples of Asia to a fight against their imperialist aggressors. And "no kind of propaganda against Russia can prevent other peoples from envying Russia." The feeling of admiration is aroused among the Asiatic peoples by the fact that "they would wish to have for themselves, for example: the schools, universities, hospitals, industrial developments, modernised farming, and opportunities for skilled workers that Russia has in greater abundance than any of its neighbours in Asia."

"Among Russia's neighbours in Asia, the progress made in the Soviet Republics of Asia from about 1925 to 1941 inspired awe and wonder" notes the author. "It leads to daydreams when a poor peasant lad in Iranian Azerbaijan, or a poor Kazakh shepherd in Sinkiang, hears that in Soviet Azerbaijan or Soviet Kazakhstan a poor boy from a family exactly like his, speaking exactly the same language, can go to school with all expenses paid by the state, and on through school to the university, to become an engineer, or a doctor, or a high official, or anything that he is good enough to be. He thinks it wonderful that in those countries his position could be as good as that of a Russian \* \* \*"

Lattimore acknowledges that in the eyes of all the Asiatic people, Soviet democracy is the only complete real democracy. "Colonial peoples," he writes, "attacked by their former rulers and shot down by American guns, increasingly feel that Russia is their only friend. \* \* \* Not one of these countries would



agree to go to war against Russia." Moreover, Lattimore, although in hollow form, is compelled to admit that "when Russia aids the development of a neighbouring country," then this country "acquires a more modern economy," that is, industrialises and becomes economically independent.

The utterances of Lattimore concerning the policies of the imperialists sound especially acute and burning now, when the ruling circles of the U. S. A. have gone over to direct acts of aggression against the Chinese People's Republic by sending its fleet for the "defence" of the last refuge of the Kuomintangites on Taiwan (Formosa), and to armed intervention against Korea.

Lattimore thoroughly describes the history of American intervention in the civil war in China on the side of the reactionary Kuomintang. He speaks about the "complete domination of the landlords in the Kuomintang," about the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was the stooge and support of the most reactionary, exploiting elements noted by the popular masses, and that even the national bourgeoisie finally saw in the Kuomintang bureaucracy its enemy. He talks about the demands of the peasant masses of China, and about the struggle for land, and although his analysis of the growing influence of the Communist Party and the relation between the working class and the peasantry of China suffers from all the defects of a bourgeois commentator, he is compelled to acknowledge the erroneousness of the "wager on Chiang Kai-shek."

The warnings of Lattimore to the American ruling circles are significant and characteristic. "If the Americans proceed along the incorrect path," writes Lattimore, "and endeavor to defend the government which has fled from Central China to the island of Taiwan, this latter also cannot serve as a reliable base \* \* \*. If America converts Taiwan, at the same time, into a base for the American Navy and into a refuge for the Kuomintang government which has been driven out of China, an anti-American frame of mind will develop very quickly there." Lattimore considers mad all such attempts, as also efforts not to permit China its lawful seat in the Security Council: "By the use of our own veto, we could delay China's acceptance in the U. N., but only by some such *reductio ad absurdum* as pretending that the island of Formosa is China."

As is well known, American imperialist policy in China has followed exactly this adventurist path. In wild hatred of the free people of China, who have thrown off the yoke of imperialism, in a frantic desire to "wipe out" the victory of the Chinese revolution, the ruling circles of the U. S. A. are committing excesses in their impotent rage. They are impeding the Chinese People's Republic, one of the five great powers of the world, from occupying the seat which belongs to it on the U. N. Security Council. A year after the warning of Lattimore, the ruling circles of the U. S. A. announced that an order was given to the American Fleet to "defend" Formosa, that is, to commence open armed intervention against the Chinese People's Republic.

This aggressive act of the U. S., as also the invasion of Korea, has revealed the real plans of American imperialism in Asia. Now, precisely that which Lattimore feared is taking place: the peoples of Asia have seen in American militarists their implacable foes. There cannot be any doubt of the fact that the "reinforcement" of the Kuomintang bands on Formosa by American naval and air units will bring about the final result of further weakening the entire camp of imperialism in the Far East.

Of even more interest are the comments and prognoses of Lattimore concerning Korea. In vivid colours, he paints the reaction and lack of perspective of the American policies in the regions of South Korea occupied by them. The American occupants, he writes, oriented themselves "with two kinds of people: returned political exiles, and Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese. \* \* \* The collaborators were detested by the Koreans, but they were useful to the Americans: they possessed a reputation of a dubious character and they were supposed, through their affiliation with the Japanese, to know something about keeping the people under control."

"America, which has in China complained of the bad luck of having inherited the Kuomintang through no fault of its own", writes Lattimore, "has however in Korea manufactured its own Kuomintang. \* \* \* We have in South Korea created a weak and unreliable police state of our own." The author describes how the Americans, not having "the faintest comprehension of the struggle which is taking place in Asia between the peasants and the landlords," established in Korea an order detestable to the people, under which the land fell into the hands of landlords and adventurists. Having spoken truthfully enough about the great transformations in Northern Korea, about the land reform and the transfer of industry into the hands of the peoples regime, Lattimore emphasized that the army of North Korea is a real people's army, at the same time as in South



Korea "the Americans created not a national army, but a constabulary," consisting of people "who are the most hated by the population." "If there is to be a civil war," he remarks, "South Korea would not be able to subdue North Korea without American aid," at the same time as "North Korea would be able to overrun South Korea without Russian help."

In the light of these admissions of a prominent figure of the U. S. State Department, one of the few collaborators of Acheson actually acquainted with the situation in the Far East, the hypocrisy and falsity of the present American attempts to justify its intervention in Korea by fabrications about North Korean "aggression" appear with all the more force. The opponents are not the northern and southern parts of Korea, but the Korean people, on the one hand, and the Americans and Japanese-American stooges on the other.

The statements of the bourgeois American writer are an act of indictment against the ruling circles of the U. S. A. and against the entire postwar policy of the imperialist camp. Proceeding from the interests of American capitalism, Lattimore sharply condemns and ridicules all the foreign policy acts of Truman's government pertaining to the countries of Asia, colonies and dependent countries. He exposes the conduct of the American occupants in Japan, considering it unwise and based upon incorrect calculations. "The basic reason for the stay of American forces in Japan," he writes, "is the demand of America to dispose of an advantageous position against Russia," \* \* \* but "the control of America over Japan is precarious." The economic policy of the U. S. A. in Japan is absurd, being based on tearing away Japan from her normal, vitally necessary, economic relations with China and other Asiatic countries; this policy is costing the U. S. up to one billion dollars a year expended on the supplying of Japanese industry with raw materials essential for it, at the same time as markets for Japanese goods are artificially closed. Lattimore writes about the inevitability of reviving the old economic connections of Japan which in their turn will create a guarantee against the revival of Japanese militarism. The U. S. A. in relation to Japan, as Lattimore expressed it, "is a dog in the manger." He is certain of the failure of this position. "The possibility that as Japan goes along the road of militarisation and subordination to the U. S. A. so Asia can be made to go is in fact a decreasing possibility. The increasing probability is that as Asia goes so Japan will go."

The author discloses the essence of the enslaving agreements concluded by the U. S. A. with the Philippines which have received formal "independence," and have been given over to the power of the collaborationists who are hated by the people. "In less than two years," he writes, "the military installations of the U. S. A. in the Philippines will be transformed into besieged strongholds surrounded by a hostile population." It is proper to note that in this respect the predictions of Lattimore were not slow to come true since now already in 1950, the national liberation movement in the Philippines—in this, it would seem, most "reliable" colony of the U. S. A.—has acquired a most unprecedentedly broad scale.

Lattimore also writes about Iran, where "exists a feeble and venal government." The ironical remarks of the author of the hopeless wager of the imperialists on some kind of "strong man," sufficiently strong to carry out the policies demanded by foreign diplomats, but insufficiently strong to oppose foreign influence, bear directly upon recent events in Iran. Chiang Kai-shek seemed to be such a "strong man" to some people, but his fate is well known. Now, in many other countries of Asia, including Iran and Indo-China, the American diplomats are endeavouring to rely upon such similar figures. "So long as we do not rid our heads of some of our illusions," writes Lattimore, "we will again and again find ourselves in the same situation as in China in 1948."

The general conclusions to which Lattimore arrives attest to his realistic understanding of the situation. The analysis of the present situation in Asia and the imminent prospects ends in the following conclusions of the author: "Asia is approaching a status of complete independence"; "neither the subjugating of colonial Asia nor the suppression of China will succeed"; "even those representatives of the national movement in Asia who fear communism, do not wish to serve as cannon fodder in an American war against Russia." But, "the communist movement in Southeast Asia will become more and more powerful," since the tendency of the popular masses of Asia "to connect the concept of democracy with Russia, and not with Europe and America belongs to a number of stubborn facts with which it is now necessary to reckon," since "the communists have mastered the art of recognising the needs of the people."



What Lattimore fears chiefly, as a moderate American writer who realises all the madness of a "policy of force," is the inevitability of the intensification of the influence and authority of the U. S. S. R. in Asia. The continuation of the aggressive policy of Truman, in his opinion, will lead only to the fact that "the situation will gradually incline in favour of Russia." In addition, he expects "a very rapid increase in the strength of the Soviet economy." It is on these fears that all his proposals are based. He proposes not only "to lessen the pressure on Asia," and to give up the "ring of military bases" of the USA around Asia, but also to render, before it is too late, economic aid to the new regimes in Asia, without demanding, for the granting of this assistance, any "political guarantees," that is, the preservation of reactionary regimes. Only in this policy does he see the possibility of maintaining the American position in Asiatic countries, where the USA must "encourage a process of the attainment of independence by the colonial countries," and not suppress the national liberation movement.

The events of recent years prove that the new paths proposed by Lattimore have been rejected by the ruling classes of the USA. They not only are not refraining from efforts to enslave anew the peoples of Asia, but are intensifying these efforts, proceeding to open, outright, aggressive war against China, Korea, and Viet Nam, and, in alliance with their West European accomplices, also against the peoples of Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and the peoples of the Near East. Thus they are dooming themselves to new defeats. The national liberation movement in Asia is invincible. Each new crime of the Americans and other imperialists against the peoples who are fighting for their freedom will lead to the further weakening of imperialism. The future belongs to communism, and whatever "recipes" for saving the power of the imperialists or saving the system of capitalism which might be proposed by liberal figures of the bourgeoisie—these recipes cannot alter the course of historical development (pp. 280-285).

—The New World, No. 11, 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Did we find out who made that translation, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Senator Cain guarantees the accuracy of the translation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Senator Cain know this language?

Mr. MANDEL. He does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then how can he guarantee the accuracy of the translation?

Mr. MANDEL. I asked him for the name of the individual who translated it, and he said it was confidential.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the kind of information we want in this record. It makes sense.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, under the circumstances, and with the limitations that have been brought out, will this be received into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received. I do think, however, it ought to be qualified on the condition attached and ought to be open to correction by anyone qualified to pass on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose that we send a copy of this to Mr. Lattimore. And, if anything is unfair to him from his point of view, I think we should take recognition of that.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. I think it ought to be left open to any correction or any counterstatement.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have photostats taken from pages of the Tydings committee hearings dealing with John Stewart Service and documents that deal with individuals that have come up in our own hearings, and that are therefore pertinent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may we receive that into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.



(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1348A" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1348A

## STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, PURSUANT TO  
SENATE RESOLUTION 231, A RESOLUTION TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER THERE ARE  
EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT DISLOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES

## PART I

March 8, 9, 13, 14, 20, 21, 27, 28; April 5, 6, 20, 25, 27, 28; May 1, 2, 3, 4, 26, 31;  
June 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 1950

[Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations]

MONDAY, JUNE 26, 1950

Mr. MORGAN. That is exactly correct, but at the same time, our record here in public session, as well as reports now in the press, have that particular portion of this information and that is all the public now has. It occurs to me that the only way we can proceed at all, if we are going to go into this situation and finally resolve it, is at least go into this matter right here at this time.

Senator TYDINGS. Let me see if we could do this for the time being. I suggest, first of all, that the letters which Mr. Morris read to the witness yesterday were not classified documents. The letters that were read to the witness yesterday were correspondence for the most part which Mr. Service carried on with certain acquaintances and perhaps friends. They were not classified documents, and they were a part of the so-called 1,700 documents seized in the case, and these particular documents were nothing more than letters for the most part.

I am wondering if part of those letters were put in the record yesterday, whether it would not have been fair to put the whole letter into the record rather than just the sentences that were picked out and read. I would like to hear what counsel for Mr. Service has to say on that particular point.

Mr. RHETTS. In that connection, Senator, I should like to point out, first, that those letters were not found in the possession of Amerasia. They were found in Mr. Service's desk at the Department of State, along with his other personal effects.

Senator TYDINGS. I understand.

Mr. RHETTS. I want to make that perfectly clear.

Senator TYDINGS. These were not seized in any connection with the Amerasia matter at all. They were taken out of Mr. Service's desk in the State Department.

Mr. RHETTS. Now, I certainly think that coming to your next point, if the letters are to be put in, they might as well be put in completely.

Senator TYDINGS. Now that we have covered that, my reason in bringing this up is we would not be breaking any rule of putting in classified documents, because these are not classified documents, but they are a part of the 1,700 papers that were seized or obtained in the case.

Now, I think we got a little too much latitude yesterday having parts of these letters and memoranda, whatever they were, that were in Mr. Service's desk read without putting the whole thing in. I am sure Mr. Morris would want them put in, and my reason for bringing it up now is to ask Mr. Service and his attorneys if they would object to having them put in.

Mr. REILLY. Emphatically not.

Senator TYDINGS. I will take that responsibility by trying to correct the error of yesterday by saying the whole document—it is not a document, we are abusing that word—all the memoranda, letters, or papers that were read yesterday now become a part of the stenographic record, and I will ask Mr. Morris if he will, at his convenience, sort those out, to which he referred yesterday, and give them to the stenographer, and I will ask the stenographer if he will not leave space right here at this point to put them into the record.



(The letters referred to follow:)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,  
STAFF, CINEPAC, ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS, BOX No. 5,  
FLEET POST OFFICE,  
*San Francisco, April 2, 1945.*

DEAR JACK: Your returning boss gives me a chance to get this line off to you. I've been luxuriating here on Guam for almost 2 months. I'm in the Future Plans Section technically but mostly am getting an education in what goes on in the Pacific and trying to keep up on China—the former is fascinating, the latter difficult. If you could find a safe way to send me an occasional copy of your memos I'd be grateful—maybe you'll find it practical, maybe not. So far as I can find out this is the only opportunity I'll have to communicate with you until and unless Lud (?) and Emmerson (?) come through.

What goes on these days in the old country? I got a chuckle out of the news this morning that old Lung Pi-win (?) is going to be a delegate to the SF Conference.

Best to the boys—specially Sol, if he is about.

A (s) JIM.

WASHINGTON, *April 16, 1945.*

DEAR ANNALEE AND TEDDY: The optimistically pleasant speculations we allowed ourselves to indulge in on that last evening of mine at 879 were 180° off.

The paper tiger roared loudly enough around here to drown out the general but timid—opposition. And based on the Tiger's modest account of his achievements, the big boss said "Keep it up." After that, the table pounding in regard to yours truly was only a matter of course.

Especially disappointing was the "political sense," in the narrow meaning, by the man I had hoped would fight.

I am now assigned to a safe job here but have been urged to bide my time. The Tiger's support ended on the 12th, the day of my arrival. And there is a (now some) feeling that good jobs go to good party members.

WASHINGTON, *April 16, 1945.*

DEAR ANNALEE AND TEDDY: The optimistically pleasant speculations we allowed ourselves that last evening of mine at 879 were 180° off.

1350 EUCLID AVENUE,  
*Berkeley, Calif., March 7, 1945.*

Mr. JACK SERVICE,

*Care of Neil Brown, OWI, APO 627, Care of PM, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR JACK SERVICE: I do hope you don't resent that I now trouble you long distance. But my conscience bothers me; I know how I would feel if I were in Dr. Schwarz's shoes (and I would be in his shoes save for some fortunate circumstances including J. S.).

I had hoped to have a chance to see you again before you left—you sure move fast, and it seems you get across the sea sooner than we get across the bay.

Actually, I have little to add to Kurt's story; I just may add his address: 173 Route Mayen (Hwa Ting Iu)—that's the place where the kindergarten is. Perhaps you may want to add his address to your other addresses, in case there is a chance to use it. Kurt's name is also known to Carlson, who used to work in Opintell, and to Fitch; and Lyman Hoover actually knows Kurt. I had a letter from Lyman a few weeks ago.

If you think it possible to write to Kurt, even just greetings so he sees he is not forgotten, I know it would be a great lift for him and Martha. He knows your name. I feel lousy to suggest this to you, and I would feel guilty if I didn't. So here you have my dilemma.

Next month I will celebrate the fourth anniversary of my arrival—and last week my folks (father and mother) arrived in the United States from England on the quota; it took me all these 4 years to get them here, but now I am the happiest guy between the two coasts.



From time to time in the office we have a chance to see reports which include your name, so we are currently reminded of you. What an interesting job you have.

Well, once again, I hope you won't mind all this too much—but I feel if anyone can appreciate the circumstances it's you.

Very sincerely yours,

S. MAX.

MAX KNIGHT.

Mr. RHETTS. In that connection, might I make another suggestion? Along toward the close of the proceedings yesterday afternoon, Mr. Morris was relying on the interesting theory of guilt by association and referring to certain names and addresses found in an address book. I should like similarly to suggest that all the names and all the addresses in that address book be made available. If that type of imputation of guilt is to be indulged in, I think we should have that.

Senator TYDINGS. I think that is fair.

The data referred to are as follows:

27—Sunday:

6:30—Terrell

12:30—Jones

28—Monday: 2:30 Reichne—2177Q

29—Tuesday:

12:30—Weaver

7—Rose Ellen—3447

S

Wakefield

30—Wednesday: 6:30—Senator Pepper

1—Friday: 1:00—Rankin—2D855

2—Saturday—Andy

3—Sunday:

Lattimore

Supper for Rose

4—Monday: Paid

5—Tuesday:

12—Lineboyer

7:30—Burns—4902 S 28 R

Fairlington 12 & Penn.

End line

6—Wednesday:

10—Gebb OSS here

12:30—Duncan Lea

\* \* \* \* \*

Sol Adler:

85/5172

85/2026

Ameson, Eliz. Yard: Glebe 2431

Adkinson, Brooks:

120 R Dr. 1

En. 2-5293

Arnold, Carl: Ex. 7700/280

Brown, Lt. Emil: Ent. 2D 869

Barnett: 86/4725

Carr: Mi. 4321

Colling, Capt. J.: 86/6001

Caldwell, John: OWI 71192

Cowan, Col. Jim:

Co. 0991

86/74107

Davis, Dan: Navy 2488

Marty: OSS/639

Dennison: RFC/614

Drumnight: s/2666

Emmerson, John K.:

903 N. Wahsatch St.

Colorado Springs, Colo

Engdahl, Lee:

1725 W. Hampshire

Apt. 403

s/2398. Du. 5351

Ficlan: Navy 63037. Ch. 1891.

John Fairbank: 80/5454

The Hon. Gauss:

17 Circle Drive

Balled Bay Sher.

Newport Beach, Calif.

Gayn Mail:

302 W 12

Ch. 3-2743

Griffiths:

Garrisonville 17

Fredericksburg, Pa.

Gentile: OSS/654

Garrisonville, Va. 17: Ask for Tom Waller

Hutchinson: OSS 2547

Hitch, Lt. S. H.: Navy 2488

Homan, Christine: Ad. 8514

Harris, Capt.: 86/72809

Hatem, Cpl. J. N.:  
1385 Service Unit  
McGuire General Hospital  
Richmond 19, Va.

Isaacs, Harold:  
33 C. P. W., N. Y.  
122

Jaffe, Phil:  
225 5th, N. Y., 13  
MU 3-0245

Jones, Col. Paul: Ex. 7700/498

Little, Herbert:  
3761 W, N. W.  
OSS2646. WO 3091

Lyon, Freddy: State 459

Luden:  
56 Woodard Rd.  
West Roxbury 32  
Boston

Lattimore:  
Roland View Rd., Huxten, Balti-  
more  
OWI, Re. 7500. 72228. Towson 846

Mr. W. W. Lockwood:  
UN. 4-0200  
119 and Morningside

Capt. Paul Lineberger: 86/5504

McHugh, Col.: OSS/2014. 2188

Mayer, Col. W.: War 72535

Mertskey (Coleman) Jeannette: Mamar-  
oneck 2497

McNally, Col. E. J.: 86/2772

Penfield, J. K.:  
U. S. For. Ser. Off.  
Staff Cinepar, 5

Reichner, Phoebe: OSS/2472

Lt. Col. Rankin Roberts: 86/74107  
Pent. 2D855

Lt. Andy Roth:  
1614 N. Queen, Arlington  
810/3892  
Roger Smith Hotel: Na. 2740  
Ray, Frank: FEA 3132  
Snow:  
Route 1, Madron, Conn.  
Or c/o Mrs. Estelle Carlson  
Int. House Berkeley  
Stevens, Mrs. Harley:  
3522 P St. NW.  
Wash. OSS ext. 2831  
Stein, Guenther: 102 W. 80. En. 2-2900  
Sullivan, Phil. s/2633: Room 609.  
17129  
Schnulz, Gen. J. W.:  
Fort Belvoir Engineer Bd.  
Temple 6800/2201  
Service, R. M.: APO 210  
Taylor, George: 5530 Broadfrank NW.  
Terrell, Gerald:  
3828 Fulton NW.  
Wisc. Car N at Fulton  
1½ blocks to left  
Tolstog: OSS/2488  
Vinogradoff, Eugene:  
Commissinat F. A.  
Chinese Dept.  
Moscow  
Wilbur:  
1625 Fitzgerald Lane  
Park Fairfax, Arlington  
Ai. 0023. OSS. 2050  
Watts, Dick:  
920 5th  
Bu. 8-2109  
Weaver, Capt.: OSS 2232  
Wolfe, Thelma: Ed. 4-8634 NYC  
Yarderman, Rose: Di. 8665

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with those letters, I believe there were three of them to which reference was made: A letter from CINCPAC headquarters, the letter from Mr. Service to Annalee and Teddy, and the third one we had just gotten to when we abandoned the project.

Mr. RHETTS. One from Max Knight.

Mr. MORRIS. From Max Knight, just three letters. I will see that the stenographer gets them in their entirety.

Mr. MORGAN. Is this applying merely to the letters or also to the reports, portions of which were read into the record?

Senator TYDINGS. The reports were Mr. Service's own personal reports and not classified documents, as I understand it. Is that correct, Mr. Service?

Mr. MORGAN. At yesterday's proceedings I believe portions of your reports were read, and you were asked as to whether or not they represented a fair cross section of your reports. I believe you commented that in your opinion that did not so represent a fair cross section.

I am wondering, Mr. Chairman, if you desire to extend your ruling with respect to these matters that have been read into the record to include the incorporation of the full text of those reports where portions of them have been read into the record.

\* \* \* \* \*

Senator TYDINGS. I make a suggestion, then, that in order to get along we proceed with the paper, and if we can get the record then, later on, we play the record back and compare it with the paper, to see if there is any difference. If there is, we will make corrections at that time. In the meantime, with your consent, I see no reason why we should not proceed with the paper.

Mr. Morgan, without objection, you may continue with your interrogation on this record.



Mr. MORGAN. I do therefore have your consent, Mr. Service, and that of your attorney, to read this into the record?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

Mr. MORGAN. This conversation is prefaced by this statement:

"Jaffe and John A. Service entered Jaffe's room after having breakfast in coffee shop."

Senator GREEN. How do they know where he had breakfast?

Senator LODGE. Who said this? Who makes the statement?

Mr. MORGAN. Perhaps we ought to get that clear in our record.

Mr. McInerney, can you help us as to who is responsible for this statement preceding the verbatim transcript of the conversation?

Mr. McINERNEY. I assume that statement is based upon a physical surveillance of the agents watching them in the coffee shop.

Mr. SERVICE. In any event, it is my recollection that we had breakfast in the coffee shop. I insisted on paying the bill, and we had quite an argument.

Mr. MORGAN (reading):

"They listened to radio addresses by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill."

Senator TYDINGS. So VE-day had been behind us.

Mr. MORGAN. As a prefatory statement, the parties to the conversation are identified by "S" and "J," "S" for Mr. Service and "J" for Mr. Jaffe.

Senator GREEN. Are you reading?

Mr. MORGAN. I am reading now, sir:

"S. If he did it, it will be translated. Have you been trying to keep track of what the Chinese are doing at San Francisco?"

"J. I can keep track of them. I'll know later on."

"S. They apparently are avoiding any controversy with the Soviet Union. They are staying, hoping on the Argentina thing. And there seem to be some indications that they are trying to play up to the Russians, hoping for some sort of understanding with the Soviet Union."

"J. Well, they are not talking privately as if they are."

"S. Well, they certainly publicly are avoiding being placed in opposition."

"Indian representatives (anyhow) (.)"

"J. I guess these are the only things."

"S. Did you get a chance to look them over?"

"J. (Unintelligible.)"

"S. The reason I—I had the same idea out in China before I came home, that the President might be playing that sort of a game and was playing a very deep game in not revealing his hand to the Chungking government but when I got home and found out the violence and bitterness of the argument going on here, I dropped it. I mean, if so, there wasn't any reason for the State Department to be smacked down, more or less. There wasn't any reason for Hurley to be kept in the dark."

"J. Well, I'll tell you what I think happened, Jack. I've been thinking about that very hard. I think that Roosevelt recognized after he appointed Hurley, that it was a mistake to appoint him, but once Hurley did his dirty work, there was nothing—would have to take time. I think that of the three big nations we are the only one in which an individual plays such a big role. It is inconceivable that a Soviet ambassador would operate as an individual but here it happens frequently. And I think Hurley put Roosevelt and the whole country on the spot and Roosevelt was trying to find a way of getting out—sending Hurley to some very important area where there was some difficulty. So I can't imagine that Roosevelt changed his ideas about China overnight, and he would have been delighted if he could have found some excuse for firing the guy, but of course Hurley put us in such a terrible spot, and has still got us on the spot where we can't move any longer without openly defying Chungking."

"S. Well, what I said about the military plans is, of course, very secret."

"J. Yes, well, that was talked around about—"

"S. That plan was made up by Wedemeyer's staff in his absence, they got orders to make some recommendations as to what we should do if we landed in Communist territory. They had several—"

"J. To cooperate with them?"

"S. Well, yes, that's what we planned, and they showed me the plans they had drawn up and if we cooperated with Chungking troops if we in recovering territory, in other words, when we were in Chungking territory, we would have to go on cooperating with them. Those were the orders. But if we landed in territory where the Communists were, without any question they'd be the dominant force."



"J. Why would they have to cooperate with the Communists?

"S. Chungking, of course, has been putting pressure on us, trying to get us to agree to take in Kuomintang officials, government officials wherever we land. As far as we know we had not been given any power to do that. But if you get Hurley there, for Hurley to be consistent, why you'd get Hurley putting his influence probably behind—Hurley has all the way down the line only recognized Chiang Kai Shek, and our job is to strengthen Chiang Kai Shek, and to support him, and to bring all the forces in China under Chiang Kai Shek's control. If he says all this publicly, he's going to be just sitting there laughing. And he's going to have a hard time refusing to take in Chungking officials.

"J. Huley's fighting Chungking then?

"S. Oh, yes.—Well, on that line of the Chinese not—with the Russians, Petroff (ph) the new Soviet Ambassador stopped in (?) and stayed for about 9 days—and Award (ph) reports that this is the first time since he'd been there that there'd been any attempt to be friendly with the Russians. All Chungking papers have been carrying practically identically the same wording, and it is obvious that it was prepared stuff and Chungking is avoiding anything derogatory, etc."

Following the verbatim quotation from the record there follows statements apparently by whoever prepared this particular statement here, and I might ask you, Mr. McInerney, who prepared the latter part of it? Was it prepared by the FBI?

Mr. McINERNEY. Yes.

Mr. MORGAN. I will proceed then, to read this:

"Jaffe tells service about T. V. Soong's visit to Washington, D. C., recently. Jaffe and Service continue their conversation along lines of whether or not Russia will declare war on Japan. Jaffe says Russia will not do so, as they know they are not wanted by the British and the United States. Service asked Jaffe what effect Russia's declaration of war on Japan would have, and Jaffe said Russia would declare war on Japan on one of two conditions:

"1. The San Francisco Conference breaks down, and Russia decides that it must settle matters of its defense in the old-fashioned way:

"2. A coalition government (democratic) is formed in Chungking which would ask Russia to enter the war, which invitation Russia would accept.

("End of record.")

Mr. Service, after having read this statement, do you recall the conversation with Mr. Jaffe? Does this refresh your recollection in any way?

Mr. SERVICE. No, sir; I have no specific recollection of the conversation or of making those statements. It is over 5 years, and it wasn't a conversation that would have been particularly noteworthy at the time.

Mr. MORGAN. I notice you apparently, referring to this conversation, have asked Mr. Jaffe as to what he is doing to keep in touch with what is going on in San Francisco. I presume that refers to the United Nations Conference there?

Mr. SERVICE. I would assume so—the general attitudes of the different delegations. "Following it" I suppose meant following it in the press.

Mr. MORGAN. As I gather from what you said, you don't recall ever having asked such question?

Mr. SERVICE. No.

Mr. MORGAN. Does that mean that any questions I might ask you concerning this conversation as reported here, on the basis of your having read it and having heard it read, would not call to mind any of the particulars or the details of the conversation?

Mr. SERVICE. I don't want to seem to be quibbling, but I am afraid that is so, that I do not have positive recollection of the conversation.

\* \* \* \* \*

Senator McMAHON. Let us put in Mr. Davies' statement.

Senator TYDINGS. Do you want Mr. Davies' statement in?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator TYDINGS. Without objection, it will be put in the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

#### DOCUMENT J 108 y, RF Q 306

1. Agency where prepared: OWI.
2. Agency where routed:
3. Where recovered: Amerasia.
4. Original or copy: Typed copy and carbons.



5. Copies found elsewhere:

6. Abstract of document:

(1) Yen-an, November 7, 1944. Subject: How Red Are the Chinese Communists? by John Davies. Memo points out moderateness of Communists, their willingness to cooperate and to make concessions.

(2) Yen-an, November 7, 1944. Subject: Will the Communists Take Over China? by John Davies. Memo reflects Davies' opinion that the Communists are in China to stay, China's destiny is in their hands, and they possess strength and vitality superior to that of Chiang and his followers. (Original typed copy with four copies.)

7. Comments of agency preparing document: An item, not an exact copy, but of the same substance, was located by Helen Groves in OWI files, July 5, 1945; filed in China Section, room 3036.

8. Comments of agency receiving document: None.

9. Laboratory examination; Latents (iodine), none; typewriting, ident K4-KB.

10. Comments:

11. Agent who can introduce document: George E. Allen.

#### HOW RED ARE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS?

The Chinese Communists are backsliders. They still acclaim the infallibility of Marxian dogma and call themselves Communists. But they have become indulgent of human frailty and confess that China's Communist salvation can be attained only through prolonged evolutionary rather than immediate revolutionary conversation. Like that other eminent backslider, Ramsay MacDonald, they have come to accept the inevitability of gradualness.

Yen-an is no Marxist New Jerusalem. The saints and prophets of Chinese communism, living in the austere comfort of caves scooped out of loess cliffs, lust after the strange gods of class compromise and party coalition, rather shamefacedly worship the golden calf of foreign investments and yearn to be considered respectable by worldly standards.

All of this is more than scheming Communist opportunism. Whatever the orthodox Communist theory may be about reversion from expedient compromise to pristine revolutionary ardor, the Chinese Communist leaders are realistic enough to recognize that they have now deviated so far to the right that they will return to the revolution only if driven to it by overwhelming pressure from domestic and foreign forces of reaction.

There are several reasons for the moderation of the Communists.

1. They are Chinese. Being Chinese, they are, for all of their early excesses, temperamentally inclined to compromise and harmony in human relationships.

2. They are realists. They recognize that the Chinese masses is 90 percent peasantry; that the peasantry is semi-feudal—culturally, economically, and politically in the Middle Ages; that not until China has developed through several generations will it be ready for communism, that the immediate program must therefore be elementary agrarian reform and the introduction of political democracy.

3. They are nationalists. In more than 7 years of bitter fighting against a foreign enemy the primary emotional and intellectual emphasis has shifted from internal social revolution to nationalism.

4. They have begun to come into power. As has been the experience in virtually all successful revolutionary movements, accession to power is bringing a sobering realization of responsibility and a desire to move cautiously and moderately.

Chinese Communist moderation and willingness to make concessions must not be confused with softness or decay. The Communists are the toughest, best organized and disciplined group in China. They offer cooperation to Chiang out of strength, not out of weakness.

JOHN DAVIES.

YENAN, November 7, 1944.

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#### WILL THE COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER CHINA?

The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north China. They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley which they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China.



The Communists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process, which has been operating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines of communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists.

The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe blockade imposed by Chiang.

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately ninety million. And they will continue to grow.

The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and fundamental. It is mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people.

Only if he is able to enlist foreign intervention on a scale equal to the Japanese invasion of China will Chiang probably be able to crush the Communists. But foreign intervention on such a scale would seem to be unlikely. Relying upon his dispirited shambling legions, his decadent corrupt bureaucracy, his sterile political moralisms, and such nervous foreign support as he can muster, the generalissimo may nevertheless plunge China into civil war. He cannot succeed, however, where the Japanese in more than 7 years of determined striving have failed. The Communists are already too strong for him.

Civil war would probably end in a mutually exhausted stalemate. China would be divided into at least two camps with Chiang reduced to the position of a regional warlord. The possibility should not be overlooked of the Communists—certainly if they receive foreign aid—emerging from a civil war swiftly and decisively victorious, in control of all China.

Since 1937 the Communists have been trying to persuade Chiang to form a democratic coalition government in which they would participate. Should the generalissimo accept this compromise proposal and a coalition government be formed with Chiang at the head, the Communists may be expected to continue effective control over the areas which they now hold. They will also probably extend their political influence throughout the rest of the country, for they are the only group in China possessing a program with positive appeal to the people.

If the generalissimo neither precipitates a civil war nor reaches an understanding with the Communists, he is still confronted with defeat. Chiang's feudal China cannot long exist alongside a modern dynamic popular government in north China.

The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs.

JOHN DAVIES.

YENAN, November 7, 1944.

\* \* \* \* \*

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT S-67, Q-404

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,

May 14, 1945.

DEAR JACK: I met your wife the other evening, and your delightful children as well. Phil had arranged with Carolyn to bring Messrs. Tung and Chen to Berkeley, and we had dinner together, along with Martin Wilbur. During the course of conversation, Carolyn mentioned her need of a washing machine in Washington. I told her that if worse comes to worse you might be able to have my family's machine which is now up on Long Island. Carolyn got all excited about this suggestion, and she said that she would write you about it. If you have been looking for one in Washington, I suggest that you continue to do so. You should also inquire about the possibility of new machines coming on the market in the near future. If your efforts in Washington all lead up a blind alley, then it would be practical to consider shipping my family's machine—if you want it—from Long Island to Washington. I just thought that I should explain this to you in case Carolyn's letter discourages you from continuing your search for a machine.



The conference is rather dull, and I find it very depressing. I imagine that this conference may go down as one of the most reactionary international gatherings in history. The only consolation I can find is that the fantastic views on international organization—views which are in essence quite contrary to real and sound international organization—may contribute to breaking down such outmoded concepts as sovereign equality and nation-state system of international relations. But they offer nothing in place of these traditional elements of world affairs.

Phil is keeping the most disgraceful company these days. It is practically certain now that he'll return to Chungking as Minister Counselor and Hurley's houseboy. He is taking his job seriously, and even shows some compassion over the inconvenience which members of the Chinese delegation occasionally have to endure. He is first-rate on seeing that T. V.'s car turns up at the right place at the right time.

John Carter has been introducing me around as the labor attaché for Chungking. The local liberal and labor groups have had me out for a party to meet the right-minded people. Saturday I was introduced to Tarasov, Soviet trade-union representative on the World Trade Union Council. He told that he didn't know that north China was called Communist China. He asked whether they were "Communists" or not. He stated that the Soviet Government favored unity in China and that the United States and Soviet Union should cooperate in bringing about such unity. I am planning to bring John Carter together with Tarasov and another Soviet trade-union leader, Kuznetzov (who is the head of the Soviet trade-union movement and an important figure in Soviet high policy). We may not learn much, but we might get some better line on Soviet psychology on the Pacific, specifically, the China question.

Not much else to say. I won't go into detail about the conference. It isn't too difficult to read between the lines in the press to see what is happening here.

Best regards,

JULIAN.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will look at that letter and identify the writer and the addressee.

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I had forgotten all about this letter until it was shown to me by the Department of State loyalty board. I assume that the writer must be a man named Julian Friedman, who was an employee of the Department of State at that time, and was at San Francisco, I think, as a liaison officer of some sort.

Mr. MORRIS. And he was writing to you?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

Senator TYDINGS. Speak the least bit more loudly, please.

Mr. MORRIS. And the John Carter referred to in this letter was, I take it, John Carter Vincent?

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I think we should let Mr. Morris ask the questions.

Senator TYDINGS. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Service, just take them up one at a time and tell us who they are.

Mr. SERVICE. The first name is Terrell, a British diplomat who was stationed in Washington for some time. I had known him and had been a neighbor of his in Shanghai and saw him for supper.

The name Jones is Col. Paul Jones, who had previously been public relations officer, China-Burma, India theater.

The next name, I believe, is copied incorrectly. It should be Reichner. I believe she was a woman working on biographic information for OSS, with whom I had agreed to offer—to whom I had offered to make available my knowledge, particularly regarding Communist personalities. I spent several afternoons with her in OSS being interrogated regarding specific people.

The next man Weaver, I believe, is a captain working in Army Intelligence.

The next name Rose Ellen refers to a Yardoumian, and Ellen Atkinson.

Rose Yardoumian, as I testified, was the secretary of the Washington office of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Ellen Atkinson was employed in the War Department, MIS, as a researcher on the Far East.

This engagement refers to the party on the 29th of May which I attended which they gave in honor of Lieutenant and Mrs. Roth.

The next name, Senator Pepper, needs no explaining.

The next name is Rankin. He was a lieutenant colonel, had been in Chungking as assistant public-relations officer, and at this time was in Washington temporarily. I saw him for lunch.



The next three entries have to do with a week end at the Lattimores'. The entry for 12 noon on June 5 is a mistake in copying. It should be Linebarger, who had formerly been professor at Duke University. During the war was in Military Intelligence, and during the war was a member of the staff at G-2 in Chungking, and was back in Washington attached to the Psychological Warfare Branch.

The next one was Ray burns.

The next name is Gebb. I don't remember Mr. Gebb, but it is written right after his name "OSS" here, meaning that he was coming to my office.

There were a good many research specialists in the other agencies who were continually contacting me with respect to some particular line or field of work in which they were engaged where they thought that I might be able to give them some help, and this was undoubtedly such a man.

The next name is Duncan Lee, concerning whom I have already testified. He had arranged to lunch with me.

Now I come to the address book proper.

Mr. MORRIS. The name "Adler" begins the address book.

Mr. SERVICE. I am sorry. I come to the address book proper. This was a new address book, as I remember it, just concerning this particular period. The first name is Adler, whom I have already testified concerning.

The next name is Arneson, Elizabeth Yard. I did not know Mr. Arneson well. He was at that time employed with OWI, I believe. He was a native Iclander, naturalized American.

Elizabeth Yard, his wife, was my friend. She was the daughter of missionaries in west China, the same age as myself, and I had grown up with her and kept contact with her. I had seen them, they lived over in Arlington.

Brooks Atkinson, correspondent for the New York Times, and probably my closest friend in China.

Carl Arnold was General Stilwell's aide.

Lt. Emil Brown—that is a mistake, it should be Lt. Emily Brown—was an old friend of my wife's. She was at that time in the WAC. She had been a college friend of my wife's and myself, too, for that matter, but I had never known her very well. She is a newspaper woman, was a newspaper woman before the war, and is now with the United Press in the Far East.

Barnett is Robert Barnett. At that time he was in the Army, and presently with the State Department.

Carr. I don't remember what Carr that is.

Mr. MORRIS. Could that be Drew Pearson's assistant?

Mr. SERVICE. It might be. It might well be.

Colling was a young captain in the OSS, who had been a member of the observer group at Yen-an. He was, what you would call, a sort of guerrilla-warfare man, a demolitions man, and he had just recently returned to Washington to make his report to OSS, and I brought back a lot of films, and they were trying to put together a picture of Chinese Communist guerrilla operations, and I went over to OSS and saw these films several times, consulted with them on it.

John Caldwell was a friend whom I had known since we were boys together in China. He was with OWI, was with me in China, and was back with me in China on the China desk of OWI.

Cowan was an officer in the headquarters at Chungking who happened to be back here temporarily in the War Department.

Dan Davis—that should be Don Davis, is a copying mistake—he was at that time an officer in Naval Intelligence. Marty refers to C. Martin Wilbur, who was head of the Political Branch of the Far Eastern Section of Research and Analysis, which is OSS, formerly a China boy; also a professor and curator in the Field Museum, and came into the OSS during the war.

Dennison refers to a man whom I had known out in China with the National City Bank. I think it was the National City Bank or possibly the Chase Bank, and he was back here with the RFC during the war. His wife had been a college friend of my wife and myself.

Drumright was Everett F. Drumright, an American Foreign Service officer, who was Assistant Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, State Department.

Emmerson is a fellow service officer. Japan expert, who had been one of the four Foreign Service officers attached to General Stilwell's staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the four, by the way?

Mr. SERVICE. John Davis, Raymond P. Ludden, John Emmerson, and myself.

Lee Engdahl was the widow of a Foreign Service officer who had served with me at Shanghai, and whom we had known very well.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his name?



Mr. SERVICE. His name was Russell Engdahl. He was killed during internment in Hong Kong during the early part of the war. She was employed by the State Department at this time on some sort of a visa review board. She is now vice consul in the Foreign Service and stationed at Tehran.

The next name I think is a mistake in copying. It should be Fickan. He was a man who was a house mate of mine at college. He was a mathematician, had been a professor and was employed during the war by the Navy.

John Fairbanks, now professor of oriental history at Harvard University, during the war was head of far eastern operations for OWI. At this time he was in Washington for employment with OWI.

Hon. C. E. Gauss, of course, was former Ambassador, and my former chief in China.

The next name is Mark Gayn.

Griffiths refers to Col. Samuel P. Griffiths, United States Marine Corps, who had been a Navy language officer in Peking, studying Chinese at the same time I was in Peking in 1936 and 1937. I had kept up my friendship with him.

Gentile is, so far as I can remember, one of those research specialists in OSS who came over to see me on some particular project that he was working on where he hoped that I could give him some advice.

Now, the next item, Garrisonville, Va., "Ask for Tom Waller," does not ring any bell right now. I don't know who Tom Waller is. That might be a mistake in copying. I mean there are so many mistakes in copying.

The next name is Hutchinson. He was a lieutenant colonel in OSS in one of their more secret branches, who had been out in the Far East, and with whom I had consulted on a number of projects which they had contemplated undertaking.

Hitch was an assistant naval attaché in Chungking during part of my period there. He had returned to Washington and was on duty here.

Christine Homan was the wife of an economist who was working for some Government bureau. I think he is employed at present with the President's Council of Economic Advisers. I had known the Homans first in Peking. They had visited there in 1936 or 1937. I had become acquainted with them there, and I was invited to their house for dinner or something here in Washington.

Captain Harris was a young man over in MIS, a researcher in the social branch of or a special branch of something of the sort there who had been present at some interrogation, and had come over to consult me further on some points he was interested in.

Hatem is Corp. J. W., who is a brother of an American doctor who had gone out to China about 1936 or 1937, and had stayed with the Chinese Communists. This doctor in Yen-an had asked me to write a letter to his family back here and let them know he was well, and this man Hatem, his younger brother, had come up to see me.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Dr. Hatem a Communist?

Mr. SERVICE. I suppose he must have been to stay there all that time, but I don't know whether he was actually a party member or not.

Harold Isaacs, of course, was at that time correspondent in China of Newsweek, and he had recently returned to the States and was living in New York.

Phil Jaffe we have already discussed.

Col. Paul Jones, his name I already mentioned. His name appears on my date pad.

Herbert Little had formerly been with the Chinese Maritime Customs in China. Since the war he has been the senior foreigner with the Chinese Customs Service. During the war he was returned from internment, I think, and he was with the OSS, and I saw him here in Washington on OSS business.

Freddy Lyon, of course, was the security officer of the Department of State.

Ludden is Raymond P. Ludden, whom I have discussed.

Lattimore I have discussed.

Mrs. W. W. Lockwood is a widow of an old friend of my mother's and father's, who was associated with them, an associate of theirs, out in the YMCA in China.

Capt. Paul Linebarger I have already mentioned. I think that his branch was the Morale Branch of MIS.

Colonel McHugh had formerly been naval attaché in China for a good many years before and during the war. At this period he had been assigned to OSS and was here in Washington.

Colonel Mayer had formerly been military attaché in China and at that time was, I don't know what the term was, Far Eastern specialist in MIS, and he asked me to come over and talk to him and to General Bissell on one occasion.

Mr. RHETTS. Who is General Bissell?



Mr. SERVICE. He was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the United States Army, in charge of intelligence.

Mertsky was a woman who had formerly been on our staff with the consul general in Changhai. After marriage to a man named Coleman, she left the Foreign Service and was living in New York.

She had been my stenographer for a while in the consulate general in Shanghai.

Colonel McNally was a man I had known in China as a language student, had known him during the war. He went out to China originally in 1934, as aide to General Hurley, returned to Washington thereafter, and was at that time stationed at MIS.

J. K. Penfield is Mr. James Penfield. I gave his address at this time as CINCPAC, commander in chief of the Pacific.

Phoebe Reichner is this woman in OSS who was writing a biographic series, biographic data, whom I was assisting.

Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, his name appears in my pad. He was assistant public relations officer in Chungking.

Lt. Andy Roth we had mentioned.

Ray is a man who has been working for lend-lease out in China, and I had seen him off and on. He had made numerous trips to China, and was here in Washington with FEA.

Snow is Edgar Snow.

Next is Mrs. Harley Stevens. I am trying to think of a Mrs. Harley Stevens. The name does not mean anything to me now, but is an address with OSS, so it must have been somebody working in OSS, somebody in the Research Branch, who had got in touch with me.

Guenther Stein was a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor and the Manchester Guardian.

Phil Sullivan was in Shanghai, and went to St. John's College. He was employed by the Department of State in the labor end.

Gen. J. W. Schulz is Brig. Gen. John Wesley Schulz, the brother of my wife's father. At that time he was a member of the engineering board. I think the head of the engineering board at Fort Belvoir.

R. M. Service is my younger brother.

George Taylor is a man I had known out in China, where he had taught at Yenan University, was in the University of Washington, and during the war was employed by OWI on Far Eastern operations, and I had had some contacts with him.

Terrell, I have already mentioned, was the British diplomat who was stationed in Washington, attached to the British Embassy, and I had known him out in China.

The next name is a mistake in copying and should be Tolstoi. He was at that time Major Tolstoi, an OSS officer I had met first in the extreme northwest of China in Lanchow. One of my reasons in going to Lanchow was to carry funds for him, and another officer, who had come from India through Lhasa, up to Lanchow. I saw a good deal of him subsequently in China, and at this time he was back in Washington.

Vino Gradoss, of course, I have already mentioned, was press attaché in Chungking at the Embassy.

Wilbur, I have mentioned as C. Martin Wilbur, at that time attaché to the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.

Dick Watts is Richard Watts, who was for many years drama critic of New York Herald Tribune. During the war he was in China first for the New York Herald Tribune and later for OWI. I saw a good deal of him in Chungking, and at this time he had returned to the States.

Captain Weaver, as I mentioned, was a research analyst whom I had met.

Senator LODGE. Are you still in touch with Richard Watts?

Mr. SERVICE. No; I have not seen him since 1945.

Senator LODGE. How often had you seen him before that?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I suppose in Chungking I saw him fairly frequently. I think I saw him once in the spring of 1945 very briefly. I have not seen him since.

Thelma Wolfe—the name does not mean anything to me now.

The last name is apparently a copying mistake. It should be Yardoumian, Rose, whose name I have already mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no other questions.

Senator LODGE. I have no questions of Mr. Service. There are some questions I would like to ask of Mr. Morgan, due to the fact that Senator Green and I were



away as a subcommittee of two, and the rest of the subcommittee very properly went ahead with the development of this case, and I have some points I would like to have cleared up.

I have had a chance to go through the transcript that was developed while Senator Green and I were away, and I have jotted down some questions I would like to ask you.

This first group can be answered "Yes" or "No" if you want to. You do not have to if you do not want to.

Senator TYDINGS. No; I don't think it is important, unless the committee wants them.

Mr. MORGAN. Pursuant to a request made of me by Mr. Morris relative to appearances of Lattimore before the Foreign Service Institute, I have a letter here, dated May 25, 1950, from the State Department, as follows:

"DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I understand that your subcommittee is interested in learning of any occasions on which Mr. Owen Lattimore has lectured for the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Lattimore's only lecture at the Foreign Service Institute was one given on June 5, 1946, as part of the 'Meet the Public' program of the Department's Office of Public Affairs, as referred to in my letter to you of April 17, 1950.

"His only other connection with the Institute arose from the Department's contract with Johns Hopkins University in relation to the University's Mongol language project, which is also covered in the letter of April 17.

"Sincerely yours,

"JOHN E. PEURIFOY."

I might say, in passing, that I have the letter of April 17, which I will incorporate here in a few moments. This letter I would like to have incorporated, without objection.

(The letter, submitted by Mr. Morgan, is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, April 17, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,  
*United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: Following Senator McCarthy's statement on March 21 that a top Russian espionage agent, whom he privately identified as Mr. Owen Lattimore, was an employee or consultant of the State Department, I submitted to your subcommittee a brief statement of Mr. Lattimore's connections with this Department, as revealed by a careful check of our personnel records. Since Mr. Lattimore has been publicly identified and since there has been considerable public discussion concerning his relationship with the Department, it is now appropriate to give in greater detail the instances of connections between Mr. Lattimore and the Department. Without any intention of reflecting on Mr. Lattimore, and for the purpose of setting the record straight, I believe I should state that Mr. Lattimore does not have a desk in the Department of State nor access to its files, and is neither an employee nor a top adviser of the Department. These are the facts.

On October 15, 1945, Mr. Owen Lattimore was appointed as an economic adviser to the United States Reparations Mission to Japan. He served with the mission until February 12, 1946. While on this assignment he was paid out of the Department's International Conferences funds.

Mr. Lattimore was one of 28 persons to lecture on a program known as Meet the Public, which was given at the Department's Foreign Service Institute. He gave one lecture on June 5, 1946. This program was initiated by the Department's Office of Public Affairs and was designed to bring before departmental personnel the viewpoints of various persons who were working on, or interested in, foreign affairs. In this capacity, Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the Department and received no remuneration. The following were the speakers on this program:

Senator J. William Fulbright

Mr. Ernest K. Lindley, chief of the Washington bureau of Newsweek

Mr. Charles Bolte, chairman of the American Veterans' Committee

Congressman Jerry Voorhis

Prof. Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University

Prof. Frederick L. Schuman, Williams College

Mr. Herbert Elliston, editor of the Washington Post



Mr. Eugene Meyer, president of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development  
 Dr. Jacob Viner, professor of economics, Princeton University  
 Dr. Harold Lasswell, professor of law, Yale University  
 Mr. Wallace Deuel, editor of the Chicago News  
 Senator Wayne Morse  
 Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, vice chairman of Americans United for World Government, Inc.  
 Mr. James M. Landis, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board  
 Senator Warren Austin  
 Dr. Arthur Compton, chancellor of Washington University, at St. Louis  
 Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean, editor and research director of the Foreign Policy Association  
 Mr. Kermit Eby, director of education and research, Congress of Industrial Organizations  
 Mr. Hamilton Owens, editor of the Baltimore Sun (and Sun papers)  
 Prof. Frank Tannenbaum, Columbia University  
 Mr. Gardner Murphy, American Psychological Association  
 Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, vice president of Georgetown University and regent of the School of Foreign Service  
 Mr. David Lawrence, editor of the United States News and of the World Report  
 Mr. Robert Watt, International representative of the American Federation of Labor  
 Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt  
 Dr. Dexter Perkins, professor of Latin American affairs, University of Rochester  
 Congressman Mike Mansfield  
 Dr. James P. Baxter, president of Williams College

On October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, Mr. Lattimore, following preliminary correspondence with the Department of State, was one of a group of 25 private individuals participating in a round-table discussion arranged by the Office of Public Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views on United States foreign policy toward China. As a member of this group Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the Department and received no compensation but was reimbursed for expenses. This round-table discussion followed a solicitation of written views on the same topic from a larger group in response to which the written views of 31 private individuals were received and analyzed. Some of the members, including Mr. Lattimore, were in both groups. Both the written views received and the transcript of the round-table discussions were made available as some of the background material for consideration by Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case, and Ambassador Jessup, who had been requested by the Secretary to review United States policy toward the Far East. The 31 who expressed views initially in writing were:

Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution  
 Prof. Hugh Borton, Columbia University  
 Former President Isaiah Bowman, John Hopkins University  
 Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh, American Council on Education, Washington  
 Former Ambassador William Bullitt  
 Former Under Secretary Castle  
 Former Consul John A. Embry  
 Prof. Rupert Emerson, Harvard University  
 Dr. Charles B. Fahs, New York City  
 Prof. John K. Fairbanks, Harvard University  
 Dr. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City  
 Prof. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University  
 Former Under Secretary Grew  
 Col. Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA, China  
 Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeck  
 Roger Lapham, former Administrator, ECA, China  
 Prof. Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University  
 Prof. Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins University  
 Oliver C. Lockhart, Export-Import Bank of Washington  
 Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations  
 Prof. Wallace Moore, Occidental College Los Angeles  
 Prof. Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University  
 C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration  
 Former Minister Walter S. Robertson, Richmond, Va.  
 Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York City  
 Mr. James Rowe, Washington  
 Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adoloff), New York City



Prof. Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky  
 Prof. Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University  
 Prof. Mary Wright, Stanford University  
 Admiral Yarnell

The 25 who attended the round-table discussions were :

Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.  
 Bernard Brodie, department of international relations, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.  
 Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.  
 Kenneth Colegrove, department of political science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.  
 Arthur G. Coons, president, Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.  
 John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, N. Y.  
 John K. Fairbank, committee on international and regional studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 William R. Herod, president, International General Electric Co., New York, N. Y.  
 Arthur N. Holcombe, department of government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane, Wash.  
 Owen Lattimore, director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.  
 Ernest B. MacNaughton, chairman of the board, First National Bank, Portland, Oreg.  
 George C. Marshall, president, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.  
 J. Morden Murphy, assistant vice president, Bankers Trust Co., New York, N. Y.  
 Nathaniel Peffer, department of public law and government, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.  
 Harold S. Quigley, department of political science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.  
 Edwin O. Reischauer, department of Far Eastern languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 William S. Robertson, president, American & Foreign Power Co., New York, N. Y.  
 John D. Rockefeller III, president, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, N. Y.  
 Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.  
 Eugene Staley, executive director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, Calif.  
 Harold Stassen, president, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.  
 Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.  
 George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.  
 Harold M. Vinacke, department of political science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio

The following were invited to the round-table October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, but did not attend :

W. Langbourne Bond, Pan American Airways, Washington, D. C.  
 Monroe E. Deutsch, provost, University of California.  
 Anne O'Hare McCormick, New York Times  
 Moris T. Moore, chairman of the board of Time, Inc.  
 Michael Ross, director, department of international affairs, CIO  
 J. E. Wallace Sterling, president, Stanford University

In order to ascertain whether any facts whatsoever might support Senator McCarthy's assertions that Mr. Lattimore has a desk in the Department, access to its files, and a position as a top adviser on far-eastern affairs, a check has been made with officers of the Department who have been concerned with the Far East, and many of whom have come to know Mr. Lattimore, who is widely regarded as one of the leading experts in this field. Beyond the normal contacts found among persons having a common specialized professional training and interest, this check developed only that Mr. Lattimore, as director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations of Johns Hopkins University, has participated in setting up at Johns Hopkins a Mongolian language project in which the Department is interested. The Department of State, in line with the policy of promoting and utilizing foreign language and other international studies in numerous American universities, has, under authority of Public Law 724 (79th Cong.), entered into a contract with the Johns Hopkins University, pursuant to which it has contributed \$3,200 toward this language project. Very much larger sums have been made available for this project, it is understood, by



the American Council of Learned Societies and the Carnegie Foundation. In connection with this project, it was possible to arrange for three Mongol scholars, including Dilowa Hutuktu, or the "Living Buddha," to enter the United States and work in the Walter Hines Page School in Baltimore. Officers of the Department's Foreign Service Institute have visited the project from time to time to observe its progress, and a junior member of the Foreign Service staff, a specialist on the Far East, whose salary is \$4,650 a year, is studying at the Walter Hines Page School as part of this project. The end results of the project will be a descriptive grammar of the Mongolian language and other teaching materials in spoken Mongolian.

Mr. Lattimore was recently sent by the Secretariat of the United Nations as a member of a preliminary economic survey mission to Afghanistan. In this capacity, Mr. Lattimore was hired by and responsible to the United Nations and not the Department of State.

Mr. Lattimore does not have a desk in the Department of State, nor does he have access to its files. Of course, in connection with his OWI employment (1942-45) and his 4-month assignment to the Pauley Reparations Mission which terminated February 12, 1946, Mr. Lattimore, like others in such positions, might have been required as part of his duties to consider some official papers from other agencies of the Government, including the Department of State.

These are the facts.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. PEURIFOY,  
Deputy Under Secretary.

Senator TYDINGS. Are you numbering these so he can identify them? You want them all in the record here, don't you?

Mr. MORGAN. Without objection, I would like to ask to have incorporated in our record a letter to me of May 2, 1950, from the United States attorney in New York City, pursuant to a request of mine concerning the physical condition of Jacob Stachel, whom we had subpoenaed. As I understand it, we have now determined that we should not seek to require Stachel's appearance, that is, the members of the committee here. I would like to have this in the record.

Senator TYDINGS. Put it in.

(The letter, submitted by Mr. Morgan, is as follows:)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,  
New York, N. Y., May 2, 1950.

*Re United States v. Foster et al.*

EDWARD P. MORGAN, Esq.,

*Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,  
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

SIR: I am in receipt of your letter dated April 28, 1950, relating to the subpoena issued by the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, directed to Jacob Stachel.

The records of the district court for the southern district of New York disclose that Stachel is represented on appeal from his conviction by George W. Crockett, Jr. I have received information that Stachel is confined to his home under the care of one Dr. Louis Finger, and has been a patient at Mt. Sinai Hospital for a coronary condition. Doctor Finger, of course, has also been physician for William Z. Foster, national chairman of the Communist Party, and has submitted affidavits in his behalf concerning a heart condition.

Stachel is presently under bond which restricts his movements to the southern district of New York. However, I have advised his attorney that I will consent to an order permitting his appearance before the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to the subpoena issued by you.

In addition, there is presently pending before the district court a motion made by Stachel, as one of the 11 defendants seeking a general modification of the bail bonds of all of them, to permit travel throughout the entire United States for the purpose of making speeches and raising funds.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Respectfully,

IRVING H. SAYPOL, *United States Attorney.*



[Advance Section from Foreign Service Journal, January 1952]

## THE DOCUMENTS IN THE SERVICE CASE

*The Editors of the Journal are making available to all Journal readers the complete texts of the documents released by the State Department upon the announcement on December 13th of the dismissal of John Stewart Service from the Foreign Service of the United States*

### LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,  
Washington 25, D. C., December 13, 1951.

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE.

SIR: Reference is made to the case of John Stewart Service, Foreign Relations Officer of the Department of State.

This case came to the attention of the Loyalty Review Board on post-audit after a favorable finding by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State. A panel of the Loyalty Review Board was duly assigned to review the matter and, on March 3, 1950, the panel recommended that it be remanded to the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State for a hearing on charges. Thereafter, the employee was duly presented with a letter of charges and notice of proposed removal action, dated March 24, 1950, in accordance with Executive Order No. 9835. Subsequently, a hearing was held by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State and said Board reaffirmed its decision, favorable to the employee. Pending reconsideration of this decision on post-audit, supplementary information was received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the complete file was returned to the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State for such consideration as it deemed advisable. Executive Order No. 9835 was amended by Executive Order No. 10241 on April 28, 1951, and the case was considered by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State under the amendment to Executive Order No. 9835 and that Board thereafter reaffirmed its favorable action.

The case again came before the Loyalty Review Board on post-audit and, under date of October 9, 1951, the panel of the Loyalty Review Board determined that it was necessary to hold a hearing before the panel of the Loyalty Review Board under its Regulation 14.

A hearing was accordingly held by the panel at the offices of the Loyalty Review Board in Washington, D. C., on November 8, 1951, at which the employee was present and testified and was represented by his counsel, Charles Edward Rhetts, of Washington, D. C.

On December 4, 1951, a stipulation was entered into by and between Hiram Bingham, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, and C. E. Rhetts, Attorney for John Stewart Service, wherein it was stipulated "that the said panel of the Loyalty Review Board may consider the entire matter and make a determination thereon as if the original letter of charges served on John Stewart Service, dated March 24, 1950, contained the following specification within the meaning of section 392.2d of the regulations and procedures of the Department of State:

"Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or nonpublic character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States."

A copy of said stipulation is attached hereto.

Thereafter, the said panel of the Loyalty Review Board, upon a consideration of all the evidence and the complete file in the matter, found that there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of said employee, John Stewart Service, to the Government of the United States. A copy of the decision of the panel is also attached hereto.

The Loyalty Review Board found no evidence of membership in the Communist Party or in any organization on the Attorney General's list on the part of John Stewart Service. The Loyalty Review Board did find that there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the employee, John Stewart Service, to the Government of the United States, based on the intentional and unauthorized disclosure of documents and information of a confidential and nonpublic character within the meaning of subparagraph d of paragraph 2 of Part V, "Standards," of Executive Order No. 9835, as amended.



The Loyalty Review Board hereby submits to the Secretary of State its opinion: The employee, John Stewart Service, should be forthwith removed from the rolls of the Department of State; the Secretary should approve and adopt the proceedings had, as heretofore recited herein; and such approval and adoption should appear on Standard Form 50, "Notification of Personnel Action."

Please advise the Loyalty Review Board of the effective date of the removal of said employee, John Stewart Service.

For the Loyalty Review Board:

Sincerely yours,

HIRAM BINGHAM,  
*Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.*

OPINION OF THE LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OCTOBER 6, 1950

The case of John Stewart Service, on which the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State had reported a favorable determination based on the information then available, was remanded on March 14, 1950, by the Loyalty Review Board, with the statement that the reviewing panel had concluded that the record had not been fully developed, and that a hearing should be held on charges. In accordance with this recommendation charges were preferred against Mr. Service and a hearing has been held. The hearing before the Loyalty Security Board has consumed 15 days and has resulted in the accumulation of a voluminous transcript and numerous exhibits.

Although the Regulations prescribed by the Loyalty Review Board provide that the determinations of the Loyalty Security Board "shall state merely the action taken," it is the feeling of the Loyalty Security Board that a full statement should be made of the reasons for its conclusions in this case, in view of the wide interest in the "Amerasia" case, in connection with which Mr. Service was arrested in 1945.

John S. Service was born in Chengtu, China, August 3, 1909, of American missionary parents. He was educated at Shanghai American School, Berkeley High School (Berkeley, California) and Oberlin College, A. B., 1931. At Oberlin he was captain of two athletic teams and president of the Men's Honor Court. In 1933 he returned to China and became clerk in the American Consulate at Kunming in the Province of Yunnan. In 1935 he was admitted to the Foreign Service and was assigned as a language student at the Embassy in Peiping; in 1938 he was transferred to the Consulate at Shanghai; in 1941 he was assigned as Third Secretary of the Embassy at Chungking.

After a four-months' leave in the United States in 1942-43, he was sent to Lanchow, in May 1943, as an observer for the Embassy. In August 1943, at the request of the Secretary of War Stimson, he was detached from the Embassy and assigned to General Stilwell, Commander of the American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. During this service he was sent with an Army observer group to the Communist headquarters in Yen-an. He was in Yen-an from July to October of that year, and was then returned to the United States, at the time of General Stilwell's recall. After a brief period of consultation in Washington he went on leave.

In January 1945, he was again ordered to Chungking, for detail to the staff of General Wedemeyer, who succeeded General Stilwell. On March 9 he was again sent to Yen-an under Army orders to report on an expected Communist Party Congress, but on March 30 was suddenly ordered to return to the United States, where he arrived on April 12. He was arrested on June 6, in connection with the so-called "Amerasia" affair, but on August 10 the Grand Jury returned "no true bill" against him. In September 1945 he was assigned to the staff of the United States Political Adviser in Tokyo, where he served until he was hospitalized, from April to August 1946.

After a leave in the United States he served as First Secretary and Consul at Wellington, New Zealand, from October 1946 to January 1949; for about two months in 1949 he served on the Foreign Service Selection Board in Washington; and for about a year as Special Assistant to the Chief, Foreign Service Personnel. He was en route to an assignment as Consul General at Calcutta when recalled for the present hearing.



## CHARGES BASED ON REPORTS FROM CHINA

The Board considered first the charges against Mr. Service which have to do with his conduct in China, in particular from 1943 to 1945, while he was stationed in Chunking, Lanchow and Yen-an.

*First*, it is alleged that Mr. Service was disloyal or insubordinate to General Hurley who was in China from August to November 1944 as personal representative of the President, and served as Ambassador to China from November 1944 until November 1945. In particular it is charged that Mr. Service's second trip to the Communist area in Yen-an was in disobedience to Ambassador Hurley's instructions. His sudden recall to the United States in March 1945, was at the instance of Ambassador Hurley, who was in the United States at the time on consultation.

The Board finds that at no time during General Hurley's service in China, either as the President's personal representative or as Ambassador, was Mr. Service attached to the Embassy, or subject to Ambassador Hurley's direction. In August 1943 Mr. Service had been detailed to General Stilwell, and in July, 1944, sent by General Stilwell with an Army observer mission to the Communist Headquarters in Yen-an. He was still in Yen-an when General Hurley arrived in Chunking in August, and returned from Yen-an to the United States at the time of General Stilwell's recall in October.

On Mr. Service's return to China in January, 1945, he was still assigned to the Army, now under General Wedemeyer. As for his second trip to Yen-an in March, General Gross, who was in command during General Wedemeyer's absence in Washington with Ambassador Hurley, accepted full responsibility, and stated that the trip had the concurrence of both Army Headquarters and the Embassy. Mr. Service cannot have been guilty of insubordination to Ambassador Hurley, for he was at no time his subordinate; he acted at all times strictly in accordance with the orders of his proper commanding officers, to whom his services were apparently satisfactory.

*Second*, it is charged that Mr. Service was disloyal to American policy with respect to China, as that policy was represented by Ambassador Hurley, in that Mr. Service was critical of the Chinese Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek and favorably disposed towards the Chinese Communists; that he favored arming and collaborating with the Communist forces; and that he favored stopping United States assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and extending it to the Communists, and believed that Communist participation in Government was the only hope for a stable democratic and independent Chinese Government.

*Third*, it is charged that Mr. Service was sympathetic with communism and working in the interest of the Communist Party. Since both the *second* and the *third* charges were based upon the reports and recommendations submitted by Mr. Service from China, and since the two charges are closely related in substance the Board considered them together.

There was nothing covert or furtive or secret, so far as American authorities in China or elsewhere were concerned, about Mr. Service's observations, conclusions and recommendations with regard to Chinese affairs from 1942 to 1945. The Board has had access to 127 reports written by Mr. Service between those dates. Only 4 of these precede his assignment as a political observer; about 10 are from Lanchow, where he was observer for the Embassy; about 50 were made at Chunking after he was detailed to the Army; about 35 were made during his first tour of duty in Yen-an, where his function was to secure political intelligence for the Army, and for this purpose to become acquainted with the principal Communist leaders, and to report on the organization, policies, program, propaganda and popular support of the Communist Party; 3 were made in Washington; 11 on his return to Chunking; and 14 on his second trip to Yen-an under General Gross's orders.

Mr. Service's reports while he was on detail with the Army were in the form of memoranda, prepared in quadruplicate—the original for Army Headquarters, one copy for his immediate superior, Mr. John P. Davies, one for the Embassy, and one for his own files. Mr. Service's views were, therefore, well known throughout both Army Headquarters and the Embassy in China, and in the War and State Departments in Washington, to which Department copies were forwarded by the Army Headquarters and Embassy respectively.



## ALLIED WITH SOVIET IN 1945

It is necessary to assess these reports against the background of 1944-1945 rather than that of 1950. In 1944-1945 the war with Japan was reaching its climax. It was the duty of the United States Military Commander in the China Theater to do all in his power to contribute to the defeat of Japan, and to this end to bring about the maximum possible Chinese military effort. In 1944-1945 we were allies with the Soviet Union in the war in Europe, and were furnishing lend-lease arms to the Russian Communists on a large scale.

In 1945 it was Ambassador Hurley's mission in China, not only to prevent the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Government and to keep the Chinese Nationalist Armies in the field, but also to prevent civil war in China and to unify the Anti-Japanese forces in China, whether Nationalist or Communist. This double-headed objective could only be accomplished by an accommodation between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists. It was precisely such an accommodation which General Hurley was endeavoring, under instructions, to bring about.

The Board has examined Mr. Service's reports in the light of this background. It finds them objective, and extraordinarily accurate as political forecasts of what was to come. It finds no indications that they misstated any fact or reported anything other than his best judgment candidly stated. The sum and substance of Mr. Service's recommendations was contained in his report No. 40, dated October 10, 1944, which profoundly displeased Ambassador Hurley, and in a report drafted by him and R. P. Ludden, another American observer, dated February 14, 1945.

Copies of both reports which have been declassified are appended to this opinion. The essential difference between Ambassador Hurley on the one hand and Mr. Service, General Stilwell and the staff of the Embassy at Chungking on the other hand, concerned the terms on which the amalgamation of forces was to be effected, the conditions under which lend-lease aid would be extended to the Communist forces; the extent to which United States interests required acceptance of the views of Chiang Kai-shek as to the nature and policies of the Chinese Government, or change in the nature and policies of that Government.

Both Ambassador Hurley and Mr. Service advocated, and it was a major objective of Ambassador Hurley's mission to achieve, unification of all Chinese military forces for the purpose of defeating Japan. Ambassador Hurley considered that his primary duty was to sustain the Nationalist Government and that the Communists should be armed only through the Nationalist Government. Mr. Service and General Stilwell considered the Nationalist Government was not prosecuting the war as vigorously as required. They believed that the Chinese forces could be unified only by utilizing lend-lease aid as a bargaining weapon to force Chiang Kai-shek to form a coalition government, and that some lend-lease aid might, if required, be extended to the Chinese Communist forces directly. Mr. Service did not favor stopping lend-lease assistance to Chiang Kai-shek but did favor making its continuance conditional upon agreement by Chiang to broaden the base of the government and undertake substantial economic, political and social reform.

## ISSUE DEFINED

The issue before the Board does not require a decision as to who was right. The issue is rather whether the views expressed by Mr. Service constitute disloyalty to American policy with respect to China. The Board finds no indication that Mr. Service was disloyal in this respect. Rather, the Board finds that he was properly stating to his superiors the conclusions at which he had honestly arrived as a result of his personal observations both in Chungking and in Yenan, and recommending a change in policy which he believed essential in the national interest.

In this connection the Board finds itself in hearty accord with a statement made by Secretary Byrnes to the Foreign Relations Committee concerning the reports of Mr. Service and of the other Foreign Service officers criticized by Ambassador Hurley: "What it amounts to is that within proper channels they expressed to those under whom they served certain views which differed to a greater or less degree from the policies of the Government as then defined. Of course, it is the duty of every officer of the United States to abide by and administer the declared policy of his Government. But conditions change, and often change quickly in the affairs of Governments. Whenever an official honestly believes that changed conditions require it, he should not hesitate to express his views to his superior officers.



"I should be profoundly unhappy to learn that an officer of the Department of State, within or without the Foreign Service, might feel bound to refrain from submitting through channels an honest report or recommendation for fear of offending some one in the Department." As Mr. George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department, said before this Board: "I would feel very alarmed for the future of Foreign Service reporting if we ever were to permit the implication to creep in that a policy recommendation contrary to the policy that was actually adopted by the Government was a sign of disloyalty to the Government purposes."

With respect to the *third* allegation that Mr. Service was sympathetic with Communism and working in the interest of the Communist Party, the Board finds no evidence that his reports acquired their character from any ulterior motive or association or from any impulse other than his desire to acquaint his superior officers with the facts as he saw and interpreted them. As early as January 1943, he reported that civil war in China would bring about a Communist government which would not be democratic in the American sense, and which would be more inclined to friendship with Russia than with the United States.

In April 1944, he recommended that in order to prevent Russian dominance over a part or all of China, the United States Government should show a sympathetic interest in the Communist and liberal groups in China, and use its influence with the Kuomintang to promote Chinese unity on the foundations of progressive reform. In June 1944, he analyzed the weaknesses of the Kuomintang which he said were precipitating a debacle of which the only parties to benefit would be Japan and Russia eventually. He recommended, not a flat refusal to aid the Kuomintang, but the use of that aid as leverage to induce the Kuomintang to broaden the base of the Government and to undertake political reform.

When he got to Yen-an he reported that the Japanese there were being faced by a total mobilization based on an economic, political and social revolution, and that unless the Kuomintang went as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, the Communists would become the dominant force in China within a few years. The Board finds nowhere in his reports any sympathy for Russian or for world Communism, but only a clearly expressed fear that the policy of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and of the United States Government as a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek alone, was headed for a major disaster that would throw all of China into the hands of the Soviet Union.

#### KENNAN ASSAYED REPORTS

The Board had the benefit of expert testimony from Mr. George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department and for many years a leading American authority on the Soviet Union and Communist matters. At the request of the Board, Mr. Kennan examined 127 of Mr. Service's reports for the specific purpose of forming an opinion as to whether or not they reflected Communist or pro-Communist tendencies or propaganda themes.

After completing his examination, Mr. Kennan testified that Mr. Service's reports indicated no Communist inspiration or guidance, that they were free from the exaggerations and distortions characteristic of Communist propaganda, that in important instances the reports took issue with the Communist Party line, that some of Mr. Service's early reports indicated a certain naivete with respect to the Soviet Union but that this was substantially corrected in his later reports, that Mr. Service appeared to be reporting honestly and conscientiously the views at which he had arrived on the basis of an open-minded examination and analysis of the facts before him. Mr. Kennan concluded that the reports could not have been the work of a man with a closed mind or ideological preconceptions.

The Board finds that, on the basis of his reports from China, Mr. Service was neither a Communist nor pro-Communist.

*Fourth*, it has been charged that at least one of Mr. Service's reports was circulated among the Chinese Communists, and that the Communists were advised that Ambassador Hurley's efforts to prevent the collapse of the Nationalist Government did not represent United States policy. The charge was denied by Mr. Service and is entirely out of character with his function. His reports did not purport to state United States policy, but only his personal observations, conclusions, and recommendations. No evidence was presented to support this charge and the Board finds no basis for it.



## THE AMERASIA AFFAIR

In the so-called Amerasia affair, Mr. Service was charged with furnishing classified information to one Philip Jaffe. In 1945 Philip Jacob Jaffe of New York City was coeditor with Kate L. Mitchell of a magazine called "Amerasia." Jaffe was born in Russia, came to the United States in 1905 and was naturalized in 1923. He was a member of the editorial board of China Today, the official publication of the American Friends of the Chinese People, which had been cited as a Communist front by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He is also reliably reported to have collaborated with other Communist front publications, to have been National Treasurer of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship, Inc., an organization on the Attorney General's list, and to have been in frequent contact with many prominent members of the Communist Party.

On March 10, 1945, a month before Mr. Service's arrival in the United States, OSS agents searched the offices of Amerasia, and there discovered a large number of classified government documents principally of State and Navy Department origin. Upon being advised by the OSS of this discovery the State and Navy Departments jointly requested the FBI to make a full investigation. On June 6, Mr. Jaffe was arrested by the FBI, along with Kate Mitchell, and four others, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, Lieutenant Andrew Roth, Mark Gayn and Mr. Service. Mr. Larsen was a State Department employee, Lieutenant Roth was a naval reserve officer on duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Mark Gayn was a free-lance writer interested in questions concerning the Far East.

Subsequently a Grand Jury returned indictments against Jaffe, Larsen and Roth, but found "no true bill" against Mitchell, Gayne and Service. Jaffe pleaded guilty, and was fined \$2,500. Larsen, who had admitted procuring some of the documents for Jaffe, also pleaded guilty and was fined \$500. The case against Roth was nol-prossed.

Among the large number of government documents found in Mr. Jaffe's office were copies of about 40 of Mr. Service's reports, and the primary question before this Board in connection with this aspect of the Service Case is his part in making any of these available to Mr. Jaffe. Eight of these 40 were ozalid copies from State Department files which were found in Mr. Jaffe's brief case and were identified by Mr. Larsen as papers which he procured for Mr. Jaffe. Included in the 40 were also typed or carbon copies of at least 10 Service reports produced from other sources than the State Department. None of these 40 reports were papers from Mr. Service's files.

It will be recalled that Mr. Service customarily kept a carbon copy for his personal files of the reports which he made while detailed to the Army in China. Most of these copies bore the typed classification "Secret" or "Confidential" which Mr. Service himself had placed on the original. Copies of about 70 of these reports were in Mr. Service's possession when he arrived in Washington on April 12, 1945, and were found in his possession at the time of his arrest. As stated above, none of Mr. Service's personal copies were found in Jaffe's possession.

## FULL STATEMENT MADE

Mr. Service made a full statement of his connection with Mr. Jaffe to the FBI, to the Grand Jury, and to the Board. Although he had heard of Mr. Jaffe as editor of "Amerasia" he had never met him or communicated with him prior to his return to Washington on April 12, 1945. On April 19 Mr. Service was introduced to Jaffe by Lieutenant Roth, whom he had met the preceding November at a talk that he (Service) gave to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and who now invited him to dinner. Thinking that Jaffe as editor of a specialist magazine on the Far East would be interested in a conversation he had had with the Communist leader Mao Tse-tung in Yen-an. Service took along with him to his meeting with Jaffe a copy of his report on that subject.

Mr. Jaffe was interested and asked if Service had other reports that he could see. He invited Mr. Service to lunch the next day, and Mr. Service brought to that meeting about 8 or 10 copies of reports which he carefully selected from his personal file as being descriptive and not discussing American policy. Mr. Jaffe at lunch stated that he wished to take the papers to New York with him. Mr. Service permitted Mr. Jaffe to do so, and afterwards, on April 25, he picked up the reports in New York.

This, according to Mr. Service, and so far as the evidence before the Board goes, was the entire extent of Mr. Service's transmission of classified documents to Mr. Jaffe. The exact number of documents loaned to Mr. Jaffe is uncertain.



It is established that Mr. Jaffe had other sources from which he obtained copies of Mr. Service's reports. The Board found no evidence to disprove Mr. Service's recollection that the number of reports which he loaned to Mr. Jaffe did not exceed ten.

The transmission of classified documents to a person outside the Government service, whether for examination or loan, was not only highly injudicious on Mr. Service's part, but was a violation of the security regulations and practices of the Department. Since the issues here are (1) loyalty, and (2) security risk, the Board has had to examine into the motives behind his act.

In this connection the nature of Mr. Service's function in China, from which he was freshly arrived, becomes of moment. One of Mr. Service's official duties under General Stilwell had been to serve as public relations officer for Army Headquarters, and as such to work closely with American correspondents and to furnish them "background information" regarding the political situation in China. Understanding of this situation was essential to intelligent and accurate press reporting. "Background information" was understood at Army Headquarters to include, at the discretion of the officer, classified information, which could not itself be published, but which would enable correspondents correctly to interpret and report events as they occurred.

On his return to the United States in October 1944, as the first American official to return after a visit to the Communist-held areas in China, Mr. Service was sought after, not only by government agencies whose work related to China, but also by newspaper people and other writers on Far Eastern affairs. He was invited, and with the authorization of his superiors accepted the invitation, to address an "off-the-record" meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations. For all of these conferences he used as working material the substance of his observations in China, the very matter which was contained in his classified reports.

It is apparent to the Board that Mr. Service, without inquiring into Mr. Jaffe's background or credentials, but solely on the basis of Mr. Jaffe's connection with "Amerasia," assumed to treat Mr. Jaffe as a reputable writer, and to give him the same sort of "background information" that he had been accustomed to give to newspaper men in China. It is also apparent that Mr. Service was eager to impart to persons interested in the Far East, his views of the Chinese situation.

Mr. Service clearly committed two serious indiscretions with reference to these reports. The first was to communicate any classified information at all to Mr. Jaffe without checking on his reputation. The second, which was both an indiscretion and a breach of regulations, was to allow Mr. Jaffe to take possession, for however short a time, of classified documents. The Board takes note, however, of the fact that the documents in question contained nothing that could be considered harmful to the national security; they were reports of Mr. Service's personal observations on the aims and situation of the Chinese Communists. The Board cannot find Mr. Service disloyal to the United States on the basis of his loan of these documents to Mr. Jaffe.

#### INFORMATION FROM FBI

The Board had before it certain confidential information from the FBI regarding conversations between Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Service in which Mr. Service referred to certain military plans in China as "very secret," and to certain information about the whereabouts of General Stilwell as "very confidential." It has been charged that Mr. Service in these conversations disclosed classified information to Mr. Jaffe. It appeared on hearing that Mr. Service on his return to the United States in April 1945, was not in possession, nor advised of the contents of, any classified documents regarding military plans or the whereabouts of General Stilwell.

As a matter of fact he was not advised of any secret information at all concerning the military plans of the United States or of General Stilwell. He was aware only of general discussions and speculations regarding the possibility of a landing in China, and of the desirability of cooperating with whatever Chinese forces might be met there. General Stilwell had told him that he was looking for a "fighting job" in the Pacific. He did not know the determination of any of these issues. He could therefore not have been guilty of disclosing secret information as alleged, for he had none. It is to be noted that oral information of the sort mentioned does not, like a document, bear on its face its classification, and that it is a mark of prudence, rather than



the opposite, for a government official in the discussion of military speculations with the press in wartime, to refer to the subject matter as secret or confidential, in order that no conclusions may be attributed by the press to government sources. The Board does not find any indiscretions on the part of Mr. Service in this issue.

So far as security risk is concerned, the record contains no evidence that Mr. Service has ever, subsequent to the Jaffe incident, been guilty of any indiscretion. The Board believes that the experience Mr. Service has been through as a result of his indiscretion in 1945 has served to make him far more than normally security conscious.

The several social affairs to which Mr. Service was invited between April 19 and May 29, 1945—lunch with Gayn, dinner with Lt. Roth, lunch with Mr. Jaffe, an evening party at Mr. Gayn's, a party at Kate Mitchell's, and another at a Miss Yardouman's given for Lt. Roth, appear to have been initiated by those persons and to have been innocently accepted by Mr. Service as normal amenities. Mr. Service spent two nights at the apartment in New York of Mark Gayn, the free-lance writer, who shared with Mr. Service a China background and had been a college mate of Mr. Service's brother.

The association with Lieutenant Roth, a naval officer in uniform on duty with Naval Intelligence, does not appear subject to criticism; the association with Mark Gayn appears to have been a natural one of mutual interests; the Jaffe and Mitchell invitations were accepted on the assumption that these were reputable literary people interested in China. All of these associations on the part of Mr. Service terminated on June 6, 1945. The Board does not consider them evidence of disloyalty, or to be of present significance as to security risk.

Mr. Service's name has also been connected with that of Mr. Owen Lattimore. Mr. Service had known Mr. Lattimore since they were both in Peiping in 1936. After Mr. Service's return to the United States in 1945 he had several casual contacts with either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore, and was finally invited to spend the first week-end in June at their home in Baltimore. Without his knowing it in advance, Lieutenant Roth and Rose Yardouman had also been invited, and Mrs. Lattimore suggested they come down together. Mr. Service took no documents with him on that occasion but did take with him a personal copy of a new edition of the writings of Mao Tze Tung which Mr. Lattimore had asked to see. The Board finds nothing exceptional in this association of Mr. Service with a noted writer on Chinese affairs. Mr. Service was never a pupil or protege of Mr. Lattimore.

#### SUBSEQUENT CAREER

The third and final aspect of this case has to do with Mr. Service's tour of duty in Tokyo from September 1945 to his hospitalization there in April 1946. It has been alleged that during that period Mr. Service was in touch with Japanese Communist leaders, and was in sympathy with Communism. It appears that Mr. Service served as administrative and executive officer in Tokyo, had no political functions, and took no part in policy decisions.

The political reporting at SCAP Headquarters was done by Mr. John K. Emmerson, one of whose duties was to keep in touch with Japanese political leaders. Nosaka, one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, who had spent most of the war at Yen-an with the Chinese Communists, called on Mr. Emmerson at SCAP Headquarters and, having met Mr. Service in Yen-an, inquired for him. Mr. Emmerson called in Mr. Service for a brief conversation. Mr. Service saw Nosaka on one or perhaps two other occasions, but at no time had any political conversations with him. No evidence was presented to the effect that he was ever in touch with any other Japanese Communists. The Board finds no evidence that Mr. Service was sympathetic with Communism.

#### CONCLUSION

The Loyalty Security Board has given extended, careful, and earnest attention to this case, and concludes, on the basis of all the evidence, that reasonable grounds do not exist for belief that John Stewart Service is disloyal to the Government of the United States. The Board further concludes that, notwithstanding a single serious indiscretion in the handling of classified information, he does not constitute a security risk to the Department of State.

On July 31, 1951, the Loyalty Security Board reconsidered the case of John Stewart Service under the provisions of the loyalty standard as amended by



Executive Order 10241 of April 28, 1951, and determined that no reasonable doubt exists as to his loyalty to the United States Government.

## OPINION OF THE LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD

DECEMBER, 12, 1951.

CHAIRMAN, LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD:

Case of: John Stewart Service, Foreign Relations Officer, U. S. Department of State, Washington, D. C.

The undersigned panel of the Loyalty Review Board first took up this case on post-audit, and on March 3, 1950, recommended that it be remanded to the Loyalty Security Board of the State Department for a hearing on charges. Subsequently a hearing was held, and the State Department board reaffirmed its decision favorable to the employee. Pending consideration of this decision on post-audit, supplementary information was received from the F. B. I. and the file was returned to the State Department board for such consideration as it deemed advisable. And after the amendment to Executive Order 9835 by Executive Order 10241 the case was again referred to the State Department board, which in each instance reaffirmed its favorable action. The case then came once more before this panel on post-audit, and after review of the entire file it was recommended under date of October 9, 1951, that a hearing be held pursuant to Loyalty Review Board Regulation 14.

A hearing was accordingly held by the undersigned panel at the office of the Loyalty Review Board, Washington, D. C., on November 8, 1951, at which the employee was present and testified and was represented by his counsel, Charles Edward Rhett of Washington.

We are satisfied that during the employee's service in China, including his visits to Yen-an while assigned to the Army and acting under Army orders, the reports which he made from Yen-an raise no reasonable doubt concerning his loyalty. In this respect we reaffirm the opinion expressed in our memorandum of March 3, 1950, in which we said:

"It is evident that as a result of his official visit to the Communist headquarters at Yen-an and from other sources, Mr. Service believed that the Communists were putting up a more effective fight against the Japanese than the Nationalists, and that the Communists should be helped. This view was shared by other observers, and it appears to have been Service's honest opinion. That he held and reported such opinion is, in the judgment of this panel, no reflection upon his loyalty. Furthermore, it was a part of his duty to confer with the Communists and report upon what he found and his conclusions as to what should be done. It should also be noted that there are many reports from those familiar with Mr. Service's work which are highly commendatory."

Concerning the employee's conduct in other respects while on assignment in China, we have in the file no sufficient evidence to support a doubt on the question of loyalty. There is, however, testimony of Patrick J. Hurley before the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate at hearings held in June 1951, indicating that the employee may have given a Chinese Communist official a copy of his report of October 10, 1944, to General Stilwell, entitled "The Need for Greater Realism in Our Relations with Chiang Kai-shek." This is the report known as Service's Report No. 40. This testimony was not available to us at the time of our hearing, and the employee was not examined upon it. We therefore make no finding with respect to this question but make note of it as a subject worthy of inquiry should there be further proceedings in this case.

A review of the entire file, including the testimony at the hearing before the State Department board, also satisfies us that no reasonable doubt concerning the employee's loyalty arises from his activities while assigned to the staff of General MacArthur in Toyko.

There is no evidence in the file that the employee was ever a member of the Communist Party or of any other organization on the Attorney General's list.

## DEALINGS WITH JAFFE

There remains for consideration the employee's dealings with Philip C. Jaffe, of New York, the editor of Amerasia, and with others after his return from China



on April 12, 1945, and up to the time of his arrest in connection with the Amerasia case on June 6, 1945. In this connection reference is made to the following provision of Executive Order 9835:

"Part V—Standards

"2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which may be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the following. \* \* \*

"d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or nonpublic character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States."

There is no evidence that the employee stole or abstracted from the official files and transmitted to Jaffe or any other person any official files. Such files found in Jaffe's possession appear to have come from Emmanuel S. Larsen, Andrew Roth, or some other source. It was on this charge that the Grand Jury in the so-called Amerasia case found no bill against Service. It is not disputed, however, that Service did intentionally lend for a period of time to Jaffe from 8 to 19 copies which he had retained in his files of his reports made during his official visits to the Communist headquarters in Yen'an during 1944 and 1945, and that he orally gave Jaffe considerable information concerning what he had learned while on Government service in China and that these reports and some of this information was of a confidential or nonpublic character.

The practice of giving out information appears to have been somewhat loose, but it is clear there was, at least to some extent, a breach of State Department regulations. The only question remaining is whether these disclosures were of such a character or were made under such circumstances as to lead to the conclusion that there is reasonable doubt concerning the employee's loyalty to the Government of the United States. We shall now address ourselves to that question.

The employee left Yen'an on April 8 and arrived in Washington from China on April 12, 1945, bringing with him his file copies of his Yen'an reports for 1944 and 1945 and also originals for the State Department of some of his 1945 reports. The others had been distributed by him through channels while in China. These State Department copies he says he delivered at the State Department shortly after his arrival, and there is no evidence to controvert this. He appears to have spent the first week after his arrival in Washington reporting to various officials in line of his duty.

On April 19, a week after his arrival from China, Service received a telephone call from Lieutenant Andrew Roth of the Navy Department, whom he had met in 1944 at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, inviting him to dinner. Later, Roth called and said that he had also invited Philip Jaffe, who was staying at the Statler in Washington, and suggested that Service call and pick Jaffe up. Service accordingly called up Jaffe and arranged to meet him at Jaffe's room in the hotel. Service testified that he had never before met Jaffe, but knew of him as editor of Amerasia, and, believing that he would be interested, brought with him to Jaffe's room his file copy of a report of an interview he had had in Yen'an in the spring of 1945 with Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader.

There is information in the file indicating that Service had met Jaffe in China some years previously, and had transmitted information to Jaffe from China. We find no corroboration of this. And it appears from FBI reports that Service and Jaffe in their telephone conversation arranged to meet in Jaffe's room because if they were to meet in the lobby they might not recognize each other.

#### SUPPLIED OTHER REPORTS

Service allowed Jaffe to retain the copy of the Mao interview and Jaffe expressed an interest in Service's other reports and it was arranged that they would meet again in Jaffe's room at the Statler on the morning of the 20th. Pursuant to this appointment Service the next morning brought a number of his reports (which in his testimony before the State Department board he claimed were specially selected as being of such nature that they might be divulged) and left them with Jaffe. Service then returned for lunch with Jaffe and Lieutenant Roth in Jaffe's room at the hotel, and Jaffe said that he wanted more time to read the reports and would like to take them to New York, to which Service assented. Service testified that he lent Jaffe 8 or 10 of his reports. The information in the file indicates that Jaffe may have received from Service as many as 19.



On April 25 Service called on Jaffe at the Amerasia office in New York, and picked up the reports. As he kept no record of what reports he had lent to Jaffe and made no check of those which were returned, we have no accurate information as to how many and what reports Service in fact lent to Jaffe. While in New York on the 24th and 25th of April, Service stayed at the apartment of Mark Gayn, a free-lance writer on Far Eastern subjects whom he had met for the first time on April 18th and who had been a college mate of his brother, and on the evening of the 24th he attended a party at Gayn's apartment at which Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, and others were present.

Service met Jaffe again in Washington at Jaffe's room in the Statler on May 8, and on May 29 picked up Jaffe at the Statler and attended with him and others a farewell party for Lieutenant Roth. He also met Jaffe in New York on a week-end party of Mr. and Mrs. T. A. Bisson on May 19 and 20. There is no evidence that Service passed any copies of reports to Jaffe at any meetings subsequent to those of April 19 and 20, but there is information in the file indicating that on May 8 and 29 at Jaffe's room in the Statler Service continued to talk freely with Jaffe, as he had on the 19th and 20th of April, and this notwithstanding the fact that at these first meetings Service felt that Jaffe was unpleasantly inquisitive and insistent, and that after leaving the meeting of April 20 with Lieutenant Roth, Service asked Roth if Jaffe was a Communist, to which Roth replied that he did not think he was a Communist, but that he was extremely sympathetic.

It was also notwithstanding the fact that on April 25th in New York one Harold Isaacs, known to Service to be a former Communist, in response to an inquiry made by Service told Service that Jaffe was "bad business" or "bad medicine," and that while on the week-end party with the Bissons on May 19th and 20th Jaffe in conversation with Service took what appeared to Service to be the "party line" by telling Service that "they had real freedom of the press in Russia, that they did not have real freedom of the press here."

Service concedes that he should not have lent copies of his reports to Jaffe, but in extenuation he says that so far as he then knew Jaffe was a reputable journalist, and that giving what he called "background" information to reputable journalists had been encouraged by his superiors. The testimony of others indicates, however, that background briefing seldom went to the extent of showing reports, much less lending them or giving them out. And Brooks Atkinson, in a letter submitted to the State Department board on behalf of Service, says, "My only complaint as a reporter was that Mr. Service was too punctilious about State Department security and declined to tell me everything he knew. He never permitted me to see classified material and was cautious and guarded about matters he considered confidentially." This contrasts strangely with the very different treatment accorded by Service to Jaffe. Indeed, Service frankly stated that he placed no restriction on the use which Jaffe might make of the reports which he lent to him.

Service conceded that in no event should reports which had passed through headquarters and to which were attached letters of transmittal or comments be handed out. A number of such reports were found among Jaffe's papers, but the evidence indicates that none of them came from Service.

#### SOME REPORTS COPIED

Copies of reports which Service did lend or may have lent Jaffe were also found among Jaffe's papers. It appears that one Anne H. C. Blumenthal copied a number of reports for Jaffe, and it seems probable that some or all of those lent by Service were among these.

We have examined the 18 reports copies of which Service concedes were or may have been lent by him to Jaffe. Some of these are not classified; others are classified "secret" or "confidential." Service testified, and the evidence indicates, that these were his own classifications and that, in many cases at least, before he showed them to Jaffe by reason of lapse of time or otherwise they were no longer secret or confidential.

From our examination of these reports, it appears to us that they were for the most part such as a newspaper reporter on the spot might transmit to his newspaper. Some of them, however, appear to us to be of a nature which no discreet person would disseminate without express authority, and some of them were dated within four to six weeks of the time they were lent to Jaffe, and the originals had not been in the hands of the State Department for more than a week. These recent reports therefore might be considered as "hot news."



We have no knowledge of what information Service may have imparted to Jaffe and others orally during these meetings in New York, or during the evening parties he went to with Jaffe and others in Washington on April 19 and May 29. We do, however, have some information concerning Service's conversations with Jaffe in Jaffe's room at the Statler in Washington on April 19th and 20th and May 8th and 29th. These indicate that there was some conviviality, and that Service talked very freely, discussing, among other things, troop dispositions and military plans which he said he had seen and which he said were "very secret."

This intimacy of talk appears to have continued unabated, though from the first Service felt that Jaffe was unduly inquisitive and evidently suspected that Jaffe might be a Communist, having after the meeting of April 20th asked Lieutenant Roth whether Jaffe was a Communist, to which Roth replied that he did not believe Jaffe was a Communist but that he was extremely sympathetic.

#### SUPERIORS NOT CONSULTED

It also continued after Isaacs had told Service on April 25th that Jaffe was "bad business" or "bad medicine," and after Jaffe had on May 19th or 20th taken the "party line" in conversation with Service. At no time did Service consult his superiors as to the extent to which he might properly give Jaffe information.

What have we that gives ground for reasonable doubt as to Service's loyalty? With some necessary repetition of what has preceded, the grounds, as we see them, are these:

He knew very early in his association with Jaffe that Jaffe was a very doubtful character, extremely left-wing, as Service said in his testimony before us. He was asked before us, "What made you think he might be a Communist?" The answer was, "I don't remember anything specific. It was fairly obvious from talking to him, and his general approach, that he was extremely left-wing. He was a much more uncritical booster of the Chinese Communists than I was. At some point fairly early, he mentioned his interest and participation in something like Russian Relief."

His counsel urged in his excellent brief that Service had mentioned Jaffe to several of his friends and colleagues, and that none of the persons of whom these inquiries were made—Vincent Friedman, Isaacs, or Salisbury—gave any indication that Jaffe was a Communist or an improper person to associate with. His statement is not entirely accurate, but it scarcely helps Service.

Service was a highly trusted official of his Department, of long and wide experience in his particular field. The statements made by him, quoted above, show that no such warning was necessary. He knew almost from the start of his relations with Jaffe of Jaffe's true character. To this man he gave, as we have stated, a large number of his reports. His story is that there were eight or ten of them which he gave to Jaffe. Jaffe, as reported by the F. B. I. said Service gave him 19. Giving these reports was against the State Department's regulations, as Service knew. It is true that, as we have said, these regulations were apparently not always strictly observed, and how many of these reports Service really furnished Jaffe is a matter of considerable doubt.

Step by step, as Service continued in his association with Jaffe, Service had a continuing line of warnings as to Jaffe's character. We begin on April 20, after Service had delivered his reports to Jaffe. He asked Roth if Jaffe were a Communist, and Roth said he was not a Communist, but a left-winger and very sympathetic. Later, when Service came to New York on April 24 and 25, two things which should have been a warning occurred.

He said he was very much annoyed at finding that Jaffe had turned over Service's reports to Gayne for use. It has been previously noted that Service had put no restriction on the use to which Jaffe might put these reports. He had, he says, simply assumed that Jaffe would treat them as reporters might use them for background information.

In New York, he saw his friend, Isaacs, who said Jaffe was "bad medicine." Isaacs had been a Communist himself, and "bad medicine," used by an ex-Communist, should, we think, have had some special significance to Service. Later, at Bisson's party on May 19, Jaffe, as quoted above, takes what Service himself called "the Communist line" in saying that there was more freedom of the press in Russia than in this country.



## DISLIKED JAFFE AS PERSON

Service also says that he soon disliked Jaffe as a person—that he was aggressive and nose-y. Yet, notwithstanding what Service knew about Jaffe as a Communist sympathizer, and notwithstanding this stated dislike of him as a person, we find in the conversations between Jaffe and Service at the former's hotel room in the Statler, as reported by the F. B. I., no indication of any caution by Service in the continuous line of answers he made to Jaffe's "nose-y" inquiries on State Department matters. If Jaffe was nose-y, he rarely failed to get from Service what he asked for, punctuated at one time, at least, by the statement, "This is very secret." Service undertook to get documents for Jaffe in the Department. Quite irrespective of whether these documents could properly be made available to Jaffe, the question we ask ourselves is, "Why should Service do it for a man he says he disliked and whom he knew to be very much of a left-winger and, as Service's own statements indicate, whom he suspected of being a Communist?"

The evidence of Jaffe's true character was, we think, built up with every contact Service had with him, and yet his last long conversation with Jaffe on May 29 shows Service telling Jaffe matters which we think a reasonably decent person in Service's position of trust should have hesitated to disclose even to a friend in whose character he had complete faith. The contrast between his treatment of Jaffe and his treatment of Brooks Atkinson, an accredited representative of the New York Times, as reported by the latter and previously quoted herein, requires no comment.

To say that his course of conduct does not raise a reasonable doubt as to Service's own loyalty would, we are forced to think, stretch the mantle of charity much too far.

We are not required to find Service guilty of disloyalty, and we do not do so, but for an experienced and trusted representative of our State Department to so far forget his duty to his trust as his conduct with Jaffe so clearly indicates, forces us with great regret to conclude that there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty. The favorable finding of the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State is accordingly reversed.

## STATEMENT ISSUED BY SERVICE

*John S. Service issued the following statement after being notified of his dismissal from the State Department:*

"The Loyalty Review Board's decision is a surprise, a shock, and an injustice. I am not now and never have been disloyal to the United States. The board expressly states that it does not find me disloyal.

"What it has done is to base a 'reasonable doubt' on a single episode which occurred six and a half years ago, which has been freely admitted by me and known to all responsible quarters since that time and for which I have been tried and unanimously acquitted at least nine times.

"That episode involved discussing normal and proper background information with a journalist whom I believed, and had every reason to believe at the time, to be nothing more than the editor of a reputable specialist magazine dealing with the Far East. The selected background information which I gave him did not adversely affect, or even deal with, the national interests of the United States, nor did it come within the meaning of regulations defining the classification secret and confidential. The information involved was known, or at least available to all of the American correspondents in China. The only thing that kept these facts about China from an un-informed American public was a foreign censorship. The same information had been used repeatedly by me, with official approval, in discussing the situation in China with other writers and researchers in the United States.

"I am confident that my record of 18½ years' service to the American Government and the testimony of the many people who have worked with me during that period will support me in my conviction that there is no doubt of my loyalty."

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a study made by the staff of the committee relative to contributions by the Carnegie Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation to the Institute of Pacific Relations, the fig-



ures being taken from the annual reports of these two organizations.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1349," and is as follows:)

*Contributions from the Carnegie Corp. of New York to the IPR as taken from the annual reports of the Carnegie Corp. of New York*

	Donations during year	
	Authorized	Paid
1925-33: No donation.		
1934: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)-----	\$20,000	\$20,000
1935: No donation.		
1936: Institute of Pacific Relations American Council (support of program) ..	10,000	10,000
1937: No donation.		
1938: Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council (support of program) ..	10,000	10,000
1939: Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council (support of program) ..	10,000	10,000
1941: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)-----	15,000	15,000
1942: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)-----	15,000	15,000
1943: Report not available.		
1944: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)-----	34,000	34,000
1945:		
Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)-----	34,000	34,000
Expenses of 9th International Conference-----	8,000	8,000
1946: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)-----	55,000	55,000
1947: Report not available.		
1948: Institute of Pacific Relations (final grant for support)-----	60,000	40,000
1949: Institute of Pacific Relations-----	*20,000	20,000
Total-----	291,000	291,000

\*Balance from Appropriations made before 1948-49.

*Contributions from Rockefeller Foundation to Institute of Pacific Relations as taken from the annual reports of the Rockefeller Foundation*

	Appropriation for year plus balance or prior-year appropriation	Payments for year
1929: Toward program of research in the social sciences-----	\$125,000.00	\$50,000.00
1930: Toward program of research in the social sciences-----	325,000.00	33,499.70
1931:		
General budget—American Council-----	60,000.00	30,000.00
General expenses—American Council-----	30,000.00	30,000.00
Program of research in the social sciences-----	291,500.00	91,500.30
1932:		
General program-----	30,000.00	20,000.00
Program of research in the social sciences-----	200,000.00	50,000.00
1933:		
General program-----	55,000.00	30,000.00
Program of research in the social sciences-----	150,000.00	50,000.00
1934:		
General budget, American Council-----	50,000.00	25,000.00
Support of Russian language instruction, American Council-----	7,500.00	2,500.00
Program of research in the social sciences-----	100,000.00	50,000.00
1935:		
American Council, experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language-----	17,500.00	
Support of Russian language instruction-----	5,000.00	5,000.00
General expenses, American Council-----	72,500.00	25,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program-----	135,000.00	
Research in the social sciences-----	50,000.00	50,000.00
1936:		
General expenses, American Council-----	47,500.00	17,500.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program-----	135,000.00	50,000.00
Experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language, American Council-----	17,500.00	4,500.00
1937:		
General expenses, American Council-----	30,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program-----	85,000.00	45,000.00
Experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language, American Council-----	13,000.00	6,305.00



*Contributions from Rockefeller Foundation to Institute of Pacific Relations as taken from the annual reports of the Rockefeller Foundation—Continued*

	Appropriation for year plus balance or prior-year appropriation	Payments for year
1938		
General expenses, American Council.....	\$45,000.00	\$15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in the Far East.....	90,000.00	12,791.27
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program.....	120,000.00	40,000.00
Experiments in intensive teaching of research program, American Council.....	6,695.00	6,500.00
1939:		
General expenses, American Council.....	30,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in the Far East.....	77,208.73	34,115.50
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program.....	80,000.00	40,000.00
English translations of source materials on Chinese history, American Council.....	31,700.00	5,950.00
Experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language.....	195.00	
1940:		
General budget, American Council.....	45,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East.....	43,093.23	14,913.57
Pacific Council, general budget and research program.....	129,000.00	40,000.00
English translations of source materials on Chinese history, American Council.....	25,750.00	10,900.00
1941:		
General budget, American Council.....	30,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East.....	28,179.66	26,453.04
Pacific Council, general budget and research program.....	89,000.00	48,000.00
American Council, English translations of source materials on Chinese history.....	14,850.00	9,900.00
1942:		
General expenses, American Council.....	45,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East.....	1,726.62	
Pacific Council, general expenses, research program and emergency fund.....	148,000.00	41,000.00
American Council, English translations of source materials on Chinese history.....	61,050.00	14,674.09
1943:		
General expenses, American Council.....	45,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East.....	1,726.62	1,726.62
Pacific Council, general expenses, research program and emergency fund, American Council.....	148,000.00	47,250.00
English translations of source materials on Chinese history.....	46,325.00	17,959.79
1944:		
General expenses, American Council.....	30,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses, research program, and emergency fund.....	100,750.00	59,750.00
American Council, English translations of source materials on Chinese history.....	28,365.21	18,208.80
1945:		
General expenses, American Council.....	15,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses, research program, and emergency fund.....	41,000.00	41,000.00
American Council, English translations of source materials on Chinese history.....	35,156.41	24,123.86
1946:		
General expenses, American Council.....	60,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research.....	173,000.00	41,000.00
American Council, English translations of source materials of Chinese history.....	36,000.00	23,500.00
1947: Report not available.		
1948:		
General expenses, American Council.....	30,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research.....	91,000.00	41,000.00
1949:		
General expenses, American Council.....	15,000.00	10,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research.....	50,000.00	30,000.00
Pacific Council, general budget.....	25,000.00	25,000.00
Total.....	4,144,771.48	1,576,521.54

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a postcard which is identified as being genuine by the John Day Co., Inc., publishers, issued by them, relative to an introduction written by Owen Lattimore to a book entitled "Failure in Japan."



Senator O'CONOR. That will be introduced and received in evidence.  
(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1350" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1350

RICHARD J. WALSH, *President*

THE JOHN DAY COMPANY, INC.

PUBLISHERS

62 West 45th Street

NEW YORK 19, N. Y., April 18, 1952.

Mr. BENJAMIN MANDEL,

*Research Director, Committee on the Judiciary,*

*United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MANDEL: The card about Robert Textor's book **FAILURE IN JAPAN** of which you enclosed copy was processed in a quantity of about 2,300 all of which were delivered to the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Institute had previously agreed to address and mail the cards to a list of its members, and I presume this was done. The time was about the middle of last June.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD WALSH, Jr., *Editor.*

[Postcard]

No one seriously concerned with current world affairs can afford to miss

### FAILURE IN JAPAN

WITH KEYSTONES FOR A POSITIVE POLICY

By Robert B. Textor

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY OWEN LATTIMORE

This book analyzes our Occupation record and seeks to show how it has been spelling out failure for democratic values in Japan, and producing a situation of strategic weakness for the West. It makes recommendations for a positive policy.

\$3.00 A COPY THROUGH YOUR BOOKSELLER OR DIRECT FROM—

THE JOHN DAY COMPANY

210 Madison Avenue, New York 16

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have the actual wrapper of a book by Catherine Porter, entitled "Crisis in the Philippines," which describes the use of her book in the Armed Forces.

Senator O' CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1351" and is as follows:)

### CRISIS IN THE PHILIPPINES

(By Catherine Porter)

Here, in a compact, readable, not-too-technical book, is full information about the first American soil to feel the tread of the invader—the Philippines. Finished after the Japanese invasion, it analyzes the opening moves in that campaign and is completely up-to-the-minute.

Miss Porter first traces the history of the islands down through the latest developments in their program for eventual independence. She provides a fine section on the people—their racial make-up, their language, their education, and their loyalties. She describes the economy of the Philippines, and considers how they could sustain themselves under blockade. She covers their politics up to the most recent elections. She offers invaluable material on the strategic prob-



lems of defense, including the significance of the various Japanese moves both strategically and economically. There are maps in the volume showing roads, railways, important airfields, principal economic regions, etc.

Miss Porter wrote this book under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which distributed copies of the first edition in pamphlet form to its members. It was considered so valuable that the War Department took a very large edition for the use of army officers. The present edition, so drastically revised as to be virtually a new book, should be of the utmost service to anyone who wants to follow intelligently the war in the Pacific.

CATHERINE PORTER is a native of Holyoke, Mass., and a graduate of Cornell University. After three years of teaching, she joined the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1926. She was managing editor of *Pacific Affairs* from 1935 to 1939, and has been editor of the *Far Eastern Survey* for the past year. She is the author of numerous articles on Pacific affairs which have appeared in various journals in both this country and the Philippines.

Miss Porter has travelled much in Europe and East Asia: but she believes her most valuable experience was a year spent in the Philippines just before the present war broke out in Europe. This trip took her not only to such important cities as Manila and Davao, but to the great sugar plantations, to the outlying mountain districts of Luzon, to the Moro regions, to Cebu and Iloilo and Negros. Everywhere she lived as much as possible among the Filipino people, from the most important to the humblest. She came away from this experience with a firm knowledge of the islands, and a firm confidence in their people's devotion to the ideal of their own independence.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have an article from the *New Masses* of November 14, 1944, pages 19 and 26, dealing with the Stilwell matter. Senator O'CONOR. That will be received.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1352" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1352

[Source: The *New Masses*, November 14, 1944, pp. 19 and 26]

#### BEHIND STILWELL'S RECALL

(By Frederick V. Field)

A major breakdown has occurred in the Far Eastern theater of war. One arm of our two-armed attack up on the Japanese enemy has been crippled. The military breakdown derives from the political deterioration of the Chinese government, which in turn is the result of the deep-rooted economic and social fallacies upon which Chungking has tried to maintain itself.

The recall of the valiant American general, Stilwell, and the resignation of our ambassador, who has had a record of notable service in his present post, are culminations of a process which has been apparent for a long time. Since before Pearl Harbor it has been evident to informed persons abroad, including officials of all branches of our own government and armed services, that the Chinese nation as a fighting unit was approaching disaster. During the last year the situation has been deemed so acute that the American government has taken unusual measures to cope with it.

Through our ambassador and military representatives the views of our government on the urgency of Chinese unity have been repeatedly and forcefully conveyed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There can be no question that at the Cairo Conference a year ago the President himself had the opportunity to put forward these views. These efforts, apparently unavailing, were then supplemented by our sending to China a whole series of officials representing various economic and military agencies of our government. Their work was bolstered and dramatized by the visits of Vice President Wallace, Donald Nelson, and Maj. Gen. Patrick Hurley.

There is every evidence that the United States has been exceedingly careful to put forward its point of view—and that, incidentally, of its other allies—in such a way as to promote unity in the coalition rather than the reverse. All possible care has been taken not to offend the Chinese people. Our government has maintained contact with and had news from a great variety of Chinese belonging to many political groups, and from not any single one—the feudal



bureaucracy excepted—has there been the slightest intimation that our interest was resented or that the false issue of foreign interference was being raised to defeat the very purposes for which we were employing our emissaries. On the contrary, Chinese of all democratic persuasions have used every opportunity to urge the American people to stand by them in pressing even more strongly for Chinese unity against the common enemy.

Press reports—and they are so consistent with our general picture of the situation as it has been known here that they ring true—indicate that we finally presented Chiang Kai-shek with three conditions which Washington regarded as prerequisites for effective coalition warfare against Japan. We asked, first, that General Stilwell be named commander in chief of all Allied forces in China; second, that the Chinese high command undertake a thorough reorganization of its armies in order to eliminate ineffective (to use a mild term) officers; and, third, that the military effort of the Kuomintang and Communist armies be unified.

There can be no doubt as to the wisdom of this position. It is conceivable that if the second and third conditions were accepted and carried out the first would become unnecessary. But under present circumstances, with the Japanese armies rapidly taking over the strategic hinterland to the China coast and destroying the advance airfields from which we have been bombing enemy shipping and outlying bases, military reforms brooked no delay.

The news of this tragedy in China and of her relations with her allies burst upon the American and British people with suddenness. A severe Chinese censorship controlled by the reactionaries in Chungking coupled with the hope for an improvement that Washington has never let go combined to hold back much of the information now being published by the yard. A natural tendency is therefore to adopt too pessimistic an attitude toward the Chinese scene, to throw up one's hands and relegate the Chinese people to a secondary position for the war's duration.

There is a further danger in the present circumstances. That is the danger that the momentary collapse of the China front will add fuel to the fire of the most reactionary circles in America. If it is assumed that the Chinese people are no longer a factor in the defeat of Japan, then to all intents and purposes the war against Japan loses its vital quality of being a war of coalition. Semi-fascists, isolationists, and imperialists, knowing that China cannot fight until an internal democracy has been initiated, welcome the avoidance of that semblance of a people's war. They say, let the Navy, the American Navy without even the British navy, complete the job alone! That won't require any deals with Communists or other democratic elements. It will mean, moreover, that we can avoid the embarrassment of arousing the Chinese people politically during the war; if we can squeak through without helping to create a real Chinese nation, they say, our imperialist ambitions after the war will have a far better chance of success.

Such thinking is fallacious and dangerous for more than the obvious reasons. Any situation which feeds reaction is fraught with peril. But I have in mind two other factors. While it is conceivable that we could defeat Japan single-handed, the war would thereby be interminably prolonged. It would cost more lives by far, it would be inefficient, it would be costly in every sense of the term. "Going it alone" would sow seeds which might well destroy the United Nations coalition completely, for it would inevitably be not only anti-Chinese but anti-British and anti-Soviet as well.

Furthermore it is impossible to conceive of postwar security in the Far East without a strong Chinese nation among the United Nations leadership. And if we do not have security in the Far East how can we expect it anywhere? A Chinese nation is not going to spring up immediately after the war out of a vacuum. Nationhood does not jump out of a Pandora's Box. The Chinese nation must be welded in the course of a coalition war against Japan. That is the only way we can be certain of its support in the postwar.

With these considerations in mind, President Roosevelt's position in trying to narrow the area of conflict to a difference of opinion between personalities is wise statesmanship. For it leaves our official position vis-à-vis China and Chiang Kai-shek intact, where it was before Stilwell's recall and Gauss' resignation. Our conditions, with the exception of General Stilwell's part in them, for the reconstitution of China's fighting power remain. The door is wide open for the democratic forces within and outside the Kuomintang to reform their government, to reorganize their armies, and to bring unity among all groups capable of or willing to fight the Japanese enemy.



Let us not, therefore, fall into the reactionary trap of writing off the Chinese people in this war. Let us instead redouble the efforts to support those forces in China, and they constitute the vast majority—who wish desperately to rid themselves of the Chungking clique which has brought them to the present disaster. By the same token let us encourage those in our own country who are committed to the policy of aiding in the establishment of a united Chinese nation.

NOVEMBER 14, 1944.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have three articles from the Daily Worker of August 28, 29, and 30, 1946, which are reprints from the Far Eastern Survey and reprinted by permission of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator O'CONNOR. They will be received in evidence.

(The articles referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1353," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1353

[Daily Worker, August 28, 1946, p. 6]

ROXAS AND THE HUK IN THE PHILIPPINES

(Reprinted from the Far Eastern Survey, by permission of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations)

(By Barbara Entenberg)

(*Barbara Entenberg was with Office of War Information from 1943 to 1945.*)

Military operations to crush the Hukbalahap and the organized peasant movement in Central Luzon have been undertaken by the Philippine Army as a first major policy of the newly inaugurated Philippine Republic. Among the resources at the command of the Philippine Army for this offensive are \$50,000,000 worth of military equipment presented as a gift to President Manuel Roxas by the Commanding General of United States Army Forces Western Pacific on the eve of the proclamation of the Republic.

To justify the offensive, stories of outlaw bands in Central Luzon have dominated the news from the Philippines. The propaganda quality of the stories is well exemplified by a Manila dispatch of the Associated Press of June 5 which reported that careful investigation of stories claiming Huk violence proved to be "entirely fabricated" and that "apparently deliberate efforts to stigmatize the Hukbalahaps are being made within the province (Nueva Ecija) by persons with access to official stationery, or who have forged it."

The Hukbalahap proposed a truce to the Roxas administration and according to Philippine newspaper reports the Huk leaders have conferred with President Roxas and members of his administration in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the pressing problems of the Filipino peasantry. The Philippine Army, however, and private armies of the landowners are on the offensive against the Hukbalahap and peasant organization with apparently full backing of Mr. Roxas.

The nature and objectives of the Hukbalahap, the "Peoples Army Against Japan" have been obscured through the preoccupation of United States and Filipino officials with the refusal of the Huk to surrender arms after liberation. The Hukbalahap has been described by its opponents as an "outlaw organization" of Communist terrorists which impose its rule on helpless landowners and peasants by force and which constitutes a "state within a state," threatening the stability of the Philippine Government.

Such reports overlook the legitimate fear of the Huks that, disarmed, they would be helpless against the reprisals of those elements of the Philippine Government which have announced that the "most extreme" measures would be taken to suppress them. Overlooked also for the most part has been the fact that announced Huk objectives include social reforms of a mild, unrevolutionary character, long needed for the improvement of the position of peasant tenant farmers.

The Hukbalahap was organized early in 1942 by Luis Taruc, the head of the General Union of Workers, and other labor and peasant leaders. Some of them were Communists. Their primary objective was to organize effective resistance to the Japanese.



Taruc immediately tried to establish liaison with General MacArthur and his forces. The General had left, but Taruc's emissaries received advice and a letter of authority from his representative Lt. Col. C. A. Thorpe. Peasants from Central Luzon joined the guerrilla bands in great numbers. Each community furnished a quota of fighters, who were indoctrinated by Huk leaders, formed into squadrons, and sent out to harass the Japanese in night raids. It is estimated that 100,000 people belong to the Huk.

The Christian Science Monitor reported that "by conservative estimate, the Huks accounted for 20,000 Japanese and puppets killed in more than 1,100 encounters with the enemy." The Huks rescued Allied aviators, and prevented large amounts of harvested rice and cotton from falling to the Japanese. Their efforts were so successful that the Japanese found it necessary to send a large force to Central Luzon in an unsuccessful attempt to wipe them out.

Colonel Thorpe wrote to the Hukbalahap in June 1942: "I desire to congratulate you on your past accomplishments and on your present enemy effort." The minutes of the cabinet meeting of the puppet republic on Jan. 25, 1944, noted that "Vice Minister Francisco declared that the [Filipino] constabulary needed the help of the Japanese Army against the guerrillas and stated that 'the most serious concern of the constabulary is the Hukbalahap.'" The constabulary that fought with the Japanese against the Huks during the war are in large measure the same constabulary fighting against the Huks today.

The Huk has been accused of hostility toward Americans as well as toward the Japanese. This conflicts with the opinion of American soldiers who later fought with the Huks on their return to the islands. In February 1945 the Free Philippines, a United States Army publication, cited the noteworthy part Huk guerrillas played with the 11th Airborne Division in liberating American internees at Los Banos. Many Philippine villages were liberated solely by the Huk. Evidence from the statements of Huk leaders, and from their behavior after the landing of American forces, indicated the desire of the Huk to cooperate with the returning U. S. Army.

In harmony with this main policy of resisting the Japanese, the Huks also attacked puppet government officials, landlords, and guerrilla and constabulary groups whom they believed to be aiding the Japanese.

In addition to these activities, the Huk established a civilian government. Elections were held and land reforms instituted. The Huk expropriated lands belonging to collaborators and divided them among peasant guerrillas. Crops of the collaborators and noncollaborators were taken over in order to coordinate the needs of the tenant farmers with the objectives of the guerrillas. That policy links the Huk's wartime activities and their current objectives.

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[Daily Worker (N. Y.), August 29, 1946, p. 6]

#### THE PROBLEMS OF PHILIPPINE TENANT FARMERS

(By Barbara Entenberg)

(The second of three instalments of an article reprinted from the "Far Eastern Survey," by permission of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations)

The position of the tenant farmer in the Philippines continued practically unchanged during the administration of the islands by the United States. In crowded Central Luzon, approximately one percent of the population held 99 percent of the land. Tenants received 50 percent of the total rice harvest, and were responsible for 50 percent of the expenses of farming, including the cost of hiring farm labor. In some cases as many as 30,000 tenants farmed the land of one owner.

On their small holdings, tenants were unable to harvest enough rice to feed themselves. They were forced to borrow and unable to meet their debts. Former High Commissioner Sayre points out that during the United States Administration "the bulk of the newly created income went to the Government, to landlords and to urban areas, and served but little to ameliorate living conditions among the almost feudal peasantry and tenantry." The relative numbers of tenants and landlords did not change materially.

It was not until after the Japanese occupation that peasants in Central Luzon were sufficiently well organized to effect a change in the system of tenantry. The Huk mobilized thousands of tenants who had formerly been passive, due to the



strength of those in authority (a wealthy clique of politicians, landlords, industrialists, and church elements). In a speech before the Manila Rotary Club, Luis Taruc said that as a result of the struggle against Japan, "The guerilla peasant in Central Luzon \* \* \* is now politically and socially conscious \* \* \* When Bataan fell and all hope seemed gone and 'superpatriot' leaders went to the enemy's side, he whetted his bolo and acquired a gun. \* \* \* He was that, while at the same time most of the landlords, the buy-and-sell merchants of death, and puppets were licking the boots of the Japs. So now he feels that he will not be fettered any more by the landlords' will."

The fight of the Huks against Japan and collaborationists landowners became after the war a political battle to exclude former collaborators from the Philippine administration, to change the land tenantry system, and to win political representation for farmers and workers. The Huk became a member of a new political party, the Democratic Alliance, together with the National Peasants Union, the Committee on Labor Organization, the Blue Eagle Guerillas, and other organizations.

Together these groups have asked increase in the peasants' share of the harvest; a minimum daily wage of three pesos for workers; the purchase of large landed estates and their sale in small parcels and on easy installments to present occupants; and prompt unseating and prosecuting of known pro-Japanese persons in high official and commercial positions.

When the Philippines were liberated, the returning Commonwealth Government found that in some regions of Central Luzon a complete Huk government was functioning. Almost autonomously, it collected taxes, punished collaborationists, administered its own laws, and resisted the reinstatement of Commonwealth officials without regard to their own elected representatives.

The Huks retained weapons which they had seized from the Japanese during the war and, according to report, refused to surrender them to the Commonwealth Government until other former guerilla groups, notably members of the United States Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE), had been disarmed. President Truman, in October, 1945, asked for an investigation, charging that "agrarian unrest" constituted a special problem "which threatens the stability of the government."

During his election campaign, the pro-Roxas press asked the United States Army to destroy the Huk, and blamed the Osmena administration for its inability to maintain order in the face of constant strife in Central Luzon. Roxas warned that, if elected President, he would "restore peace and order in 30 days," if necessary asking the assistance of the United States Army.

Huk officials have said that after the return of the Commonwealth Government they recognized the impossibility of two governments in the islands and were willing to surrender arms. They insisted that this be done by negotiation. They feared reprisals by those they had fought as collaborators during the war, especially members of the Philippine Army Military Police Command and the guerrilla Filipino members of the USAFFE. They feared attacks of private guards of landlords who were unwilling to concede peasant farmers the newly won share of the harvest.

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[Daily Worker (N. Y.), August 30, 1946, p. 6]

#### ROXAS SUPPRESSES FILIPINO DEMOCRATS

(By Barbara Entenberg)

(The last installment of an article reprinted from the Far Eastern Survey, by permission of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations)

Huk fears were apparently well founded. In February 1945, Huk Squadrons 77 and 97, which had fought with the Sixth Army, were ordered to surrender their arms. On their way back to Pampanga, unarmed, they were attacked by a band of armed USAFFE guerillas and thrown into the Malolos provisional prison. During the night, 109 of them were slain. An investigation was made by U. S. Army officers, and then the only action taken was the arrest of a USAFFE leader, who was released after two days and later was appointed, by P. S. Civil Affairs officers, mayor of the town where the massacre took place.

A committee appointed to investigate disorders in Central Luzon after visiting Nueva Ecija reported to Secretary of the Interior Montelibano that "Mayors Rigor of Cabanatuan and Jose Carlos of Jaen openly and notoriously connived



with civilian guards in arresting, shooting and, in a few cases, murdering of men suspected to be members of the Huk and PKM (Peasants Union)." Luis Taruc claims that it is officially admitted that from 70 to 80 percent of the Filipino Military Police are ex-collaborators, bitter enemies of the Huks.

The policy of the United States Army has apparently been hostile to the Huk. Immediately after landing, the U. S. Army Counter-Intelligence Corps rounded up and jailed Huk leaders, including Taruc and Castro Alejandrino, while many whom the Huks considered collaborators remained free. Taruc and Alejandrino were released for lack of evidence. As early as July 1945, the U. S. Army used tank destroyers to break up Huk meetings.

The Army loaned the Secretary of National Defense 10,000 submachine guns, and jeeps, planes and field hospitals for the control of "restive tenants under agitators." The Huk and other groups have charged that the action of the U. S. Army in putting the Sixth Division in readiness for "battle" in January 1946, long after any enemy forces remained in Luzon, was "designed to confront progressive groups who are now clamoring for the rights long denied them."

The Huk, as a member of the Democratic Alliance, supported the candidacy of Osmena, although disappointed in his conciliatory attitude toward collaborators, his mechanical reinstatement of former Commonwealth officials, his ignoring of leaders who had developed during the occupation, and his failure to solve the problems of food distribution and relief.

They viewed Roxas as the candidate of the landowners and big business interests who, while urging the political independence of the Philippines, is actually interested in maintaining close economic connection with the United States. This connection has in the past been profitable for the propertied class, but has brought few benefits to those tenant farmers who form the bulk of the Huk and the people as a whole.

The Roxas majority in the Congress, after a fight over rules, refused to seat three opposition senators and seven congressmen, most of them elected from Central Luzon. Among them was Taruc, elected representative of the first district of Pampanga. Roxas supporters have called the opposition congressmen Communists "who have no place in our scheme of government." The banning of the opposition congressmen seems to have been a move to secure for Roxas the necessary three-fourths majority for the ratification of the Bell Act, strongly opposed by the Democratic Alliance. The Bell Act prolongs free trade with the United States and grants United States businessmen equal rights with Filipinos in the islands, and in the opinion of the Democratic Alliance perpetuates the economic dependence of the Philippines and the advantages of the entrenched business interests.

At the same time, majority groups in both houses seated two representatives and three senators under indictment for treason. Jose de Leon, chief of the Huk in Nueva Ecija, offered on June 6 cooperation with the Government's pacification program provided the Government seat the seven Democratic Alliance congressmen, including Taruc, and recognize the Huk guerillas for veterans' benefits.

In answer to peasant requests for reform, the Roxas administration has made no serious effort to solve the problem either by legislation or by initiation of improvements in the working conditions of the peasants. On the contrary, political maneuvering is giving way to full-scale military action by the Government. It is improbable, however, that the problems which press for solution—namely, agrarian and democratic reform—can be dispelled by force of arms, even when those arms are backed by the material force and influence of the United States.

Mr. MANDEL. The name of Mme. Sun Yat-sen has come up in the hearings, and we have here a copy of page 90 from the book entitled "The People's War," by Israel Epstein, describing Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be received in evidence.



(The material referred to is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1354

## MADAME SUN YAT-SEN

[Source: The People's War, by I. Epstein, published by Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London, 1939]

Madame Sun Yat-sen writes:

"This book is different from any other foreign work on our war resistance, because it relates an analytic and factual account of the struggle to our past history and the future prospects of our national revolution. Every friend of China should read it" (wrapper).

Among the first to greet the reconciliation was Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Kuomintang, the father of China's national revolution. "Throughout his life," she wrote, "Dr. Sun advocated the principle of joint struggle for the existence of China. That is why he held that the Kuomintang and Communists should work together. The Communist Party is a party which stands for the interests of the working classes, both industrial and agricultural. Dr. Sun realized that, without the keen support and cooperation of these classes, the mission of completing the national revolution could not easily be carried out. If the cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party which Dr. Sun advocated had continued uninterruptedly until the present time, China would by now have been a free and independent power. Past events are a good lesson. During the present crisis, all former differences should be forgotten. The whole nation must join together in opposing Japanese aggression and fighting for the final victory" (p. 90).

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a tabulation made by the staff, showing the contributors associated with Amerasia and with the Institute of Pacific Relations, showing the volume number, the page, and the date in each case.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The tabulation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1355" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1355

*Amerasia—Contributors associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations*

Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year	Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year
Allen, James S.-----	I	2	73	Apr. 1937	Jaffe, Philip J.-----	I	3	136	May 1937
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	I	8	360	Oct. 1937		I	8	338	Oct. 1937
Carter, Edward C.-----	I	11	489	Jan. 1938	Kizer, Benjamin H.-----	I	5	207	July 1937
Chi Ch'ao-Ting-----	I	8	343	Oct. 1937	Lang, Olga-----	I	9	415	Nov. 1937
	I	6	247	Aug. 1937	Lasker, Bruno-----	I	8	366	Oct. 1937
	I	1	33	Mar. 1937	Lattimore, Owen-----	I	7	310	Sept. 1937
	I	10	443	Dec. 1937		I	1	26	Mar. 1937
	I	11	487	Jan. 1938	Lockwood, Wm. W.-----	I	11	503	Jan. 1938
	I	5	195	July 1937		I	2	53	Apr. 1937
Coons, Arthur G.-----	I	4	168	June 1937		I	3	98	May 1937
Earnshaw, Ruth-----	I	3	133	May 1937	Moore, Harriet-----	I	6	244	Aug. 1937
Emerson, Rupert-----	I	5	203	July 1937	Motylev, V.-----	I	5	230	July 1937
Fairbank, John K.-----	I	7	295	Sept. 1937	Norman, E. Herbert-----	I	2	84	Apr. 1937
Field, Frederick V.-----	I	9	397	Nov. 1937		I	12	571	Feb. 1938
	I	1	9	Mar. 1937		I	1	2	Mar. 1937
	I	6	253	Aug. 1937		I	2	50	Apr. 1937
	I	3	122	May 1937	Peake, Cyrus H.-----	I	9	387	Nov. 1937
	I	2	52	Apr. 1937		I	1	41	Mar. 1937
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	I	6	242	Aug. 1937		I	8	340	Oct. 1937
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Hanwell, Norman D.-----	I	10	471	Dec. 1937		I	3	99	May 1937
	I	5	211	July 1937		I	2	50	Apr. 1937
Jaffe, Philip J.-----	I	1	20	Mar. 1937		I	6	243	Aug. 1937
	I	9	389	Nov. 1937	Peffer, Nathaniel-----	I	9	391	Nov. 1937
	I	4	183	June 1937	Popper, David H.-----	I	12	534	Feb. 1938
	I	10	434	Dec. 1937		I	10	435	Dec. 1937
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Popper, David H.-----	I	11	510	Jan. 1938	Johnstone, Wm. C.-----	II	3	137	May 1938
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	I	1	28	Mar. 1937		II	2	86	Apr. 1938
	I	3	99	May 1937	Lattimore, Owen.-----	II	10	475	Dec. 1938
	I	1	4	Mar. 1937		II	6	309	Aug. 1938
Rosinger, Lawrence K.-----	I	6	270	Aug. 1937		II	8	380	Oct. 1938
	I	10	463	Dec. 1937		II	1	31	Mar. 1938
Snow, Edgar.-----	I	6	263	Aug. 1937	Leaf, Earl H.-----	II	12	593	Feb. 1939
Stone, Wm. T.-----	I	2	52	Apr. 1937		II	4	203	June 1938
	I	7	292	Sep. 1937		II	10	496	Dec. 1938
	I	8	339	Oct. 1937	Lockwood, Wm. W.-----	II	11	517	Jan. 1939
	I	4	175	June 1937		II	9	425	Nov. 1938
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	I	3	116	May 1937		II	10	467	Dec. 1938
Voitinsky, G.-----	I	3	116	May 1937	Moore, Harriet and Barnes, Kathleen.-----	II	3	143	May 1938
Wittfogel, Karl August.-----	I	10	437	Dec. 1937	Nagano, Y.-----	II	11	549	Jan. 1939
"Asiaticus".-----	II	11	545	Jan. 1939	Norins, Martin R.-----	II	7	357	Sep. 1938
Barnes, Kathleen, and Moore, Harriet.-----	II	3	143	May 1938	Peake, Cyrus H.-----	II	1	50	Mar. 1938
Bisson, T. A.-----	II	7	322	Sept. 1938		II	8	385	Oct. 1938
	II	4	178	June 1938		II	9	456	Nov. 1938
	II	1	3	Mar. 1938	Peffer, Lillian.-----	II	1	68	Mar. 1938
	II	2	82	Apr. 1938		II	11	553	Jan. 1939
	II	7	323	Sept. 1938		II	7	324	Sep. 1938
	II	4	181	June 1938	Peffer, Nathaniel.-----	II	6	279	Aug. 1938
	II	9	421	Nov. 1938		II	5	235	July 1938
	II	7	324	Sept. 1938	Popper, David H.-----	II	10	502	Dec. 1938
	II	10	481	Dec. 1938		II	4	179	June 1938
	II	12	581	Feb. 1939		II	9	420	Nov. 1938
	II	8	371	Oct. 1938		II	6	275	Aug. 1938
	II	6	274	Aug. 1938	Recht, Charles.-----	II	1	56	Mar. 1938
	II	5	263	July 1938		II	6	277	Aug. 1938
	II	3	130	May 1938		II	7	346	Sep. 1938
	II	9	418	Nov. 1938	Rosinger, Lawrence K.-----	II	2	119	Apr. 1938
	II	7	347	Sep. 1938		II	9	453	Nov. 1938
	II	11	551	Jan. 1939	Smedley, Agnes.-----	II	7	362	Sep. 1938
	II	9	452	Nov. 1938	Stewart, Maxwell.-----	II	5	527	July 1938
Bloch, Kurt.-----	II	11	519	Jan. 1939	Stone, Wm. T.-----	II	10	505	Dec. 1938
Chen Han-Seng.-----	II	8	390	Oct. 1938		II	6	275	Aug. 1938
Chi, Ch'ao-Ting.-----	II	1-5	77, 123, 173, 220, 268	Mar.-		II	1	63	Mar. 1938
				July 1938	Strong, Anna Louise.-----	II	6	304	Aug. 1938
	II	3	157	May 1938	Timperley, H. J.-----	II	8	375	Oct. 1938
	II	2	84	Apr. 1938		II	11	553	Jan. 1939
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Colegrove, Kenneth W.-----	II	1	11	Mar. 1938	"Asiaticus".-----	III	---	184	June 1939
	II	12	571	Feb. 1939	Barnes, Kathleen and Gregory, Homer E.-----	III	---	427	Nov. 1939
Coons, Arthur G.-----	II	11	535	Jan. 1939	Bisson, T. A.-----	III	---	246	Aug. 1939
Emerson, Rupert.-----	II	5	236	July 1938		III	---	198	July 1939
Field, Fred. V.-----	II	8	370	Oct. 1938		III	---	294	Sep. 1939
	II	11	515	Jan. 1939		III	---	2	Mar. 1939
	II	8	373	Oct. 1938		III	---	438	Dec. 1939
	II	1	18	Mar. 1938	Bloch, Kurt.-----	III	---	393	Nov. 1939
	II	4	191	June 1938		III	---	68	Apr. 1939
	II	11	524	Jan. 1939		III	---	534	Feb. 1940
Grajdanzev, A. J.-----	II	6	316	Aug. 1938		III	---	549	Feb. 1940
Greene, Roger S.-----	II	9	423	Nov. 1938	Borg, Dorothy.-----	III	---	471	Dec. 1939
Holland, Wm. L.-----	II	2	93	Apr. 1938	Carlson, Evans Fordyce.-----	III	---	580	Feb. 1940
Jaffe, Philip J.-----	II	9	419	Nov. 1938		III	---	555	Feb. 1940
	II	7	322	Sep. 1938		III	---	345	Oct. 1939
	II	10	466	Dec. 1938		III	---	12	Mar. 1939
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	II	7-11	364, 410, 458, 507, 554	Sep. 1938-	Chi, Ch'ao-Ting.-----	III	---	50	Apr. 1939
				Jan. 1939		III	---	199	July 1939
	II	8	372	Oct. 1938	Farley, Miriam.-----	III	---	367	Oct. 1939
	II	3	131	May 1938	Field, Fred. V.-----	III	---	215	July 1939
	II	5	227	July 1938		III	---	53	Apr. 1939
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	II	10	471	Dec. 1938	Green, Roger S.-----	III	---	398	Nov. 1939
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Kizer, Benjamin H	III	---	132	May 1939		V	---	530	Feb. 1942
Lasker, Bruno	III	---	575	Feb. 1940	Carlson, Evans For-				
Lockwood, Wm. W	III	---	487	Jan. 1940	dyce	V	---	5	Mar. 1941
	III	---	201	July 1939	Deane, Hugh	V	---	316	Sep. 1941
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Mitchell, Kate	III	---	350	Oct. 1939		V	---	250	Aug. 1941
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Moore, Harriet L	III	---	516	Jan. 1940	Jaffe, Philip J	V	---	191	July 1941
Norins, Martin R	III	---	477	Dec. 1939		V	---	109	May 1941
Norton, Robert	III	---	263	Aug. 1939	Johnstone, Wm. C	V	---	30	Mar. 1941
	III	---	371	Oct. 1939		V	---	335	Oct. 1941
Peake, Cyrus H	III	---	360	Oct. 1939	Kizer, Benjamin H	V	---	425	Dec. 1941
Peffer, Nathaniel	III	---	16	Mar. 1939	Lattimore, Owen	V	---	296	Sep. 1941
Popper, David H	III	---	147	June 1939	Mitchell, Kate	V	---	---	Mar. 1941-
Price, Harry B	III	---	355	Oct. 1939					Feb. 1942
Reischauer, Robert						V	---	139	June 1941
Karl	III	---	191	June 1939		V	---	330	Oct. 1941
Shepherd, Jack	III	---	218	July 1939	Popper, David H	V	---	536	Feb. 1942
Stein, Guenther	III	---	234	July 1939	Roth, Andrew	V	---	239	Aug. 1941
	III	---	282	Aug. 1939	Steiger, G. Nye	V	---	542	Feb. 1942
Stone, Wm. T	III	---	98	May 1939	Strong, Anna Louise			11	Mar. 1941
Timperley, H. J	III	---	510	Jan. 1940	Vinacke, Harold M			473	Jan. 1942
Vinacke, Harold M	III	---	249	Aug. 1939	Brandt, Wm	VI	---	187	June 1942
"Asiaticus"	IV	---	543	Feb. 1941	Goshal, Kumar	VI	---	36	Mar. 1942
	IV	---	442	Dec. 1940	Grajdanzer, Andrew	VI	---	174	June 1942
Barnes, Kathleen	IV	---	116	May 1940		VI	---	269	Aug. 1942
Barnett, Robert W	IV	---	518	Jan. 1941		VI	---	362	Oct. 1942
	IV	---	38	Mar. 1940	Greenberg, Michael	VI	---	42	Mar. 1942
	IV	---	225	July 1940	Holland, Wm. L	VI	---	179	June 1942
	IV	---	72	Apr. 1940	Jaffe, Philip J	VI	---	161	June 1942
Bisson, T. A	IV	---	136	May 1940		VI	---	255	Aug. 1942
	IV	---	421	Nov. 1940	Kizer, Benjamin H	VI	---	233	July 1942
	IV	---	469	Dec. 1940	Mitchell, Kate L	VI	---	27	Mar. 1942
Brandt, Wm	IV	---	315	Sep. 1940		VI	---	107	May 1942
	IV	---	10	Mar. 1940		VI	---	275	Aug. 1942
	IV	---	401	Nov. 1940		VI	---	382	Oct. 1942
Chi, Ch'ao-Ting	IV	---	4	Mar. 1940	Moore, Harriet	VI	---	15	Mar. 1942
Field, Fred. V	IV	---	349	Oct. 1940	Norton, Robert	VI	---	211	July 1942
Grajdanzev, A	IV	---	336	Sep. 1940	Popper, David H	VI	---	225	July 1942
	IV	---	513	Jan. 1941	Rosinger, Lawrence K	VI	---	483	Jan. 25 '43
	IV	---	381	Oct. 1940	Steiger, G. Nye	VI	---	221	July 1942
Graves, Mortimer	IV	---	7	Mar. 1940	Vinacke, Harold M	VI	---	495	Jan. 25 '43
Greene, Roger S	IV	---	452	Dec. 1940	Hsu Yung-Ying	VII	---	195-	July 1943
Jaffe, Philip J	IV	---	397	Nov. 1940				205	
	IV	---	547	Feb. 1941	Jaffe, Philip J	VII	---	195-	July 1943
Lattimore, Owen	IV	---	253	Aug. 1940				205	
	IV	---	136	May 1940	Kizer, Benjamin H	VII	---	323-	Oct. 1943
Mitchell, Kate	IV	---	---	Mar. 1940-				327	
	IV	---	213	July 1940	Mitchell, Kate L	VII	---	216-	July 1943
	IV	---	538	Feb. 1941				227	
Motylev, V. E	IV	---	417	Nov. 1940	Bisson, T. A	VIII	---	62	Feb. 23 '45
	IV	---	21	Mar. 1940	Field, Fred. V	VIII	---	62	Feb. 23 '45
Norton, Robert	IV	---	229	July 1940	Rhee, Dr. Syngman	VIII	---	275-	Oct. 1945
Porter, Catherine	IV	---	25	Mar. 1940				76	
Rosinger, Lawrence K	IV	---	368	Oct. 1940		VIII	---	324	Dec. 1945
	IV	---	42	Mar. 1940	Rosinger, Lawrence K	VIII	---	62	Dec. 1945
	IV	---	271	Aug. 1940	Tung, Pi-wu	IX	---	137-	May 4 '45
Roth, Andrew	IV	---	276	Aug. 1940				138	
	IV	---	411	Nov. 1940	Wallace, V-Pres	IX	---	116-	Apr. 20 '45
Stone, Wm. T	IV	---	111	May 1940				117	
Thompson, Virginia	IV	---	307	Sep. 1940	Allen, James S	X	---	160	Nov. 1946
Vinacke, Harold	IV	---	289	Aug. 1940	Benedict, Ruth	XI	---	91	Mar. 1947
"Asiaticus"	V	---	11	Mar. 1941	Borg, Dorothy	XI	---	189	June 1947
	V	---	355	Oct. 1941	Epstein, Israel	XI	---	188	June 1947
	V	---	118	May 1941	Isaacs, Harold R	XI	---	189	June 1947
	V	---	287	Sep. 1941	Jaffe, Philip	XI	---	195-	July 1947
Austern, Hilda	V	---	546	Feb. 1942				231	
Barnett, Robert	V	---	163	June 1941	McNair, Harley Farns-	XI	---	93	Mar. 1947
	V	---	123	May 1941	worth.				

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have the United States Government employees who contributed to Amerasia, a study made by the staff of the committee.



Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1356" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1356

*United States Government employees who contributed to Amerasia*

Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year	Government post
Barnett, Robert W.-----	IV	-----	38	Mar. 1940	Army 1943-45, maj., overseas ser., asst. adv. for econ. affairs (Japan), Office of Asst. Sec. of St. for Econ. Aff's; econ. adv. & chmn., Far Eastern Comm.; sp. ass't. for St., War, Navy Coord'ng Comm. aff'rs; adv. to Far Eastern Comm., Div of Jap. & Korean Aff'rs; Act. adv., div. of Occupied-Area Econ. Aff'rs; officer in chg. of econ. Aff'rs, Office of Chinese Affr's.
		-----	225	July 1940	
		-----	72	Apr. 1940	
	V	-----	518	Jan. 1941	
		-----	163	June 1941	
		-----	123	May 1941	
Bisson, T. A.-----	I	4	151	June 1937	Adviser, Govt. Section, Supr. Cmdr. for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Princ. Economist, Bd. of Econ. Warfare, 1942-43.
	I	8	360	Oct. 1937	
	II	7	322	Sept. 1938	
	II	4	178	June 1938	
	II	1	3	Mar. 1938	
	II	2	82	Apr. 1938	
	II	7	323	Sept. 1938	
	II	4	181	June 1938	
	II	9	421	Nov. 1938	
	II	7	324	Sept. 1938	
	II	10	481	Dec. 1938	
	II	12	581	Feb. 1939	
	II	8	371	Oct. 1938	
	II	6	274	Aug. 1938	
	II	5	263	July 1938	
	II	3	130	May 1938	
	II	9	418	Nov. 1938	
	II	7	347	Sept. 1938	
	II	11	551	Jan. 1939	
	II	9	452	Nov. 1938	
	III	-----	246	Aug. 1939	
	III	-----	198	July 1939	
	III	-----	294	Sept. 1939	
	III	-----	2	Mar. 1939	
	III	-----	438	Dec. 1939	
	III	-----	393	Nov. 1939	
	IV	-----	136	May 1940	
	IV	-----	421	Nov. 1940	
	IV	-----	469	Dec. 1940	
	V	-----	101	May 1941	
	V	-----	344	Oct. 1941	
	VI	-----	50	Mar. 1942	
	IX	-----	62	Feb. 1945	
Carlson, Evans Fordyce.-----	III	-----	555	Feb. 1940	U. S. Army 1912-20; U. S. Marine Corps 1922-39, disch. Col.; Marine Corps 1941 to ---, Col. 1944.
		-----	345	Oct. 1939	
		-----	12	Mar. 1939	
		-----	458	Dec. 1939	
Deane, Hugh.-----	V	-----	5	Mar. 1941	OWI, Infor. Coordinator, 1942.
	V	-----	316	Sept. 1941	
		-----	202	July 1941	
Fairbank, John K.-----	I	7	250	Aug. 1941	Cultural-relations office, Chungking, 1945; same, Nanking, 1946.
			295	Sept. 1937	
Greenberg, Michael.-----	V	-----	144	June 1941	Bd. of Econ. Warfare; For. Econ. Adm.; (Specialist on China).
	VI	-----	42	Mar. 1942	
Hanson, Haldore.-----	III	-----	78	Apr. 1939	Actg. Asst. to the Adm'r. for Projects of the Tech. Coop. Adm., St. Dept. (1951), St. Dept. 1942-45.
		-----	158	June 1939	
Hornbeck, Stanley K.-----	I	1	16	Mar. 1937	Far Eastern Div., Dept. of State, 1925-44.
Johnstone, Wm. C.-----	II	3	137	May 1938	Pub. Aff'rs Off., Foreign Ser. Aux., New Delhi, 7/46; For. Ser. Res. off. 11/13/46; Act. Dir., Off. of Ed. Exch., 7/48; Dir. 8/48; GS-15 10/49.
			335	Oct. 1941	



*United States Government employees who contributed to Amerasia—Continued*

Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year	Government post
Kizer, Benjamin H.-----	I	5	207	July 1937	Dir. of UNRRA in China, 1944-46; Nat. War Labor Bd.; Spl. Master, U. S. Cir. Ct. of Appls., 1942-44.
	II	12	563	Feb. 1939	
	II	2	86	Apr. 1938	
	III	-----	132	May 1939	
	V	-----	425	Dec. 1941	
Latimore, Owen.-----	VI	-----	233	July 1942	State Dept. 1941, as F. D. R. pol. adv. to Kai-shek; Depy. Dir., Pac. Relations, OWI., 1944; St. Dept. del. to Ind.-Amer. Conf. at New Delhi, 1949.
	I	7	310	Sept. 1937	
	II	1	26	Mar. 1937	
		10	475	Dec. 1938	
		6	309	Aug. 1938	
		8	380	Oct. 1938	
		1	31	Mar. 1938	
	IV	-----	253	Aug. 1940	
	V	-----	136	May 1940	
		-----	296	Sept. 1941	
Lockwood, Wm. W.-----	I	11	503	Jan. 1938	Division of Japanese and Korean Econ. Affairs, State Dept.
	II	2	53	Apr. 1937	
		3	98	May 1937	
		11	517	Jan. 1939	
		9	425	Nov. 1938	
		1	44	Mar. 1938	
	III	5	226	July 1938	
		10	467	Dec. 1938	
		-----	487	Jan. 1940	
		-----	201	July 1939	
Porter, Catherine.-----	IV	-----	390	Nov. 1939	With the St. Dept. since '45, Chf. of Philippines Br. Area Div. III since 1946.
		-----	25	Mar. 1940	
		-----	16	Mar. 1940	
Roth, Andrew.-----	IV	-----	276	Aug. 1940	Lt. jg. US Navy 1941- ; As- signed to ONI, as Liaison officer betw. Navy & St. Dept.
	V	-----	239	Aug. 1941	
	-----	-----	173	June 1941	
		-----	361	Oct. 1941	
Stone, Wm. T.-----	I	2	52	Apr. 1937	Ed. of research publ. 1925-28, dir. of Wash. bu. 1928-33, v. pres. 1933-41, For. Policy Assn.; chief of Br. Empire Div. 1941, asst. dir. 1942-43 Bd. of Econ. Warfare; dir. of spec. areas br., For. Econ. Admin. 1943-44; dir. of Econ. Warfare Div., Am. emb., Lon- don, and sp. adv. to Am. Amb. at London 1944-45; app. dir., Office of Int. Infor. and Cult. Affairs, Dept. of St., P-8, Nov. 12, '45; V. Chm., Interdept. Comm. on Sci. & Cult. Co-op., 2/4/46; Spl. asst. to asst. Sec. of St. for public affrs. 6/21/48; GS- 15 10/30/49.
		7	292	Sept. 1937	
		8	339	Oct. 1937	
		4	175	June 1937	
		1	3	Mar. 1937	
	II	9	386	Nov. 1937	
		10	505	Dec. 1938	
		6	275	Aug. 1938	
		1	63	Mar. 1938	
	III	-----	98	May 1939	
	IV	-----	111	May 1940	

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a photostat from the hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, dated January 16, 1952, showing that Max Granich, whose name has appeared in our hearings, refused to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1357" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1357

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PRESS IN THE COMMUNIST  
CONSPIRACY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1952

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

PUBLIC HEARING

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to adjournment at 10:45 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. Clyde Doyle, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Clyde Doyle, Harold H. Velde, Bernard W. Kearney, and Donald L. Jackson.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Thomas W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and Rosella Purdy, secretary to counsel.

Mr. DOYLE. For the purpose of the record, I will announce that the chairman of the committee has appointed for the purpose of this hearing as a subcommittee, committee members Velde, Jackson, and Doyle. Present also at this time is committee member Kearney. The subcommittee named is all present.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, the first witness this morning is Mr. Max Granich.

Will you come forward, please, Mr. Granich?

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Granich, will you please raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give this morning in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GRANICH. I do.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name, please, sir?

TESTIMONY OF MAX GRANICH, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, DAVID REIN

Mr. GRANICH. Max Granich.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you represented by counsel?

Mr. GRANICH. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will counsel please identify himself for the record?

Mr. REIN. David Rein, R-e-i-n, 711 Fourteenth Street NW.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present address, Mr. Granich?

Mr. GRANICH. Wilmington, Vt.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give us your full name, please?

Mr. GRANICH. Max Granich.

Mr. TAVENNER. When and where were you born?

Mr. GRANICH. New York City, March 19, 1896.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please outline for the committee, briefly, your educational background?

Mr. GRANICH. New York public schools; a graduate. Evening high schools; didn't graduate. And then self-education.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your profession or trade?

Mr. GRANICH. Well, I have had many jobs. I haven't limited myself to one thing.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please speak a little louder?



Mr. GRANICH. I have had many jobs, many trades.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you outline for the committee, briefly please, how you have been employed?

Mr. GRANICH. Well, going back a long way, I was office boy, cowpuncher, ranch hand, orange picker, railroad section hand, newspaper reporter.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you become a newspaper reporter?

Mr. GRANICH. Early 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, some period in there.

I worked as a sales engineer. I worked as a carpenter. I worked as a shipyard worker, a farmer.

Mr. TAVENNER. How are you employed now?

Mr. GRANICH. Self-employed.

Mr. TAVENNER. In what business?

Mr. GRANICH. Operating a children's camp, and a farm; a work camp, a farm camp.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where?

Mr. GRANICH. In Wilmington, Vt.

Mr. DOYLE. Will you speak up just a little louder, Mr. Granich, please?

Mr. GRANICH. I will try.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you for trying.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long have you been engaged in that work in Wilmington?

Mr. GRANICH. The last 6 years or 7 years. In fact, I believe we bought the farm in 1944.

Mr. TAVENNER. In 1944. How were you employed between 1944 and 1946?

Mr. GRANICH. Well, in-between there, I worked in the shipyards. That was at the time I went to the camp. I worked in the shipyards from 1941 to the end of the war.

Mr. TAVENNER. What shipyards?

Mr. GRANICH. Two or three of them around New York City.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give us the names of them?

Mr. GRANICH. Certainly. Todd's Shipyards, Hoboken, N. J.; Atlantic Basin in Brooklyn.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you speak a little louder, please? It is a little difficult to hear you.

Prior to 1941, how were you employed?

Mr. GRANICH. I was editing a magazine in New York City.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the name of the magazine?

Mr. GRANICH. China today.

Mr. TAVENNER. Whom did you succeed as editor?

Mr. GRANICH. I just don't remember his name. I just don't.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who were some of the editors of that magazine prior to the time that you became its editor?

Mr. GRANICH. Gentlemen, I am going to refuse to answer that question, and claim my constitutional privilege; self-incrimination.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was Philip Jaffe the first editor of that magazine?

Mr. GRANICH. On the same grounds, gentlemen, of self-incrimination, I refuse.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you acquainted with Philip Jaffe?

Mr. GRANICH. On the same grounds, gentlemen—

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you an employee of Philip Jaffe at one period of time?

Mr. GRANICH. On the same grounds; I claim the fifth amendment.

Mr. TAVENNER. Prior to the time that you—let me ask you this first. When did you first become employed as editor of that mafazine?

Mr. GRANICH. When I came back from China.

Mr. TAVENNER. What date was that, approximately?

Mr. GRANICH. 1938.

Mr. TAVENNER. 1938. Well, prior to your going to China, how were you employed?

Mr. GRANICH. I am trying to get dates exactly. It is difficult thinking back. But I worked as a sales engineer there for a period of time. I had three or four jobs as sales engineer. I was unemployed some periods of that time. I can't say exactly what I did prior to that time, by date.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Granich, you were identified in testimony before this committee yesterday and last week as a member of the Communist Party. Do you desire to comment on that?

Mr. GRANICH. Not a bit.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. GRANICH. I will claim my constitutional privilege on that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you now a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. GRANICH. I still will refuse.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, when you state you refuse to answer on the ground of your constitutional privilege, what do you mean?

Mr. GRANICH. That it might be incriminating, self-incriminating.

Mr. TAVENNER. That to answer that question might tend to subject you to criminal prosecution?

Mr. GRANICH. Right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you acquainted with Mr. Louis F. Budenz?

Mr. GRANICH. I still will claim the privilege, gentlemen.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Granich, I hand you a photostatic copy of a passport application in the name of Max Granich, executed October 22, 1931.

I will first offer this passport in evidence and ask that it be marked "Granich Exhibit No. 1."

Mr. DOYLE. It will be accepted and so marked.

(The passport referred to, marked "Granich Exhibit No. 1," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you examine the passport and look at page 2 and state whether or not that is your signature? It is at the top of page 2.

Mr. GRANICH. Yes, sir, I will identify this.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is that also your photograph appearing at the bottom of the same page?

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have the passport application of David Lattimore to the World Youth Festival in 1947.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.



(The passport application referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1357A" and is as follows:)

Form DS-11  
7-1-47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
PASSPORT APPLICATION  
FORM FOR NATIVE CITIZEN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

STATE OF \_\_\_\_\_

COUNTY OF \_\_\_\_\_

I, DAVID LATTIMORE  
(Name of applicant)  
do hereby apply to the Department of State, at Washington, for a passport. I solemnly swear that I was born at  
PEKING HOPEN CHINA on MARCH 25, 1931  
(City and State) (Country or country)  
I am domiciled in the United States, my permanent residence being at Roland Vines Road  
in Ruxton (Town or city) (State and county)  
I have resided outside the United States as follows:  
(State name of, and period of residence in, each foreign country)  
China from 1931 to 1933  
(Name of principal) from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
My father, Owen Lattimore (Name of father)  
was born or about July 29, 1900 and is now residing at Roland Vines Rd., Ruxton, Md.  
(The following portion in this block is to be filled in only by a person whose father has not been in the United States for at least 10 years)  
My father emigrated to the United States on or about \_\_\_\_\_ (Month, day, and year) and resided \_\_\_\_\_  
years continuously in the United States from \_\_\_\_\_ and was naturalized as a citizen of the United States before the \_\_\_\_\_ (Month, day, and year) at \_\_\_\_\_ (City and State)  
My mother, Eleanor Holgate Lattimore (Name of mother)  
was born or about May 1, 1895 and is now residing at Roland Vines Rd., Ruxton, Md.  
(The following portion in this block is to be filled in only by a person whose mother has not been in the United States for at least 10 years)  
My mother emigrated to the United States on or about \_\_\_\_\_ (Month, day, and year) and resided \_\_\_\_\_  
years continuously in the United States from \_\_\_\_\_ and was naturalized as a citizen of the United States before the \_\_\_\_\_ (Month, day, and year) at \_\_\_\_\_ (City and State)  
DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT  
Height 5 feet, 9 3/4 inches.  
Hair Brown  
Eyes Hazel  
Distinguishing marks or features \_\_\_\_\_ (Note any marks or features.)  
Neatness of face by which applicant may be identified  
Place of birth Peking, Hopen, China (City and State)  
Date of birth March 25, 1931 (Month, day, and year)  
Occupation Student  
MAILING ADDRESS  
(Print complete address plainly)  
MR. JOHN HOLDEN  
THE PUTNEY SCHOOL  
PUTNEY SCHOOL  
194177  
My last American passport was obtained from \_\_\_\_\_ and is submitted herewith for cancellation.



I was ~~(never married)~~  
 last married on ..... to .....  
 who was born at .....; who <sup>is</sup><sub>is not</sub> an American citizen,  
 and who is now residing at .....  
 Our marriage <sup>has not been terminated.</sup>  
 was terminated by (death) (divorce) on .....  
 (Date of death or divorce)

**A WOMAN APPLICANT WHO IS OR HAS BEEN MARRIED MUST FILL IN THIS PORTION**

My maiden name was ..... and  
 I <sup>was not previously married.</sup>  
 was previously married to .....  
 (Full name of former husband)  
 on ..... at ..... who was born  
 (Date) (City and State)  
 at ..... and the marriage was terminated by <sup>death</sup><sub>divorce</sub> on .....  
 (Date)  
 (If married more than twice, set forth facts in a supplemental statement)  
 My <sup>husband</sup><sub>former husband</sub> emigrated to the United States on .....  
 and <sup>his father</sup><sub>he</sub> ..... was naturalized as a citizen of the United States before the  
 (Name of father)  
 Court of ..... at .....  
 (City and State)  
 on ..... as shown by the Certificate of Naturalization <sup>submitted herewith.</sup>  
 (Month, day, and year) previously submitted.

**MY TRAVEL PLANS ARE AS FOLLOWS:**

Port of departure New York  
 Approximate date of departure June 21, 1947  
 Proposed length of stay abroad 4 months  
 Means of transportation Marine Tiger  
 (Name of ship or air line)  
 Countries to be visited France, Czechoslovakia,  
England - for  
 Purpose of trip for study and reconstruct-  
ion work & to attend the World Youth  
Festival in Prague



I solemnly swear that the statements on both sides of this application are true and that the photograph attached hereto is a likeness of me.

I <sup>have</sup><sub>have not</sub> been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted or performed the duties of any office, post or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of war; been convicted by court martial, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, of committing any act of treason against, or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States.

**OATH OF ALLEGIANCE**

Further, I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation, or purpose of evasion: So help me God.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of June, 1947  
 (Signature of applicant) David Lathmore  
 [SEAL OF COURT] St. Paul  
 Clerk of the County Court at Brattleboro, Vt.

**AFFIDAVIT OF IDENTIFYING WITNESS**

I, the undersigned, solemnly swear that I am a citizen of the United States; that I reside at the address written below my signature hereto affixed; that I know the applicant who executed the affidavit hereinbefore set forth to be a citizen of the United States; that the statements made in the applicant's affidavit are true to the best of my knowledge and belief; further, I solemnly swear that I have known the applicant personally for 2 years.

If witness has been issued a passport, give number if known and date or approximate date of issue.

No. \_\_\_\_\_ Date of issue \_\_\_\_\_

No lawyer or other person will be accepted as witness to a passport application if he has received or expects to receive a fee for his services in connection with the execution of the application or obtaining the passport.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of June, 1947  
 (Signature of witness) Bertha Vinton  
 [SEAL OF COURT] Not related  
 (Relationship to applicant; if not related, so state)  
Putney School, Putney, Vt.  
 (Residence address of witness)  
 Clerk of the County Court at Brattleboro, Vt.



THE PUTNEY SCHOOL,  
ELM LEA FARM,  
Putney, Vt., May 31, 1947.

Mr. LOUIS B. OWENS,  
Passport Division, Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. OWEN: This is to certify that David Lattimore is a bona fide member of the Putney School group going to France for construction work this summer and is getting a IB priority to sail on the S. S. *Marine Tiger* on June 21, 1947, and return on the *Marine Tiger* on September 12, 1947. Since June 21st is almost upon us, it is hoped that his passport will be returned to me without delay.

Sincerely yours,

John S. Holden,  
JOHN S. HOLDEN,  
Director, Summer Trips.

Mr. MANDEL. In connection with that it was disclosed that David Lattimore sailed on the steamship *Marine Tiger*, and we have a letter from the United States Department of Commerce showing that the steamship *Marine Tiger* was used for cultural missions abroad, and the authority under which it operated.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1358" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1358

MAY 4, 1952.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,  
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Some time during the middle 1940's the United States ship *Marine Tiger* was, according to my information, used under Government auspices for cultural missions abroad. Would you kindly let me know the exact period of such use and the exact authority under which that ship operated at that time?

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,  
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION,  
Washington, D. C., May 23, 1952.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: Your letter of May 5, 1952, addressed to the Secretary of State, inquiring as to the period the S/S *Marine Tiger* was used for cultural missions abroad and under what authority the ship was operated at that time, has been referred to the Maritime Administration for reply.

The Department of State on April 24, 1947 requested the former Maritime Commission to assign suitable ships for the transportation of students and teachers between the United States and European countries, for the 1947 summer season only. The Commission on April 29, 1947 authorized the use of the ships *Marine Tiger* and *Marine Jumper* in this service from June to October 1947 for operation under General Agency Agreement by Agwilines and Moore-McCormack Lines, respectively.

The authority of the Maritime Commission to operate these vessels was contained in P. L. 521, 79th Congress (60 Stat. 614), which authorized the Maritime Commission to carry on until March 1, 1947 the operating functions transferred from the War Shipping Administration to the Commission by P. L. 492, 79th Congress (60 Stat. 481); and in P. L. 6, 80th Congress (61 Stat. 6) and P. L. 127, 80th Congress (61 Stat. 190) which successively extended the authority of the Maritime Commission until July 1, 1947 and March 1, 1948. The War Shipping Administration authority was based upon E. O. 9054, as amended, and P. L. 101 of the 78th Congress (55 Stat. 242), as amended.



Voyages made by the two ships under this program are shown on the attached pages.

Should you desire further information concerning this matter, I shall be glad to assist you.

Sincerely yours,

E. L. COCHRANE,  
Maritime Administrator.


Attachment.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have documents taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one being a post card addressed to Mr. Frederick Field, announcing an open forum of the American Friends of the Chinese People.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1359" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1359





Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a circular of the New School for Social Research, as taken from the files of the institute, showing the course scheduled on the Far East, including a number of names included in our hearings.

Mr. MORRIS. The significance of that, Mr. Chairman, is that the chairman of this course is Mr. Edward C. Carter, and in almost every case there the people on his staff at the New School now are people who have come up in our hearings.

Seantor O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1360" and is follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1360

### ASIA IN FERMENT

#### A COURSE PLANNED TO HELP AMERICANS UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT WORLD-SHAKING EVENTS IN ASIA

Tuesdays, 8:30-10:10 p. m. \$23.50, incl. registration fee.<sup>1</sup> Beginning Sept. 25.

This course deals with current events in Asia and their effects, present and potential, on the rest of the world. The lectures offer a comprehensive analysis of the social forces at work in an attempt to give the student a perspective on the future.

Individual topics treated include: Asia in American and Russian policies; after Korea; Communism in China; reaction and progress in India; whither Pakistan; economic development—the case of Japan; Indonesian problems and progress; Viet Nam and Viet Minh (French Indo-China); Huks vs. Government in the Philippines; Asia's nationalisms; clash in Burma, Siam, Malaya; British, French, and Dutch interests; Asia and the Pacific "bloes"; requisites for viable settlements in Asia.

#### OPTIONAL SEMINAR HOUR

Ample opportunity is afforded at the end of each lecture period for questions from students and answers by the lecturer. The lecture course is complete in itself. Credit students, however, are required also to take an additional seminar hour in which subjects introduced in lectures can be developed in conversation. This seminar hour is open to a limited number of non-credit students who can satisfy the course chairman of serious purpose and ability to profit from the hour. Application for admittance to the seminar hour should be addressed, by letter, to Edward C. Carter at the New School. The provisional seminar hour is Tuesday, 5:10-6:00 p. m. Special fee, \$14.00.

#### COURSE SCHEDULE

Chairman of the course is EDWARD C. CARTER. Mr. Carter was formerly Secretary-General of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Director of International Studies of the New School. He lived and worked in Asia for many years and has known many of that continent's leading figures of the last quarter-century.

Guest lecturers will participate as follows:

- Sept. 25. OWEN LATTIMORE, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University
- Oct. 2. RALPH E. TURNER, Professor of History, Yale University
- Oct. 9. C. MARTIN WILBUR, Associate Professor of Chinese History, Columbia University
- Oct. 16. LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN, Institute of Pacific Relations, Fellow, recently returned from Indonesia
- Oct. 23. DR. FINKELSTEIN

<sup>1</sup> You may register merely by sending this coupon and your check for \$23.50 by mail:

REGISTRAR,

New School,

66 W. 12th St., New York 11, N. Y.

Please register me for Course 122, *Asia in Ferment*.

Please register me for Course 122, *Asia in Ferment*.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Street \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_



- Oct. 30. LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, Social Science Research Council Fellow, Columbia University
- Nov. 6. DERK BODDE, Professor of Chinese, University of Pennsylvania
- Nov. 13. HUGH BORTON, Associate Professor of Japanese; acting director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Nov. 20. W. W. LOCKWOOD, Assistant Director, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
- Nov. 27. MR. LOCKWOOD
- Dec. 4. NATHANIEL W. PEPPER, Professor of International Relations, Columbia University
- Dec. 11. VERA M. DEAN, Director, Research Department, Foreign Policy Assn.
- Dec. 18. W. L. HOLLAND, Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations
- Jan. 8. HAROLD R. ISAACS, journalist; author, "New Cycle in Asia," "Two Thirds of the World"
- Jan. 15. MR. ISAACS

REGISTER NOW

NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH  
66 West Twelfth Street, New York 11, N. Y.

MR. MANDEL. Next we have a document from Y. Y. Hsu, dated May 8, 1942, which is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dealing with the Chinese Communist movement.

MR. MORRIS. There are two of those, are there not, Mr. Mandel?

MR. MANDEL. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. The unavailability of Mr. Hsu is noted in connection with this document.

Senator O'CONOR. They will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit Nos. 1360-A and 1360-B" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1360-A

#### STATEMENT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, AUG. 19, 1941

Four copies:

1 to Mr. Carter

1 to Mr. Holland

1 to Miss Brenecke of YWCA, who lent the material

Notes #12

NOTES ON CHINESE LITERATURE, No. 12, MAY 7, 1942. BY Y. Y. H.

A copy of the full text of the Chinese Communist Party's position on the Roosevelt-Churchill joint declaration of August 14, 1941, reached this country belatedly. Arriving with this document there is an article by Mr. Mao Tse-tung throwing some interesting light on the Chinese Communist position on the "capitalist development of China's social economy"

*On Roosevelt-Churchill joint declaration.*—The Chinese Communist statement, dated August 19, 1941, characterized the Roosevelt-Churchill joint declaration of August 14 and the concurrent proposal for a tri-partite conference in Moscow as "an international foundation not only for the liberation of England, America, and the Soviet Union from the menace of Fascism, but also for the liberation of the peoples of the entire world as well as for the liberation of our Chinese people." The fact that "the declaration did not mention Japan by name," that Point IV of the declaration "hinted to Japan the possibility of trade and supply of raw materials," and that Point VII hinted "to permit Japanese immigration" was noted by the statement. These by themselves might indicate attempts "to conciliate Japan," but the Chinese Communists see a "positive Anti-Japanese" stand in the declaration, especially in Point VIII which "recognizes the necessity to disarm all aggressor nations."

The full text of the statement, issued in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, follows:

"The joint declaration issued on August 14 by President Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain and their proposal



for a tri-partite conference in Moscow is an important event of world historical significance which opens a new stage in world history.

"The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and the proposal for a Moscow conference indicates England and America's determination to overthrow Fascism. This determination is thoroughly beneficial to the Soviet Union, to England and America, to China, and to the world.

"The greatest danger has been and still is the attempt to accept a Fascist peace on the part of a section of the pro-Fascist reactionaries in England and America, in defiance of the will of the people, but the declaration has rejected this kind of peace. There are also others who would take the position of a spectator and let the Soviet Union shoulder alone the burden of wearing out the Fascists so that they would be able to take any advantage at an opportune time. But this passive attempt received a blow from the action of Roosevelt and Churchill, who proposed the Moscow conference in order to map out concrete measures for the assignments of war tasks and the distribution of war supplies.. It is especially in England and America's recognition of the necessity to disarm the aggressor nations and their insistence upon the ultimate collapse of Nazism, as well as their agreement to share the tasks and the supplies for the war that the victory for the Soviet union, England and America, as well as the victory for China and the entire world, is guaranteed.

"In his famous speech of July 3 Stalin referred to the fact that the Soviet Union had observed treaty obligations while Germany had violated them and attacked the Soviet Union as to have constituted a political factor in the long run, laying the basis for military victory. This is a truth which has found its complete vindication in the recent Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and the proposal for a Moscow conference. The declaration and the conference proposal has especially evidenced America's determination to participate in the sacred war against Fascist aggression and such a determination on the part of America indicates that the great worldwide fighting front against Fascist aggression has been completed politically, while its organizational completion will be effected in the Moscow conference. The Fascist front is now isolated and its doom pre-determined.

"The situation as existing at present was impossible to obtain prior to the outbreak of the European war in the Autumn of 1939, for, despite the efforts on the part of the Soviet Union and the peoples of the entire world to organize an anti-Fascist front for international security, the Munich policy, damaging both to the advocates and the victims, was still in vogue in England and America at that time. This erroneous policy was rectified only after the cruel lessons of war. The change is directly effected by the heroic battles of the peoples of the Soviet Union; the Red Army has stopped the offensive of the German army, and thereby Roosevelt and Churchill were encouraged to confer and issue the recent joint declaration. The change has also been the result of the militant struggles of the peoples of England and America. Such struggles have dealt blows against a section of the pro-Fascist reactionaries in England and America and enabled both Roosevelt and Churchill to reject the temptations of a Fascist peace. Such a change for a politically farsighted policy is also the result of the heroic struggles of the Chinese people. The Chinese people has brought the invasion of the Japanese Fascist bandit army to a stop, thus emboldening England and America to issue the statement for the disarming of all aggressor nations.

"The joint declaration did not mention Japan by name; Point IV of the declaration hinted to Japan the possibility of trade and supply of war materials; and Point VII hinted to permit Japanese immigration; these are attempts to befriend Japan's advocates of the status quo and indicate a willingness to conciliate Japan. But Point II of the declaration opposed to arbitrary territorial changes; Point III insists upon the reestablishment of nations whose rights have been deprived; and especially Point VIII recognizes the necessity of disarming all aggressor nations: these all constitute a positive anti-Japanese stand.

"All in all, the entire people of China welcomes this Anglo-American declaration and the Anglo-American-Soviet tripartite conference to be held in Moscow. The Chinese people believes this to be an international foundation not only for the liberation of England, America and the Soviet Union from the menace of Fascism, but also for the liberation of the peoples of the entire world as well as for the liberating of our own Chinese people.

"The tasks of the Chinese people lie in the insistence upon unity and the war of resistance, the overcoming of reactionary attempts to sabotage unity and resistance within the Anti-Japanese front, and the active organization of the counter-offensive against the Japanese invaders.



"There exists within China Fifth-columnists of the enemy who are Japanophiles and Germanophiles. These people advocate against the Communists in the country, contrary to the national interest and the interest of the human race. What they are doing are nothing more than giving their support to Hitler's anti-Bolshevist crusade and clearing the way for the Japanese Fascists. If these Fifth-columnists remain unstirred and persist to perpetrate their antipeople, antination, and antihumanity crimes in the face of the actual establishment of the great world-wide anti-Fascist union, they would be condemned by the entire Chinese people and the entire world. We believe that if the people of the entire nation would only redouble its effort and clean out the Fifth columnists, then unity will be strengthened, the war of resistance will be energetically maintained, and the counter-offensive will be realized. China is well-qualified as a participant in the worldwide anti-Fascist front to become one of its powerful arms.

"The fate of entire China and the whole world is tied up with the present struggle with Fascism. All political parties and groupings in China ought to deal with this rare opportunity of a millenium with wisdom and propriety, by unifying the people of the entire country to strive as one man toward a good and progressive direction. This is the deeply seated desire of the Communists."

The Chinese Communists position on "Capitalist development" in China will be dealt with in the following number of the "Notes."

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EXHIBIT No. 1360-B

Four copies :

1 to Carter

1 to Holland

1 to Miss Brenecke who supplied the original.

Part of the summaries are written especially to oblige the owner of the "Selections" who wants to know the general content.

NOTES ON CHINESE LITERATURE. No. 13, MAY 8, 1942. Y. Y. H.

*Communist guidance of capitalist development.*—The twofold historical task of the Chinese Communists, according to Mao Tse-tung, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, is to maintain their Communist integrity on one hand and "to give guidance to the capitalist development" of China's social economy on the other. This is the most categorical clarification of the economic policy of the Chinese Communists which has come to our attention.

Elsewhere in the article which contained the above statement Mr. Mao wrote: "The labor policy (of the Chinese Communist Party) is a twofold policy of proper improvement of the living conditions of the workers and noninterference with the development of capitalist production. The land policy is a twofold one which stands for the reduction of rent and interest on the part of the landlords and the payment of rent and interest on the part of the farmers. The policy on political right is a twofold one which grants human and property rights to all landlords and capitalists identical with those of the workers and farmers on the one hand and the prevention of their possible counterrevolutionary actions sabotage of the anti-Japanese movement and the people's (interests)."

*Free and government enterprises and cooperatives.*—The relative importance of free and government enterprises and cooperatives is contrasted by Mr. Mao, as he wrote: "State economic enterprises and cooperatives ought to be developed, but the main thing for the present is not state enterprises but private enterprises. It is to afford the opportunity of development for an economy based upon liberalism, to oppose Japanese Imperialism and semifeudalism. This is the most revolutionary policy for China at the present. It is wrong to oppose or sabotage this trend."

*Communist integrity distinguished from correct national policy.*—The general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party anticipates demoralization among some of his followers during the process of China's capitalist development, but even then he would insist upon what he regards as the correct policy. "It is our historical task during the period of the war of resistance against the Japanese and the building of the democratic republic", writes Mao, "both to maintain solemnly and determinedly our Communist integrity and to promote and guide the capitalist development of social economy." He continues: "During this period, it is inevitable, and it need not cause us worry, that a section of the membership of the Communist Party will be demoralized by capitalism and



the capitalist class. The intraparty struggle against political and ideological demoralization must not be mistakenly directed against the social economy."

*Review of Soviet policy.*—There is "difference in principle," according to Mao, between the present Communist policy and the policy during the Soviet period before the war. "Then it was opposition to the landlords and the Bourgeoisie; now, it is unity with all landlords and capitalists who are not opposed to the anti-Japanese War."

But the undifferentiated policy during the very last period of the Soviets toward the "reactionary government and the reactionary political party which were attacking" the Soviet regime on the one hand, and the capitalist elements "within the jurisdiction" of the Soviet regime on the other, was wrong, according to the Communist leader. This mistaken policy, as characterized by Mao, was "struggle-against-everything", which was compared with an equally mistaken policy in 1927—"Unity-with-everything-and-denial-of-any-struggle".

One concrete instance during the "last period" of the Soviet was mentioned by Mao. This was the repudiation of a policy adopted in the "first and middle periods." This original policy which distributed land equally to former landlords was now regarded as correct.

*Rural Surveys.*—The above definitive statements of the economic policy of the Chinese Communists appear in the postscript to Mao Tse-tung's "Rural Surveys," reprinted in *Selections from Emancipation Daily*, Yen-an, No. 6, September 10, 1941. In the same issue of the *Selections* there is also a reprint of the second introduction to the survey. (Title of reprint: "Introduction to Rural Surveys, II." By Mao Tse-tung.) While the postscript explains the difference of the Communist policies between the Civil war period and the present, the introduction dwells upon the importance of fact-finding. These survey were personally conducted by Mao Tse-tung in Kiangsi and Hunan provinces between 1927 and 1934. A number of these, according to the Introduction, were lost. The main purpose for the publication of those which had been preserved was, according to the author, "not to expect the comrades to remember those concrete data and the conclusions derived therefrom, but to point out one of the ways to understand the conditions at the bottom (of the social structure)."

*Fact-finding.*—This entire issue of *Selections from Emancipation Daily* is, in fact, keynoted by the insistence upon facts as one of the main basis for Communist policy and action. A total of five articles are reprinted in this issue, including the two already mentioned. The other are: (1) Decisions on Survey and Research by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; (2) Intensify the Forging of Party Character; and (3) Against Doctrinarism in Learning. The second article is an editorial and the third is unsigned.

The Party Decisions and the editorial (dated September 6, 1941) are similar in content. The editorial is prefaced by a synopsis in a box which reads as follows:

"To correct tendencies contrary to party character, there must first be developed a struggle against subjectivistic and formalistic styles of work by promoting a style of work which is a striving for the real, burying the head in hard working, emphatically eliminating arrogance—superficiality, and closely linking up theory and practice; and second, there must be in intraparty life a further emphasis of the importance of the unitedness and centralization, of the entire party and obedience to the decisions and guidance of the Central Committee of the Party. There should be strict check-up of the carrying out of all decisions, timely discovery and correction of the mistakes of every party member, intensification of intra-party solidarity and mutual assistance reinforcement of party discipline, and development of intra-party self-criticism."

The entire "Decisions" article and nine-tenths of the editorial are, however, devoted to the importance and ways and means of fact finding despite the greater space devoted to intraparty discipline in the synopsis. Economic and social surveys are to be conducted by small conferences with elements intimately connected with the subject under study and the selection of "typical" samples, rather than by systematic and comprehensive census-taking and formal statistical compilations. Studies of leading individuals in all classes and walks of China's national life are urged, by writing up and collecting their biographs of from a few hundred to a few thousand words. "The biographical sketches must meticulously agree with the realities of the subjects, and there should be no distortions resulting from the compiler's own friendliness or enmity." Such impartial and factual studies of individuals are "an important link in the study of entire China," according to the "Decisions."

The slogan of "No factual study, no qualification for vaunting opinions" appeared in almost every article in this issue of the *Selections from Emancipation*



Daily. In his second introduction to the Rural Surveys, Mao Tse-tung wrote that this slogan had been characterized by some as "narrow Empiricism," but he still does not "regret it." "Not only that I have no regret," he continues, "but I still insist that there should be no qualification for vaunting opinions without fact-finding." The Chinese Communist Party, according to Mao, "has suffered greatly from wanton opinions without intimate factual knowledge."

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, how are these documents identified as being from Y. Y. Hsu? Are they signed by him?

Mr. MANDEL. The name is on the document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they signed by him?

Mr. MANDEL. The name is typed on it. One is a manuscript with his initials, and on the other his name is up in the corner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does his signature appear on either one?

Mr. MANDEL. We have no way of knowing that this is his signature. The name appears in handwritten characters.

Mr. MORRIS. A reading of it will indicate that it purports to be a summary.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I am trying to make the record show. This purports to be documents from Mr. Y. Y. Hsu, but we have not yet identified them positively, have we?

Senator O'CONOR. They will be received with that qualification.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a photostat from *The Worker*, Sunday, September 16, 1945, a photostat made under the direction of the staff of an article entitled "Many in Washington Furious Over Our Far East Kid Gloves," dealing with matters that have come up before this committee.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1361" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1361

[*The Worker*, New York, Sunday, September 16, 1945]

#### MANY IN WASHINGTON FURIOUS OVER OUR FAR EAST KID GLOVES

(By Virginia Gardner)

WASHINGTON.—Official Washington is seething over events in Japan.

"What we have is a negotiated peace." These are the words you hear from embittered government people who have no more desire to see the Japanese military and political regime maintained than do the mass of American people.

The State Department itself is divided. Even so, it is reported that an official protest was sent by the State Department to General MacArthur on the retention of a Japanese government in Korea, and that a huffy reply was received to the effect that it had to be retained now.

The two chief emperor lovers have departed—former Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew and Eugene Dooman, special assistant to Joseph W. Ballantine, director of the Far Eastern Division. Moreover, some lasting-peace advocates are being sent to Japan and it would greatly strengthen their hand if labor and progressives began raising hell publicly about the MacArthur policies.

Of course backing MacArthur is James Clement Dunn, who with Brig. Gen. Julius Holmes did so much to help bring the Vichyite Marcel Peyrouton back from Argentina to become Governor of Algiers where anti-Nazis continued to be kept in concentration camps for many months.

And he has his circle in the State Department.

#### "OLD CHINA HAND"

As it happens, the newly appointed political adviser has spent years in China and saw at close range the effects of Japanese aggression. Minister to Thailand George Atcheson was aboard the U. S. S. *Panay* when the Japanese bombed it Dec. 12, 1937.



Since Dooman's retirement, the key place he held in formulating occupation policy as chairman the board known as SWINK (State, War and Navy Departments) fortunately has been taken by John Carter Vincent, chief of the Chinese Affairs Division. Although he retains his position on the Chinese Division, Vincent will be devoting himself to Japanese affairs. The only thing unfortunate about this is that he is needed in formulating policy on China, and will not have the time to devote to it that he should. Vincent also spent years in China and is one of the better informed State Dept. people.

Heated debates and arguments are in progress within the agencies closest to the foreign field, but those who defend the policies of General MacArthur are definitely in the minority.

Some of the agency people who worked on the directives for the treatment of Japan, who fought for a tough peace policy who finally saw those directives passed by the Inter-Departmental Committee and packed up beautifully in boxes to be flown to MacArthur headquarters, are wild.

The directives were good. They provided for eliminating the stranglehold the Zaibatsu monopolists have on Japan's economy. They would have broken up the heavy steel and chemical industries and any others making war matériel or which might later be converted secretly to making it.

They would, like the directives on the treatment of Germany, call for preservation of light industry and would not involve any return to an archaic agrarian economy—but at the same time would eliminate Japan as a threat to the peace of the world. Primarily, this would be achieved in prosecution of war criminals and a strict control over the country's monopolies and was predicated on the assumption that the Emperor and the Imperial advisers were not kept in power.

#### THEORY AND FACT

In theory, with the sort of surrender that was accepted from Japan, it might be possible to wait until the armed forces had laid down their arms and then say, "Scram" to the powerful imperialist-militarist Japanese who run the show.

It is known that not only did the U. S. never plan to have the control over Japan shared by any ally, but that the Office of Strategic Services was actually drawing up plans preparing to land personnel in Port Arthur and elsewhere to govern Manchuria by the same unilateral methods.

Where the responsibility for the conditions of surrender can be fixed with exactness is not clear. But those who were acting in the best interests, with the desire only to save American lives, were doubtless influenced too by those who are dominated by their fear of the Soviet Union and democratic forces that might arise in Japan, and those which exist in very real fashion in China.

Just as there were forces in the State Department opposing with all their striped-pants subtlety and cleverness the fight for the so-called Morgenthau plan for Germany, in the hopes of leaving Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, there has been the same activity directed against the real destruction of Japan as a world militarist power.

To date those forces seem to have won in the Japanese situation—despite all the trimmings and the radio broadcasts and the super-duper-formality of the peace-signing ceremony aboard the Missouri.

#### CHANGE OF HEART DUE?

Maybe when labor begins saying aloud, publicly, and with delegations to the State Department, what the better people in government are saying covertly, Messrs. Acheson and Vincent and other people who can do a job, will sigh with relief.

Maybe Pat Hurley, the oilman turned diplomat, whose main job in China has been to try to keep all lend-lease and all American sympathy turned away from the Yen'an Communists in China, and General MacArthur, and our Secretary of State, James Byrnes, who is rather bearish on the Soviet Union, will soon suffer a so-called change of heart.

**Mr. MANDEL.** Next we have an editorial in the Stilwell matter which appeared in the New Masses for December 19, 1944, page 21.

**Senator O'CONOR.** That will be received in evidence.



(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1362," and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1362

[New Masses, December 19, 1944, p. 21]

## NM SPOTLIGHT

## THE CHANGES IN CHINA

A good deal has happened in China since the crisis which occurred over the recall of General Stilwell. The changes in the cabinet are evidently more important than certain skeptics in this country at first thought. If nothing else they brought into extremely influential positions two patriotic men, General Chen Cheng and T. V. Soong, both of whom are friendly to China's allies and advocates of military, political, and economic reform. Soong represents those elements among China's big bourgeoisie which believe in internal unity as the condition of victory.

The Kuomintang-Communist negotiations have been resumed. Major General—now Ambassador—Hurley deserves much of the credit for that. The negotiations, however, have not been completed and there is again evidence that Chiang Kai-shek is taking a position considerably short of what the situation demands. Nevertheless the unity discussions are proceeding in an atmosphere more favorable than at any period in the last few years. Major General Wedemeyer has had a series of conferences with the Generalissimo and with the new Minister of War. As a result China's forces have been regrouped in such a way that some of the troops previously wasted in the notorious blockade of the Northwest have been sent against the Japanese. This does not mean that the blockade has been broken, but it does indicate a new willingness to compromise.

All of these events are nothing more than preludes to the basic changes that must be made if China is to resume her place as a fighting ally. This is virtually Chungking's last chance to save itself. It has no time nor space for further delays. For Chungking and for Chiang Kai-shek the alternatives are immediate and drastic changes in policy, or suicide. China's people and her democratic leaders supported by the United States must prevail upon the Generalissimo to take the only realistic course—a coalition government.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a list of literature on the Chinese Soviet movement prepared by the staff of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, as it appeared in Pacific Affairs for September 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. The significance of that, Mr. Chairman, is that it bears on the knowledge that the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations had of the Chinese Communist organization.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1363" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1363

[Pacific Affairs, September 1936]

## PACIFIC AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHIES

## No. III: LITERATURE ON THE CHINESE SOVIET MOVEMENT

(Prepared by the Staff of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations)

The social root of the Soviet movement in China, according to orthodox Marxists, lies in the semi-feudal and semi-colonial character of Chinese society. The problem of semi-feudalism in China is highly controversial and involves the question of the interpretation of the whole course of China's economic development. So far no comprehensive economic history of China, based on most, if not all, available source material on the subject, exists. However, several notable works attempting to give a Marxist interpretation of Chinese history and society have been published during the last decade.

L. Madyar's *The Agricultural Economy of China* (original Russian version published in Moscow, 1928; Chinese translation, 1930) has exerted considerable influence on later writers in the field. The book was issued with a critical preface which represents the collective opinion of its editors in the Institute for Chinese Studies in Moscow. The preface rejects Madyar's attempt to



designate Chinese economy as a special "Asiatic mode of production," and characterizes Chinese economy as "semi-feudal," which is the viewpoint adopted by official documents of the Communist International and the Communist Party of China. Madyar also published a book on Chinese handicrafts and industry, a companion volume to his book on agrarian economy (Chinese translation, 1932). The scholarly volume, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig, 1931; Japanese translation, 1935) by Karl August Wittfogel, gives a clearer and much more consistent formulation of the theory of "Asiatic agrarian society" or "Asiatic mode of production" than Madyar. Far from being scholarly, though still influential among certain writers in China, are Karl Radek's *Theoretical Analysis of Chinese History* (a series of lectures delivered at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, 1926-27, Chinese translation 1933) and Safarov's *History of the Development of Chinese Society* (Chinese translation 1932). Safarov's work has been challenged and in part refuted by P. Grenivich in an excellent article, entitled "The Problem of the History of Chinese Feudalism" (*Problems of China*, No. 14).

Among numerous works on the subject by Chinese writers, Chen Han-seng's "The Agrarian Problem of China" (*Problems of the Pacific*, 1933, pp. 271-298, in English), *Landlords and Peasants in China* (New York, 1936, in English) and "The Good Earth of China's Model Province," (*PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, September 1936, pp. 370-381) are excellent analytical studies of the problem based upon factual data collected from field work. Chi Ch'ao-ting's *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History* (London and New York, 1936, in English) studies the historical development of irrigation, flood control and water transport, gives an original approach to the problems of regional relations, one of the basic problems in Chinese economic history. Kuo Mo-jo's *Study of Ancient Chinese Society* (Shanghai, 1931, in Chinese) and T'ao Hsi-sheng's *Chinese Society and the Chinese Revolution* (Shanghai, 1929, in Chinese) deserve special attention, although the importance of both lies in their influence on students, rather than the soundness of their interpretation, which is questioned by many competent critics. (See also "The Rise of Land Tax and the Fall of Dynasties in Chinese History," by Wang Yü-Ch'üan, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, June 1936, pp. 201-221.)

Between 1931 and 1933, a very lively controversy over the social history of China was waged among left intellectuals. During this discussion, various theories were represented. The results were published in four volumes under the title *Discussions of the Social History of China* (in Chinese). Most of the participants in the discussion, however, are non-Communist left intellectuals, the most prominent of whom are Wang Li-hsi and Hu Chiu-yuan, and others who are not connected with the actual work of the Soviet movement. Owing to the legal disabilities under which Communists work in China, practically none of the leaders of the official Marxist (Communist) Party took part in the controversy. The whole controversy is not only of academic interest. A correct interpretation of history underlies a proper understanding of such problems as the special character of agricultural and handicraft production, the influence of irrigation, flood-control and water transport on social organization and political activity, the land system, the role of commercial and usury capital, class relations in town and village, the position of the landlords, the nature of the agrarian crisis and the character of the state and the bureaucracy. All of these problems are of practical importance to the Soviet movement.

#### LITERATURE ON THE CHINESE SOVIET MOVEMENT

The term "semi-colonial" was used by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to characterize Chinese economy in the same sense that the Marxists use the term. Concretely speaking, semi-colonialism refers to the condition of economic and political subordination to imperialist control imposed upon China by the Unequal Treaties and the political and economic implications of a country divided between rival foreign spheres of influence. Created by the penetration of Western influence in the latter half of the nineteenth century, this situation profoundly modified the social, economic, and political structure of China. Hence, for two thousand years before the middle of the nineteenth century the Marxists regard Chinese society as semi-feudal. After the Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking, however, China became semi-feudal as well as semi-colonial. The book which exercised the greatest influence in bringing the facts of imperialist economic domination to the Chinese people, is the huge volume, *China Under the Iron Heel of Imperialism* (in Chinese), by Chi Shu-feng, first published in Shanghai in 1925. The most authoritative Marxist analysis of the characteristics of



colonial economics was worked out in 1928 at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International and embodied in a long resolution on the colonial question. This resolution, published as a pamphlet, entitled *The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies* (obtainable in English, Chinese, Russian, French, German, Spanish, Japanese, etc.), constitutes the basis of all official Communist writings on the colonial question subsequent to its publication and must be regarded as one of the most important documents for the understanding of the Soviet movement in China.

The immediate historical antecedent of the Chinese Soviet movement was the revolution of 1925-1927. For a general history of China since the middle of the nineteenth century and for the social and cultural movements and political events leading to the revolution, the best short work seems to be Li Ting-sheng's *A Modern History of China* (in Chinese; Peiping, 1933). *Thirty Years of Recent Political History of China*, by Li Chien-nun (in Chinese; Shanghai, 1930) gives a more detailed account of the political history of the period. As for military history, which is important for a period in which hardly a year passes without civil wars, the best source is Wen Chih-kung's *Thirty Years of Recent Military History of China* (in Chinese; Shanghai, 1930). T. A. Bisson, of the Foreign Policy Association, New York, gives a very able summary of the period in his *Ten Years of the Kuomintang: Revolution and Reaction* (*Foreign Policy Reports*, February 15, 1933). The official Communist summary and estimate of the economic and political situation between 1925 and 1927 can be found in the Communist International publications, *Between the Fifth and the Sixth World Congresses, 1924-28: A Report on the Position of All Sections of the World Communist Party* (pp. 436-457, English edition; in English and Russian and many other languages) and the report of the Chinese delegate Strahov (Chu Chiu-po) and speeches of the delegates at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International. (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, No. 68ff.) The best popular history of the period from the official Communist viewpoint is given in Yolk's *The Chinese Revolution* (in Chinese; Moscow, 1932).

In addition to these materials of a general nature, there is much special material available dealing with specific topics of the period, usually of a documentary or semi-documentary character. As the revolution of 1925-27 was specifically directed at British imperialism, an article on "British Imperialism in China" written in 1923 by G. Voitinsky, a leading Soviet authority on the Far Eastern question, should be of more than usual interest. The fact that it appeared in *The Communist International* (No. 6, November 1924), the official organ of the Communist International, gives it a semi-documentary character. For a Marxist estimate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's life and ideas and his role in the Chinese Revolution, the best short account available is Hansu Chan's article, "Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Revolution" (*China Today*, October 1935). This article traces the inspiring story of the life of Dr. Sun and points out its revolutionary tradition which is still a source of strength to the patriotic anti-Japanese movement today. In an article, "The Situation in China," written in April 1925 (*Communist International*, No. 21), G. Voitinsky gives an excellent summary of the complicated situation of civil war and diplomacy among the northern militarists and the development of the revolutionary movement in South China on the eve of the Northern Expedition.

The most important documents dealing with the period are the *Resolution on the Chinese Question* passed by the Sixth Plenum of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International in March 1926 (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 6, No. 40); the speech delivered by Stalin in the Chinese Commission of the Seventh Plenum in November 1926 (reprinted in the pamphlet *China in Revolt*, in English) and the *Resolution on the Chinese Question* passed by the Eighth Plenum in April 1927. In these resolutions, the general line of policy as well as the Comintern's views on leading events in the period are formulated. Of basic importance to an understanding of the critical months after the revolutionary government was moved from Canton to Wuhan, are the three documents on the workers and peasants policy of the Kuomintang, published in *Chinese Correspondence* (May 8, 1927, in English), namely, the *Political Platform of the Kuomintang Concerning Workers and Peasants* and the reports of the peasant movement from Kwangtung and Hunan. On the question of Chiang Kai-shek's change of front in April 1927, the text of the *Declaration of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang*, expelling Chiang K'ai-shek from membership in the party, and the declarations of the Communist Party of China and of the Communist International, can be found



in *Chinese Correspondence, Weekly Organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang* (Wuhan, China, May 1, 1927, in English). A long editorial in the *Communist International* of May 30, 1927, entitled "The Crisis in the Chinese Nationalist Movement," sums up the Communist view of the crisis, and its policy of dealing with it in considerable detail.

Chiang K'ai-shek openly broke with the left-wing Kuomintang and the Communists on April 12, and six days later, on April 18, 1927, he launched the Nanking Government as a rallying center against the government at Wuhan. The mass workers' and peasants' movement had grown to great dimensions and the rate of change was at its quickest during the Wuhan period. It was one of the most difficult and yet one of the most important periods for the historian of the Chinese revolution to grasp. *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, by T'ang Liang-li (London, 1930, in English), gives the story of the Wuhan period from the viewpoint of the Wang Ching-wei group. *Kuomintang and the Chinese Revolution*, by T. C. Wu (London, 1930) gives a left Kuomintang account of the revolution. The most important source materials for Communist policy in this period are: the *Chinese Revolution* (original in Russian; Chinese translation in 1933) by Mif, the leading Far Eastern authority in the Comintern, especially chapters II and III, in which he analyzes in detail the policy of the Chinese Communist Party in the critical months of 1927, and "An Abrupt Turn in the Chinese Revolution," by N. Bukharin (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 7, Nos. 41 and 42) in which he dealt with the collapse of the Wuhan Government and sharply criticized the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for rejecting the decisions of the Comintern (June 16, 1927), which instructed them to quicken the pace of revolution rather than allow it to slow down. A. V. Bakulin's *Notes on the Wuhan Period of the Chinese Revolution* (Moscow, 1930, in Russian) contains very interesting material that deserves attention. For a detailed account of the mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership see Tsai Ho-sen's "The History of Opportunism in the Chinese Communist Party." (*The Problems of China, Journal of the Institute of Research on China*, Moscow, No. 1, 1929, pp. 1-77, in Russian.) Also see G. Voitinsky's "The Errors of the Communist Party of China in the Revolution of 1925-1927" (*The Problems of China*, Nos. 4 and 5, 1930, in Russian). Earl Browder's *Civil War in Nationalist China* (in English) gives a vivid account of those critical days by a keen American eye-witness who is also a distinguished Marxist. Anna Louise Strong's *China's Millions* (New York 1928, New Edition 1936) tells the story of the Wuhan days and gives, so to speak, the human side of the picture more than most other accounts.

The curtains of the Revolution of 1925-27 were drawn with the defeat of the Canton uprising in December 1927 when the Canton workers, led by the Communist Party, seized power and established a Soviet Government for three days. The Canton Commune, as that short-lived régime was called by Communist writers, was regarded by the Communist authorities as "the rearguard battle of the revolution." However, it not only closed an old epoch but also opened a new one. For the first time in the history of a colonial or semi-colonial country, the banner of the Soviets was unfurled. Thus the Canton Commune must be regarded as the beginning of the Soviet period of the Chinese Revolution. The best source material on the Canton Commune is *The First Anniversary Memorial Volume on the Canton Uprising* (in Chinese and Russian), a symposium of six chapters including contributions from leading participants in the uprising and a very able research article based upon current press reports of the uprising. The symposium was published by the Institute of Researches on China in Moscow, in 1929. Hansu Chan's short article on the Canton Commune, "The Canton Uprising and Soviet China" (*China Today*, Vol. I, No. 3, December 1934) is based on this material and is the best available factual summary of the history of the Commune in English.

While the Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927 was raging, the Trotskyists were actively engaged in their opposition activities against the majority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led by J. Stalin. One of the important subjects of controversy, perhaps second in importance only to the Russian question, was the Chinese Revolution. Trotsky's writings on the question are collected in a volume, entitled *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (New York, 1932, in English). Trotsky's main contention was that it was the Comintern's policy of working inside the Kuomintang that brought about the defeat of



the revolution. The most important writings explaining and defending the policy of the Comintern and sharply criticizing the position taken by Trotsky and his group is unquestionably Stalin's book *About the Opposition* (Moscow, in Russian; Chinese translation, 1931), over a hundred pages of which are devoted to the Chinese question. The English version of one of Stalin's most important writings on the Chinese question, *Extract from a Speech on "The International Situation and the Defense of the U. S. S. R.," Delivered at a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C. P. S. U., August 1, 1927*, is printed in Stalin's book *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (pp. 232-252; English translation, New York, 1936) and included in the *Handbook of Marxism*, edited by Emile Burns (pp. 894-909, New York, 1935).

In these writings, Stalin affirms that it was the difficult objective conditions of the revolution and the refusal of the Chinese Communist Party leadership to carry out the policy of the Comintern that caused the defeat. He particularly noted that although the revolution failed, Communism had become a mass movement. Had the Comintern adopted the policy of the Trotskyists, Stalin contends, Communism would still be just a sect. For polemics against Trotsky's writings on the situation after August 1927, especially on the issue of the Chinese Soviets, see R. Doonping's articles, "The Rising Revolutionary Wave and Trotskyist Liquidationism in China" (*The Communist*, monthly theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the United States, March 1930, in English), and "The Burgeois-Democratic Revolution and Soviet Power in China" (*The Communist*, November-December 1930, pp. 1016-1030). For the most recent echoes of the controversy, see Harold Isaacs' "Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution: A Marxist View" (*PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, September 1935, pp. 269-283), and Hansu Chan's answer, "The Nature and Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution—An Answer to the Trotskyist Views of Harold Isaacs" (*China Today*, September 1935, pp. 228-230). A summary of this article appeared in *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, December 1935, pp. 477-481). In these articles Doonping and Chan sharply took issue with the Trotskyist view that the Chinese Soviet movement is no more than a peasant war and is bound to degenerate into banditry and oblivion. In addition to the above materials, which are largely of a theoretical nature, it should be of interest to read the report of Trotskyist activities from the Central Soviet District in Kiangsi, entitled "The Secret Counterrevolutionary Machinations in the Central Soviet Districts of China and Their Liquidation" (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 12, No. 3, January 21, 1932, p. 46).

The four years from the Canton Commune to the establishment of the Provisional Central Soviet Government in November 1931, witnessed the utter failure of the Nanking Government to stabilize its power and the phenomenal rise of Soviet districts in many parts of south and central China. The much heralded unification of China by the Kuomintang Nanking Government in the middle of 1928 proved to be extremely short-lived. Soon the country was plunged into a series of civil wars. The Kwangsi-Nanking war was followed by the war of the Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang North China coalition against Chiang K'ai-shek. For a Marxist interpretation of these events, see R. Doonping's pamphlet, *Militarist Wars and Revolution in China* (New York, 1930, in English). The story of Kuomintang rule down to 1932 is eloquently told from the Communist viewpoint in the pamphlet *Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction* (in English, Shanghai, 1932).

As a result of dissatisfaction over the conditions described in the above pamphlets, which reveal the inability of the Kuomintang to stabilize its rule, its betrayal of its original workers and peasants policy, its failure to solve the people's problems of livelihood and its helplessness in the face of foreign invasion, peasant uprisings occurred in many parts of the country. Remnants of the Revolutionary Army, which refused to submit to the Nanking high command after the collapse of the Wuhan Government and the Canton Commune, retreated into the mountains of south China and helped the peasant rebels to arm and organize their struggles against the landlords and usurers. The result was widespread peasant guerrilla warfare in the Yangtze and Pearl River valleys. The detailed stories of this movement, especially in the provinces of Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Hunan, Kwangtung, Fukien and Shantung are told in a series of research reports, *Bulletins of the Institute of Research on China*, published in Moscow from 1928 to 1931 (all available in Russian only). The development of these guerrilla struggles resulted in the organization of many Soviet districts in various parts of south and central China.

The years from 1928 to 1931 are generally regarded as the first stage of the Soviet movement in China. As the development of the struggle approached a



culminating point in 1930, the leadership in the Communist Party of China, under the domination of Li Li-san, tended to exaggerate grossly the maturity of the revolutionary situation in China as well as in the world, and adopted the adventurist tactics of a headlong, reckless drive in an attempt to establish socialism (in the form of Soviet Farms and Collective Farms) in the Soviet districts and to capture such big cities as Changsha and Hankow. A new group, headed by Chü Chiu-po, which came to leadership after the Third Plenum of the Central Committee, in 1930, adopted a policy of reconciliation with Li Li-san, but failed to liquidate his influence. Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming) led the criticism of the weaknesses of the Third Plenum policies. The criticism led to a new plenum, the Fourth Plenum which finally liquidated Li Li-san's policies, corrected Chü Chiu-po's conciliatory attitude toward Li Li-san, and took the helm of the party. The writings of Chen Shao-yu in this connection are collected in a book, entitled *The Struggle for Increasing Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party* (1932, in Chinese). The period is also described in V. Kuchymov's article, "The Struggle for the Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China" (*Communist International*, Vol. VIII, No. 6, March 15, 1931, pp. 162-167, in English). Subsequent history indicates that the work of the Fourth Plenum represents a very important consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party, ideologically as well as in organization. It prepared the Chinese party for facing the difficult tasks of a new period of the Soviet movement.

With the organization of the Provisional Central Soviet Government in Juichin, Kiangsi, on November 7, 1931, the Soviet movement in China entered its second period of development. In regard to the First All-China Soviet Congress, which brought into existence the Central Soviet Government, there are two authoritative articles, one by Mif, entitled "The Revolutionary Fight in China" (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 11, No. 60, Nov. 26, 1931, pp. 1075-1076), and the "First Congress of Representatives of the Soviet Districts in China," by L. I. (*Communist International*, Vol. VII, No. 5, pp. 34-40). The socio-economic and political structure of Soviet China, as well as its main lines of policy in regard to the Red Army, agrarian labor, economic construction and other problems are formulated in a series of laws which, together with the *Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic*, are collected in a one-volume edition, *Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic* (Chinese edition, 1933, with an introduction by Wang Ming; English edition, 1934, with an introduction by Bela Kun). These laws constitute a concrete formulation of what the Marxists call a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." For a detailed discussion of economic policy, see Wang Ming's article, "The Economic Policy of the Soviets in China" (*Problems of China*, No. 12, 1933, pp. 3-21, in Russian).

As the agrarian revolution is the key problem of the present stage of the Chinese Soviet movement, land policy constitutes a factor of decisive importance. It is generally known that in the Soviet districts there has been much discussion of the problem in connection with the actual carrying out of the land policy as formulated in the land laws. Of great importance in this connection is Mao Tse-tung's pamphlet on *Land Investigation Movement* (Moscow 1934, in Chinese). Aside from this, very little of the documentary and other material, affording evidence on this accumulated experience, has been published outside the Soviet districts. The only available materials in this connection are included in a series of articles on "Land Policy in the Soviet Districts" (in Chinese), by Shen Sheng-chang, which appeared in the *Kuo-wen Weekly* in 1933. They include long quotations taken from Soviet documents seized by the Kuomintang troops when certain Soviet districts were taken by them. The quotations, carefully selected by one who is distinctly not sympathetic, are necessarily fragmentary. However, they are indispensable to a careful study of land policy in the Soviet districts. For a descriptive account of conditions in Soviet villages see "Life in Chinese Soviet Villages" (*China Today*, Vol. I, No. 3, Dec. 1934, pp. 48-49). In January 1934 the Second Soviet Congress met in Juichin, the Red capital. Mao Tse-tung, the president of Soviet China, delivered a long report which outlined the achievements of three years of Soviet power in China. These documents have been published in many languages. The English edition is entitled *Red China* (International Publishers, 1934).

There are two short summaries of the development of Soviet China available in English: *Soviet China* by M. James and R. Doonping (International Pamphlets, New York, 1932) and the summary by T. A. Bisson in *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 4, April 26, 1933. The best comprehensive source book on Soviet China is the big Russian volume, *Soviets in China*, which contains detailed docu-



ments and other material in regard to each separate Soviet district that was in existence up to 1933, and a good bibliography of books and articles dealing with the Chinese Soviet movement in the Russian language. (Moscow, 1933, in Russian. Translated from original German edition.) The only full-sized book on Soviet China in the English language is *The Chinese Soviets* by Victor A. Yakhontoff (New York, 1934), which discusses the Chinese Revolution from the Taiping Rebellion down to Soviet China. Agnes Smedley's *China's Red Army Marches* (New York, 1934) is a vivid account of the growth of Soviet China, based on very reliable historical facts but written in the author's characteristic vigorous prose which makes the book read like fiction.

In the latter half of 1930, almost immediately after crushing the Yen-Feng opposition to Nanking, Chiang K'ai-Shek opened his military campaign for the eradication of the Soviet Districts and Communist activities in China. From the fall of 1930 to that of 1931, three anti-Communist military campaigns were launched. Three more campaigns, much larger in scale and longer in duration, were undertaken after 1931. Some of these campaigns ended in the total failure of the anti-Communist expeditions, some of them gained substantial results and forced the Red armies to retreat to new positions; but none of them succeeded in achieving the result aimed at—the wiping out of Soviet power from Chinese soil. For the official Kuomintang view of the campaign, see T'ang Liang-li's *Suppression of Communist Banditry in China* (Shanghai, 1935, in English). The story of the first five campaigns is told by General Yakhontoff in his book, *The Chinese Soviets* (Chapter VIII, pp. 100–120). Analytical studies of the sixth and most protracted campaign were made by Frederick V. Field in "The Recent Anti-Communist Campaign in China" (*Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. IV, No. 16, August 14, New York, 1935); by Wang Ming in "The Sixth Anti-Communist War and the Tactics of the Red Army" (*The Communist International*, Chinese edition, Vol. V, No. 12, Dec. 31, 1934, pp. 62–101); and by G. Kara-Murza in "The End of the Sixth Campaign against the Chinese Soviets" (*Tikhii Okean*, No. 1, 1935, in Russian).

It is common knowledge that the Red forces showed extraordinary vitality in resisting a force that was many times superior in numbers and equipment. The secret of this strength on the part of the Red troops can best be seen from two extraordinarily valuable accounts by two able Chinese journalists whose sympathies are by no means with the Reds. One is a book of 189 pages, *Notes Taken on an Investigation Tour of Kiangsi, Anhueti, Hunan and Hupei*, by Chen Keng-ya, special correspondent of the Shanghai *Shen Pao* (Shanghai, 1934, in Chinese). The other is a series of seven long articles, "Impressions of the Anti-Communist Campaign in Northeastern Szechwan," by Hsiung Shih (*Kuo-wen Weekly*, Vol. 12, Nos. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 1935, in Chinese). Both correspondents visited former Soviet districts and had close contact with the anti-Communist activities of the Nanking Government. Their contributions are of great value in helping one to understand the strength and weakness and the problems faced by both contending forces. The two accounts also contain much material on the conditions in the Soviet districts and the people's reactions toward Soviet innovations. They are social documents of first-rate importance. (See also "Reconstruction after Revolution: Kiangsi Province and the Chinese Nation," by G. E. Taylor, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, Sept. 1935; pp. 302–312.) A detailed discussion of the Chinese Red Army from the Communist viewpoint is given by V. Siang in his very interesting and informative article, "The Red Army of China" (*The Problems of China*, Nos. 8 and 9, 1931, in Russian).

The strategy of the Sixth Anti-Communist campaign was to bottle up the main Soviet forces in Kiangsi by blockhouse construction, road-building and an immense concentration of the best forces under Chiang K'ai-shek's command. This policy of encirclement failed because the Reds finally succeeded in breaking through, but it did make it impossible for the Communist forces to maintain their base in Kiangsi. They thereupon selected a new base in Szechwan, where Red troops under the command of Hsü Hsiang-chien had already occupied an extensive territory in the northeastern part of the province. (See "The Dramatic Struggle for a Soviet Szechwan," *China Today*, Vol. I, No. 2, Nov. 1934, pp. 31–33. Also see "Struggle for Soviets in Szechwan," by B. Perlin, *China Today*, Vol. II, Nos. 5 and 6, Feb. and March, 1936, pp. 93–96 and 114–117.) Breaking through the encirclement in November 1934, the main body of the Red Army commanded by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh marched westward and, crossing the boundaries of thirteen provinces and covering a distance of over 3,000 miles, it joined forces with Hsü Hsiang-chien in June, 1935. The story of this extraordinary march, one of the most unique in military history, is eloquently told by Shu Pin in "Heroic



Trek of the Chinese Red Army" (*Communist International*, Special Chinese Number, February 1936, pp. 124-144). Other materials on the westward march can be found in the pages of *China Today* ("Soviet March into Szechwan," by Crispian Corcoran, Vol. I, No. 4; "New Tactics of the Chinese Red Army," by J. W. Phillips, No. 5; "Toward Szechwan," by Harry Gannes, No. 9).

A most detailed and authoritative account of the Soviet Army is given by Chow Ho-sin in his article "Military Power of Soviet China" (*China Today*, Vol. II, No. 4, January 1936, pp. 71-74), which includes a statistical table showing the territorial distribution of the Armed Forces of the Revolution in the summer of 1935. In August 1935, the main Red troops which were concentrated in western Szechwan after the joining of the forces of Mao Tse-tung with those of Hsü Hsiang-chien, began to move northeastward. This was the beginning of a chain of movements which resulted in the consolidation of a base on the border between Szechwan and Sikang, a great extension of Soviet territory in northern Shensi and the entry into Shansi in the spring of 1936. The only systematic and detailed account of these new developments is given by Hansu Chan in "Chinese Red Army in New Offensive" (*China Today*, Vol. II, No. 7, April 1936, pp. 128-130).

With the abandonment of the base in Kiangsi and the westward march of the main Red forces, the Soviet movement in China entered upon a third stage of its development. The most important new factor in the present period is the great stress placed upon the policy of organizing a united front especially directed against Japanese imperialism. As the main resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International emphatically puts it, "The extension of the Soviet movement and the strengthening of the fighting power of the Red Army must be combined with the development of the people's anti-imperialist movement all over the country." (*Resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International*, New York, 1936, p. 35.) In order to understand this new emphasis on the anti-imperialist front, it is necessary to trace the development of the Communist policy on the united anti-imperialist front which had been the order of the day ever since 1931.

Immediately following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the Communist Party proposed the organization of a united effort of all Chinese people for revolutionary war of liberation. As early as the beginning of 1932, during the Shanghai campaign against the Japanese invaders in Shanghai, Chinese Communists volunteered assistance to the 19th Route Army. Later, in April, the Soviet Government of China issued a statement declaring war on Japan. In January 1933, in another public statement, Soviet China declared itself ready to enter into agreements to fight against the Japanese invaders with any army or military detachment, under three conditions: cessation of civil war against the Soviet districts; the granting of democratic rights to the Chinese people; and the arming of the people for the anti-Japanese war. This offer for an anti-Japanese united front was repeated on April 15, 1933. (See documents printed in *International Press Correspondence*.)

In October 1933, the Kuomintang 19th Route Army, of Shanghai fame, which was in control of Fukien province, concluded the first series of anti-Japanese united front agreements with Soviet China and the Red Army. (For English text of the agreements, see *China Today*, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 10-11. For Chinese text, see *Kuo-wen Weekly*, Vol. 12, No. 9, March 11, 1935.) In August 1934, a special detachment of the Chinese Red Army, under the command of Fang Chih-ming, was dispatched northward through Anhwei province to attack the Japanese invaders. However, before reaching its destination, it was cornered and wiped out by the forces of Chiang K'ai-shek. On August 2, 1934, a document entitled "The Basic Program of the Chinese People in a War against Japan" (*China Today*, Vol. I, No. 1) was issued. The document, which was signed by Madame Sun Yat-sen and over 3,000 prominent persons from all walks of life, called for the arming of the whole population and mobilization of all resources of the nation for a determined struggle against Japanese invasion. This document is an expression of the rising anti-Japanese movement as well as a powerful stimulus for its further development.

In one of the sessions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, the Chinese delegate, Wang Ming, made a new and most emphatic appeal to "all parties, groups, military units, mass organizations and prominent politicians" to join the anti-imperialist front against Japanese invasion. (See Wang Ming's speech on *The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries*, New York, 1935, pp. 6-33 and 53-64, in English. Also see *New Political Power and New*



*Army*, a collection of speeches by members of the Chinese delegation to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, Moscow, 1935, in Chinese.) Less than a month after the Seventh Congress, on August 1, 1935, the Chinese Soviet Government jointly with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a manifesto to the Chinese people in which it made a very broad appeal to "Chinese men and women of all walks of life" to resist Japanese invasion and fight for the recovery of lost territories. For the attainment of this objective, the manifesto proposed the formation of a Government of National Defense and a United Anti-Japanese Army. (See document reprinted in *China Today*, Vol. II, No. 3, December 1935, pp. 58-59.)

A series of very weighty articles recently published by Wang Ming, the leading authority in the Comintern on the Chinese question, clearly indicates that the Comintern regards the organization of the anti-imperialist front, centered against Japanese imperialism, as the central task of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Government of China. (See Wang Ming's *Resist-Japan Save-China Policy*, a collection of two articles, Moscow, 1936. Also see the following three articles in *International Press Correspondence* by Wang Ming: "The Basis of the New Policy of the Communist Party of China," Vol. 15, No. 11, Dec. 28, 1935, pp. 1751-1754; "Replies to Chief Arguments against the Anti-Imperialist Front in China," Vol. 16, No. 2, January 11, 1936, pp. 39-40; and "The Relation between the Soviet Government and the People's Government of National Defense," Vol. 16, No. 6, Jan. 25, 1936, pp. 149-150.) In another article, entitled "The Struggle for the Anti-Imperialist United Front and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of China" (*The Communist International*, Special Chinese number, Feb. 1936, pp. 107-123), Wang Ming points out the essential changes in policy in the Soviet regions in regard to agrarian questions, trade, industry, labor, political administration and foreign affairs, in order to adjust the policy of the Communists to the immediate needs of the national emergency and to bring it into harmony with the Seventh Congress decisions and the general united front program. The changes outlined in this article, which in general greatly "liberalize" the policy in the Soviet regions toward non-proletarian elements and foreign interests other than the Japanese, open new perspectives for the Soviet movement in China and deserve the closest attention of all who are concerned with the Far Eastern situation.

MR. MANDEL. This is a photostat of an article appearing in the *Daily Worker* of August 20, 1942, page 3, showing that Ordway Southard was a Communist candidate for Governor of Alabama in 1942.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Southard was the man to whom Mr. Lattimore sold his property.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1364" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1364

[*Daily Worker*, August 20, 1942, p. 3]

### 3 COMMUNISTS QUALIFY FOR ALABAMA ELECTION

(Special to the *Daily Worker*)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA., Aug. 19—Three candidates nominated by the Communist Party of Alabama have qualified to run in the general election No. 3, it was announced in the state capitol today.

The candidates are Mary Boggs Southard, for state senator; Rob F. Hall for Congress from the 9th Congressional District; and Ordway Southard for governor.

Mrs. Southard is District Secretary of the Young Communist League. She was born in South Carolina 27 years ago and was reared in Birmingham. She graduated with highest honors from Phillips High School and Agnes Scott College. Hall was born in Mississippi in 1906 and was reared in Mobile, Ala. Since 1935, he has been district secretary of the Communist Party.

Ordway Southard, 30, is a native of Cambridge, Mass., where his father, the late Dr. Ernest Southard held the chair of neuro-pathology in the Harvard School of Medicine. He is the grandson of former Governor Horace Austin of Minnesota one of the pioneer governors of that state. Southard has lived in Birmingham for the past five years and is District *Daily Worker* director.



Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat of an article appearing in the Seattle Post Intelligencer for August 5, 1937, page 1, dealing with the expulsion of Selden Menefee from the Central Labor Council of Seattle. The name of Menefee has come up in our testimony, and that is relevant.

Mr. MORRIS. It is a newspaper report of a dismissal, Mr. Chairman. That is the best evidence we have on it.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1365," and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1365

[Seattle Post Intelligencer, August 5, 1937, p. 1]

#### CENTRAL LABOR BODY OUSTS FOUR DELEGATES

Four delegates to the Central Labor Council were unseated by action of the executive board and a vote of the membership last night for "actions subversive to the best interests of the American Federation of Labor."

The men unseated were Eugene Dennett of the Inland Boatmen's Union, Selden Menefee, and Victor Hicks of the Teachers' Union and E. E. Hendrickson of the Postoffice Clerks' Union.

Dennett was found guilty of abrogation of his oath of allegiance to the American Federation of Labor, because he refused to deny making remarks favorable to the Committee for Industrial Organization, according to Charles Hughes, who was one of the men who brought the charges.

#### VIOLATION CHARGED

The other three men in a previous session with the executive board of the Central Labor Council declared that they had attended meetings of the Seattle Unity Labor Council, recently formed for the expressed purpose of bringing about unity in the labor movement. Some of the unions in the new group are C. I. O. members.

Holding that this attendance was a violation of obligation to the A. F. of L., the executive board ruled that the local unions of Menefee, Hicks and Hendrickson should be instructed to repudiate their membership in the Unity Council.

On motion from the floor from Charles Hughes, the council voted to remove all four men as delegates to the Central Labor Council.

The four men denied the charges and said they would appeal their cases to the American Federation of Labor.

#### GUILD CRITICIZED

A resolution was introduced by Seattle Web Pressman's Union No. 26, criticizing the Seattle Newspaper Guild for its activities in the strike on the Seattle Star and "doing everything possible to tear down and disrupt legitimate organized labor." The resolution also commended the Seattle Star for its stand "for the best interests of labor," and urged all A. F. of L. members to support the newspaper in its controversy. The resolution was adopted.

Officers of the labor council were also elected at last night's session with Claude O'Reilley reelected president; Harry Ames, vice president, and Charles Doyle, executive secretary. Doyle's reelection provided the only contest and he defeated Bert Nelson by a vote of 239 to 67.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a letter sent by Mr. Holland in answer to our request for anti-Communist material critical of the Soviet Union that has been published by the IPR, and this is Mr. Holland's reply dated August 27, 1951.

Senator O'CONOR. Signed by him?

Mr. MANDEL. Signed by him.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.



(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1366" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1366

JULY 16, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,  
1 East 54th St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: Will you kindly send us the following material which will be returned to you:

Copies of all articles published by the IPR critical of the Soviet Union covering the period 1931 to 1950.

Sincerely,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel.*

"A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union," by L. E. Hubbard. (*Pacific Affairs*, June 1938, pp. 171-185.)

Notes and Comment. "Soviet Russia and the Korean Communist Party," by John N. Washburn. (*Pacific Affairs*, March 1950, pp. 59-65.)

"Soviet Policy in China," by Max Beloff. (*Pacific Affairs*, June 1950, pp. 128-138.)

"The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia," by Milton Sacks. (*Pacific Affairs*, September 1950, pp. 227-247.)

"The Japanese Communist Party, the Soviet Union and Korea," by Paul Langer and Rodger Swearingen. (*Pacific Affairs*, December 1950, pp. 339-355.)

Notes and Comment. "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Government," by Wilbert B. Dubin. (*Pacific Affairs*, December 1950, pp. 381-392.)

"The Communist Party in India," by M. R. Masani. (*Pacific Affairs*, March 1951, pp. 18-38.)

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

ELdorado 5-1759

AUGUST 27, 1951..

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

*Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security,  
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In response to your request I send you herewith a collection of articles critical of the Soviet Union and communism, published in *Pacific Affairs*, quarterly journal of the international Institute of Pacific Relations, and in *Far Eastern Survey*, fortnightly magazine of the American I. P. R. In addition to these articles, I wish to direct your attention to the following correspondence published in *Pacific Affairs*: letter from William Henry Chamberlin on the Moscow trials (September 1938) and letter from W. J. Oudendyk on the Soviet position in the Far East (March 1937). These may be found in the bound copies of *Pacific Affairs* which you have in Washington. I also refer you to a pamphlet entitled *The Red Influence in China* by R. Otsuka, submitted by the Japanese I. P. R. to the 1936 conference of the Institute in Yosemite (a copy of which I have already sent you).

I wish to stress the fact that, since the I. P. R. concerns itself mainly with the Far East and the Pacific, its publications seldom deal with the Soviet Union as such, or with its internal problems or with its European areas. They almost all have to do with the Far Eastern regions of the U. S. S. R. or with Soviet relations with other Far Eastern or Pacific countries. I would also point out that the great majority of the I. P. R. articles which do deal with the Soviet Far East or with Soviet policies towards other Far Eastern countries are purely descriptive accounts in which the authors do not express political judgments or take either a pro- or anti-Soviet position. This is particularly true of the numerous factual, short articles in the *Far Eastern Survey*, dealing with the geography, resources, and economic development of Soviet Asia.

In *Pacific Affairs* from 1931 to 1951 approximately 525 articles were printed. Of these, 35 articles were largely concerned with the Soviet Union, 9 of them being critical, 10 being more or less favorable, and 16 taking no position. In the *Far Eastern Survey* from its inception in 1935 and up to 1951, there were 31 major articles and 54 short notes on the Soviet Union or its policies in the Far East. Of these all except 3 were descriptive, expressing neither praise nor criticism. Of the three exceptions, two were unfavorable and one was favorable.



Please note that from 1935 to 1940, the *Far Eastern Survey* was exclusively concerned with economic topics and only after 1940 did it carry articles on political questions.

It should be remembered also that through most of the period 1931 to 1945 the Soviet Union was not taking an aggressive position in the Far East as it has done since World War II. It was opposed to Japanese imperialism, supported collective security during most of the period, and maintained friendly relations with Nationalist China. Since 1945, the Soviets have intervened much more aggressively in Far Eastern affairs. Consequently, it is natural that I. P. R. publications in recent years should contain more criticism of Soviet and communist policies in Asia.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM M. HOLLAND,  
*Executive Vice Chairman.*

WLH: abs.  
Enclosure.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a statement from Mr. Holland dated May 23, 1952, sent in reply to our request as to the use of the name "American Institute of Pacific Relations" after a certain period.

Senator O'CONOR. And also signed by him?

Mr. MANDEL. Also signed by him.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1367" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1367

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Eldorado 5-1759

MAY 23, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,  
*Special Counsel, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,  
Room 424-C, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORRIS: This is in reply to your inquiry of May 22nd about the change in name of the American IPR, as listed on the masthead of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY.

At its meeting on November 26, 1946, the Board of Trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., voted to change the name of the organization to the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.

Several formalities were required, such as getting the written consent of two-thirds of the Trustees before such a change could be made, and so it was not until January 14, 1947, that the final certificate of amendment to the certificate of incorporation was recorded in the District of Columbia.

The firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, handled this matter for us and we did not receive from them the certified copy of the certificate of amendment until the middle of February 1947.

The masthead box in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY is included in all issues, but it was not until after the February 26 issue had been printed that it was noted the necessary change had not been made in the masthead statement. As the March 12 issue had probably already gone to press, the change in the name of the organization was not published in the journal until the March 26 issue.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,  
*Executive Vice Chairman.*

Mr. MANDEL. This is a copy from the Proceedings of the Third Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 23 to November 9, 1929, a statement made by J. Merle Davis, then general secretary, regarding his visit to Moscow and his dealings with the Third International leaders.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1368" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1368

One of the chief responsibilities of the Secretariat has been to maintain liaison between the Institute member groups. This has been carried on by travel, correspondence and publications. All of the National Councils have been visited by one or more staff members during the two-year period. In the autumn of 1927 and winter of 1928, the General Secretary visited Canada, the United States, England and the Continent of Europe. He spent a month at Geneva studying the organization and program of the League of Nations and the International Labor Office and making contacts with their Secretariats. *He then visited Moscow, met with Foreign Office officials and Third International leaders to whom he explained the Institute of Pacific Relations.* Through the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, he was able to hold a conference with a group of specialists representing the principal Russian scientific societies interested in Far Eastern and Pacific questions. Tentative plans were made with this group and a committee was formed for the purpose of cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations and participation in the 1929 Conference.

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC 1929 Proceedings, Third Conference Institute of Pacific Relations (p. 674), Nara and Kyoto, Japan, October 23 to November 9, 1929.

The University of Chicago Press, June 1930.

Biennial Report of the General Secretary.

J. Merle Davis, General Secretary (p. 630).

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a statement of ownership of Pacific Affairs during the year 1945, as photostated from Pacific Affairs of that year.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1369" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1369

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC., REQUIRED BY THE ACTS OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AND MARCH 3, 1933

OF PACIFIC AFFAIRS, published quarterly at Orange, Connecticut, for March, June, September, December, 1945.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

Before me, a notary public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Hilda Austern, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the business manager of the PACIFIC AFFAIRS and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the owner-



ship, management (and if a daily paper, the circulation), etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:

Publisher, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Editor, Edward C. Carter, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Business Manager, Hilda Austern, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

2. That the owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding one percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a firm, company, or other unincorporated concern, its name and address, as well as those of each individual member, must be given.)

Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Editor: Edward C. Carter, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Hilda Austern, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None.

4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as so stated by him.

5. That the average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the twelve months preceding the date shown above is 3,500. (This information is required from daily publications only.)

HILDA AUSTERN.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 12th day of September 1945.

[SEAL]

ROSAMOND L. TESCHNER,

Notary Public, Queens County, No. 3066.

(My commission expires March 31, 1946.

Certificate listed in N. Y. Co. No. 306. Reg. No. 174-T-6.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a newspaper account entitled, "Tokyo Reds Urge Trial of Emperor," taken from the New York Times of March 1, 1946, page 13, on the question of the Communist Party of Japan's attitude toward the Emperor, having been under discussion in our hearing.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.



(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1370" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1370

[New York Times, Friday, March 1, 1946, p. 63]

TOKYO REDS URGE TRIAL OF EMPEROR—COMMUNISTS DENOUNCE PUBLIC APPEARANCES OF HIROHITO AS "REACTIONARY" ELECTIONEERING

(By Lindsay Parrott)

[By wireless to the New York Times]

TOKYO, February 28.—The Japanese Communist Party came out into the open for the first time today in opposition to Emperor Hirohito's personal conduct, attacking his recent visits to repatriation centers and other public places as "designed to help the election campaigns of the reactionary parties and trying to frustrate the democratization of Japan."

The Communists' criticism was voiced in a party resolution handed to the Imperial Household Ministry today just as the Emperor completed his first inspection trip through bombed-out sections of Tokyo, during which he visited schools, emergency dwellings, and open-air markets and large stores selling the products of reconverted munitions factories.

The resolution charged that the Emperor was "largely responsible for the war, which brought misery to millions of his people," and remanded that the government take steps to prohibit "electioneering" by "the Emperor and all other war criminals," thus putting the monarch directly in the criminal class, in which the Allies have refrained so far from listing him.

The Communists, through they are on record for the eventual elimination of the "Tenno system," or imperial rule, recently have tended to soft-pedal the issue, which probably is the principal impediment to their chances in the general election scheduled for April. Today's attack, therefore, appeared to be a reversion to the Communists' earlier tactics of open demand for the immediate abolition of the monarchy and possibly the trial of the monarch.

The Emperor's trip today was his most extensive so far. He left the Palace at 9 a. m. and made a 6-hour automobile tour of the capital. As in his previous appearances, he was accompanied by only a small escort. He wore a European suit and a gray felt hat, which he raised occasionally to acknowledge applause.

The largest group of Japanese citizens who saw their ruler for the first time probably was in the Ginza department store, where the Emperor saw the products now on sale to the public and inquired about prices and the supplies available.

As he left the store several hundred persons gathered at the doors and set up a shout of "banzai"—greetings, which also was the battle cry of Japanese troops. The Emperor bowed and removed his hat and waved to the crowd as the imperial automobile drove off.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a Christian Science Monitor article dated August 18, 1947, page 3, dealing with the Pacific Institute's meeting on the Japanese Peace Treaty and showing their desire to mold public opinion on the treaty with Japan.

This is a newspaper article.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1371" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1371

[The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Monday, August 18, 1947]

PACIFIC INSTITUTE TO STUDY JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

(By Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor)

NEW YORK.—Controversial issues of the countries around the Pacific Basin, high lighted by discussions of the proposed Japanese peace treaty, mark the agenda of the 10th international conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which will be held at Stratford-on-Avon, England, Sept. 5-20.

The United States delegation, under its Chairman Huntington Gilchrist, expects this meeting of the Institute's history to provide valuable background material for molding public opinion on the treaty with Japan.



Prior to the Stratford-on-Avon meeting, all the national councils and the international secretariat of the Institute will have assembled documents which bear on the issues to be discussed.

All questions revolve around the one central matter of Japan.

The United States group filed material on this country's economic relationship with the new Philippine Republic, its business interests in Asia, and the political and economic problems involved in Micronesia.

Australia is concerned about dependencies and trusteeships in the Pacific and policies which provide for the social and economic reconstruction of the countries in the area.

China's economic problems, its social progress, and its international monetary position appear in the background material.

The future on Indo-China concerns the French.

New Zealanders, like the Australians, are concerned about their economic and defense positions in the Pacific.

The international secretariat submitted studies on China's agricultural problems and the problems of agricultural reconstruction throughout the Far East. Korea's political and economic problems are scheduled for conference debate.

Members from Australia, Canada, China, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States will attend the Stratford-on-Avon meetings. Observers are expected from India, the Netherlands, Korea, and several international organizations. This will be the first conference the Institute has held in Europe.

American universities will be represented by Prof. Donald Tewksbury of Columbia University, Prof. Raymond Kennedy of Yale University, Prof. James H. Shoemaker of the University of Hawaii, and Prof. Owen Lattimore of Johns Hopkins University. Mortimer Graves, Director of the American Council of Learned Societies, also will attend.

Prominent members of the British delegation will be Viscount Astor, Chairman of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee, Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and author of the "Study of History"; Sir Andrew McFadyen, Director of the British North Borneo Chartered Company and Honorary Treasurer of the British Liberal Party; Lieut. Col. D. R. Rees-Williams, Labor Member of Parliament and an expert on Malaya and Burma; Sir John Masson, partner of John Swire and Sons and prominent in British Far East trade, and Lieut. Col. L. J. Barley of the Imperial Chemical Industries.

Leading members of the Canadian delegation will be R. M. Fowler, President of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association; Sidney Scott, Managing Editor of the Vancouver Daily Province; the Honorable Justice J. B. Coyne, Manitoba Court of Appeals, and E. Herbert Norman, Chief of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo.

The leader of the Chinese delegation will be Dr. Chiang Monlin, until recently Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese National Government.

MR. MANDEL. This is a review by Owen Lattimore of Gunther Stein's book, *The Challenge of Red China*, as taken from the New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, October 14, 1945, page 3.

MR. MORRIS. That has already been acknowledged as having been written, has it not, Mr. Mandel?

MR. MANDEL. It has.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.



(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1372" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1372

[Source: New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, October 14, 1945]

THE VITAL COMMUNIST PROBLEM IN CHINA—AN AMICABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE AGREEMENT OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR NATIONAL POLICY

THE CHALLENGE OF RED CHINA. By Gunther Stein \* \* \* 490 pp. \* \* \* New York: Whittlesey House \* \* \* \$3.50.

(Reviewed by OWEN LATTIMORE)

At this time, when it seems clear that the Soviet policy in the Far East is to avoid a head-on collision with America, and when one report follows another that there is to be an amicable and constructive agreement between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists, understanding of the Communist problem in China is of the greatest importance to the formation of our national policy. We need to demand the widest possible presentation of facts, from both official and unofficial sources, and we need to encourage discussion and to clarify issues so that our long-term policy can be formed with the backing of public opinion.

The problem is important because it affects economic interests as much as it affects political attitudes. Can we invest safely and trade profitably in a China in which the Communists continue to be active? Will such a China provide an area in which we can meet the Russians and cooperate with them in the maintenance of security and world-wide organization of a higher standard of living, or will China's Great Wall be taken over by us as our Great Wall to exclude the Russians from the community of democratic peoples?

These problems will not be settled by one agreement in Chungking. The fact is that no one agreement, no matter how cordial or far reaching, will "settle" or "solve" or eliminate the Communist problem in China. That problem has come to stay. It is now part of the Chinese environment and habitat. It is one of the conditions which mold the domestic politics and international relations of China. As a problem, it will change and develop in the years to come, just as every other aspect of China will change and develop. That only means that it is now necessary for Americans to study Chinese Communism from the ground up, if they wish to equip themselves to understand the China of the future.

To the study of this problem, Mr. Stein has made two contributions which deserve the highest praise: he has assembled a great deal of new material, and he has offered his own analysis of the material. The two elements of the book are interwoven but distinct. The analysis is clear in statement and temperate in tone but it need not prevent the reader from making his own evaluation of the facts.

Mr. Stein's book does not have the colorful appeal of those parts of Harrison Forman's recent "Report From Red China" which describes guerrilla territory and guerrilla campaigning; for while Mr. Forman penetrated behind Japanese lines, Mr. Stein settled down to a five-month program of exhaustive interviews and investigation in Yen-an.

He was remarkably well qualified for his work. His previous experience as a journalist included Germany, Russia, and Japan. He had already had several years in Hong Kong and free China. He had established a name for himself as an economic journalist; while other reporters handled economic news from time to time, Mr. Stein had made his way from the beginning as an economic journalist. The worth of his economic knowledge is attested again and again by his evaluation of the economic problems and economic methods of both Yen-an and Chungking.

Mr. Stein clearly prepared himself for the trip with great care, taking it not as an adventure but as a major assignment. In particular, he thoroughly briefed himself on all of Chungking's complaints and suspicions regarding the Communists, and he really "bore down" to get the Communist answers. In addition he made a study of Japanese materials on the Chinese Communists which are of great value and are little known in this country. He must also have tried to think out in advance and to tabulate for the purpose of interviewing people in Yen-an, all the most searching questions that would be asked by ordinary people in America. As a result, he has been able to provide us with the most up-to-date handbook, amazingly complete, of questions about the Chinese Reds, views held



about them by others, theories which they themselves expound, and their own expositions and interpretations of what they do, and why.

So detailed and thorough a book cannot be given a running review which touches on all the high lights. There is room here to discuss only one of the major topics: The absorbing problem of how Communist a body of Communists can remain when preaching and training others to follow, a program that is non-Communist.

Mr. Stein found Chinese Nationalism "a more characteristic trait of Yen-an's ideology than Marxism." He says that the Chinese Communists "feel as grown-up after eighteen years of continuous responsibility for the conduct of armies and administrations, as the Soviet Union does after twenty-eight years. They regard the conditions under which Marxism has to be applied to China as utterly different from those prevailing in Russia. And they consider themselves as little in need of advice from any foreign communist party as Moscow does."

The social composition of their membership "has undergone a deep change, away from radicalism." Of their membership, 93 percent joined after 1937 (so that the Old Guard of the civil war period is heavily outnumbered). The great bulk of the membership "are 'middle peasants' with a pronounced petty-bourgeois, nationalistic background." They joined up "not after having read and agreed with the theories of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung, but in the course of liberating their homes from the Japanese and reforming the social life of their villages."

There would seem to be in this summary both a reassurance that the Communists have gone a long way toward making themselves a party of compromise instead of extremism, and a warning that a renewal of civil war in China would force on progressives and on conservatives a return to the extremism which characterized both sides in the last civil war phase, which in the ten years from 1927 to 1936 so nearly destroyed China and laid her open to foreign conquest.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a statement from the Library of Congress, giving the biography of V. E. Motylev, his name having been mentioned in the hearings.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1373" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT NO. 1373

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,  
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,  
Washington 25, D. C.

Motylev, Vol'f Evnovich, lecturer at the Urals-Siberian Communist University. [Field of Specialization]: political economy, Soviet economics. [Address]: Sverdlovsk, Communist University, Moscow, 5 Serpov Drive, Apt. No. 2. [Born]: 1898 at the locality of Dubrovno, District of Gomel', Mogilev Province. (Partial translation of page 267 of *Nauchnye rabotniki SSSR bez Moskvy i Leningrada—Scientific workers in the USSR except for Moscow and Leningrad*—edited by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Leningrad, 1928).

The following publications by the above author are available in Washington, D. C.:

1. *Tsena i stoimost' v kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve i v khoziaistve SSSR.* (Price and value in the capitalistic economy and in the economy of the USSR). Krasnodar, 1924.

2. *Zarabotnaia plata v kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve i v SSSR.* (Wages in the capitalistic economy and in the USSR). Second edition. Rostov n/D, 1925. This publication includes a "scheme for a course of political economy to be given at communist universities."

Motylev states in the preface to the first edition of *Zarabotnaia plata v kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve* which is reprinted in the second edition that both forementioned pamphlets represent "the transcripts of a portion of the lectures which I delivered in the courses established at the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party for the secretaries of the Party district committees." He further states that he found it impossible to make up-to-date additions to the publication "in view of my departure for England." The preface is dated March, 1924.



3. Problema tempa rasvitiia SSSR. (The problem of the tempo of the development of the USSR). Moscow, 1929.

4. Varianty piatiletki; vreditel'skie teorii i sovetskaia deistvitel'nost. (Versions of the 5 year plan; the wreckers theories and the Soviet reality). Moscow, 1931. This pamphlet was published in the series "Ekonomicheskaiia biblioteka propagandista" (The Economic library for the propagandist).

5. Zarozhdenie i razvitie tikhoookeanskogo uzla protivorechii. (Origins and development of contadictions in the Pacific Ocean). Moscow, 1939. A notice on the cover of the book indicates that this publication "is meant for teachers and students who are active members of the Party."

SERGIUS YAKOBSON, *Senior Specialist.*

NOVEMBER 21, 1951.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is the correction from the Library of Congress of a word which we have been told has been incorrectly translated from the French, and the Library of Congress experts make the correction in that connection.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in connection with Gunther Stein's leaving France, is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1374" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1374

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,  
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,  
Washington 25, D. C.

Memorandum to: Mr. Benjamin Mandel, Internal Security Subcommittee.

From: Elizabeth Hanunian, translator.

Date: November 27, 1951.

In answer to the inquiry from Mr. Mandel as to the exact meaning of the word "arrêté," in the penultimate paragraph on p. 400 of the Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, the sentence in which the word appears is translated as follows:

"He was expelled from France for espionage, by virtue of an order of November 14, 1950, and headed for England."

The word "arrêté" does not mean "arrest"; the French use this for an administrative decision in a broad sense—administrative order. Arrest is translated either by "arrestation" or "arrêt."

Mr. MANDEL. Next is the page numbers in Pacific Affairs and Soviet Russia Today containing writings by Owen Lattimore, with excerpts therefrom.

Mr. MORRIS. He has acknowledged writing those?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And the excerpting was done by you?

Mr. MANDEL. By the staff; yes.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1375" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1375

OWEN LATTIMORE

GREAT SOVIET ATLAS, Moscow, reviewed by Owen Lattimore \* \* \* "a major geographical work infused with the spirit of Marxist historical materialism cannot fail to challenge the interest of geographers all over the world. The tone of the Atlas is set by a letter from Lenin; written in 1921, that is characteristic of Lenin's greatness of mind \* \* \* it is evident that Marxist historical



materialism, as practiced by the scientists of the Soviet Union, is not a crude materialism. The historical method \* \* \* is extended to demonstrate the superiority of Socialism, as practiced in the Soviet Union, with the deliberate purpose of arriving at a future Communism, over the Capitalism of the rest of the world. It is not vulgar 'propaganda,' but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect" (pp. 383-389, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, June 1938).

THE MOSCOW TRIALS defended by Owen Lattimore. He wrote, "Why should Mr. Chamberlin be surprised that no letters, memoranda or minutes of meetings of the conspirators were adduced in evidence? The testimony makes it clear by inference that the work of all the conspirators interlocked so closely with that of loyal citizens that, if they had risked much in writing, they would have been caught much sooner \* \* \* The verbatim records of the trials are entirely credible in the way they describe the descent from grandiose ideas to futile deeds." (pp. 370-372, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, September 1938).

CAN THE SOVIET UNION BE ISOLATED? reviewed by Owen Lattimore. "The only positive evidence on the record is clear: France and Great Britain have not been willing to fight. The Soviet Union has been willing to fight, and has actually fought, in self-defense, but has refused to take the aggressive, even when it looked profitable, as in Siberia \* \* \* France and Great Britain may yet be driven to beg from the Soviet Union the assistance which they refused in the case of Czechoslovakia. For, arguing from the record, there is every probability that Germany, Italy, and Japan will go on grabbing what they can from Great Britain and France rather than rush headlong against the enigmatic menace of the Red Army." (pp. 492-493, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, December 1938).

THE AMERICAN QUARTERLY ON THE SOVIET UNION, Vol. 1, No. 1, reviewed by Owen Lattimore. "The first issue opens with an article by John N. Hazard \* \* \* the article is one more indication that the series of Moscow Trials does not represent the climax of a process of repression, but on the contrary is part of a new advance in the struggle to set free the social and economic potentialities of a whole nation and its people. It is evident that the Quarterly will be indispensable for the formation of intelligent opinion about the Soviet Union." (pp. 404-406, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, September 1938).

COMMENT AND OPINION by Owen Lattimore. Tribute to Walter Duranty: "We need Western journalists who can \* \* \* feel the creative, formative period of Russia as the peoples of the Soviet Union feel it—or as Duranty feels it." (p. 205, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, June 1934).

THIS SOVIET WORLD by Anna Louise Strong, reviewed by Owen Lattimore. "Her book as a whole is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individually and the foreign idea of 'regimentation'." (pp. 611-612, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, December 1936).

LA MONGOLIE by J. Levine, reviewed by Owen Lattimore. "The ruling party is Communist in the character of its thought, but not in its policy; it looks forward, rather, to a future transition to Communism, when the people are ready for it \* \* \*" (p. 479, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, December 1937).

SOLUTION IN ASIA by Owen Lattimore, reviewed by Harriet Moore. "To the people of Asia, he (Lattimore) says: '\* \* \* the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy' \* \* \* It is interesting to note that Trud, the Soviet Trade Union newspaper, has given SOLUTION IN ASIA a long review and has quoted extensively from it." (p. 27, *SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY*, July 1945).

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a typewritten copy of an article from the Communist dated November 1944, dealing with Wallace's trip to the Soviet Union.

It is entitled "The Soviet Union and the Small Nations," by Marcia T. Scott.

Senator O'CONNOR. That will be received in evidence.



(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1376" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1376

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SMALL NATIONS

(By Marcia T. Scott)

(On the occasion of the Twenty-Seventh Anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution)

\* \* \* \* \*

All recent American visitors to the Soviet Union have been especially impressed by the extraordinary progress of all the Soviet minority peoples. Eric Johnston, amazed to find the age of science flourishing in Uzbekistan, was moved to offer a toast in a Tashkent factory to "the tremendous progress made here in the last twenty years under the Soviet system." W. H. Lawrence, New York Times correspondent who traveled with him, wrote in his dispatch of the two Central Asiatic Republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbeistan that "more progress has been made in the years since Soviet rule was firmly established here than in all the other years since Alexander the Great first captured Samarkand in 329 B. C."

Vice President Wallace commented enthusiastically on the new industry and new life and above all the new free people he found in Siberia on his visit last spring. Owen Lattimore, who accompanied him, noted especially the flexibility of the Soviet national policy. In a recent article in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY, Mr. Lattimore made a penetrating analysis of the difference in the status between minority groups in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, where minority rights tend to be largely identified with the right to nonconformity. This, he said, sometimes, led Americans to ask: "What would happen if one of these Soviet minorities were to attempt to set up laws, institutions, and practices conflicting with Marxist doctrines and Soviet orthodoxy?" Mr. Lattimore answers thus:

"\* \* \* This would be the last thing that would occur to their minds, not the first. All of them have a long history of oppression. Since, in all their long history, only the Soviet government ever freed them from discrimination and gave them the opportunity of progress, they identify their own interest with the Soviet interest, and in everything which they do to advance their own particular interest their instinct is also to advance the general Soviet interest, not to encroach upon it, because the general Soviet interest is the primary safeguard of their own particular interest."

FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH SMALL COUNTRIES

The principle that underlies the relations of the family of nations within the Soviet Union also determines her relations with the small countries outside her borders. The application of the principle is of necessity different, because the relations are different. Within, cooperation has assumed its most complete form, because the Soviet Republics have voluntarily subordinated themselves to a central federal government which in turn has assumed great responsibilities in relation to them. But the principle of the right of nations to self-determination—expressed more accurately as the right to independent political existence—is completely operative in Soviet relations to outside states. Thus, the Soviet Union has consistently sought peaceful and friendly relations with other states and a system of collective security, as the only guarantee that nations could be independent.

\* \* \* \* \*

(Source: THE COMMUNIST, November 1944, pp. 968-969.)

Mr. MANDEL. Next is an excerpt which was typed by the committee staff from a book called The Orient Past and Present by Elizabeth Seeger, the book being published jointly by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co. in 1946.

It is a poem which has been copied from the book.

Senator O'CONNOR. That will be received.



(The poem referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1377" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1377

## CHAPTER ON : THE PEOPLE OF SOVIET ASIA

Here is one of their poems which has been translated into English.

"Jenghis Khan crossed the earth with his hordes,  
And he knew one law only : to kill and rob.  
He crossed sands and deserts,  
Forests and steppes, cities and valleys.  
Rivers of blood and tears flowed in his wake.  
Hissing curses followed him.

"Tamerlane crossed the earth long long ago  
And left a bloody trail  
Buried under ashes of burned cities.  
Behind him he left a desert strewn with corpses,  
And before him,  
Whenever he saw light and joy,  
He sowed grief and darkness.

"There was Nicholas, the Czar over Russia,  
Only a short time ago.  
He destroyed and plundered,  
Massacring and enslaving nations.  
His generals were dressed in gold,  
But the whip in their hands  
Was heavy as in the hands of the executioner.

"Then Lenin came,  
He, too, will live in the memory of men,  
But men will remember him in a new way,  
For he brought light to the land Nicholas cast into darkness,  
He replanted orchards made fruitless by the Mongols,  
Rebuilt cities destroyed by Jenghis Khan.

"Jenghis Khan, Tamerlane, and Nicholas were warriors :  
Wherever they saw light they made darkness.  
Wherever they saw orchards they made deserts.  
Wherever they saw life they made death.

"Lenin ! Out of the darkness he brought forth light.  
Out of the deserts he made orchards :  
Out of death, life !  
He was mightier than all the warriors put together,  
For he alone built in eight years  
What they had destroyed in a thousand."

("The Orient Past and Present" by Elizabeth Seger, a Cooperative Project between the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Webster Publishing Co. 1946, pp. 293-294.)

MR. MANDEL. Next is a State Department release dated October 11, 1951, dealing with the discussion of October 6 to 8, 1949, on problems of United States policy in China.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.



(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1378" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 1378

Department of State. For the Press. Caution—future release

OCTOBER 11, 1951

No. 922

*For release at 7:00 p. m., E. S. T., Thursday, October 11, 1951. Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way*

RELEASE OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION HELD IN THE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON OCTOBER 6-8, 1949, ON PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES  
POLICY IN CHINA

At the request of the Senate Internal Security Committee and the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considering the nomination of Ambassador Philip C. Jessup to be a United States delegate to the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly, the Department on October 9 released to the Senate Internal Security Committee and the Subcommittee considering the nomination of Ambassador Philip C. Jessup to be United States delegate to the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations the transcript of the round table discussion held in the State Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, on American policy toward China. In view of the public discussion that has taken place concerning this meeting and the requests for its release, the transcript is being made public.

In the summer of 1949 Secretary Acheson invited Mr. Everett Case, President of Colgate University, and Mr. Raymond Fosdick, former President of the Rockefeller Foundation, to work with Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, in a study of problems confronting the United States throughout Asia.

On August 18 Ambassador Jessup wrote a letter to a considerable number of individuals who had either had extensive personal experience in the Far East or who had made a special study of the area. He invited a written summary of their views on the objectives of United States policy. The list was drawn up in order to elicit as many different points of view as possible. The list included among others former Ambassador William Bullitt, former Under Secretary Castle, former Ambassador Stanley Hornbeck, former Under Secretary Grew, Admiral Harry E. Yarnel, and former President Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins. In addition it was decided to bring together a similar group of people for an informal conference.

In order to make the views expressed at this meeting available to Department officers concerned but unable to attend, a stenographic record was made. A compilation of the principal sections of the discussion was distributed to interested officers of the Department.

The Department's verbatim transcript of Governor Stassen's statements at the conference was sent to him following the meetings and his principal statement in the report contains his editorial changes. Colonel McCann's statements have also been edited. The rest of the transcript is unedited.

The participants were informed at the outset of the meeting that there would be no effort to arrive at a consensus of views. They were also told that the transcript would not be made available to anyone outside the Department, so that there could be the freest possible exchange of ideas without the necessity of careful consideration of phraseology.

In view of the requests from the Senate Subcommittees the Department has recently inquired of the participants concerning their willingness to have the full transcript released to the public. All agreed to the release of the transcript.

In recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Mr. Stassen has declared that:

a. There was a prevailing group at the conference and that there were two leaders in this group, Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger.

b. This group recommended 10 points for American policy in China and in Asia.

c. There was a "prevailing agreement" on the 10 points.

A careful scrutiny of the transcript discloses that Mr. Stassen's statements are factually incorrect. The transcript fails to reveal a "prevailing group" led by Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger—or anyone else. The reading fails to disclose a 10 point policy recommendation upon which there was a "prevailing agreement."

One of the topics of discussion at the round table was the question of recognition or nonrecognition of Communist China. The transcript indicates that a



majority of the round table participants inclined toward eventual recognition—with due attention given to the question of timing—or believed that eventually recognition was inevitable in view of the probability that the Communists would gain complete control of Chinese territory. At no point, however, did the discussions take the shape of anything resembling a policy recommendation. Such was not the purpose of the round table, and nothing of that character resulted.

The record of the United States Government in its refusal to accord recognition to the Communist regime in Peiping from before the Round Table Conference to date is thoroughly documented from official records. These records have been made available to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. These show conclusively that the Department of State has never advocated the recognition of Communist China. Therefore it is beyond challenge that any statements made by Mr. Stassen to the effect that a recognition policy favored by a majority of persons at the Round Table Conference was either favored or followed by the Department of State are not correct.

It is apparent from the transcript that the discussion was arranged for the purpose first of obtaining a full expression of varying points of view and, secondly, of having those various points of view subjected to the scrutiny and comment of persons holding other views. It is apparent from the transcript that those who took part in the discussion were made fully aware of the fact that the group was not being asked to make any recommendations as a group nor even to attempt to arrive at a consensus. The purpose of the meeting was to give to those in the Department who were charged with the responsibility of recommending policy the assurance that they were being given the benefit of a full and free discussion of a given situation by an informed group of citizens who had no official responsibility.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. MANDEL. The name of Joseph Weinberg has come up in connection with one of our exhibits as well as the name of Frank Oppenheimer.

And I offer a newspaper account of the present status of Joseph W. Weinberg and also the testimony of Frank Oppenheimer as photostated from the hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the relevancy of that is that a conference was held by the Institute of Pacific Relations on the general question of the atom bomb, and the two scientists who were asked to be present were Mr. Oppenheimer and Mr. Weinberg.

We have asked General Groves, who held a high position in respect to atomic energy at that time, to comment on the significance of the conference at the time. And Mr. Groves has answered and has presented a letter to the committee.

And I ask you, if you think it appropriate that his comment on that conference go into the record at this time, that that be done.

Senator O'CONNOR. I personally doubt, Mr. Morris, whether it is in line with the others. It is not official. It has not been submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission or anything of that kind.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, no. You see, he is no longer associated with it. But we asked him, in view of what he knew about atomic energy and the nature of the thing being discussed at the conference, and he is qualified in every way, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, except that instead of being here as a witness he is giving it to us as a letter.

Senator O'CONNOR. It is the equivalent of a statement he would make if he were present here as a witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The inadequacy of it, Senator, is that he is not here as a witness; that he has written his opinion.

With that limitation, I wonder if you would allow that to go into the record, strictly for informational purposes.



Senator O'CONOR. I do feel, however, without digesting all of the paragraphs in the letter, that it had to be qualified to that extent, because it is not under oath.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. And if it reflects upon anybody or anything of that kind, I think it has to be understood that it is not the same as if it were testimony from a witness.

But it is introduced purely for informational purposes, and it will be received with that restriction.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1379" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 1379

[From the Washington Star, May 23, 1952, p. 1]

#### PERJURY CHARGED TO ATOM EXPERT IN INDICTMENT—WEINBERG ACCUSED OF FALSELY DENYING COMMUNIST TIES

Joseph W. Weinberg, a scientist who helped develop the atomic bomb, was indicted here today on charges he lied when he denied under oath to a congressional committee that he had been a member of the Communist Party.

Weinberg was long described only as "Scientist X" by the House Un-American Activities Committee during an investigation of atomic spying. He figured prominently in the committee's investigation of spying at the University of California's wartime radiation laboratory at Berkeley.

Conviction would make him liable to 10 years imprisonment on each of three counts.

#### ARRESTED IN MINNEAPOLIS

Weinberg was arrested by the United States marshal in Minneapolis. He expressed surprise when told of the indictment.

He indicated he would seek legal advice immediately preparatory to his scheduled appearance to answer the indictment in Washington June 2. He refused to discuss the charges against him.

Weinberg went to the University of Minnesota in 1947 from the University of California to serve as assistant professor of physics.

He was suspended by President J. L. Morrill on May 16, 1951, on charges he refused to cooperate with the grand jury investigating his testimony before the Un-American Activities Committee.

A month later the Board of Regents voted to relieve him of all duties but to keep him on the payroll for one year to comply with university tenure regulations. That year will expire June 15.

Weinberg appeared before the House committee May 25, 1949.

The committee demanded that Weinberg be indicted for perjury and his case long has been before a grand jury here.

Weinberg appeared before the grand jury and refused to answer certain questions. This led to contempt of court proceedings, but he was acquitted on his plea that he had a constitutional right to refuse answers that might be incriminating.

District Court Judge James R. Kirkland, before whom the indictment was returned, fixed bond at \$10,000.

The indictment charges Weinberg's statement under oath that he had not been a member of the Communist Party was "false."

A second count alleges that Weinberg falsely told the committee that other than one Communist Party meeting in Oakland, Calif., during the war, he did not believe he had attended any meeting which he believed to be Communist.

A third count alleges Weinberg lied when he testified he did not remember having known Steve Nelson prior to April 26, 1949.

#### PARTY ORGANIZER IN WAR

Nelson now is a Communist Party functionary in Western Pennsylvania, but during the war he was party organizer in Alameda County, Calif., where the university is located.

The House committee alleged that Nelson, in that capacity, infiltrated the radiation laboratory with Reds and obtained atomic secrets to be passed along to Russia.



Several scientists of lesser stature who worked in the radiation laboratory also were called before the committee, but refused to answer questions about Communist connections on the ground of possible self-incrimination.

# HEARINGS REGARDING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF RADIATION LABORATORY AND ATOMIC BOMB PROJECT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CALIF.

TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 1949

## EXECUTIVE SESSION <sup>6</sup>

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,

*Washington, D. C.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood, Burr P. Harrison, John McSweeney, Morgan M. Moulder, and Richard M. Nixon.

Staff members present: Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; William A. Wheeler, investigator; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will be in order.

Let the record disclose that Mr. Harrison, Mr. McSweeney, Mr. Moulder, Mr. Nixon, and Mr. Wood are present, a quorum.

Mr. RUSSELL. The first witness is Frank Oppenheimer.

(Thereupon, Dr. Frank Friedman Oppenheimer entered the hearing room, accompanied by his counsel, Mr. Clifford J. Durr.)

Mr. DURR. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would permit Mrs. Oppenheimer to come in with Dr. Oppenheimer at one and the same time? I assure you there will be no attempts at evasion. Some of the incidents you might want to talk about occurred a long time ago, and you might get more accurate information from both of them at the same time than separately.

Mr. WOOD. Will Mrs. Oppenheimer be a witness?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. We will proceed with one at the time.

Mr. DURR. What was your ruling?

Mr. WOOD. We will proceed with one at the time.

Dr. Oppenheimer, will you raise your right hand. You solemnly swear that the testimony you will give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I do.

Mr. WOOD. If it becomes necessary, in the course of the examination, for Dr. Oppenheimer to confer with Mrs. Oppenheimer, we will be very glad to give him that opportunity.

Mr. DURR. Thanks for the "very competent."

Mr. RUSSELL. Dr. Oppenheimer, did you ever meet Steve Nelson at more than one place, or was it the same place all the time?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Two different places.

Mr. RUSSELL. Two different places?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Yes. I met him only twice.

Mr. RUSSELL. Only twice?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. At two different places?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. A different place each time?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Yes; both being social occasions.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did you ever meet him in the home of Dr. Joseph Weinberg?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. No; I did not meet him in the home of Dr. Weinberg.

Mr. RUSSELL. You stated this morning that when you joined the Communist Party you used the name Frank Folsom.

<sup>6</sup> Testimony taken in executive session and released during the public hearing in the afternoon of same day.



Dr. OPPENHEIMER. May I correct that? I did not use the name Frank Folsom. When I joined the Communist Party, for some reason which I did not understand at the time and have never understood since, they requested that my right name and another name be written down. This seemed to me ludicrous. I never used any name but my own, and at the time, because of the fact it seemed so ludicrous, I wrote down the name of a California jail.

Mr. RUSSELL. Who asked you to use the false name?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. A person I do not recall, whose identity I do not recall who took my application.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did you ever pay dues to the Communist Party of the United States?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I certainly did.

Mr. RUSSELL. To whom did you pay dues?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. To the treasurer of the particular branch to which I happened to belong.

Mr. RUSSELL. Do you recall the branch?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. No.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did you receive Communist Party membership cards during 1940 and 1941?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I do not remember whether I did or not.

Mr. RUSSELL. For purposes of the record, the committee's investigation reflects that in 1937, under the name of Frank Folsom, you were issued Communist Party book 56385. In 1938 you were issued Communist Party book 60493. And in 1939 you were the holder of Communist Party book No. 1001.

Mr. WOOD. Can you affirm or deny the correctness of the statement counsel has just made?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I can't possibly identify the numbers, but the fact that I was issued a membership book at that time, I certainly affirm.

Mr. RUSSELL. At the time of your membership in the Communist Party, that is, when you first joined in 1937, were you residing at 1288 Cordova Street in Pasadena, Calif.?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. No.

DELLWOOD ROAD,  
Darien, Conn., May 26, 1952.

Honorable PAT McCARRAN,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: This is in reply to your letter of April 30 in which you enclosed a summary of the round table conference which was held under the joint auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the San Francisco International Center.

The most significant names on the list of participants shown in the photostats you sent me were those of Frank Oppenheimer and Joseph W. Weinberg, and Felix Bloch. Other names that might on investigation prove to be interesting from a scientific standpoint were those of Leo Brewer, Paul H. Kirkpatrick, David L. Webster, and Walton A. Wickett.

As to the Army and Navy officers who were present, I have been unable to determine just who Col. Isaacs was. Admiral Greenslade died several years ago. General Wilbur, who won the Congressional Medal of Honor in Africa, is now retired from the Army. I imagine that General Wilbur and possibly Col. Isaacs attended as representatives of the military command in San Francisco. General Wilbur has done a great deal of public speaking in the last few years and has consistently pointed out the dangers of the advance of creeping socialism in Europe.

As far as I know, Mr. Brewer, Mr. Webster and Mr. Wickett had no connection with the Manhattan District, although they may have participated in the work of the present Atomic Energy Commission. I do not know about Mr. Kirkpatrick.

Mr. Bloch was one of the more experienced physicists who was originally recruited for work at Los Alamos by Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, the scientific head at that point. After his arrival there, a certain amount of friction developed between him and Dr. Oppenheimer. Just what the cause was I cannot remember without reference to records not now in my personal possession. It was not personal, but dealt with the work. I would guess either that it was the organizational set-up (Bloch did not, I believe, consider Oppenheimer to be his superior in experience or ability), or possibly it was because Bloch was not in complete sympathy with the goal which we hoped to achieve. I do not know whether he was influenced in his decision by Dr. E. U. Condon, who was at Los Alamos for



a short period as an associate director under Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer at about that time. At any rate, Mr. Bloch left after a very short stay at Los Alamos.

I rather assume that the files of the Manhattan Project, which were turned over to the Atomic Energy Commission, or perhaps those remaining at Los Alamos, would disclose the reason, although it may have been reported verbally by Dr. Oppenheimer to me. Dr. Oppenheimer should remember, because he was personally involved. I have the recollection that it in no way involved security.

The two significant names are, of course, those of Frank Oppenheimer and Joseph W. Weinberg. As has been brought out in the testimony before and the conclusions of the House Un-American Activities Committee, Weinberg's attitude towards security was not above suspicion. He never enjoyed my confidence or trust after his attitude towards Russia became known.

Frank Oppenheimer, as you know, is a younger brother of J. R. Oppenheimer. You are undoubtedly familiar with his record. I do not recall that we were able, during the war, to discover any proof that Frank Oppenheimer himself was not loyal to the United States. It is possible that the security files of the Manhattan Project, which are no longer under my control, would disclose otherwise. In that event, I would not dispute them. When I say this, it does not mean that we did not keep a rather close eye on Frank Oppenheimer.

The significance of his appearance at such a meeting is that he knew a great deal more about the project than did Weinberg. The latter's information was, as I recall, limited to that of the Berkeley Laboratory plus whatever he may have been told by people violating our security rules. Weinberg did not enjoy our confidence. He did not know everything that went on in Berkeley.

Frank Oppenheimer had been at Berkeley. He had also been at Oak Ridge on the Electro Magnetic plant. He undoubtedly learned through conversation with other scientists, although it was forbidden, a great deal about the gas diffusion plant. He also spent some time at Los Alamos where he would have learned about the actual bomb design and to some extent about the Hanford plutonium project.

As to the meeting itself, it is difficult to guess the difference between what was said and what was reported. The statements of the two scientists at the top of page two were definitely in line with the Communist line that the Soviet Union was superior to the United States and that it would be to our advantage to give away as much of our secret processes and secret knowledge as we could.

In general, the views expressed at the conference appear to follow the general party line. If one eliminated the views attributed to the military personnel, it would not be difficult to imagine that the meeting was being held in a regularly established cell.

The most interesting thing to me was the agenda used by the conference. This must have been prepared in advance. It was slanted in such a way that no other type of discussion could possibly have taken place with such a participating group. I noted that there were a number of subjects on the agenda that were not discussed in the meeting. The tone was undoubtedly set by the agenda and the moderator. I found no indication as to who prepared the agenda and who was the moderator, or who selected him. On the whole it seems to be part and parcel with the general aims of those who would surrender American aims to those of the Soviet.

Sincerely yours,

LESLIE R. GROVES, *Lt. Gen. USA (Ret.)*.

LRG/eru.

Senator O'CONOR. That concludes the list, and the hearing will now be adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., Thursday, May 29, 1952, the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)





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NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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